*1 paid have and insurer here not in fact $25,000 weekly com-
threshold amount
pensation qualify which would for the them third-party
offset because the settlement they
resulted in reimbursement of what had
actually paid prior to its and in execution extinguished
the credit which in effect their
obligation compensation pay in the fu-
ture ordinary until its exhaustion.
understanding, reimbursement they apply
credit which would to become “weekly
entitled to the are offset com-
pensation” they paid. which We dis- legisla-
cern no intention 176.101,
ture language in the of section
subd. to include the reim- amounts so $25,-
bursed and in the credited threshold compensation
000 of “weekly paid,” . . .
in our provision view to so construe this contrary
would be both to the remedial usually given
construction the Workers’
Compensation pur- apparent Act and to the 176.101,
pose grant of section subd.
offset employer to an and insurer who have
actually paid employee compen- weekly $25,000. totaling
sation
Employee is awarded attorneys fees of
$400.
Affirmed. Marriage
In re the of Pedro DeLa
ROSA, petitioner, Appellant, ROSA, Respondent.
Elena DeLa
No. 50737.
Supreme Court Minnesota.
Aug. *2 McCormick, University
Robert L. Student Service, Minneapolis, Legal William Mau- pins, Bloomington, appellant.
Hoke, Roehrdanz, Bigelow, Chamberlain Chamberlain, & Goldsmith and Paul W. Minneapolis, respondent.
AMDAHL, Justice. marriage proceeding,
In this dissolution petitioner, Rosa, appeals Pedro DeLa a awarding from district court order resti- Rosa, respondent tution to the Elena DeLa support peti- for financial during his education. We remand entry this case court trial judgment opinion. with consistent this parties
The case in this werе married July time, California on 1972. At that college degree had a peti- beginning undergraduate tioner was his ed- parties understanding ucation. The had an would work and petitioner undergrad- while he obtained his degrees. uate and medical began pre-medical Petitioner his studies in the California fall of 1972.1 Between petitioner pursued 1973 and while a Degree, respondent time, B.S. worked full holding positions successive as an elementa- schoolteacher, ry youth employment di- rector and an admissiоns director. moved to this state so that tioner could attend medical school at University Respondent of Minnesota. job obtained a full-time staff writer newspaper, position with a local she cur- rently holds. parties separated in November of Respondent paid the rent and utili-
ties for that month. Petitioner filed for following year dissolution his second medical school and the case was tried July completed 1979 after he had his third year. He degree obtained his medical June 1980. argues appli-
1. Petitioner
law
California
argument
cable to this case. We find that
unpersuasive.
nance
separation,
to their
was
under
Prior
Minn.Stat.
518.552
§
income,
Otis,
primary
source of financial
thus
(Minn.1980).3
Otis v.
limited
Melamed,
716,
providing
remedy
favor of
working
v.
286 N.W.2d
717
to the
lamed
guided
courts are
(Minn.1979), the district
such a situation and the district
equitable principles
determining
equitable authority
courts have the
pro-
rights
parties upon
vide that
and liabilities of
relief.6
marriage relationship.
dissolution
Englund
Englund,
227,
286
v.
Minn.
Christenson,
507,
281 Minn.
v.
Christenson
(1970),
recognized
175 N.W.2d
we
461
162 N.W.2d
The dis
right
in a
of one
divorce action to
inherent
court therefore has
trict
joint
recover
expended
monies
ex-
grant equitable
“as the facts in each
relief
penses
original expectation
if there was an
justice may
ends of
particular case and the
repayment.
Id. at
175 N.W.2d at
Johnston,
requirе.”
v.
See Johnston
McGough McGough,
463. See
311 Minn.
*4
81, 86,
249,
(1968).
Minn.
158 N.W.2d
254
381, 384,
885,
(1977).
249 N.W.2d
888
Al-
though the
is
sup-
evidence
insufficient
to
presents
The case at bar
the com
case,
port
finding
such a
in the instant
spouse
mon situation where one
has fore
expectation
had a reasonablе
enjoyment
the
gone
immediate
of earned
that she would be rewarded for her efforts
pursue
to
other
income
enable the
to
by
higher
living
a
standard
when
education on
full-time basis.
advanced
began practicing
medicine. We find
Typically, this
is
sаcrifice made with the
that the trial court
not abuse
did
its discre-
expectation
enjoy
that
the
will
equitable
tion in making an
award to re-
higher
standard of
in the future.
spondent
for the
pro-
she
working
the
the
spouse
Because
income of
petitiоner during
vided to
schooling
his
living expenses,
used for
usually
is
there is
light of the facts and circumstances of this
property
little accumulated marital
to be
ease.
prior
divided when the dissolution occurs
to
Respondent
the attainment
urges
of the
rewards
this court to hold that
degree
concomitant with the advanced
or
or
earning
education
increased
Furthermore,
professional
capacity
property
license.
the
is marital
within the
working spouse
meaning
entitled
(1980),
is not
to mainte
518.58
§
Minn.Stat.
thus
(1980)
nance under
entitling
§
Minn.Stat.
518.552
her
present
as
to a division of the
has
ability
there
been a demonstrated
value of
that
In
asset.7
decisions which
jurisdictions
disagree.
6. Courts
in other
g.
have
these courts
considered
e.
Compare,
Lynn,
working
the issue of a
entitlement
to
with
spouse’s
supra,
Mahoney,
supra.
relief
incident
to a dissolution where
that
recognize
Courts that have refused to
a prop
marriage during
spouse
the
the stu
supported
erty interest
of this
cases
have done
type
so
jurisdictions
dеnt
spouse’s
education.
grounds
degree
on the
that an advanced
or
working
which have
to
allowed a
the
recovery
education
attributes,
lacks traditional
property
rulings
divergent
have
spouse
based their
Graham v. Graham,
er this addressed issue and that the trial TODD, Justice (concurring part, dis- guidelines court did not have the benefit of senting part). determining proper award. I concur in portiоn majority It is this Court’s view that opinion which equitable affirms the award should have been limited to the mo of the trial court permit recovery in a *5 expended by respondent petition nies proceeding by divorce a former living expenses any er’s аnd contributions support. educational petitioner’s made toward direct educational However, affirming since we are eq- résult, costs. To achieve this we subtract uitable of the trial court in such respondent’s earnings from her own procеedings, I do not believe it is necessary expenses. imputing This has the effect of granted to cast the relief in a mathematical living expenses one-half of the and all the formula. Under all the facts and circum- expenses spouse. educational to the student record, stances of this I would affirm the respondent’s formula subtracts from $29,669 award of to Elena DeLa Rosa. couple’s living contributions one-half of the expenses, that being amount the contribu
tions of the two which were not costs;
used for direct educational
working spouse’s financial contributions joint living expenses and educational
costs of student
less
n (working spouse’s financial contribu- plus spouse’s
tions student 8 financial con- education)
tributions less cost of cpurt 8. The financial contributions of the student 10. Because the trial did not account earnings any includes by respondent student the income earned which was loans, grants, stipends or other funds оbtained utilized for her own and did not con- spouse. petitioner’s expenses sider educational or his grants loans, higher student it arrived at a $41,000 (respondent’s contributions) figure. - [$41,000 (respondent’s financial contribu- V2 tions) $2,300 (petitioner’s earnings) + + may periodic 11. Thе trial court either devise a $9,031 (petitioner’s benefits) veterans’ + payment plan payment lump or order a sum $5,680 (petitioner’s grant) medical school + after due consideration of - $10,000 (petitioner’s loans) student situation. (petitioner’s undergraduate tuition and medical = $11,400. costs)] school
