Marriage of Jensen v. Jensen

rеspondent had to believe invoked law was influence of driving under the while

been explicitly trial court did alcohol. The probable cause. rule the issue issue, deter- remand on this but need not facts demonstrate instead that the mine Although the probable cause. existence of trooper’s testimony that rejected the talk- the odor of alcohol while he detected respondent was ing with when vehicle, trooper’s in his own it credited they detect it testimony that he could while squad Respondent car. were both drinking, trooper he had been admitted blоodshot, watery eyes, and the observed trooper believed there was evidence over the dent’s vehicle had been driven probable body. trooper had cause driving respondent was while intox- believe Eggersgluss icated. v. Commissioner See Safety, Public (Minn.1986); Rude Commissioner of (Minn.Ct. Safety, Public App.1984).

DECISION rescinding The order the revocation respondent’s driver’s license is reversed.

Reversed. Marriage In re the of Jean Louise JEN SEN, Phipps, Jean Louise n/k/a Petitioner, Respondent, JENSEN, Jay Appellant.

Jerome No. CX-88-2081. Appeals Court of of Minnesota.

spondent by with amounts re- she mortgage principal homestead duced the time of the final dissolution hear- from the ing required bear re- sponsibility capital for half the cost of provements made to the homestead re- parties’ spondent after dissolution and appellant’s agreement. Appellant without challenges the trial court’s order an as impermissible of the modification provisions of the af- division decree. We part part. firm in and reverse

FACTS temporary during

A order issued pendency parties’ pro- of the ceedings part: stated Court, Until further Order of this monthly mortgage payments par- on [the marital shall be the sole ties’ homestead] responsibility [appellant] and he shall [respondent] hold harmless thereon. final dissolution on Decem- At the 3, 1984, parties orally stipulated ber the record to all relevant issues. ‍‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‍The de- stipulation drafted from the included cree agreed upon homestead market value of an $89,900,” ap- “approximately an award to equity of the pellant of a lien for half net sale, upon and a of the homestead realized provision was to make all payments mortgage, tax and assessment Upon sale until sale of the homestead.1 Edina, Finney, Finney, L. Fuller & Stuart she was to be respondent. petitioner, which she has credited with amount Lofstrom, Scheide, James C. Smith & principal reduced the balance of the Lofstrom, P.A., Eagan, appellant. mortgage from amount due under the Judgment entry of this the date of Heard, and decided considered and Decree until the time CRIPPEN, P.J., and HUSPENI and upon. sold and closed SCHULTZ,* JJ. stipulated that: also any rights not have [appellant] shall OPINION in the whatsoever homestead] [marital HUSPENI, Judge. Judgment, except of the portion equi- granting post-decree right to receive a The triаl court ty upon sought by respondent, relief credited re- sale. * ever, Acting judge Appeals ap- note that the decree was drafted of the Court of we also Const, pointment pursuant by respondent’s to Minn. art. 2. approved counsel and that any question respondent does not now of these pro- 1. We note that the decree contained certain terms. explicitly visions in addition to those referenced stipulation in the read into the record. How- legal equitable rather than stipulation read into the is a stipulation

While Johnston, hearing, Sandberg the dissolution at the final matter. See record (Minn.Ct.App.1987). not entered until June Divi- decree was delay, respon- property upon of this parties’ the cause marital Whatever sion of making mortgage payments in governed by dent started Minn.Stat. dissolution decree, entry (1984); After December 1984. Minn.Stat. 518.58 see also § $7,280.19 improve respondent expended to (Supp.1987). By statute 518.58 § property by adding, former homestead personal property of real and all divisions things, and a among other a bedroom final, by provided section 518.58 shall be three-quarter bath. may only or modified and be revoked the court finds the existence of where 1988, respondent agreed to sell spring justify reopening judg- conditions that $95,000. requested ap- the house for She of this state. ment under laws for the pellant allow her reimbursement improvements and the money spent 518.64, (1984); 2 Minn.Stat. subd. see § reduced the mort- by amount which she 518.64, (Supp. 2 also Minn.Stat. subd. § refused, appellant gage principal. When 1987). such, As sought relief in respondent and obtained personal property real Divisions of and * * n Appellant the trial court on both issues. marriage ordered in dissolutions challenges granted by all relief may only or modified for be revoked alleges that such relief court and violates fraud or mistake. provisions of Minn.Stat. 518.58 and §§ 667, (Minn. Juelfs, 359 N.W.2d 670 Juelfs regarding finality 518.64 divi- Ct.App.1984). cases. sion dissolution I. ISSUES decree states: allowing 1. Did the trial court’s order sold, [respondent] Until the homestead is respondent reimbursement for amounts pay mortgage obligation shall loan mortgage principal which she reduced the upon the [homestead]. balance December 1984 and June between . sale, [Upon respondent] shall be credited. improperly parties’ property 1985 alter the with the amount which she has reduced settlement? principal balance amount due allowing Did the trial court’s order mortgage under the from the date of the respondent reimbursement entry Judgment and Decree until ments made to the house after dissolution the time that the is sold and improperly parties’ property alter the set- upon. closed tlement? added.) (Emphasis Respondent started making mortgage payments in December ANALYSIS hearing, 1984 after the final six months Generally, entry of the before decree. guided the district by eq- courts are Appellant argues that when the trial principles determining uitable respondent court credited for the amounts rights parties upon liabilities mortgage princi- which she reduced the marriage relationship, dissolution of the pal balance between the final the district court therefore [and] decree, entry of the it violated Minn.Stat. power grant equitable has inherent 518.64, disagree. subd. 2. We § relief particular “as the facts each justice case and the ends of may re- temporary appellant Under the order had quire.” responsibility making mortgage payments, statute: Rosa, DeLa Rosa v. DeLa (Minn.1981)(quoting A temporary Johnston John order shall continue in full ston, 81, 86, 158 280 Minn. force and effect until the earlier of its (1968)). However, vacation, of a amendment or dismissal of the final decree of II. of a main action legal separation. dissolution or disagree with the trial court’s deter- 518.131, (1984); responsibility mination bear see subd. Minn.Stat. § capital improvements for half of the (1986). Minn.Stat. also by respondent to the former homestead. Therefore, obligated to make appellant was entry of the mortgage payments until A trial court he, final decree in June 1985.2 Had change is without a division not commenced done so and personal property of real and after the making payments until June those original decree has been entered and granted not have the trial court could appealing time for therefrom ex- has However, not appellant it did. did relief pired. hearing any payments after the final make Mikkelsen, 520, Mikkelsen v. 286 Minn. Instead, respondent in December 1984. 522, 241, (1970). However, 243 making payments the in December started or clarification of a believing that she would be reim- judgment involves neither an providеd parties’ Decem- bursed amendment challenge of its terms nor a stipulation. properly The trial court ber validity. to its granted respondent’s request reim- Stieler, 312, 319, 244 Minn. Stieler from December 1984. bursement (1955). Therefore, N.W.2d a trial The trial court’s decision is consistent may interpret clarify “ambigu- court or an prior case law. In Peterson v. Lo with judgment.” ous Id. at at N.W.2d beck, 421 367 (Minn.Ct.App.1988), 131. allowing maintained that an offset of wife rules, applying these full effect must [I]n overpayment of main husband’s accidental given necessarily be to that which is against tenance lien interest in the wife’s pliеd in judgment, as well as to that improp marital homestead amounted to an actually expressed therein. property er modification of the settlement 518.64, under Minn.Stat. subd. 2. This Id. at 70 N.W.2d at 131-32. § disagreed and stated: merely interpreted If the trial court or Here, modify does not seek to husband clarified the decree when the court bur- couple’s property or revoke the settle- obligation pay appellant dened ‍‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‍with the to simply attempts pay- ment but to recover costs, capital improvement such ac- half of erroneously ments he made to wife. If, however, proper. tion was was, property court’s action divi- Petersen, 421 N.W.2d at 368. modification, it cannot sion stand because case, respondent’s In the mistak- instant jurisdiction. the court acted without mortgage analogous payments en are to overpayment Mr. Petersen’s accidental A. JURISDICTION respon- maintenance and can credited to be any improper dent without modification of Under Minn.Stat. Mikkelsen, marital property settlement. Credit to a court cannot alter expiration principal

dent for reduction of the mort- after distributions Herе, appeal time. that time has gage balance between December 1984 and the Stieler, may inter produces passed. June 1985 the same result as Under a court ambiguous pret clarify judgment. the decree an would have been obtained had here is not promptly Any entered. other result conclude that the decree been disposition of appellant inequitably ambiguous either as to the would allow dis- regard stipulation capital- proceeds or as to the parties’ the former homestead responsibilities for financial corn- entry parties’ tee on the late of the decree. Appellant argument appellant responsibility. that the for the dent's admits 2. At oral mentioned allegedly submitted to this court does not contain first time a trial court order issued record considering prior to the final dissolution that order. We are foreclosed from subsequent mortgage payments respon- Minn.R.Civ.App.P. See 110.01. it. any rights not have [appellant] shall that with connection assumed mitments in the said whatsoever property. except right Judgment, of this parties could have Unquestionably equity upon portion tо receive to, incorporated into agreed negotiated, specified. hereinafter sale as addressing the provision decree a their capital improvements. very issue appellant provision, by prohibiting This such decrees contain Countless authority regard- any decisionmaking from Here, is silent as to the record provisions. homestead, makes a de fac- ing the former this issue. negotiated whether authority re- grant to of all incorporate such they did not Certainly, validly exer- garding property. She decree, and stipulated into their provision authority when she made cised evidence to allow sufficient without we are improvements and that exercise is capital they meant to do so. the inference by appellant. It cannot be. challenged important to consider what It is as respondent’s challenged then What is stipulation as it in their parties did include appellant to her own inde- to bind was not included. Sev- is to consider what compel payment pendent decisions and then address the former specific provisions eral agreement. his without proceeds of sale property. The homestead given by authority clearly not the Such was fees, “after realtor’s to divided were be stipulated in the decree parties themselves costs, of sale.” The closing and all costs subsequently agreed upon and was not regarding disposition only referred to costs Therefore, parties. and between the relat- proceeds are costs of the homestead’s respondent’s and modification of the decree ing to sale.3 authority may resulting unchecked not now provi- stipulated decree also contains The upon appellant “interpreta- an foisted as be parties’ inten- demonstrate the sions which or “clarification” under tion” Stieler. relationships to sever their financial tion court, effect, gave respon- the to When unnecessary post-dis- attempt and to avoid appellant to re- dent the to bind entanglements. solution decisions, spondent’s post-decree unilateral party pay shall assume and all out- Each property impermissibly it modified a divi- standing individually debts incurred provision. sion * * * the date of * * party agreed *. Each has to indem- B. LAW CASE nify, defend and hold the other absolute- Respondent argues that Hanson v. Han any expense, claim or ly harmless from son, (Minn.Ct.App.1985) liability from, arising whatsoever or in Sullivan, and Sullivan any way outstanding connected to such (Minn.Ct.App.1985) support her assertion debts. merely the trial court’s order was an that capital improvement The debt was one. “implementation” and not modification of individually by respondent. assumed The original judgment. disagree. the provision party decree under which each “absolutely holds the other harmless from Hanson, party each was awarded half any expense” susceptible only one personal property. parties the the When provi- and we do not find this upon implementation could not decide ambiguous “interpreta- sion or in need of court, the division ordered the tion” or “clarification.” all of wife was awarded title to absolute personal property and to was ordered Additionally, importance par- of the pay equivalent husband its value. This post-dissolution independence ties’ financial stating pro- is underscored an additional decree court affirmed that the trial cоurt’s only “changes vision which states: order the form of applicability principle 3. We note also the costs. of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius to these goods homestead, interest from to cash order sale of the and dent’s ordered the fairly implement the decree.” Id. at 233 parties “cooperate to to with each other in * * * added). (emphasis listing property for sale effecting sale of the as prop- The failure in to divide the Hanson practicable.” soon as Id. at 398. The articulated, explicitly af- erty violated an Stromberg deсree also ordered that both obligation required firmative the de- under parties equally responsible “be pay parties’ disputes cree. The caused an repairs such and maintenance may be passe implementation made and execu- necessary.” at 398. parties’ Id. When the unambiguous provision tion of an decree efforts to sell the homestead failed. impossible. required The court to act impasse. to end the Such is not the situa- agent The real estate suggested to the requirement here. There was no tion parties they makе the house more ap- this decree for to make or saleable, by lowering price either pellant pay any capital improvements to making changes some to the home. such, parties As did homestead. Appellant at agreed Id. in Stromberg perform duty not fail to under decree. subsequent improvements that some of the This fundamental difference is critical in by respondent “necessary were distinguishing Hanson. make the more marketable.” Id. also involves an affirmative Sullivan at 401. After Stromberg de- There, duty. original required decree cree, wife, tо whom the court had husband, broker, a real estate sell the possession homestead, awarded April homestead between and June 1985. moved out and posses- husband became the parties agree upon implemen- could not sory party. When returned to unambiguous and tation execution of this problems court for resolution of all the impasse provision and an reached. was had in arisen connection with the Subsequently, the trial court ordered that homestead, court-ordered sale of the re- right husband’s to sell the house would sponsibility capital improvements was terminate 1985 so that wife could presented. but one of several issues Be- Sullivan, agency. list the house with an unique cause of the circumstances of affirming 374 N.W.2d at 518-19. In the including Stromberg, suggestion of im- court, trial court noted: decree, provements to effectuate the the having were difficulties agreement parties’ subsequent as to the agreeing price on the and other terms of necessity improvements of those and the home, that, the sale of the in and nonpossessory spouse becoming posses- differences, minimizing interests of those distinguishable sory spouse, that case is sale, expediting insuring terms important, despite from this one. Most parties, which are fair to both an unin- dissatisfaction with the trial court’s ulti- volved engaged realtor should be to sell decisions, in mate there is no indication the house. Stromberg party challenged that either Thus, Hanson, Id. at 519. as in trial court to, jurisdiction of the court in under- necessary action fairly was order to capital improve- take consideration plement obligations the affirmative place. ments issue in the first Such chal- decree. Here there were no аffirmative lenge is made here and is a meritorious obligations imposed by the decree which one. danger being

were violated or remain- EQUITY C. ing unimplemented. Respondent’s reliance ‍‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‍upon misplaced. Hanson and Sullivan is The dissent observes that the trial

The dissent’s reliance Stromberg findings unchallenged on court’s are and that Stromberg, (Minn.Ct.App. “[ijndeed, equity say, appellant 397 N.W.2d 396 if has its 1986) controlling inappropriate. quarrel as is also cannot trial with the court’s deci- However, Stromberg The decree was issued sion.” the issue before this hearing, required a contested court is not whether the trial court’s find- 518.64, 2 by record,4 of Minn.Stat. or violation ings supported by the § were equitably. reduced crediting respondent acted with the the trial court whether the trial court had resulting issue is whether from mort- mortgage principal The may be at all. While it authority to act the final gage payments she made between equitably in a trial court acted argued that entry of the decree. Where a instance, eq- distilling from that given regarding capi- decree is silent modify license uitable conduct broad homestead, improvements to a marital tal property divisions otherwise unmodifiable jurisdiction to court is without the trial would, produce abundant mischief. “interpret” “implement” that decree to or mistake is clear. Absent statute fraud lienholding spouse compel nonpossessory, property personal of real and divisions “all * * * capital improvements to share the costs of * * be final Minn.Stat. shall possessory spouse. added); (emphasis subd. 2 see part. part Affirmed reversed 667, 670. The Juelfs, Juelfs inequitable prohibit only statute does It of final divisions. modification CRIPPEN, J., dissents. modifications of final prohibits all CRIPPEN, dissenting. reasоn, Judge, For this the trial court divisions. statutorily modifying forbidden Equity the decree. Appellant acknowledges appearance lienholding spouse nonpossessory A proceeds inequity in his claim for sale decisionmaking rights in the only has those improvement paid by traced to home costs specifically as are de former homestead Indeed, say, respondent. equity if has its spouse in the decree. That nominated quarrel cannot with only regard duties should also have those strictly equitable court’s decision. specifical ing the former homestead as are terms, appeal is frivolous and both ly permit denominated in the decree. To mean-spirited. modification of the decree such occurred $7,280.19 Respondent spent hol&ng nonpos- here tantamount ments to the home awarded to her in the sessory spouse’s ran homestead interest proceedings concluded in 1984. December pos- som to the unilateral decisions of the According unchallenged trial court find- spouse. sessory parties If the wished to ings, respondent proved the cost of those stipulate responsibility payment for of improvements and those costs “fair were capital improvement's, they could have done addition, and reasonable.” In the trial They so. did not. The trial court cannot improvements “in- court found that these now, “interpreting,” guise under the of marketability” creased the value and the of “clarifying,” “implementing,” modify home, improvements and that the “ben- the decree in such a manner to make it look they agree. as if did so efited both at the time of sale due marketability to the increased value and of

DECISION property.” ultimately deal we modify undisputed finding: The trial сourt with this trial court did not dissolution decree’s [respon- settlement “That it is fair and reasonable that Appellant, citing parties' stipulated findings, value the 1985 trial court that home had 4. $89,900 $89,900." for the homestead at in 1984 and its sale “approximately respon- a value of As $95,000 later, years challenges for four observes, the trial dent there is no evidence that this $7,280.19 finding capital court’s that the im- of approximation professional was the fruit of a provements actually increased the value and appraisal. Respondent furnished evi- current marketability proрerty. of this projected dence that a realtor in 1985 of $69,000, any apparent n Although home for also without challenging findings, 1. trial court professional appraisal. If the fact issue were appellant “subject observes that it is to debate” raised, dispute we would have no basis to appellant's improvements produc- whether all of findings. current trial court ed an increased market value of the house. He points parties, to a statement of the included in abundantly the cost of evident that will for be be reimbursed dent] homestead.” improvements madе to the unjustly by enriched the decision to unravel handling the trial court’s credible of the case, dem- facts of the Given the settled case. are not findings, we onstrated trial occupant’s mischievi- dealing here with an 3. Precedent charges nonoccupant infliction of to the ous equitable The result chosen Moreover, a de- expenditures. for wasteful precedent. court is not without Where the court does not affirming the trial cision supported finding record a trial court that improvement license ransom for frivolous “improvements added to the overall value by provi- may precluded costs. Waste be and would be reflected in deal with squarely of a decree which sions price,” the final sale this court determined judg- improvement costs. Whether home occupant 1986 that the should not be we commonly topic, address this do ments responsible payment provisions, such how- for full of not know. Absent ever, payment unnecessary for costs is Stromberg ment costs. v. Stromberg, 397 finds, by a court which unlike the avoided (Minn.Ct.App.1986). here, that costs have been incurred case overruled, Stromberg should not ex- be unwisely. pressly оr otherwise. against recovery A hard and fast rule of case, like Stromberg, involved investment, improvement a home absent provements by spouse in the course the lien express license the decree or occupancy period years. for of three holder, litigation. might avoid That is Although agent a real estate had earlier cause, however, imposition of a small urged changes” that “some made to the be and un- result known to be unreasonable home, suggestion there is no in the case fair. specific improvements were recom- Equity’s Place anyone occupant mended or but Equity, may vary like indeed initially improvements decided which would foot, may chancellor’s sometimes fail to add to the value of the home. There are serve the fundamental interests of those differences between the facts here and few by personal affected and domestic welfare Stromberg. importance any fac- Nevertheless, as to the decisions. even completely tual distinction is eliminated finality judgments, jurisdic- trial court findings in the trial court’s this case that equitable,” tion in a dissolution case “is respondent’s improvements increased the may the trial court award relief “as the marketability and the of the home- value particular facts in each case and the ends stead such that reimbursement may justice require.” Johnston v. John dent’s costs was both fair reasonable. ston, 81, 86, 158 249, 280 Minn. N.W.2d 254 (1968)(court upon petition powers Stromberg, to vacate In in addition to our decision decree). a divorce recognized have on other occasions trial we altering property deci- jurisdiction court ‍‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‍for This of the trial court is an “fairly implement” provisions of sions to power grant equitable “inherent relief.” Hanson, v. 379 an earlier decree. Hanson Rosa, 755, DeLa Rosa v. DeLa 309 N.W.2d (Minn.Ct.App.1985); N.W.2d see (Minn.1981). addition, however, un Sullivan, 374 N.W.2d 517 jurisdiction reopen for also Sullivan v. der statute on ing judgment modify language (Minn.Ct.App.1985). a on a In Hanson and Sulli- division, the law of the case is van, to deal the decree of the court failed Johnston, wholly shaped by equity. See affecting change with a of circumstances 254; 280 Minn. at at Minn. N.W.2d completing the mechanics (1988). Stat. jurisdic- recognized there the award. We post-decree provision for which took tiоn equity guid- Articulable considerations of changed circumstances without account for ed the trial court in this case. The same compel altering considerations us the interests of the deter- to affirm. It is asks that Respondent mined in the decree. VILLARS, individually Gay here. do the same Pamela

we persons behalf of all and on parame- within Finally, this case is situated, Appellant, similarly interpret- of routine task ters of more a decree. See ambiguous provisions ing 312, 319-20, 70 Stieler, 244 Minn.

Stieler PROVO, Adminis District Court M. Jack (“full (1955) effect 127, 131-32 al., etc., County, trator, Hennepin et necessarily that which given to must be Folstad, Hennepin Treasurer of Dale as to as well implied judgment, in the County, for Bat Minnesota Coalition therein”). The trial actually expressed curiae, Women, Respon tered amicus pro- clarify a decree rightfully could dents. a future home contemplating vision No. CX-88-2016. payment of called the decree where other ref- contained no Minnesota. Appeals sale” “costs of but Court improvement ex- maintenance erence to investments, espe- estate penses.2 Real homes, investments are not static

ciаlly neglected by the owner with- can be recovery of value. The out severe loss of profes- other than includes costs sale value expenses. Stromberg, sional fees and See sharing (requiring at 401 the decree re- improvement costs where “repairs and mainte- ferred to costs of nance”). of limits on a statement Absent occupant’s freedom to make

ments, for valuable reimbursement fair provements constitutes a and conditions of a decree of the terms contemplating equal equity division for costs of sale.

reimbursements rejeсting appel- I concur our decision mortgage pay- plea profit lant’s respondent made after the ments 1984. Because our reversal ‍‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‍December improvement con- respondent’s costs equity notions of flicts with fundamental law, respectfully I dissent on that is- sue. decree, only by Paragraph implica- 17 of the decree states that incurred after the it is party each claims ties incurred after the first If this is to hold the other unambiguous harmless tion and it is not an declaration arising “outstanding” par- debts improvement costs incurred before on home hearing. temporary proceeds were divided. provision germane obligations at all to

Case Details

Case Name: Marriage of Jensen v. Jensen

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Minnesota

Date Published: May 23, 1989

Citation: 440 N.W.2d 152

Docket Number: CX-88-2081

Court Abbreviation: Minn. Ct. App.