91 Ky. 88 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1891
belivered the opinion oe the court.
William Babb died testate in August, 1889. His will was probated, and Ms executor, E. R. Moore, wlio is styled “administrator” in the will, qualified in the proper court in the State of Massachusetts, where the testator resided at th'e time of his death. This action was brought to compel the specific execution of a contract of sale made by the executor of a lot of about three and a half acres of land in Jefferson county, Kentucky, the will having been first proven and admitted to record in the proper court of that county as a valid one in this State of both real and personal property.
The demurrer to the petition by the appellant, A. H. Marrett, who was the purchaser, having been overruled, and he declining to plead further, a judgment was rendered enforcing the contract. It is now contended, first, that the executor had no power under the will to make the sale, and this is the principal question; second, that if he had, yet he has no power to sue, because, so far as the record shows, he has never qualified as executor in this State.
The will provides : “Should I die before I am able to sell out my property and settle my debts, I do appoint my good, kind brother-in-law, E. F. Moore, as my administrator, * * and would also ask my dear friend, Mr. Henry Farnum, to assist him in seeing my place all he can. * * * I wish my Oakland farm and land opposite sold with such personal
The petition shows that the Oakland place, which is in Massachusetts, has been sold, and that after exhausting all the property, other than that in contest, the estate is still largely in debt.
Upon the death of the owner his real estate at once passes to his heirs or devisees in the absence of testamentary counter-direction from him. The personal representative, whether he be administrator or executor, has no inherent authority over or title to it by virtue of his appointment merely. In case he be executor, such power or right does not exist, unless it be conferred by the will. To enable him to sell it, the power must either be expressly given or arise by implication. If the avails are to pass through his hands in the execution of his office, as for the payment of debts or legacies, then the power to sell will be implied. If the will directs a sale, but does not name the donee of the power, and the proceeds must, either by its provisions or by the rules of law, be distributed by the executor, then he, by necessary implication, is invested with the power of sale, unless some other
In this instance the will discloses a controlling purpose upon the part of the testator to constitute the land in contest, as well as all his other property, a trust fund for the payment of his debts. This was evidently the purpose uppermost in his mind. The will even sets forth minutely his indebtedness, which was considerable, and there can be no doubt, from all of its provisions, that he intended to confer upon his
The property is to be considered as of that species into which it is directed to be converted, and the fund thus to arise passes through the executor’s hands by virtue of his office. An executor has the power to sell the land of the testator where the testator directs the sale, and a distribution of the proceeds among certain persons, although the will does not say by whom the sale is to be made. Such a disposition is regarded as a bequest of a fund distributable to the legatees by the executor, and he, therefore, by implication, takes the power to sell and convert the real estate into money without a decree of court. If the testator directs the sale for certain purposes, and the proceeds are, either by the terms of the will or the provisions of law, distributable by the executor, the power of sale vests in him by implication.- (Rankin v. Rankin, 36 Ill., 293; same case, 87 Am. Dec., 205.)
In our opinion the executor clearly had the power in this instance to make the sale. There is, however, nothing in this record showing that he has ever qualified as executor in this State, or taken the steps required by our statute to enable him to even sue for debt. The petition does not so aver, nor is it so shown in any way. He appears only as a foreign executor. As such he has no. power to sue here. His existence is not recognized. Section 43, article 2, chapter 39, of our General Statutes provides: “By giving bond, with surety resident of the county in which the action is brought, non-resident executors or administrators of persons who, at the time of their death, were non-residents of the Commonwealth, may prosecute actions for the recovery of debts due to such decedents.”
Thus we see that a non-resident executor can not even sue to collect a debt of the testator, unless he first complies with this statutory provision, the conditions upon which he is allowed to do so being, as the law as originally enacted plainly shows, intended
Upon this ground the judgment is reversed, with directions to sustain the demurrer to the petition, and for further proper proceedings.