*1 Marriage re F. of Howard KARON, Petitioner, Appellant, Bennett, Schulte, Robert Bruce J. J. Min- neapolis, appellant. KARON, Respondent.

Frima M. Aaron, Geier, Allen H. Mark R. Minne- No. C2-87-976. apolis, respondent. Supreme Court of Minnesota. Ojala, Minneapolis, Linda M. amicus curi- ae, for American Ass’n of Univ. Women. Jan. Comm, Breen, Director,

Aviva Executive Women, on the Economic Status of St. Paul, O’Gorman, A. Chairperson, Patricia Joint Family amicus curiae Committee Law Assoc., Cottage Section of Minn. State Bar Grove.

YETKA, Justice. ap-

This case is before the court on the peal by petitioner of a decision of the County Court, Hennepin District affirmed appeals, the court of which modified an originally pur- award of maintenance made suant to a any right which the waived fu- ture modification of maintenance. re-We origi- verse court and reinstate the the trial the decree of nal terms of dissolution. Howard Karon Frima and executed stipulation in this dissolution action incorpo- and the trial court June into its rated the terms August decree entered August tunc to pro nunc temporary awarded decree 10-year period. for a nance to Frima well as the stipulation, as decree, that the waived states except provided to maintenance that the court was therein and divested alter the jurisdiction to or main- tenance. February

On referee recom- held, pursuant mended and motion, jurisdiction to that it had Frima’s decree modify the dissolution (Supp.1985). On court affirmed the referee’s March discovery period, After recommendation. *2 accruing payment recommended and the court interest in a deferred the referee plan will plan the and decree be since 1981. The be worth ordered that $625,000 stays approximately if he to the amount of modified increase company the his until that time. nance Frima and made maintenance with temporary. than permanent award rather representative Frima as sales worked a 19, 1987, court the April On the affirmed sportswear. Beginning in the for women’s the in- order. The court made referee’s mid-1960’s, compa- at she worked various to Octo- crease in maintenance retroactive 1984, 1981, $16,924; nies. In she earned 1, 1986, an and ber and amended $13,956; her earned she estimated she and 14, May on decree “negligible” because her income appealed job the issue of whether had eliminated. Conditions been Howard industry finding de- authority precluded her from similar the court had 1985, employment, she appealed cree the amount of and November while Frima bakery part per of attor- time in the amount worked a for $5 modification and 1986, appeals In estate ney The court of hour. Frima took real fees awarded. Karon, began selling real at trial course and estate affirmed the court. Karon money (Minn.App.1988). Realty. Edina She earned dur- Howard N.W.2d In ing year September her appealed this first of work. court. $26,500. she had an IRA valued at and M. F. Frima Karon married Howard 21, 1952. com- In late moved the court for on December Howard Frima award, re- proceeding in modification of the maintenance menced a dissolution $3,500 stipulation questing permanent parties executed maintenance of and the judg- per challenged the court’s 1981. The court entered its month. Howard June August authority modify provi- incor- maintenance ment decree on sion, stipulation. arguing porating the terms of the Both had waived provided any stipu- documents that Howard would alteration maintenance $1,200 pay years that the had itself per Frima month for 6 lation and divested per years the decree. A ref- month for thereafter. alter $600 (Supp. Both eree documents also stated: held Minn.Stat. § 1985) granted it such and ordered maintenance, Except for aforesaid hear motion that would the modification each waives and is forever barred period. discovery on the merits after receiving spousal from district court affirmed this order. another, from one and this whatsoever having any juris- court is divested from completion discovery, After a ref- temporary to award diction whatsoever eree heard the merits of motion to ei- permanent spousal change in circum- ruled that a substantial parties. ther of the occurred, warranting mainte- stances had section nance modification Moreover, states however, determined, The referee 518.64. “hereby mutually release each oth- $1,000 capacity had the to earn Frima rights, er all claims and other obli- per month and thus increased maintenance arising gations during of or the course out $1,500 $3,500 per month rather than the marriage relationship, except of their requested. The referee also made the Stip- specifically set in this forth elsewhere permanent had an award because Frima ulation.” earning Finally, capacity. uncertain future president worked as the vice Howard $1,000 Frima in attor- the referee awarded Phillips sales at Ed & Sons Co. before the ney court affirmed the fees. district January In he became dissolution. order. referee’s gross president senior of sales with a vice $79,337. jurisdictional deci- appealed In he Howard annual income $111,440 In and the decision on the merits. Frima earned taxable income. sion gross and the salary appealed estimated his 1986 at the decision on the merits Howard $126,000. addition, claimed attorney has been decision on fees. She Howard Smith, that the court had abused its discretion (consent awarding (1967) requested judgments amounts. estop- have effect). pel words, Phrased we appeals The court of affirmed trial must decide whether the district court Karon, 417 at This court. properly divested itself of over granted for fur- Howard’s the issue in 1981. We hold that it did. which, arguments like

ther be- review appeals, presented only fore the court of It is not the to the *3 jurisdictional issues. Frima never filed ability a who have divested the court of to relitigate for further review. the issue of maintenance. The authority court had the to accept refuse to parties The have confused and com- stipulation the terms of the part or in issues, pounded numerous but we believe place toto. The trial court stands in and on question before us is the whether one of the behalf the citizens of the state as a third stipulation to a in a dissolu- adult duty to dissolution actions. It has a ap- tion matter made which was protect the interests both and proved by the trial court and which settled all the citizens of the state to ensure that maintenance, issues, including all and stipulation the is fair and to all. reasonable provided further that the ex- approved court did so here and pressly any to maintenance waived incorporated the terms except provided original agree- in the Thus, therein in its decree. the decree is ment, may re-open the now issue of mainte- final absent fraud. nance to seek an increase therein. The recognized trial parties may court allowed reconsideration of We have appeals stipulate issue to waive all maintenance at the affirmed. We reverse. time of the initial decree and that authority courts are without to award it in argues Howard the terms of the the future. McCarthy McCarthy, v. original judgment decree denied the (1972); over the is- Warner, 59, 68-69, 17 219 Minn. Warner agree. sue of maintenance. We lan- (1944); see also Wibbens v. guage purports of the and decree Wibbens, (Minn.App.1985). 379 N.W.2d 225 518.64, jurisdiction. to divest Section how- Likewise, we have held that if maintenance ever, may modify states that the court expired, is awarded and the term has upon petition maintenance award equally court is without award ty. (1984). further maintenance. Eckert v. Ec See decide, therefore, The court must kert, judicata the maintenance issue was res (1974). correctly whether the court modified the under maintenance award section 518.64 We see no valid distinction between the regardless original language. of the order’s two situations outlined above and one respondent now us. Counsel before Initially, legal doctrines at issue need would have us believe that waiver of a .Howard, essence, argues clarification. statutory right precedent. is without One judicata form of res known as quickly fallacy argu- can see the of such an estoppel precludes relitigation direct of the law, probate In example, ment. heirs estoppel maintenance issue. Direct is issue frequently stipulations enter into to distrib- preclusion a second action on the same property or to allow- ute waive (Second) Judgment claim. Restatement Antenuptial agreements ances. have be- issue, 27 comment b The seminal quite past come common in the several therefore, original becomes whether de- law, In decades. criminal we have held cree constituted a final numerous occasions that a defendant can dissolution on the maintenance issue. If rights. waive constitutional so, judicata it should have had the res preventing hearing effect of the court from Much of the material filed on behalf respondent language referring modification motion. See Hentschel v. contains give or take certain items in order have women. the economic status of divorced Setting in reference to reduced or eliminated. arguments made another While important portion stipulation may and should be aside one that status are portions legislature totally warp and the by both the effects of addressed in this case. courts, they applicable are not It be difficult to the document. would why anyone agree tempo- the decision would cut imagine That is so because would upheld— if the were ways rary both maintenance or maintenance it- even could not decrease period agree- the husband if the self for an indefinite obligated pay it for and would Why nance ment could be later nullified. regardless any financial set- years origi- litigate the matter at the time fact, proceedings? some of the a matter of nal dissolution the interest backs. As argument judicial economy, parties should at oral be en- materials submitted to us couraged compromise his situation their differences suggest financial litigate litiga- since this action and not to them. It is already deteriorated have tion of difficult dissolution matters brought. where *4 long-term acrimony much of the and scars Section of Family for the Law Amicus created, litigation. leading are to still more Bar Association stated the Minnesota State argument setting aside the that reasons, at oral of we For all these reverse insulting and de- and decree is original modification of the dissolution de- argued who meaning to women. Counsel trial court cree and remand to the with of the association is a woman. on behalf to enforce the terms of that instructions position response to coun- She took initial dissolution decree. respondent’s implication that women sel for COYNE, (dissenting). understand or Justice in divorce cannot

involved repre- rights protect their even when act to unlikely that not event that a Consider counsel; therefore, the state by sented entering into a identical woman pro- manner it protect them in the must presented shortly to that thereafter suffers parens patriae. in the role of tects children totally disabling illness that threatens to argument compelling. Amicus’s is her available re- quickly exhaust all of that, period, Moreover, during and the same affirmance sources what effect would enjoys into a substantial her former husband have on other contracts majority opinion a decision increase income. The Would such married women? ultimately respondent broadly decrees that the is val- supporting the lead back, outlawing id, of is final and turning the waiver the clock to agreements, powerless also al- that the courts fashion a antenuptial but are only validity remedy. I in a decision of all cannot concur lowing parties to contest the I potential effect and there- entered into on has this and contracts which instruments simply I we fore dissent. am unable recon- married women? Would also behalf of validity conveyanc- majority decision with either the of deeds of cile question the legislative personal clearly stated mandate contained purchases expensive of es and protection in Minn.Stat. 518.64 or the cumulative Where property? would short, women, support- intelligent adult decisional of this end? counsel, represented by ing principle spousal of awards especially when motion, are, subject upon expected honor their contracts must be continuing jurisdiction scrutiny anyone Any other and of else. hold- the same family courts. result law the trial ing would in chaos declining binding respect field and proposition limiting I start with the agreements as well. expressly has conceded that all Howard separate findings of fact and conclusions Normally, stipulations carefully are of compromises property apart issues which affect drawn supported distribution, adequately are personal, real and as well as waiver example, clearly erroneous. record and are not As a may, income. One future result, purposes recently we must assume for As as 1985 we discussed the requi- rationale for the exclusivity this discussion that there exists the of the statu tory warranting parameters definition of the juris site of circumstances spousal family diction matters of Ange modification of the law. In Angelos, los v. 367 N.W.2d 518 award.1 What remains what view 1985), pointing after issue, out that namely, the focal whether the because of preserving our concern finality with may, by agreement, divest the court of its judgments orderly and the administration continuing jurisdiction to entertain a mo- justice denying an order a motion to tion for modification made judgment or vacate a is generally For 518.64. the reasons appealable, we said that different con follow, they I conclude that cannot govern family siderations law: and that the trial court should be affirmed. practice law, however, In the family Admittedly, language original judgments modifications of on the basis decree, par as well as the circumstances gener- are sui stipulation, purports ties’ to divest is and do not fit within the reasons for any jurisdiction modify pro court of respect finality judg- rules with spousal vision for maintenance. The ma appealed ments not days. from within 90 jority accepted has Howard’s contention changes These in circumstances do not and decree should be ordinarily appear days within the 90 fol- effect, given judicata precluding res relit- lowing entry judgment. Moreover, igation or reconsideration of the mainte n domestic nature, relationships, by However, years ago, nance issue.2 in a *5 jurisdiction continue under the of the context, re somewhat different this court virtually throughout court the lives of give judicata fused to res effect to lan parties. Accordingly, legislature the the guage purported in a divorce decree which modification, specifically authorized in jurisdiction the court of divest over circumstances, changed cases of of those Sessions, maintenance. 178 Sessions v. provisions affecting decrees divorce 211, (1929) Minn. 226 212 N.W. visitation, maintenance, custody, sup- (decree deprive jurisdiction did not court of port. 518.18 and Minn.Stat. 518.64 §§ obligor contempt to hold in for failure to (1984). pay alimony). Although there have been at 519. Id. many changes family in inter law over the 518.55, (1986) 1 con- vening years, consistently rec we have provision: tains this ognized jurisdiction marriage that over dis legal In a of dissolution or statutory. is E.g., solution DeLa Rosa v. determine, separation may Rosa, DeLa 309 N.W.2d 757-58 case, one of the issues of the whether or 1981); Kiesow, 270 Minn. Kiesow v. spouse not either is entitled to an award (1965). Since notwithstanding maintenance jurisdiction statutory, dissolution is the cor made, award is then or it reserve ollary of the that the district observation jurisdiction of the issue of maintenance power except delegated court has no for determination at a later date. statute, id., by is the district court 518.64, validly (1986) power provides cannot divest itself of the subd. 1 Minn.Stat. § by delegated statute. for modification of a maintenance award: Although interpose petition she did not a dent who seeks affirmative relief in the event review, grants Frima contends that the mod- this court further review should file a inadequate ified maintenance award is to meet timely petition conditional for further review. requests her needs and this court to increase the While amount the award. this court judicata 2. The form of res known as direct es- involving review any order the merits and take toppel preclusion in results in issue a second appropriate, action it deems the interest of (Sec- the action on same claim. Restatement justice require does not review of the amount of (1982). ond) Judgments 27 comment b view, my respon- the award in this case. a only logical It sup- legislature order for maintenance or seems the After an permanent, money, temporary provisions or crafted the modification of sec- port * * * time, recognition tion may from time to obvious court * * * that, parties, fact that the future is uncertain4 and of either of the upon requisite showing, remedy respecting the order the amount pre- should available to either support money, of maintenance or * * * vent continued enforcement of an award *. payment of it inadequate ex- which has been rendered or long has been established that section It vagaries by parties’ cessive fi- power modify 518.64limits the court’s physical nancial or The omission state. to those cases in which maintenance award statutory authorization to the provided by order or maintenance has been by agreement continuing limit authori- Warner, decree. Warner ty purpose- court must be viewed (1944). is Similarly, willing ful. extent the majority To the is there is neither an well settled that where clairvoyance attribute sufficient award of maintenance nor reservation formulating agreement ties in to over- the decree of the issue of public policy ride the broad embodied the pursu- for later determination statute, I it unacceptable. find ant to section the district court can- similarly unpersuaded by major- am E.g., not thereafter award maintenance. ity's if apparent conclusion that even Eckert, Eckert v. jurisdiction, court has Frima is bound is, however, There express her contractual to relin- nothing either decisional quish right to seek ex- suggests that the law which district provided by parties’ stipu- cess of that may divest itself of the Stein,5 paraphrase lation. To Gertrude legislature has accorded it. To the contract contract is a is a contract contrary, this court has declared that a contract; goes argument. so adopted for maintenance in its decree does limit or final true, course, It is that a deprive discretionary power the court of its damages stip money to a to determine whether circumstanc- gener ulation for settlement and release is *6 es of the warrant revision ally upon expiration final of considered Mark, 446, 450, 248 award. Mark v. Minn. appeal time absent or some for fraud 621, (1957); Ramsay 80 624 v. N.W.2d justify circumstance which would relief 323, 321, 305 Ramsay, Minn. 233 N.W.2d 60.02, to Rule Minn.R.Civ.P. 729, (1975). recently, provision 731 More a Similarly, of disso and decree authorizing expressly precluding a decree stipula lution accordance with limiting any stipulated of or modification property upon tion is final for distribution except concerning support, terms those expiration appeal. Angelos the time of children, custody, 518, or of visitation included 367 Angelos, N.W.2d 520 1985).6 chapter Except in a 1978 bill for amendment of an award of the 518, homestead, occupy was deleted before enactment.3 a division of real 2027, 3.Compare Leg., Sharp, Separation 70th 4. H.F. No. 2d Sess. Fairness Standards and Agreements: 50(f) (1978) (first through A Word engross- Caution on Contractual § third of Freedom, 1399, (1984). 5, 1978, 772, 132 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1407-42 ments) Apr. with Act of ch. 1978 (enacted Minn.Laws 1062 version of H.F. No. Stein, Emily. Sacred 50§ 2027 which does not contain of earlier 2027, engrossments). No. 50§ H.F. was based legislative produc- I that the 1988 session note Marriage statutory §on 306 the Uniform and Divorce ed a that allows a court amendment Act, (1973). legislature provisions judg- U.L.A. 9A 216-17 relieve most rejected attempts ments and decrees if it finds the existence any previous also two to enact require factors that would relief under Leg., 306. See H.F. 70th Sess. § No. 1st 26, 1988, Apr. 1007, 60.02. See Act of Minn.R.Civ.P. ch. (1977); Leg., 20 67th Sess. § S.F. No. 1st 1011-12 § 1988 Minn.Laws (1971). 20§ (codified (1988)). at Minn.Stat. 518.145

507 personal or property (1958); be revoked Tammen v. where the court finds the Tammen, “only modified justify reopen- existence of conditions that (1970); Kaiser, and Kaiser v.

ing under this laws of (1971), (1986). state.” equally applicable are here and adequately define a trial inquiry court’s without inter- Nevertheless, the same statute which fering statutory with its juris- exercise of provides finality for the of a division of diction. property, or not based stipulation, provides

ties’ for modification practical then, effect a trial court respecting of the terms of a decree gives weight considerable to the fact nance, parties’ whether or not based on the rights obligations that the financial stipulation. Minn.Stat. § have been fixed in the decree as have, believe, previously We said all that agreement a result of well be needs to the effect be said about restrained in the exercise of its discretion stipulation: Kaiser, not controlled. Kaiser v. id. at but Although the fact that the court in its And, course, N.W.2d at 683. adopted final decree the [maintenance] agreement tenor of that must con- be. provisions entered into in determining sidered whether circum- by parties pending the action is enti- agree- stances have so weight evidentiary tled to considerable fundamentally ment has become unfair. passing upon application an for [mainte- analysis only This preserves the con- revision, stipulation is, never- nance] tinuing jurisdiction court, of the trial but theless, purely advisory to the court and provides also a forum in which the deprive not limit does it of its discre- are free to assert their views as to the power tionary determining whether a significance agreement. future of circumstances warrants however, majority, sweep- decrees a court-adopted A revision. structure, ing change in this as- given evidentiary weight to be such serting inequitable it is to allow a reluctant, will make the court more than “renege” provision on one of an be, orig- would otherwise accepting while benefit provisions. Stipula- inal [maintenance] provision. time, another At the same how- tions of this kind are deemed to have ever, acknowledge it refuses to been entered into in view of the language finality of waiver and does not upon conferred the statute guarantee against unilateral modification merged judgment, and are and are obligor so an who falls on hard times. controlling far contracts as to be upon saying preclude country the court or as to There is an old that blood subse- quent change, proper case, got turnip: obligor cannot be from a an *7 original final decree. It money pay follows that has no can neither nor who be stipulation cannot their bind pay forced to maintenance. If it is not change the court as to what of circum- fundamentally recognize unfair to that be- change stance justify shall or shall not obligor cause of circumstances the in [maintenance]. longer financially is no able to meet the terms of the without modifica- Mark, Mark v. 248 Minn. 80 N.W. tion, fundamentally it is not unfair to rec- (1957).7 principles 2d 624 These were Hellman, ognize change Hellman v. because marked reiterated 250 422, 426-27, obligee’s Minn. circumstances the financial need 371 Mund, v. (1957); Mund contemplated by original Minn. exceeds that stipu- subsequently changing 7. The statement that when the terms of a the court from and mod- judgment, stipu- ifying judgment, upon application lation are embodied in the of one of Warren, merged parties,” appeared lation becomes and is first in Warren v. not, (1912), subject, Minn. in the absence of a statute on 133 N.W. 1009 preclude "so far of a contractual nature as to 131 N.W. 379 (1957). Really, this is the same ability 2d obligor’s financial judgment or the meaningless. saying stipulation is improved. obligee’s needs has meet the weight only carries when If the waiver majority decision summary, I view subsequent change in circum- there is no accepted departure significant as a stances, it is not needed. supervision spousal judicial of of principles it is unclear if the trial court contrary de- In this case maintenance awards Moreover, evidentiary weight to the gave any the deci- public policy. clared maintenance. spouse’s into waiver of further requires particularized inquiry sion appears treated this case purport- The court to have upon which the the circumstances application for modification specific consid- like or the ed waiver was based maintenance, only if cir- looking to see therefor, pro- little or no of it offers eration changed subsequent to the potential cumstances had spouse one from the tection to stipulation. Having found that circum- Finally, it effec- overbearing by the other. changed, that the husband was stances had tively strips the trial court of time-hon- earning money even more while wife in difficult ored discretion afforded broad less, earning proceeded much was of this nature. matters upwards. modify WAHL, (dissenting). Justice ap- to me need a better It seems we Coyne. in the dissent of Justice join proach stipulations on maintenance.2 unique institutional nature Because of the SIMONETT, (dissenting). Justice are not to marriage, stipulations these contracts; ordinary they are can be treated as I do not think the court divest itself marketplace evaluated it has. Courts do not be with hand, neither are mentality. On the other Coyne’s Justice dissent elab- self-destruct. me, stipulations ignored. to be question point. on this For orates partners separate need to agree, Marriage who can between measure of themselves, agreements with some their to have the make to waive plan they prudently agreed-upon finality so can maintenance.1 get on with their lives. only expressly Frima waive futures and Here not did maintenance, she did so with but me, inquiry, it seems to is to The initial approval of the advice of counsel and the waiver is to determine if the maintenance go on the court. She now wants to back binding.3 fortunes of the How the her word. stipulation after the was ties fluctuated inquiry. to this stipulations made should not be relevant Our attitude on maintenance stip- conscionability of the waiver have said a The test is has been ambivalent. We made, i.e., judged as of the time it was was ulation “is entitled to considerable eviden- and fair? The burden tiary weight”; the same time we have it then reasonable at seeking evade the proof is on the “purely advisory” said it is and does within ignoring it if a The test is to be conducted deprive the court from waiver. marriage circumstances the institutional context future warrants. to be con- Mark, relationship. Among the factors 80 N.W. Mark court, course, waiving mainte does not activate its 3.We assume the fraud, sponte; product sua it must be invoked undue nance influence, not the Thus, party. be time or duress. A (1986), says, from time See, "[T]he e.g., ly attacked for these reasons. * * * time, parties, either Ronnkvist, Ronnkvist v. * * * *8 respecting the order case, 1983). now claims on In this wife * * added.) (Emphasis *.” fraudulently con appeal the husband had negotia at the time of settlement assets cealed Only stipulations on maintenance are involved presented to the trial tions. This claim was Stipulations support proper- on child here. ty and, therefore, is not before us. quite policy different distribution involve already body considerations on which there is of case and law. however, validity judge is to was extent the waiver are: To what sidered given, as of the time it was waiver settle- package interdependent part of an that, subsequent changes of circumstances whether, example, the waiver ment, though unforeseen at the time of the waiv- assets; to what for other trade-off was a er, in were nevertheless assumed the bar- long-term, marriage had been a extent the process as risks inherent in life. gaining degree marriage; spouse’s each traditional also, to what independence; argued by approving the economic It can be incorporating its into account settlement parties took extent decree, terms into the divorce the trial its uncertainties future with unforeseen court found that the maintenance waiver each security; and whether job health fair at the time it was reasonable and by counsel. represented party was actions, stipulated Most divorce made. pro- be to the law should policy matters, however, proved up are as default family by protect- marriage and the mote assuming, especially if both marriage. in inherent ing the commitments counsel, represented by spouses are marriage are relationships outside While appropriate. The court common, marriage becoming more perhaps of trust and may not be aware abuses it de- the norm because very much is still despite represen- exist confidence commitment, in- kind of particular notes of counsel. While the court tation reviews and a sense cluding permanence a sense appears to be reasonableness what spouse for responsibility each stipulation, ordinari- the overall settlement marriage Implicit other’s welfare. expected to make an in- ly it cannot be understanding an commitment has been specific depth inquiry into the reasonable- opportunities of money-making that if the ness of a waiver of maintenance. other, than for the spouse greater are one findings and remand for I would reverse disadvantaged economically spouse, or not is enforce- on whether the waiver marriage break-up, may the event of case, prolonging I dislike this While able. support; the mainte- expect financial some litiga- that there will appears be permanent, temporary or may be nance If footnote 3. event. See tion all, rehabilitative, depending none at nonbinding, there is is found to be waiver longer circumstances. The particular issue, second-step retry need to bread-winning and marriage, the more namely, there has been substan- divided, home-making duties are the more Frima would circumstances. tial by the need for maintenance increase al- likelihood the to the maintenance be entitled disputed. disadvantaged spouse ready out- ordered and not now economically provisions curtailing weighs contractual policy This has been the law’s that need. years. over hand, marriages some are the other On Or, becoming as is more com- quite short. marriage mon, where both there Minnesota, Respondent, STATE the home and spouses have careers outside roughly equivalent measure of have a both independence. such individual economic Jr., FRIBERG, Boyle, Mary Bernard for enforc- justification is more cases there Bernabei, Georgia Springer Paul ing the maintenance waiver. O’Donnell, Petitioners. and Paul cataloguing a list interested in I am not No. C5-87-1703. determining weigh in the rea- of factors to Minnesota. Supreme Court of waiver, nor sonableness Jan. factors; assigning weight to the various the factors here mentioned to be nor are mechanically. The court sits as a applied principle, equity. guiding court of