In re Marriage of CHRISTINE NAKAMOTO and DANIEL HSU. CHRISTINE NAKAMOTO, Respondent, v. DANIEL HSU, Appellant; BRION CORPORATION et al., Claimants and Respondents.
G059108
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
May 4, 2022
Super. Ct. No. 11D006853. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
James L. Waltz, Judge.
OPINION
Masson & Fatini, Richard E. Masson and Susan M. Masson for Appellant.
Minyard Morris, Alexander Payne; Garrett C. Dailey for Claimants and Respondents.
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In this appeal, Daniel Hsu (Daniel) asks that we reverse the trial court‘s decision denying him need-based attorney fees under
This is a marriage dissolution proceeding between Daniel and Christine Nakamoto (Christine; together, the spouses). But the dispute at issue is between Daniel and his two siblings, Charleson Hsu (Chau) and Melissa Hsu See (Melissa). After their parents passed away, Daniel claimed Chau was concealing a portion of his inheritance. The siblings met on March 1, 2006, to discuss Daniel‘s claims. They reached an agreement at the meeting, which Daniel documented on a two-page handwritten memorandum (the Handwritten Agreement). Among other things, the Handwritten Agreement stated Daniel was to be paid $4 million. Several months later, the three siblings executed a formal Compromise Agreement for Structured Settlement (Compromise Agreement). The Compromise Agreement contained many of the terms set forth in the Handwritten Agreement but did not mention the $4 million payment.
The spouses claimed Daniel was never paid the $4 million, which would be a community asset, and that it is still owed to him under the Handwritten Agreement. Chau and Melissa asserted the Handwritten Agreement was not a binding contract and that Daniel had already been paid $4 million through a separate transaction outside the Compromise Agreement. Chau, Melissa, and several business entities they own (together, claimants) were involuntarily joined to this dissolution proceeding to settle this dispute. At trial, the primary question facing the lower court was whether the Handwritten Agreement or the Compromise Agreement was the enforceable contract. The court found in favor of claimants, ruling the Compromise Agreement was enforceable while the Handwritten Agreement was not. Daniel sought interlocutory review of this order, but his request was denied.
Meanwhile, over the course of Daniel‘s litigation against claimants, the court awarded him $140,000 in attorney fees under
We affirm the court‘s postjudgment order. The court‘s finding that Daniel overlitigated this case is supported by substantial evidence. As to the denial
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Daniel and Christine married in 2002. Christine filed this marriage dissolution action in 2011. The underlying dispute in this appeal concerns a disagreement between Daniel and his two siblings, Chau and Melissa, over Daniel‘s family inheritance. In short, Daniel believes Chau, Melissa, and several family-owned business entities, including Sun Ten Pharmaceutical, California (Sun Ten) and Brion Corporation owe him $4 million.2 It is undisputed this alleged sum is a community asset per a transmutation agreement Daniel signed the day he wed Christine. Daniel litigated this claim against claimants in the divorce proceeding and lost. While this appeal only concerns the court‘s denial of Daniel‘s request for attorney fees, the underlying conflict is material to the fee issue. Thus, we review the history of this dispute below.3
A. Background
Daniel, Chau, and Melissa are the only children of Dr. Hong-Yen Hsu (Hong-Yen) and Dr. Ruth Lin-Run Hsu (Ruth), who accumulated substantial wealth during their lifetimes. Hong-Yen and Ruth were originally from Taiwan, where they started several businesses, and immigrated to the United States in the 1970s. Hong-Yen passed away in 1991, and Ruth passed away in 1998. Ruth was the executor of Hong-Yen‘s estate after his death, and all three children were co-executors of Ruth‘s estate when she passed. The Final Order of Distribution for Ruth‘s estate was filed in 2000, and the estate‘s final tax return was filed in 2002. Still, the total value of Ruth‘s estate was opaque and appears to be a source of friction. During trial, Daniel estimated her
Around 2005, Daniel became convinced Chau was hiding a portion of their parents’ estate from him. He hired an attorney to assist him in obtaining his portion of these allegedly hidden assets. The three siblings met in Irvine on March 1, 2006, to address Daniel‘s allegations. Though Daniel and Chau had both consulted with attorneys about Daniel‘s claims, no attorneys attended the meeting. Rather, it was informally mediated by a mutual family friend, Herb Shen (Shen). After hours of discussion, the siblings reached a general agreement. It was documented in the Handwritten Agreement, a terse two-page memorandum handwritten by Daniel partially in Chinese and partially in English. All three siblings and Shen (as a witness) signed the Handwritten Agreement on March 1, 2006.
The only portion of the Handwritten Agreement written in Chinese is the first half of first sentence, but the parties agree on its English translation. The remainder is written in English. In its entirety, the Handwritten Agreement states,
“[$4,000,000 paid to Daniel over eight years]4 plus employment agreement until May 2011 annual salary of US $100,000.00. Brion Corporation‘s stock in Aurie, Lin-Ling, Hansdale name transfer back to company. No touch all the corporation and company from this point on including Foundation. [¶] Brion Corporation‘s stock in the name of Aurie, Lin-Ling and Hansdale the buy back amount not to exceed US $100,000.00.”
Aurie, Lin-Ling, and Hansdale are Daniel‘s children from a prior marriage. Brion Corporation is a California Corporation that was previously owned by Hong-Yen and Ruth. Following their deaths, its shares were owned by the Chau, Melissa, and Daniel. Aurie, Lin-Ling, and Hansdale appear to have owned an indirect interest in Brion Corporation shares through their father, Daniel. It appears the “Foundation” referred to in the Handwritten Agreement is the Hong-Yen and Lin-Run Hsu Charitable Foundation (the Foundation), a California nonprofit public benefit corporation.
In the underlying litigation, the parties dispute whether the Handwritten Agreement was meant to be a standalone contract or a memorandum of general points to be later incorporated into a formal written contract. The primary disagreement appears to be whether or not Daniel is still owed the $4 million set forth in the Handwritten Agreement. The conflict arises from the parties’ divergent perspectives of the events that occurred after March 1, 2006.
Under the Compromise Agreement, Daniel agreed to give up all claims to his parents’ estate and to sell his shares in Brion Corporation to Chau for $100,000, eliminating his interest in the company. The Compromise Agreement further required Daniel to resign as director of the Foundation and as a cotrustee of a subtrust of the Hsu Family Trust, and he concurrently executed separate formal resignations. In exchange, Brion Corporation would retain Daniel as a senior manager with a salary of $100,000 per year plus health insurance, and he would be employed until the earlier of his death, incapacity, or his 66th birthday, which was in May 2011. Significantly, though, the Compromise Agreement did not mention the $4 million payment discussed at the March 1, 2006 meeting.5
The same day he signed the Compromise Agreement, Daniel also signed various documents concerning a parcel of real property on Roosevelt Road in Taipei, Taiwan (the Roosevelt Property). Daniel owned the land and co-owned a building on the property with Chau. Initially, Daniel had planned to donate the Roosevelt Property to a local theological college. To facilitate the transfer, Chau and Daniel created a real estate trust in March 2006 naming the college as the beneficiary of the Roosevelt Property. At some point prior to the September 12 meeting, however, the donation became unviable because the college could not afford the transfer tax. After the donation fell through, Melissa and Chau agreed to buy the property from Daniel. The purchase was documented through a property sale agreement, signed on September 12, 2006, in which Chau and Melissa purchased the Roosevelt Property for $4 million (the Chau/Melissa Sale Agreement). Under the Chau/Melissa Sale Agreement, payments would be made over eight years into a Taiwanese bank account owned by Daniel. Daniel also concurrently executed a Cancellation of Trust for the real estate trust previously created to facilitate the donation to the college.
Chau and Melissa subsequently made two payments to Daniel under the Chau/Melissa Sale Agreement in December 2006 and May 2007 totaling $350,000. Sometime in 2007, Shen approached Daniel about Sun Ten purchasing Daniel‘s interest in the Roosevelt Property rather than Chau and Melissa. Sun Ten had been established by Hong-Yen and Ruth in 1946, and Chau was chairman of its board of directors at the time. Daniel and Sun Ten signed a new Property Sale Agreement on June 7, 2007, in which Sun Ten agreed to purchase the Roosevelt Property for $4 million paid over eight years (Sun Ten Sale Agreement). Like the Chau/Melissa Sale Agreement, payments under the Sun Ten Sale Agreement would be paid to a Taiwanese bank account held by Daniel. Daniel, Melissa, and Chau then executed an agreement cancelling the sale of the Roosevelt Property from Daniel to his two siblings. Sun Ten then reimbursed Chau and Melissa for the $350,000 they had paid Daniel.
Chau testified that the parties intended for Sun Ten to assume the obligation of him and Melissa to pay Daniel $4 million. Likewise, the Sun Ten Sale Agreement attached the Compromise Agreement as an exhibit and incorporated its provisions. Specifically, the Sun Ten Sale Agreement, as translated from Chinese to English, stated that
“[i]n case that [Daniel] breaches any of the obligations mentioned in [the Compromise Agreement] during the term of payment by [Sun Ten], [Sun Ten] must cease the payment of the aforesaid price according to notification of the third party [Chau]; [Daniel] agrees that [Sun Ten] shall make liquidation of the compensation to [Chau] within the scope of claim by [Chau] for [Daniel‘s] violation of any of its aforesaid obligations with the unpaid price on behalf of [Daniel].”
B. Trial in the Divorce Proceeding
Christine filed for divorce on July 21, 2011, and later involuntarily joined claimants to the proceeding on grounds they were holding community property. Claimants responded by demanding indemnity from the spouses under a provision in the Compromise Agreement that required Daniel to indemnify claimants for claims made against them relating to the agreement (the indemnity provision). The spouses denied claimants’ indemnity request and argued the Compromise Agreement was invalid.
The spouses’ claims against claimants proceeded to trial, in which the primary dispute was whether the Handwritten Agreement or the Compromise Agreement was enforceable. The spouses alleged claimants owed them $4 million under the Handwritten Agreement. Claimants maintained the Handwritten Agreement was never intended to be a binding contract. Rather, according to them, it was only a summary of the deal points discussed at the March 1, 2006 meeting, and all parties understood that formal contracts would be subsequently drafted and signed by the parties. They also asserted that even if the Handwritten Agreement was found to be a valid contract, it was too vague to enforce.
The court estimated trial would last three days, and none of the parties disputed this estimate. Trial commenced in November 2019. However, it consumed a total of seven trial days and concluded in January 2019. The court issued a detailed 18-page final statement of decision in February 2020 (the statement of decision), in which it ruled the Handwritten Agreement was not a valid contract and, even if it were valid, it would be unenforceable. Instead, the court found the Compromise Agreement was valid, enforceable, and controlling. In the court‘s opinion, “this was not a close judicial call.”
In explaining the basis for its ruling, the court found Chau to be “a more accurate reporter of historical events and found his testimony truthful. On the other hand, the court found Daniel to be less accurate as to historical events, his trial testimony less credible and at times his testimony [was] not truthful.” Further, after the March 1, 2006 meeting, “Daniel‘s correspondence makes very clear that . . . he was anticipating the forthcoming Compromise Agreement . . ., something he (falsely) denied at [the] time of the bifurcated trial. [B]ased on the totality of the correspondence and based on the post [March 1, 2006] conduct by the parties and third parties, and based on the
Daniel requested interlocutory review of the trial court‘s ruling, but this court denied that request. As such, Daniel cannot directly appeal this ruling until final judgment has been entered in the dissolution proceeding. (See In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 756 [Generally, “[u]nder the one final judgment rule, ‘“an appeal may be taken only from the final judgment in an entire action.”’”].)
C. Requests for Attorney Fees
The spouses each requested need-based attorney fees from claimants under
After it became clear trial would go longer than the initial three-day estimate, the court ordered claimants in December 2018 to pay another $10,000 in attorney fees to each spouse. Then, on the final day of trial in January 2019, the spouses again moved for more attorney fees. The court reserved the issue. After trial, it issued tentative rulings finding the Compromise Agreement was enforceable and controlling and the Handwritten Agreement was not. Christine subsequently submitted a request for $293,934.80 in fees incurred plus another $100,000 in prospective fees for appeal, while
The first ruling (the attorney fees ruling) found the spouses had failed to show their respective fee requests were reasonable. It explained the fees previously awarded by the court were sufficient, as they reasonably allowed each party the ability to retain counsel of their choice and to fairly litigate the matter. The court determined the request for incurred fees was also unreasonable because the spouses had overlitigated this case. As to the requests for appellate fees, the court ruled that the spouses had failed to show reasonable grounds for appeal.
In the alternative, the second ruling (the indemnity ruling) held the spouses were barred from seeking attorney fees from claimants under the indemnity provision. The court found “Daniel ha[d] an obligation to defend and indemnify Claimants for all matters embraced by the indemnity provision, which necessarily include[d] all costs incurred and/or related to this action.” Due to the indemnity provision, the spouses could not seek need-based fees against claimants under
In this appeal, Daniel contends the trial court wrongly denied his request for $50,000 in incurred fees and $30,000 in prospective appellate fees. We are unpersuaded.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Section 2030
“The denial of a request for attorney fees pendente lite is appealable because it possesses all the elements of a final judgment on the issue of whether a spouse may be able to obtain such fees.” (Askew v. Askew (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 942, 964, fn. 37; In re Marriage of Weiss (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 106, 119 [“[A] direct appeal lies from a pendente lite attorney fees order where nothing remains for judicial determination except the issue of compliance or noncompliance with its terms”].)
Here, Daniel sought fees under
A court may award fees under
A court‘s denial of attorney fees under
B. Attorney Fees Incurred at Trial
In the attorney fees ruling, the trial court denied Daniel‘s request for an additional $50,000 in fees incurred at trial because Daniel had overlitigated the case. Daniel argues this finding is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
Under the substantial evidence standard, “‘[o]ur review is limited to a determination whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that supports the finding. [Citation.] In so reviewing, all conflicts must be resolved in favor of [the prevailing party] and all legitimate and reasonable inferences must be indulged to uphold the finding.’” (In re Marriage of Brandes (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1472.) “[W]e examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and give that party the benefit of every reasonable inference.” (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1151.) We do “not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses or indulge in inferences contrary to the findings of the trial court. [Citations.] The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not the function of the reviewing court to determine the facts.” (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 589.)
In the attorney fees ruling, the court concluded “the additional four trial days [were] wholly un-necessary. [W]hile Daniel presented many challenges to documents and events, and a lot of trial was allocated to chase down facts and authenticate documents, in the end, Daniel conceded what he at first disputed.” The court also provided several examples of Daniel‘s conduct supporting this conclusion. First, it noted he extended trial by challenging “authentication of foreign language documents, business records and authentication of foreign language ‘signature stamps.’” Second, “Daniel disputed/contested any consideration as and for the Compromise Agreement . . . and many hours were allocated to challenge and refute Daniel‘s claims and testimony, [with] the court later declaring substantial portions of his testimony mis-leading, not credible and even false.” Third, “[w]ithin final arguments and proposed findings, both Daniel and Christine abandon[ed] positions asserted before and during trial, making un-necessary certain trial hours.” The record supports these findings.
As to the first example, many of the documents at issue contained signature stamps, also referred to as “medallions,” that are commonly use in Taipei to sign documents. The medallions of Daniel and Chau contained Chinese characters that corresponded to their Chinese names. Daniel admits that early in the trial, his counsel hesitated to stipulate to the authenticity of documents
The record supports the court‘s finding that claimants were forced to expend trial time authenticating signature stamps on documents based on Daniel‘s refusal to stipulate to their authenticity due to the claimed loss of his medallion. For example, when exhibit 3241 (a trust document relating to the Roosevelt Property) was introduced, claimants asked Chau a series of questions to authenticate Daniel‘s wet signature and signature stamp. They moved to admit the exhibit, but Christine objected on grounds that Daniel had challenged the use of his medallion. Claimants then had to wait until Daniel was on the witness stand to ask him whether exhibit 3241 contained his signature.
Likewise, there are other instances in the record in which claimants were forced to have Chau authenticate various signatures and signature stamps, including Daniel‘s, on different documents introduced at trial. Other than mistakenly believing he had lost his signature stamp, Daniel provides no grounds for failing to stipulate to the authenticity of these documents. And from the portions of the record cited by the parties, it does not appear there were any serious doubts about the authenticity of any of the documents with signature stamps.
Daniel also admits to questioning the accuracy of several translated documents, which necessitated an appearance by the translator at trial. The record also shows several instances in which Daniel objected to the authentication of translated documents on grounds the translator needed to be made “available for cross-examination as to the accuracy of their translation.” But the record reflects the parties stipulated to the translator. Nor does Daniel explain why any disputed translation could not have been resolved prior to its presentation at trial, avoiding the need for the translator to testify. While Daniel generally contends that objecting to a translation is a proper litigation tactic, he does not explain why objection to the authenticity of these translations was warranted or why it was necessary to examine the translator,
As to the court‘s second example, Daniel suggests his consideration argument was legally tenable based on “his belief of the underlying facts, as they occurred.” But the court was not troubled by the legal portion of his argument. Rather, it found the argument factually untenable based on its determination that Daniel‘s testimony was “mis-leading, not credible and even false.” In response, Daniel spends a large portion of his brief arguing the court erred by finding his testimony lacked credibility while believing the testimony of Chau. But he overlooks a key aspect of appellate review. Appellate courts do not determine the facts themselves. (People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 105-106.) An appellate court “‘ha[s] no power to judge of the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence, to consider the credibility of the witnesses, or to resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.’” (Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 518.) “‘Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact.’” (Brown, at pp. 105-106, italics added.) “‘“The trial judge, having heard the evidence, observed the witnesses, their demeanor, attitude, candor or lack of candor, is best qualified to pass upon and determine the factual issues presented by their testimony.”’” (Catherine D. v. Dennis B. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 922, 931.)
As to the court‘s third example, Daniel does not offer anything to show this finding is unsupported by substantial evidence, and, therefore, we presume it is supported by the record. (Universal Home Improvement, Inc. v. Robertson, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 125-126; see Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 400, 409 (Huong Que).)
Daniel‘s opening brief spends little time addressing any of the court‘s factual findings discussed above supporting its conclusion that he overlitigated this case. Instead, he argues it was not his fault the trial lasted seven days instead of three. He asserts it was claimants that engaged in excessive litigation. Specifically, he maintains claimants introduced a variety of tangential documents that were irrelevant to determining whether the Handwritten Agreement or the Compromise Agreement was enforceable. These documents include, among others, the Cancellation of Trust, the Chau/Melissa Sale
This argument is outside our scope of review. When reviewing for substantial evidence, “‘the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the [trial court‘s] determination . . . . If such substantial evidence be found, it is of no consequence that the trial court believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.’” (Jameson v. Five Feet Restaurant, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 138, 143.) It is irrelevant whether the trial court could have found that claimants were responsible for unnecessarily prolonging trial. Instead, we review whether substantial evidence supports the court‘s finding that Daniel engaged in excessive litigation.
Besides, we find no merit to Daniel‘s contention that these documents were irrelevant to the issues at trial. The documents were all executed after the March 1, 2006 meeting, and, significantly, they all relate to various points discussed at that meeting: the return of Daniel‘s Brion Corporation shares, his lack of further involvement with the Foundation and Brion Corporation, and the $4 million promised. As such, they provide evidence that the Handwritten Agreement was not intended to be a binding, final contract between Daniel and his siblings. Rather, it can be inferred from these documents that the Handwritten Agreement was only a memorandum of general points that the parties understood would be followed by formal contracts, namely, these documents. Consequently, Daniel‘s suggestion that these documents were irrelevant at trial is unpersuasive.
In summary, the court‘s findings relating to Daniel‘s overlitigation of this case are supported by substantial evidence, so it was not arbitrary or capricious for the court to deny his request for $50,000 in fees incurred at trial.
C. Appellate Attorney Fees
Litigants to a spousal dissolution may request appellate attorney fees under
In the attorney fees ruling, the court denied Daniel‘s request for $30,000 in appellate fees because he failed to show reasonable grounds for appeal. It explained that “the contents of the Handwritten Agreement . . . fell a mile short of being understandable so to be enforceable. Nor was the Handwritten Agreement . . . intended by the parties as the final agreement (per the credible testimony from Chau, conflicting with the incredible testimony from Daniel) . . ., as evidenced by the parties participating in the subsequent drafting and execution of the Compromise Agreement . . ., followed by a plethora of subsequent agreements intended to execute and fulfill the negotiated expectations and promises of the parties, all the while Daniel [accepted] the negotiated benefits and . . . . did so over many years until the negotiated benefits timed out. In the end the court did not struggle during deliberations . . . .”
Daniel fails to show any error in the court‘s analysis. Instead, he contends that in his future appeal he will show the Handwritten Agreement contains all the elements of a valid contract. He then cites evidence showing (1) the Handwritten Agreement recorded four general points, (2) the parties all testified to the meaning of those four points, (3) the Handwritten Agreement was signed by all three siblings and Shen, (4) the parties all understood the Handwritten Agreement recorded Daniel‘s agreement to be bought out of the Brion Corporation and the Foundation for $4 million and an annual salary of $100,000 until May 2011.
Daniel, however, completely ignores the evidence supporting the trial court‘s findings, particularly, the evidence showing the Handwritten Agreement was not intended to be a binding contract. By doing so, he has failed to
Among other things, Chau testified that he told Daniel on March 1, 2006 that a formal agreement would be prepared. Likewise, Shen testified it was his “understanding that a formal agreement was to be prepared following the March 1st, 2006, meeting[.]” He recounted that at the March 1, 2006 meeting, “each of us agreed that [the Handwritten Agreement] was a memo and the [formal] agreement should be drafted.” Melissa also testified the Handwritten Agreement was a “memorandum” rather than a final agreement. She stated all three siblings understood the Handwritten Agreement would be followed by an official agreement drafted in English by an attorney. She further explained the Handwritten Agreement did not contain all the agreed upon points from the March 1, 2006 meeting. Finally, though the Compromise Agreement was signed in September 2006, it was “effective as of March 1, 2006.” This further indicates it was meant to formally record the three siblings’ agreement at the March 1, 2006 meeting, and the Handwritten Agreement was not.
Moreover, Daniel sent a fax to Sun Ten‘s legal counsel on June 14, 2006, a few months before he signed the Compromise Agreement. In this fax, which was translated from Chinese to English, Daniel requested changes to the salary he negotiated at the March 1, 2006 meeting. Specifically, he states, “[t]he final conclusion is that the agreement reached at the beginning of March will remain the same. The only change was about my salary for the next 5 years.” He then explained how he would like his salary to be paid over the next five years. Within the same fax, he further states that “with regard to the agreement, you mentioned that you would get it ready by mid-July. Could you please tell the attorney to hurry a little? [B]ecause I probably would not be here for the entire month of July. I will be going to Canada. Please make sure to ask the attorney to help out. Even if it would be just an initial draft. [I]t would be ok.” From this fax, it can be inferred that Daniel knew the Handwritten Agreement was not final and was waiting to receive the final agreement as of June 2006. This interpretation is bolstered by the plethora of documents discussed above that Daniel signed months after the March 1, 2006 meeting, which all related to the subject matter discussed at that meeting.
Daniel‘s failure to mention this evidence is telling. The testimony of Chau, Melissa, and Shen shows Daniel knew the Handwritten Agreement was not intended to be a final agreement. Their testimony is supported by Daniel‘s
D. The Indemnity Ruling
As to the indemnity ruling, it only provides an alternative ground for denying the spouses’ request for additional attorney fees under
Since we find no error in the attorney fees ruling, we need not address the propriety of the indemnity ruling. Should the trial court issue any other orders on the indemnity issue outside the context of this attorney fees dispute, our opinion does not preclude any party from appealing them.
DISPOSITION
The court‘s postjudgment order denying Daniel attorney fees is affirmed. Claimants are entitled to their costs on appeal.
MOORE, J.
WE CONCUR:
BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.
ZELON, J.*
*Retired Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.