15 Conn. App. 323 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1988
The defendants appeal from the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff, Paul J. Marsala, Jr., initiated a three count complaint against the defendants, the city of Bridgeport; Thomas
There was evidence adduced at trial, which reasonably supported the following findings and conclusions of the trial court. On January 1,1979, the then mayor of Bridgeport appointed Joseph Savino as building official for the city, for a term of four years ending January 1, 1983. Although Savino’s four year term officially concluded on December 31,1982, he remained in the position of building official until August 6, 1984. On August 6, 1984, mayor Leonard Paoletta appointed the plaintiff as building official for the city for a term of four years ending August 6,1988. On or about March 20,1987, the defendant Bucci terminated the plaintiff without providing notice or an opportunity to be heard, and appointed the defendant Mercaldi to the position of building official. Soon thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants.
Pursuant to an order to show cause, and by stipulation of the parties, a limited hearing was held as to the mandamus and quo warranto counts of the complaint. After this hearing, the trial court found the issues on these counts for the plaintiff, and from the judgment rendered thereon, the defendants appeal.
The defendants claim that the trial court erred (1) in concluding that the plaintiffs term of office commenced from the date of his appointment, and (2) in concluding that the defendant Mercaldi was not holding office under color of title.
The defendants argue that each four year term commences from the date of the first appointment, and a new term commences on the anniversary of that date every four years. In order to support such a view, we would, in effect, have to hold that where a person in office holds over, he depletes that portion of his successor’s term commensurate with his service past his termination date. The successor’s four year term would then be four years, less any time served by the predecessor in office. This interpretation is flawed and lacks any basis in law.
“[I]t is only when the law does not fix the commencement of the term it begins to run from the date of
The statute setting forth the term of the building official is clear and unambiguous. It mandates a four year term “and [such period of time] until his successor qualifies.” (Emphasis added.) The interpretation pressed by the defendants would render the conjunctive “and” meaningless and would allow an appointing authority to “set aside the plainly expressed intention of the legislature.” State ex rel. McCarthy v. Watson, 132 Conn. 518, 536-37, 45 A.2d 716 (1946). “Where the language is plain and unambiguous, as in this case, the intent of the statute is to be determined from its language. Landry v. Personnel Appeal Board, 138 Conn. 445, 447, 86 A.2d 70 [1952]. In such a case, the enactment speaks for itself and there is no occasion to construe it. State ex rel. Cooley v. Kegley, 143 Conn. 679, 683, 124 A.2d 898 [1956]; Wilson v. West Haven, 142 Conn. 646, 654, 116 A.2d 420 [1955]. The words used in expressing the legislative intent are to be given their commonly approved meaning. General Statutes § 1-1; Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 144 Conn. 516, 522, 134 A.2d 351 (1958); Spellacy v. American Life Ins. Assn., 144 Conn. 346, 354, 131 A.2d 834 [1958]. It must also be assumed that the General Assembly had a purpose, for every sentence, clause or phrase in the statute. McAdams v. Barbieri, [143 Conn. 405, 419, 123 A.2d 182 (1956)].” State v. Springer, 149 Conn. 244, 248, 178 A.2d 525 (1962). Furthermore, there is no room for statutory construction where the legislative intent is clear. Brown
The trial court’s conclusion that the legislature’s intent, as expressed in General Statutes § 29-260, was to provide for a four year term plus any holdover time as an extension of that term, is legally and logically sound. It would be inappropriate and difficult to give any other meaning to the word “and” as used in the statute. Certainly, the defendant’s argument that the word “and” diminishes the length of the officeholder’s successor is untenable.
The defendants’ final claim is that the defendant Mercaldi held office legally, under color of title, and could not be ousted from his position in an action of quo warranto.
“An action in the nature of quo warranto may be brought to challenge a person’s legal authority to hold public office. State ex rel. Neal v. Brethauer, 83 Conn. 143, 145-46, 75 A. 705 (1910).” Carletonv. Civil Service Commission, 10 Conn. App. 209, 212, 522 A.2d 825 (1987). “A quo warranto proceeding under the common law lies only to test the defendant’s right to hold office
The trial court’s finding that the defendant Mercaldi’s appointment was void ab initio due to the plaintiff’s unlawful removal from office before his term expired is fully supported by the evidence adduced at trial. The defendant failed to sustain its burden of proof. Cheshire v. McKenney, supra, 257.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The defendants also claim that the court erred in finding that the plaintiff was qualified for, and legally held, the position of building official because (1) the plaintiff never took an oath of office, and (2) the plaintiffs appointed
General Statutes § 52-491, the statutory authorization for quo warranto proceedings, provides: “When any person or corporation usurps the exercise of any office, franchise or jurisdiction, the superior court may proceed, on a complaint in the nature of a quo warranto, to punish such person or corporation for such usurpation, according to the course of the common law and may proceed therein and render judgment according to the course of the common law.”
