On Pеtition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 03A05-0602-CV-56
During their marriage, Steward England and Virginia (England) Snow became guardians of Snow’s grandson from a prior marriage. The parties later divorced, submitting a proрerty settlement agreement, which the trial court incorporated into their dissolution decree.
After the dissolution, England remarried, withdrew as guardian, and sought modification of the decree’s section about payments for the benefit of the grandson. The trial court granted modification, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We conclude that termination of guardianship was not grounds for modifying the dissolution decree.
Facts and Procedural History
Virginia Snow married Steward England in 1978. On April 16, 1990, Snow’s son from a prior marriage fathered J.H. out of wedlock in South Carolina. Snow and England brought J.H. to Indiana to raise him. On August 27, 1990, in the Bartholomew Circuit Court, Snow and England obtained joint guardianshiр over J.H.
Ten years later, Snow filed for dissolution. Snow and England executed a settlement agreement, by which the parties specified a distribution of the marital property, agreed to “joint custody” and stipulаted that England would make payments to Snow for J.H.’s care. A section of the agreement entitled “Child Support” provided:
There shall be no child support per se paid by either party to the other for and on behalf of [J.H.]. [England] shall pay the amount of $300.00 as a clothing allowance two (2) times per year, on or before August 1st of each year and on or before April 1st of each year unless otherwise аgreed between the parties. [England] shall also pay for all school book and related fees connected with [J.H.’s] elementary, middle school and secondary education. [England] will additionally pаy the amount of $50.00 per week to [Snow] for food and miscellane *666 ous expenses associated with [J.H.]. [England] shall also maintain [J.H.] as a dependent on his health insurance and pay all deductible and uninsured expenses.
(Appellant’s App. at 103.) The court incorporated the agreement into its final decree of dissolution on October 19, 2001.
Following the dissolution, J.H. lived primarily with England, and Snow and England proceedеd in accordance with the decree. In 2005, England remarried and subsequently petitioned to resign as guardian of J.H. The court recognized England’s resignation on June 3, 2005.
England simultaneously petitioned to modify the 2001 dissolution decree. He sought to “remove all references requiring him to make any payments to [Snow] for the benefit of [J.H.].” (Appellant’s App. at 113.)
Snow moved to dismiss. The trial court denied this motion and granted England’s petition to modify. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Snow v. England,
No. 03A05-0602-CV-56, slip op. at 7,
Standard of Review
When reviewing a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we accept as truе the facts alleged in the petition. As we said in
Martin v. Shea,
“a complaint is not subject to dismissal under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts.”
Snow advances two legal theories for finding that modification is inappropriate and that her motion to dismiss should be granted. First, she argues that England is in loco parentis to J.H. and that England is thus obligated to pay child support as if he were J.H.’s natural father. Second, she argues that England failed to demonstrate any “changed circumstances” that justify modification of thе dissolution decree under Ind.Code § 31-16-8-1.
I. In Loco Parentis Is Inapposite
Snow strongly urges that the doctrine of
in loco parentis
supports her position.
In loco parentis
means “in the place of a parent.”
Black’s Law Dictionary
803 (8th ed.2004). The doctrine “refers to a person who has put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relation without going through the formalities necessary to legal adoption. It embodies the two ideas of assuming the parental status and discharging the parental duties.”
Niewiadomski v. United States,
Historically,
in loco parentis
has been deployed to protect schools and teachers from liability for restricting and disciplining their pupils.
See, e.g., Indiana State Pers. Bd. v. Jackson,
Courts commonly hold that a person
in loco parentis
has a duty of child support while that relationship exists.
See, e.g., Moyer v. Moyer,
Addressing this question for the first time, we see a number of public policies that militate against imposing a child support obligation on stand-in parents, such as custodians and guardians. First, we note that Indiana policy disfavors entering a support order against adults who are not natural parents.
See Fairrow v. Fairrow,
Second, it makes little sense to require child support from a person in loco paren-tis when that status is temporary in nature and essentially voluntary. The stand-in parent would effectively be able to choose whether or not he or she should be rеquired to pay child support simply by choosing to continue or discontinue the relationship. It also seems unwise to create a layer of financial risk for adults who voluntarily provide financial and emotional support to children not their own. Lastly, it is difficult to imagine imposing parallel obligations on the institutions (like juvenile courts or universities) to which in loco parentis is commonly deployed. Therefore, we hold that when a relаtionship of in loco parentis exists, that status alone is an insufficient basis for imposing a child support obligation on the stand-in parent.
II. Termination of Guardianship Alone Is Not Grounds for Modification
Snow’s contention that the dissolution dеcree and the settlement agreement obligate England to support J.H. is a proposition of greater weight.
The parties disagree about whether the first sentence of the settlement section еntitled “Child Support,” which says there will be “no child support per se,” means that the payments described are child support or not child support. This determination bears on whether the dissolution decree may be modified. There are three possible interpretations of this language, and as we will demonstrate shortly, we think England cannot prevail under any of them.
Our dissolution statute is such that the provision at issue requiring England’s payments for J.H.’s benefit must fall into one of three statutory categories: “(1) the maintenance of either of the parties; (2) the disposition of any property owned by either or both of the parties; [or] (3) the custody and support of the children of the parties.” Ind.Code Ann. § 31-15-2-17(a) (West 2007).
A. Is It Maintenance?
If the provision for England’s payments could be somehow characterized as maintenance for Snow, it could fall into one of fоur categories: incapacity, caregiver, rehabilitation, or voluntary. Indiana courts may order only the first three of these, and only under conditions specified by statute.
Voigt v. Voigt,
For example, a court may order incapacity maintenance if it “finds a spouse to be
*668
physically or mentally incapacitated to the extent that the ability of the incapacitated spouse to support himself or herself is materially affected.” Ind.Code Ann. § 31-15-7-2(1). A court may impose caregiver maintenance if it finds that a spouse lacks sufficient property for the spоuse’s needs and the spouse must forego employment to care for a child with a physical or mental incapacity. Ind.Code Ann. § 31-15-7-2(2). Lastly, a court may order rehabilitative maintenance for no morе than three years if it finds that a spouse needs support while acquiring sufficient education or training to obtain an appropriate job. Ind. Code Ann. § 31-15-7-2(3);
see also Voigt,
A fourth form of maintenance may be incorporated into a dissolution decree, but only when both parties аsk the court to do so (“the parties may agree in writing”).
See Voigt,
B. Is It Custody and Support?
Indiana law permits a custody and support provision in a settlement agreement only for “children of the parties” to the agreement. Ind.Code Ann. § 31-15-2-17(a)(3). This sеction complements the broader declaration that Indiana’s dissolution law governs only “children of both parties to the marriage.” Ind.Code Ann. § 31-9-2-13 (West 2007). This is a term of art that refers only to natural and adoptivе parents.
Russell v. Russell,
C. Is It Property Division?
The final possibility is that the disputed language sets out a property disposition. An agreement for division of property is eсonomic in nature — an ordinary contract.
See Bowman v. Bowman,
In sum, whether the contract provision entitled “Child Support” is characterized as maintenance, child support, or disposition of property, the termination of guardianship has little practical effect. Given the facts and the decree before us, termination of guardianship is not a basis for modifying the dissolution decree.
Conclusion
Because England cannot prevail under any interpretation оf the decree, we re *669 verse the order of modification and direct the trial court to grant Snow’s motion to dismiss.
Notes
. The agreement states in relevant part, "it is the mutual desire of the parties hereto to make a permanent, complete and final ad-judgment of all their property and legal rights of every kind and nature whatsoever.” (Appellant's App. at 102.)