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Marras v. State
741 S.W.2d 395
Tex. Crim. App.
1987
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*1 rеasons, ney, agree v. 154 Tex.Cr.R. we must See Ellison obvious appeal attorney (1950). with on that the State’s Demouchette by State, “When the was cross-examined (Tex.Cr.App.1986), witness regarding charges the defense that this also that it was not error to Court held against Call], him he been filed similar, give very although [Me refuse to a explain the reasons there- entitled detailed, more as the one re- instruction fore on redirect examination ... The trial in quested by appellant this cause. court its discretion in allow- did not abuse Cuevas, supra, rejecting in This Court complained of examination no ... contention that the re- defendant’s is shown ...” reversible error quested instruction that he claimed should Appellant’s point of eleventh error is given, also held: “The trial have been overruled. charge 'distinctly court's forth the set[s] compliance applicable the case’ law attorneys Appellant’s appeal, 36.14, with Art. The trial court Y.A.C.C.P. error,

their of assert that twelfth refusing give appellant’s did not err overruling appel “The erred in trial court requested charge.” an request lant’s additional verdict parties.” again form of on the issue We point of er- Appellant’s and final twelfth disagree counsel. ror is overruled. reflects that re- record Having each of carefully reviewed given jury separ- quest that error, points finding of that none lant’s ate form to cover “law verdict error, court’s contain reversible the trial stage of the parties” guilt trial was sentence of judgment of conviction and judge. Appellant’s the trial denied are death affirmed. complaint punishment does not concern stage of his trial. Cuevas v. 1987), (Tex.Cr.App. Court held that the refusal the trial give special

court to instruction on the punishment stage of parties

law at the trial, wording light “In of the one, application

issue number of the parties law of to the facts of case at MARRAS, Appellant, Marlyn Edward guilt phase, argument and the coun- regarding sel for appellant and the State evidence, no law and the actual harm Texas, Appellee. The STATE of Accordingly, accrued to we hold 69141. No. error, refusing any, requested (Page Texas, error.” instruction was harmless Appeals of of Criminal Court Slip Opinion.) of the En Banc. instance, In this was instructed 28, 1987. Oct. trial, alia, guilt stage

at the inter capital it could convict or as murder if it found that he acted alone party. jury’s verdict reflects “guilty found capital

offense murder.” 37.07, V.A.C.C.P., provides that

Article every criminal action must be

the verdict

general, has held where and this Court charg- contains but one count indictment case, offense,

ing single as in the instant general “guilty” is sufficient. verdict *3 testified prosecution events

witness; the trial court’s refusal to voluntary manslaughter; trial permit court's refusal to to submit testimony additional from cross- response note; examination in to a jury note; trial court’s failure to answer a sufficiency jury’s finding affirmative is- two; and, finally, sue number the effective- ness pun- counsel at the *4 phase appel- ishment of the trial. Since argues lant that the evidence is insufficient findings ‍‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‍guilt to both and future dangerousness, a detailed review of the facts necessary.

During guilt/innocence phase of the trial, Larry Flading testified that at about 1982, p.m. 4, September 10:00 on he and his Morrow, Seymour (Court-appointed Janet appellant brother met the and another man Houston, appeal only), appellant. on parking Blueberry in the outside the lot Holmes, Jr., Atty., John B. Dist. and J. nightclub, Hill located at the corner of Hudson, Atty., Harvey Asst. Dist. Hous- Westpark men and Gessner. The four left ton, Huttash, Atty., Austin, State’s Robert car, Flading parking lot in a with the for the State. seat, riding in the brothers back seat, and the other passenger lant in the they park- driving. man after left Soon lot, companion ing appellant his told OPINION to return later to rob some- that he wanted company CAMPBELL, Judge. parted with one. The brothers companion his at 10:30 appellant and conviction Appeal is taken from a parking lot. p.m., miles from the about five V.T.C.A., capital murder. Penal Code victim, Reed, and 19.03(a)(2). p.m., 11:30 appellant The was convicted About § Weaster, Joseph left the companiоn, intentionally causing the death of David his nightclub. Both men were committing Blueberry Hill L. Reed in the course of and The doorman at the aggra- extremely intoxicated. attempting to commit the offense of fight and between Weaster robbery. finding appellant After club observed vated the sidewalk outside the appellant on guilty, returned affirmative find- yelled at appellant The Weaster ings Article club. issues under names, called hit 37.071, not like to be was as- he did V.A.C.C.P. Punishment face, and knocked him in the pun- Weaster twice sessed at death. We will reform the lay on the ground. As Weaster life and affirm. ishment to appellant him in the ground, kicked points er- appellant raises twelve At boots. head with his western sufficiency challenges: He ror. Reed, coming to the aid point, apparently finding support the evidence to friend, in the air and kicked “jumped his place during the commission offense took adrenaline-type yell.” Reed made an and robbery; the trial court’s aggravated of an ap- up stand and helped then Weaster quash the indict- denial of his motion to up fight. trying to break peared to be ment; ju- prospective of one the exclusion Baum, thereafter, who Shortly Barbara exclude ror; refusal the trial court’s nearby, saw walking along a sidewalk into was potential juror; the admission another car in the approach their of Reed and Weaster videotaped re-enactment of a parking appellant stepped lot. off the him to officers. The tified Reed, gun and sidewalk hurried toward who arrested there with the in his still standing the driver’s side of the hand. on words; exchanged Reed car. two punishment phase trial, At the of the hands; point- then the raised Larry Flading “meeting” testified that his gun at chest fired one ed a Reed’s appellant, he had which described shot. guilt/innocence phase in veiled terms at the back, trial, front in fact jumped Reed ran around the had occurred side, Flad- passenger yelled, aggravated robbery car to the course of brother, John, enough.” Baum heard and his “I have also man, say, got.” is all another someone “That I have Clifford Zataraus. moments, a few Reed fell to the After p.m. Septem- approximately At 10:00 Weaster, pavement. who was then on Flading ber brothers drove car, pock- passenger side of the turned his Gessner, parking Westpark lot driver, passing inside out. A cab John ets Rockers, intending go night- another Bernardoni, attention whose was drawn Blueberry Hill club in the same area as the scene he heard when saw flash and car, *5 Larry parked his club. As Clifford gunfire, fall knees. the saw Weaster to his appellant began walking and Zataraus the appeared give his Weaster to items from parking across the lot toward them. The pockets appellant begged to the the and appellant the side headed toward driver’s not appellant to hurt him. the car while Zataraus went toward the appellant Flading got and toward side. As out passenger The turned walked John said, car, nearby apartment building. Zataraus “This is a rob- the corner a At briefly bery. There he with man in the seat of the car.” met another Get back time, appellant put a small they together and walked the same the before turned warned, apartment began Larry’s and “You complex. pistol into the Baum to head Larry get in following through the men corri- him.” He instructed two the heard keys. him apartment building. give dors of the the seat and to the car She back Deputy and joined County Sheriff’s The moved into the back seat Harris brothers appellant keys to auto- working nightclub had been at another handed the the the who nearby shooting Baum when the occurred. mobile. deputy informed the that a had been man the appellant The then walked around to

shot, pointed appellant and she out the as passenger side of the car while Zataraus time, perpetrator. the At the same the the enter- moved into driver’s seat. After he appellant deрuty, saw Baum and the and side, passenger’s ing the car on the companion began to run. Baum and Flading gun at appellant pointed the men, deputy but and chased two said, going “This is to be a and brothers pursuit during appellant and his mur- to make it a robbery. We don’t want split deputy companion up. Baum and the safely they were out der.” Once up, split Baum continued to chase then lot, Zata- appellant turned to parking appellant in- appellant. ran When said, pretty “That worked out raus and enclosure, building Baum side a darkened do it go back and good. We’ll have enter, chose not to and she returned Gessner, the they As drove down again.” shooting. scene of the Flading Larry John and appellant ordered money. As the two out all of their to take police officers arrived When Houston pockets, John scene, began emptying their she men informed them that Baum out his wal- nearby cards slipped several credit appellant had chased the into in his officers, attempted he to conceal them let. As complex. Two accom- apartment boot, men in front watched the two Baum, John retraced the panied that him, they not notice hoping would walk- searching pavement path, them. keeping cards from the credit appellant lying be- he was ways. Baum saw mirror rear view looked into the iden- Zataraus in a flower hind some shrubs bed peaceable, looking being law-abiding appellant, “He’s tation and shouted to the officer, Man, looking police He’s A third Houston he’s at me. citizen. at me. Runnels, appellant Sergeant im- identify me.” The testified he had trying to Flad- appellant years, hit both of the for nine off mediately turned and known Larry on, appellant jail While sat custody. in the face. when the was in brothers mouth, urged Zataraus bleeding appellant given pass from the He said kill go ahead and both appellant jail during the time he work men. awaiting Although trial in this case. jail’s policy generally excluded that status handed over their the two brothers As murder, charged capital for inmates angry appellant money, the became exception for the had been made twenty they have more than about did appellant lant. Runnels said the had had them, Larry told “That’s all each. dollars barber, using straight job as an inmate got.” we’ve Zata- got. That’s all we’ve shaves, give given and had in fact razor to appellant, you “I said to the bet raus then him a shave. He stated he had never seen up money you with more he will come appellant fight jail. appellant friend’s head off.” blow his shouted, to Zataraus and then turned three, I’ll do what I tell me what to do. “Dоn’t the evidence is insufficient asserts that angry so became want.” killing occurred prove that he a moment that appeared it committing aggravated rob- course of might Zataraus. shoot argues that bery of Reed. on circumstantial the State relied they had taken Apparently satisfied that robbery, and that evi- establish the brothers, money they could from the all the inference oth- supports reasonable *6 dence stopped the car Zataraus and Specifically, appellant’s guilt. er than the complex. apartment of an a dark corner to it is reasonable appellant argues that and, car, appellant jumped out of the his motive for infer from the evidence the Flad- motioning gun, ordered with the anger, rage or from shooting Reed arose Larry and ing get out. John brothers to fight, rather course of a in the resentment their hands raised got of the car with out aggravated rob- commit than a desire to away. began slowly back When and to van, bery. parked John they close to drew pulled him behind grabbed Larry and sufficiency of reviewing the When complex, apartment into the They van. ran in ei support a conviction to the evidence sum- a resident who eventually found and evidence circumstantial a direct or ther police. moned evidenсe case, must review this Court robbery unadjudicated In addition to the jury’s favorable light in the most Flading kidnapping of the aggravated and any rational whether and consider verdict ap- that the brothers, the State established essential found the have of fact could trier of convicted previously pellant had been a reason beyond offense elements offenses, cases including three felony nine Virginia, 443 v. doubt. See Jackson able mari- possession of forgery, two cases 2781, L.Ed.2d 560 307, 61 99 S.Ct. U.S. assault, robbery juana, two cases S.W.2d 80 717 (1979); Duhamel building with escape, burglary of a and (Tex.Cr.App.1986). Given robbery and aggravated intent to commit hour before an approximately statement offenses, kidnapping. For these going to return shooting he was Department of to the Texas lant sent killing v/as occurred lot where parking four times. Corrections robbery, aggravated an to commit order of the rob by one uttered phrase and the extraneous Apart from the evidence got,” heard I have victims, is all “That bery convictions, follow- prior offenses and shooting, we contemporaneously punish- at ing was adduced sup overwhelmingly the evidence find that officers police Two Houston phase. ment killing theory that the State’s repu- ports bad appellant had a testified

401 place eleven, appel point took in the course of commission In error robbery. lant contends that the trial court erred in aggravated of an Point sustaining challenge the State’s for cause three is overruled. venireperson Eugene Lowell Williams error, his tenth Wither such was violation of because deny- the trial erred in contends that court Illinois, 510, spoon v. U.S. S.Ct. supplemental quash the motion to (1968); Adams v. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 indictment, which asserted that the indict- 38, Texas, 2521, U.S. S.Ct. 65 L.Ed. proper by alleging him ment denied notice (1980); 35.16(b)(3), 2d 581 Article V.A. non-existent) offense, wit, (and a lesser disagree We with this C.C.P. contention. attempt in the course of murder Wainwright Witt, 412, 105 469 U.S. attempted theft. commit 844, (1985), 83 L.Ed.2d 841 S.Ct. United reasons because proper Supreme States Court held that the aggravated robbery offense of allows a potential juror excusal of test conduct conviction for that occurs juror’s capital punish views on whether theft, attempt to commit a conviction “prevent substantially or im ment would attempted category for an offense is one pair performance of his duties as attempted, lower than the offense and the juror in accordance with his instructions reads “while indictment in the course Witt, his oath.” at 469 U.S. attempting committing to commit the at 851-52. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d added), aggravated robbery” (emphasis 35.16(b)(3), provides supra, Article capital then a murder could сonviction may any po- challenge for cause the State upon be obtained under indictment prejudice juror who “has a tential bias proof of- of a non-existent lesser included upon against any phase of the law which fense, wit, attempt attempted commit rely is entitled to for conviction or State theft. punishment.” person capital A commits the offense of carefully examine entire We “intentionally murder if he commits the venireperson voir dire examination of committing murder in course of or at- in order to determine whether he Williams burglary, tempting kidnapping, to commit excluded, improperly giving deference *7 assault, robbery, aggravated sexual or ar- position judge who in a to to the trial V.T.C.A., 19.03(a)(2). son.” Penal Code § juror. McCoy v. hear the see and alleged The indictment that the (Tex.Cr.App.1986). unlawfully did there “then and while testimony Following excerpts are committing attempting course to of Williams: the voir dire examination from aggravated robbery of David L. commit the with Q: Assume PROSECUTOR] [BY Reed, in- styled Complainant, hereafter hypothetical situation me in a Com- tentionally cause the death of the you have that only evidence would shooting Complainant plainant by [punishment] would be trial phase of gun....” you And capital murder. of a evidence your mind as capital those faсts in upheld has can make This Court capital mur- gruesome to and horrible identical murder indictments which were of. you can conceive mo der as face of a indictment instant State, Landry quash. tion could be a you to See feel like there Do (Tex.Cr.App.1985), would be 107-08 like that that situation indict consider Generally, you an could cases cited therein. most horrible facts only evidence penal tracking language ment that this was the question, in this to to consider question legally you sufficient statute in ques- this answer you be able to provide defendant with notice would to future Beck v. [special issue two charged 682 S.W. tion offense. no based yes or dangerousness] either (Tex.Cr.App.1985). Appellant’s 2d you heard? evidence that on the tenth overruled. you A: I do not feel that one act alone can follow the law and if the State give enough you beyond to indi- would me convinces a reasonable probability person’s cate future doubt that those of a answers should be yes, you conduct. could then in fact answer Q: $ So, my question n [*] [*] you n ! would be [*] A: Yes. them yes? Could you do that? this: ‍‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‍In every case that you heard, capi- [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] case, murder where there was noth- tal Q: Let’s take the Mr. situation that except consider you available for gave you. kidnaps Hansen A man itself; is, the facts of the offense school kids and tаkes them out and phase guilt heard the you have puts goes away them in a bus and person guilty. And trial and found $5,000,000; Mayor; calls the send me going you all the evidence are that’s $5,000,000. Mayor brutally sends He questions, have to answer these anyway. dissects them and kills them every you each and case would have to capital Those are ex- That’s murder. Question no as to No. 2? vote examples. treme A: I would have to vote no. you My question you is: could answering Question yes2 sjc sjc consider No. n n n : sfc you or no in the most extreme facts Q: trying I am to find out from What could think of? you just is if there is evidence of one Well, certainly I can answer A: transaction, you found that is the one just snap- this one question based on murder, you guilty capital him could Mr. Han- And what I have told shot. yes you if believe question answer probably I answer sen is that would on a reasonable doubt that evidence question no. yes? Or is that it should be answered answering yes Q: you it Could consider way prove I it just there no could ever strong enough? if the facts were only thing one trans- you if the capital regardless of A: No. action of murder how horrible it is? Q: Ever? Hansen, say you would Mr. I would No, picture

A: I that one A: do not believe uphill very, very hard battle to gives adequate be in a person’s life of a you have is the one judgment convince me all person make a for а basis question yes. offense to answer call on that.... [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] When asked again by the court, Williams heart, my “in again responded [I] my rephrase your question me A: Let question.” to that *8 to answer no would have like I am you if feel own words and see pro- counsel attempt by final defense One understanding of getting proper solely making a “just response, duced question. your that conduct on the criminal decision based you provide if me You want to know time, no, at that is involved before single of a snapshot picture a definitely, no.” most or in life whether event an individual’s judgment as to he could repeatedly not I can then make a said that Williams or dis- issue probability of either similar second yes not answer least, but, capi a snapshots upon similar evidence of solely based then, fu- occurring in the Clearly, nature Williams criminal tal offense. I cannot upon I do that. which against ture. And cannot the law biased snapshot 35.- single Article predict upon rely. a See based entitled State was State, v. see also Hawkins matter what 16(b)(3), supra; individual no of an Mun 65, (Tex.Cr.App.1983; picture is of. 82 660 S.W.2d (Tex.Cr . State, 792, 795 iz v. And the Q: DEFENSE COUNSEL] [BY Furthermore, his beliefs would App.1978). or not is whether in a nutshell question 403 substantially impaired perform- difficulty hearing attorney have that when juror as in accordance spoke, ance of his duties him if he and could not hear at all with his instructions and his oath. See attorney spoke looking while down Adams, Witt, supra; supra. The trial reading. juror while stated that on the sustaining court did not err in the State’s day sitting he first when had been at the venireperson challenge for cause back of the courtroom he had missed some Appellant’s point of er- Williams. eleventh panel. However, of what said to the ror overruled. is case, Dean diffi- the instant evinced no culty hearing questions put to him twelve, during simply dire. He informed the voir alleges that the trial court its dis- abused spoke quietly court that if someone too he refusing challenge his for cause cretion difficulty hearing him. venireperson physical Lee would have V. Dean for 35.16(a)(4), incapacity under Article V.A.C. responsi The trial court has the provision challenge C.P.1 This allows a for bility determining qualifications for cause either the state or the defense if prospective juror challenge when juror organs “has such defect in the Villarreal v. made. S.W.2d feeling hearing, bodily or such or mental 35.21, (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Article V.A.C. him for defect or disease to render unfit certainly C.P. It was within the court’s Id. jury service....” challenge discretion to overrule the examination, During voir dire Dean was hearing problem in cause based on a any asked if there was reason that would Chappell instance. See 519 S.W. рrevent sitting juror him from as a (Tex.Cr.App.1975). 2d 453 answered, “Nothing He than case. other got unless I sick.” Dean informed the trial possibility As for that Dean veteran, court that he disabled during proceedings, ill could become lung partially stopped up, he had one testimony, the likelihood based on all the lung collapse he had had one any appeared to about the same as prone he was to colds because he had had Certainly juror becoming other ill. Dean tuberculosis, caught cold it when he concerned; simply greatly he stat was not very require hospital- could be serious and ed that he wanted to let court know ization, years got and that some he sick might happen. ques advance that it When years get and some he did not sick. Dean court, that he tioned the trial Dean said also informed the trial court that he had jury. that he could sit on the was satisfied difficulty hearing some did not someone of the situations in quite This is the reverse speak up they spoke or if in low tones. He State, (Tex. Hernandez v. hearing tested stated that he had had his State, Villarreal Cr.App.1982) and past year and was told within ju (Tex.Cr.App.1978), where the problem doctor that his was not serious. ability to about their expressed rors doubt him, you The trial court asked “Are satis- jury. Under the facts on the serve jury and not be you fied could sit on this case, trial court did not abuse instant subject illness as troubled to the same overruling its discretion everybody subject to?” Dean an- else venireperson Dean. challenge for cause swered, “Yes.” The trial court overruled point of error is over Appellant’s twelfth *9 challenge based the for cause ruled. problems. on health fourth, fifth, points of In his and sixth State, v. Woolls appellant The relies on error, appellant complains that the ad- the (Tex.Cr.App.1983), which the videotape an abuse of Woolls, mission of a In distinguishable. find we (1) it was discretion because trial court’s during dire prospective juror voir admitted (2) duplication; preju- its not an accurate hearing he had not that due to his defect value; outweighed probative its attorneys, dicial effect the name of one heard 35.16(a)(5), V.A.C.C.P. codified in Article 1. Now

404 State, (3) in Lopez v. testimony reasoning

and it bolstered the of 651 S.W.2d witness, Baum. (Tex.App.—Fort 1983), State’s Barbara pub- 413 Worth a opinion lished which was later withdrawn. complained videotape of The Lopez, appeals of court held that by herein this Court and has been reviewed staged, “any re-enacted criminal acts or video, i.e., portion, only no audio contains involving beings defensive issues human pictures just pictures. motion Motion are a impossible duplicate every are to minute рhotographs and the collection of rules sur and are inherently danger- detail therefore rounding admission are the same as those ous, little impact offer in substance and the photographs. Housewright v. for still is too highly prejudicial re-enactments to State, 101, 225 154 Tex.Cr.R. insure the State or the defendant a fair (1949). pictures Motion are admissible sound, We reasoning trial.” find this but authenticated, they properly when are rele to instant inapplicable case. The video- issue, vant an and not violative tape merely in this instance was a series of admissibility rules of pictures appellant by of the route taken State, photographs. Lopez v. 630 S.W.2d shooting and Barbara Baum after the (Tex.Cr.App.1982). a de When verbal videotape depict The does any Reed. admissible, scription photo scene of a is a staged, re-enacted criminal acts. graph recording of or video the scene v. would also be admissible. Wilkerson appellant argues The next that the State, 542, (Tex.Cr.App. 726 S.W.2d videotape prejudicial out effect State, 1986); see Burdine 719 S.W.2d disagree. probative value. weighed its We The trial (Tex.Cr.App.1986). tape accompanying testimony and admitting vid judge has broad discretion attempted clarify the loca will recordings eo and his action not be Baum in relatiоn to the events she tion of discre disturbed absent abuse “If a about. verbal witnessed testified Burdine, 719 S.W.2d at 316. tion. See portrayed is ad description the material appellant videotape, which the de- missible, reflecting photograph then scribes a “re-enactment of the events as also admissible.” testimony verbal Baum,” partial re- testified to shows Wilkerson 726 S.W.2d by Baum of the route taken enactment reasoning (Tex.Cr.App.1986). This the loud conversation when she overheard videotape. applicable to a See equally Reed, between the observed pro Housewright, supra. We find appellant from shooting and followed videotape was not out value of this bative part portrayed A man the scene. by its effect. weighed prejudicial that he appellant to the extent retraced path after taken appellant complains Finally, following him illus- Baum shooting, with not have been videotape should distance between them trate the the unim- it bolstered because admitted pointing Baum tape also time. The shows Barbara Baum. This peached testimony of flower bed where Court in was addressed contention hiding. found (Tex.Cr.App. Roy v. played for the while tape to be merit. 1980), was found without questions and used Baum answered “[ajppellant’s explained that the Roy, we on pointer path she followed to show is a witness anytime there position, that explained night question. dis- She transaction, all thereafter who testifies crepancies area as shown between the bolstering, evidence constitutes additional tape night, such appeared as it of all the introduction would act exclude bushes lighting, and the different evidence, even when tangible and scientific bed. flower This con predicate has been laid. proper *10 in case law.” finds tention no argues appellant first The videotape This 649. “duplication.” Roy, 608 S.W.2d at an videotape is not accurate aid, photograph like merely a visual to follow the asks this Court appellant The

405 diagram or a on a ordinary blackboard. It did not son of temper, sufficient to render bolstering testimony. incapable constitute of Baum’s the mind of cool reflection.” V.T.C.A., 19.04(c). Penal Code § reasons, For these we find that the appellant The contends the rais- evidence trial court did not abuse its in discretion passion es issue of sudden because he admitting videotape. Points of error fight prior and Reed had been in a to the four, five, and six are overruled. shooting. evidence, The as recited earlier number two the opinion, in this appellant revealed that the lant asserts as revеrsible error the trial yelling was overheard at Weaster. He charge court’s failure to submit a on volun- punched twice, Weaster face knock- tary manslaughter. The appellant con- down, began him then kicking him in tends passion that the issue of sudden the head. by Reed jumping intervened in by and, therefore, raised the evidence air kicking and the appellant let- while voluntary manslaughter charge should ting out an “adrenaline-type yell.” Reed have been submitted. why then asked Weaster he called the began talking. names. The three If any evidence from source raises later, A short time the appellant and Reed the issue of a lesser included offense or talking loudly. were observed Reed then theory, it in defensive must be included raised his hands and the appellant shot him charge. State, Marquez court’s v. in the chest. The robbed Weast- 217, (Tex.Cr.App.1987). S.W.2d As this er, begging who was on knees his not to be State, court said Moore v. 574 S.W.2d hurt. Then the turned and 122, (Tex.Cr.App.1978): casually away, appearing “totally walked credibility The of evidence and whether ‍‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‍it unconcerned.” is controverted or conflicts other only may by evidence in the evidence of actions case not be con- Reed prior shooting ap- determining kicking sidered were whether defen- pellant up fight charge breaking and sive between or instruction on a lesser appellant. Weaster conversa- given. included offense should be When appellant just tion between Reed and the any evidence from source raises a defen- prior shooting is not revealed or sive issue raises an issue that a lesser record. included offense may have been commit- ted ... issue must be submitted (Tex. State, Ojeda v. jury. duty, It is then the jury’s Cr.App.1986), the evidence revealed that instructions, proper under the to deter- girlfriend his the defendant and had been mine whether the evidence is credible deceased, by the after which the struck supports the defense lesser fight. defendant involved became included offense. showing There was no direct evidence acting under defendant was sudden voluntary A manslaugh on passion, at nor as his frame of mind only ter given should be when there time of incident. Whether the defend the defendant acted under defending ant was cool and collected passion the “immediate influence of sudden seeing enraged being himself or at hit arising adequate Marquez from cause.” girlfriend hit not shown State, 725 223-24. sudden This that in the ab court held evidence. passion directly caused sence evidence that the defendant had arising provocation out of deceased passion, the issue of volun acted sudden solely at the time of the offense. Passion tary manslaughter had not raised. been provocation the result of former is insuffi 712 S.W.2d at Ojeda, 744.

cient. Hobson v. V.T.C.A., voluntary (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Penal An instruction 19.04(b). manslaughter properly where Adequate is “cause refused Code cause § adequate cause. commonly degree is no evidence produce that would there resentment, anger, rage, per- McCartney in a or terror

(Tex.Cr.App.1976). viewing After jury response the evi- in to this note. The alleged provocation dence of the appendix is followed a sworn statement objectively, instant case we conclude that reporter from the court attesting that this adequate there is no evidence of cause to was indeed what jury. she read to the voluntary manslaugh- warrant a response, the State attached to its Hobson, 478; ter. 644 S.W.2d at Section brief a controverting affidavit in which the 19.04(c),supra. The trial court did not err reporter same court stated that the trial refusing the instruction. Point of error had occurred years more than two ago, and number two is overruled. she had no independent recollection of what point

In his first appel error the testimony was read back. merely She alleges lant that the trial court erred in looked at her stenographic tape for paper refusing request tо read back additional clip markers to determine testimony what cross-examination, testimony, elicited at in she had read to the jury. She found at response jury note. The least three sections which were so marked. contends that such refusal was an abuse of She then stated that it was never her inten- 36.28, discretion under Article Y.A.C.C.P. represent tion to that the transcribed testi- process and “a violation of due mony, attached to the affidavit she made rights.” appellant, only testimony read jury. back to the During jury deliberations the sent out a notes, number of one of which read as appellate “An may rely upon court not follows: supplement an invalid to a record decid- jury disagreement 1. The is in over the a defendant’s appeal; appellate phrasing exact of Barbara Baum’s tes- portions court is limited to those timony regard points: to two properly record which have ap- been proved.” Farris v. wording phrases a. of the three (Tex.Cr.App.1986). However, clearly. which she did hear reliance may on an invalid record if be harmless b. she phrase whether heard the appellate correctly supple- court could have got” “That’s all I’ve mented the record on its motion. own Id. i. coming from the driver’s side of 515; Armstead v. car; (Tex.Cr.App.1985). just ii. or while the two individuals standing case, were on the driver’s side of In the instant we are faced with the the car. situation where could not cure the error we reporter on our own motion. The court has appellant complains that the testimo- that she can- stated her second affidavit ny jury that was read back to the not testimony not recall she read back to what jury’s question, sufficient to answer the jury; only assumptions make she can testimony and that further from the cross- placed paper clips based on she on the examination of Baum should also have stenographic tape. Because we are unable jury. Unfortunately, been read to the from the record or the affida- to ascertain testimony record does not reflect what just testimony what was read to the vits response query. read to the to this note, error, any, response to their “(Re- merely says, The statement of facts preserved has not been for review. back)”. porter reads point first of error is overruled. objected neither error the eighth In his record, requested per- omission nor appellant complains the trial court re Ar- supplement mission to the record. See versibly failing to answer a writ 40.09(7), Instead, erred in ap- ticle V.A.C.C.P.2 ten, from the file-marked communication pellant appendix in his has included an 36.27, V.A.C.C. jury, in Article purports the two sec- violation of brief which to reveal Appellant does process.” “due testimony tions of that were read back to P. and Tex.R.App. 2. Now Pro. 55. see

407 allege wrongdoing part purposeful appellant on the written. The failed to make suggests complaint judge, that this at trial or his motion for trial but instead communication, failed, appellant trial. has some new The there- jury unex- fore, reason, this of any show Court violation plained judge. never reached Article and has failed to overcome 36.27 that there were six record shows presumption pro- regularity jury filed of record on notes from ceedings. eight is Point of error number stamp March 1983. The file on each overruled. an- reveals the time it was submitted and nine, These times swered. were follows: In asserts that the evidence is insufficient to RECEIVED: ANSWER TIME TIME RETURNED: jury’s answer to affirmative p.m. p.m. 2:50 1. 2:45 3:00 p.m. p.m. 2. 2:55 two, i.e., number that he issue will 3. 4:05p.m. p.m. 4:15 continuing society. a constitute threat p.m. 4. 4:50 5:00 p.m. 37.071(b)(2), p.m. orally appel Article Y.A.C.C.P. 5. 4:55 answered court 6. 4:56p.m. no of answer record requested counsel and was denied a lant’s It is number six com- note charge limiting consideration of extraneous plains of herein. appellant’s prior and the criminal offenses of, However, complained In the communication question record to number two. jury requested testimony ultimately gave charge judge “the Barbara trial a concerning following limiting Baum in and the cab driver words contained the which spoken by complainant or Joe Weast- struction: communications,

er.” five Unlike other You further that if there are instructed signed by jury this was not fore- note any testimony you in this case before man. The record does reflect not whether having regarding the commit- defendant judge received, upon the trial ever acted or ted other than the offense al- offenses request. Appellant simply answered the indictment, leged against you him in the argues “something pre- intervened” testimony any cannot consider said judge complying vent trial from you purpose unless find and believe be- Article 36.27. yond a reasonable doubt that defend- offenses, other if ant committed such (Tex.Cr. 808 Pete v. committed, you then any were and even App.1976),this a similar situa court faced in deter- may only consider the same Pete, jury tion. had submitted if mining defendant, the intent of request testimony to have the written any, offense, with the in connection The record three witnesses read them. any, against him in the indict- alleged did reflect whether court ever the trial ment, purpose. no other and for upon request. acted This answered the added). procedural require (emphasis court held “where appear in the affirmatively ments do not objection no the State There was violated, presumption record to have been presume must instruction. We this Pete, regularity prevail.” as directed itself conducted is on the de S.W.2d at 811. The burden State, 642 O’Pry v. trial court. See Ex presumption. fendant to this overcome portion (Tex.Cr.App.1982). When (Tex.Cr. parte Stacey, unnecessarily charge increases App.1986). proof, he should prosecutor’s burden correctly which request specially his failure to contends that him law. placed on the burden allocates point of object dispositive cannot (Tex.Cr. S.W.2d 701 Ortega v. notify did not the trial court error because Rehearing). Ar (On Motion for App.1984) it jury’s request when him of the written pertinent 36.15, states Y.A.C.C.P. ticle mer- This contention is without was made. part: Pete, 812. As 533 S.W.2d at it. See charge to court reads Before the Pete, the instant communication supra, shall have on both sides day jury, it counsel on the file with the others was on present reasonable time to in- written witness testified that on the afternoon of *13 they given structions and ask day the next suggested defendant jury. everyone watch the television news and report when the defendant saw the of the (emphasis added). provides This article story, laughed. he Still another witness State with the vehicle to make such a re- testified that the defendant told her that quest. police “if Regina’a came to [the sufficiency of the evidence must be house, they better have their in- friend’s] given. measured that was policy paid surance up or he would kill State, (Tex.Cr. Boozer v. them gun same that he killed the App.1984); State, see Benson v. 661 S.W. with.” Id. at 602. [victim] Therefore, 2d 708 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). even though permissible, generally, it is for a case, In the appellant instant prior to consider criminal conduct and apparently “rolling Zataraus were drunks” deciding pun criminal record in the second nightclubs. at shooting, After the the ap- issue, State, ishment see Keeton v. 724 armed, pellant, who was ran when followed (not (Tex.Cr.App.1987) yet S.W.2d 58 re Although given an unarmed woman. case, ported), in the instant ample opportunity, appellant made no instructed not to consider such evidence for attempt pursuer. to shoot at his unarmed any purpose other than the intent of the Later, caught when near in connection with the offense bushes, hiding again the scene he some alleged Accordingly, in the indictment. we attempt pursuers. made no to shoot at his sufficiency evaluate the of the evi evidence, light find the viewed in the We support dence to the affirmative answer most favorable to the verdict directed excluding after the evidеnce of the extrane jury, by the instruction to the insuf- court’s past ous offenses and convictions. support jury’s ficient to affirmative Excluding from consideration the extra- special Appellant’s answer to issue two. convictions, prior neous offenses point ninth of error is sustained. remaining evidence consists of the facts of seven, ap- point In of error number guilt/innocence the case revealed at the pellant alleges that because his trial coun- trial, phase testimony of two punishment sel failed to call five witnesses police appel- Houston officers who said the of coun- he was denied effective assistance bad, reputation lant’s the testimo- punishment phase of trial. Be- sel at the ny police one officer who said disposition point cause of our peaceable inmate. lant was a and trusted nine, not address this we need number murder, “Although this was senseless point of error. every that fact is true of murder ap sustained the Because we have Staie, robbery.” Roney course of v. 632 error, the evi pellant’s ninth However, (Tex.Cr.App.1982). S.W.2d 598 support jury’s insufficient to dence was “yes” answer to the second two, reform the issue we answer issue, punishment must show imprisonment. life from death to sentence is a beyond a doubt that there reasonable (Tex. State, Roney 632 S.W.2d v. probability would commit punish judgment, with Cr.App.1982). The would consti criminal acts of violence that life, is affirmed. ment reformed society. Article continuing tute a threat to 37.071(b)(2),supra. ONION, P.J., dissents. less The facts of this case are much CLINTON, concurring. Judge, supra. egregious Roney, than the facts (Tex. State, 717 S.W.2d Boozer Roney, several witnesses testified 1986), dissenting to denial of Cr.App.1984, shortly made the defendant statements to file motion motion for leave heard the State’s offense. One witness after the Judge wrote an rehearing, Presiding Onion say, “I to kill the m- defendant f_before Judges joined. three other opinion in which him kill me.” Another I let opined right (Tex.Cr.App.1981)], At the end he that “the result original as reached submis- panel Benson the Court held that “under Sec. 36.- ...Boozer, 621, n. 3. The supra, sion 06(a),supra, the term “one ‘witness’means panel original decision on “result” proceeding,” who has testified an official submission Benson ‘prospective and does include a mere ” (Tex.Cr.App.1982): judgment “The Id., (original empha- witness.’ at 710-711 entry a judgment and we order reversed Odom). by Judge sis Id., us acquittal.” at 711. Let then Then, the concluded: Court *14 revisit Benson. “Therefore, we sustain burglary “in- alleged The offense is lant’s that adduced contention evidence felony the offense of retali- tent to commit at trial insufficient to show accused ation;” jury per- that a was instructed possessed requisite ‘in intent to act of “if son commits offense retaliation the ser- for or on account of retaliation intentionally knowingly harms or he (Empha- of vices another as witness.’ by harm an another unlawful threatens added.) complainant, Mary sis The Ben- act in retaliation or on account for of son, not, facts of simply was under the another On service as a WITNESS.” of official this case a witness before an presented appeal ground direct sole The proceeding, omitted] [footnote by panel sufficiency decided the Court is of only clearly record indicates that she was of guilty. a verdict evidence against prospective witness her ex-hus- agreed facts parties on essential charge.” pending in a assault band matter, viz: only the only “The evidence and con- Id., at 711. by tention the State as to the intent of original on Thus the decision submission the Defendant is that he intended at the in that solely turned on circumstance ex-wife, entry to Mary time of coerce his charge beyond indict- its the court went Benson, private citizen, drop assault jury in allegations ment and instructed charges against him in which she was service on account of terms retaliation complainant.” by the Measuring it as “a witness.” Writing panel, Judge for a unanimous found to be charge, the Court evidence problem, framed the viz: Odom insufficient.2 “Hence the before us is whether issue original on submis- result ultimate private intends coerce ... a one who ‘to by acquittal sion Benson is ordered drop charges pending citizen assault for there no panel, basis Court possesses required him’ against in- judicial ordering than a determina- it other felony tent to commit offense re- finding by implicit requisite that tion narrowly, taliation. Stated more is this com- was to intent accused that ‘private complainant,’ citizen who not has Mary on ac- against Benson mit retaliation any proceeding, testified official a ‘wit- not as count of her service witness that ness’ as term is used Retalia- by evidence. When supported sufficient statute, Y.T.C.A., Code, Penal tion Sec. noted the alternate panel opinion that 36.06?” theory as informant” of “service Id., at 710. only mean it “pursued,” not been could has de- Noting Legislature that the not charge had not instructed that “witness,” ger- upon analyzing fined regard. in that prior and two deci- mane related statutes opinion unerringly for stands of the Court sions [Ulmer sufficiency of evidence proposition that (Tex.Cr.App.1976), Jones alleged burglary as in the indictment throughout ecuted emphasis other- for unless 1. All mine Mary theory Benson was that service noted. on the wise witness," but "an rather than "a as informant" 2 the observed under 2. In its note Court pursued case.” theory in this "was pros- appellant "possibly” have could been facts here, primarily invoking dissents a en- guilt must be mea- now support a verdict opinion guilt igmatic statement contained authority to find which sured charge on an unauthorized State’s second motion jury by a is bestowed on the Benson, viz: rehearing rehearing by motion for State’s court. On on majority the Court elaborated a wide charge “We hold that when a is correct disposi- conclude “the proposition to theory presented the case we original submis- made on tion of this cause sufficiency review correct,” Benson, supra, at 712.3 light sion was most favorable to the verdict comparing the indictment evidence to the among Judges who Though those he is incorporated charge.” into the Presiding Judge acknowl- joined Onion S.W.2d, (latter reached in Ben- emphasis at 715 edging right result was Davis).4 submission, Judge Judge Davis son original lodge any "one who has testified in an official noting was that of State failed to After 3. rather, request proceeding;” accused objection or to under the facts the court’s *15 charge prosecuted to em- part “possibly" be amended could have been on the critical of the party theory Mary now theory "retaliation" that Benson rendеred as an brace the of that service supported by informant, only the “the one contends was evidence,” but was not. "acquiesced to the at trial theory presented? and thus the case was So what legal decided, unnecessary the theo- limitation of court’s ry original it was and also submission On issue, by law, established which was not in to one evidence,” rehearing as a matter of the on we held holding State party’s and that "may present theory upon which did not the evidence lapse consequences of its follows, not avoid the jury. It trial court instructed presented,” the Court under the circumstances therefore, contrary opinion on second to the by panel applied on the Court restated the rule original charge rehearing, was not for that motion submission, viz: theory as it of the case insofar for the correct necessarily 'guilty’ “Because a verdict Mary Benson was a to find authorized the witness, of that on has found evidence means the to convict her exhus- and on that basis convict, the evi- it was authorized to which band. per- by charge which measured dence is stated, together charge Judge with "The Davis allegations, comprehends the indictment force reflects the State’s proof indictment and the that if it does It follows omitted]. [footnote Benson, supra, theоry at 715. the offense.” charge, as it is insufficient not conform to the opined, appeared to all intents "It But then he only support verdict law to a matter of theory of retalia- State’s purposes that the and authorized.” However, any such a 'witness’." tion involved Court). emphasis by We (Original Ibid. of the evidence appearance in the face flies charge, “the given the court’s found that also by account taken into should have been law that evidence only in view of the verdict authorized Indeed, charge. drafting on its court in the trial nevertheless, that, guilty,’” was ‘not suggested panel original Court submission the seeking opportunity to cor- "an was now State theory only was "possibly” "correct” charge trial court’s the omission in the rect upon was an informant. that she however, concluded, We a retrial.” rehearing the State motion for In its first rehearing may not do on motion "the State sought suggestion to make on that seized that the quate this State and laws of the Constitution what contending was ade- theory, evidence doing upon a ‘not prohibit the return of it from allegation of support indictment guilty1 verdict." Ibid. retaliation, so the offense to commit intent long general to the is narrowed term (Tex. as the State, Recently 4. in Fain theory victim is an the intended alternative uncertainty as to Cr.App.1986), to an I confessed thus, "witness;” it than a rather "informant” argued language on relied above intendment of the charge and therefore erroneous Fain, id., been It has not majority at 203. in ultimately We only error.” "trial today. constituted Judge dissent Davis in his clarified error’ of which “no ‘trial there was concluded be presented” may "theory case How process avail point in the may at the State prosecution, as in a criminal identified? Issues ...,” result desirable end of a more itself law, those are any litigation a court of in in Benson, at 712. by evidence. by pleadings and raised tendered basing premise” The State’s “fundamental any Benson, as to is mute the indictment motion in its second contentions witness, identical servant, public as a “service of another Court, Benson, rejected rehearing 714, informant;” requires a statute because the charge perspective that from albeit service, may inferentially said it kind of such However, "correct,” id., as demon- at 715. tendered allegations in the indictment that issue in one or above, was not. More- fact it in law and strated over, Mary service rendered Benson of whether Fain, opinion my in However, pointed out as capacity. the other "[Tjhe aban- appears have since supra, Court capacity her an issue that did not raise offense, (citations opin- join I the elements With those observations omitted) has sustaining point and theft several different ion of the Court elements, charge possible join judgment nine sets and otherwise theft must set out one of those sets of Court. elements, omitted). (citations If the DAVIS, dissenting. object fails to Judge, State W.C. in terms elements of theft defines Today majority incorrectly relies receiving property the evi- stolen (Tex. State, 661 upon Benson v. appropriation an unlawful dence shows 1982) Cr.App. and Boozer v. owner, from the the convictionshould be (Tex.Cr.App.1984) determin if a for insufficient evidence reversed sufficiency of evidence to charge. such a jury convicts under finding issue affirmative possible interpretation of indict- only Ortega See also Number Two. charge is that the State’s theo- ment and (Tex.Cr.App.1983). With burglary intent to commit ry is analysis, employed the standard first out by receiving property. theft —theft stolen Benson, today supra, is extended from use Therefore, viewing the evidence phase guilt-innocence of a lesser proper charge incorporating of a terms phase of felony punishment case to the indictment, reviewing court would capita] murder. find the evidenceinsufficient be bound Benson, supra, majority of this (emphasis origi- a matter of law. prove found the State had failed to Court *16 nal) theory involving its of retaliation a “wit- present to the of interest Two matters Although charging the instrument ness.” First, from gleaned can Benson. case Benson, supra, alleged simply in the de- charge the must be a correct instruction. the intent to commit the of- fendant had Second, specifically standard of review the retaliation, charge properly, the fense of phase. In Ben- applies to the initial trial objection, incompletely, and without in- charge a is son, supra, held that ‍‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‍“when we is commit- jury formed the that retaliation theory presented case correct for the the knowingly is threat- ted where a witness in sufficiency we review the words, other the trial ened or harmed. In by the verdict light a most favorable to charge unnecessarily restricted the court’s to the indictment comparing the evidence complainant’s jury’s consideration to (em- charge.” incorporated as into a See and cf. testifying role as witness. original) in phasis State, (Tex.Cr.App. 628 S.W.2d 51 Jones Boozer, supra, a of this plurality 1980), jury charging rather than insufficient again found the evidence Court allegation general of “retaliation” given guilt- charge as measured the indictment would include retaliation State, su Ortega also See innocence. witness, public against a informant Overlooking predicate to Benson pra. one incorporated into servant. Once charge— analysis correctness —the being proper if charge, and the instruction stated that opinion Boozer plurality restrictive, to the was bound State charge but correctness of it is not the in- higher proof required by the level of is sufficient the evidence simply whether analogized situation in struction. We charge given. by whatever measured Benson, in which supra, with a situation authority as bootstrapped is then Benson alleges elements of proper indictment proposition. for this alleges element as the intent burglary disagreed stated: with to commit theft”. We

“intent I Benson but authored opin- of that interpretation Judge authorizing con- Clinton’s charge jury Since Boozer, Judge McCormick’s joining ion in find require jury all viction id., charge,” measuring at 204. particular prerequisite to doned sufficiency according of the evidence case, Here, especially appellant’s claim insufficiency dissent the latter predicated upon error, jury charge also discussion of trial error and its ramifica- apparent error both the denial of position here. tions. That remains constant requested charge lant’s own similar apparent willing- disagree I also usage from the usual and technical to eliminate plurality ness of a of the Court charge guilt-innocence phase at the of trial allega- of an indictment consideration punishment phase rather than at the analysis, sufficiency for it is tion appeared trial as it here. Under the stan- charging that the state’s “theo- instrument State, dard enunciated in Almanza v. su- presented, ry is first and it is of the case” pra, proper analysis result in a would find- only incorporation of the indictment ing by this Court that was not charge allegations in the that a Benson Fain, harmed. Just as we decided in su- analysis gains sufficiency credence. pra, jury there “could not have (Tex.Cr. Fain v. prior the evidence of the con- both believed App.1986) majority a case not cited commission, and, victions and their at the today, presented the issue was much closer time, same have found that second of- the instant case in that Fain fense not committed after the first complaining in evidence was final,” they though became even were so finding of “true” sufficient instructed, here the could not have punishment count at the to an enhancement appellant’s both believed the evidence phase. appeals court found that a prior extraneous offense and found those mechanical error had occurred which “did appellant’s probative offenses future indictment, comport the evi with the simultaneously, dangerousness, and have or common sense” and treated that dence merely proba- found those offenses to be insufficiency appellant’s claim of commit the tive of intent to error. Fain v. they underlying of which had al- offense 1984). (Tex.App. 8th District Be guilty. ready found him Both instructions object did not cause juries effectively respective to do asked *17 trial, appeals analyzed court charge at the being impossible, only here view the according requirements case of the intent to offenses to determine extraneous (Tex.Cr. State, 157 Almanza v. offense, The fact that any.” commit an “if App.1984) (opinion on State’s motion by appel- had been committed the offense error did not rehearing) and found that the by the verdict of already lant decided was reversal. require implied incorrectly guilt. The instruction finding. this jury was to re-examine Fain, here, the instruction as evidence, brought and undisputed case theory incorrect “for parties, jury both discussed before Benson, first presented.” supra. We See long history of appellant had a showed that 443 U.S. Virginia, that in v. noted Jackson offenses, more than prior criminal some (1979), 61 560 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d appellant’s vio- demonstrating adequately Supreme that its “ra- made clear Court jury attitudes. and lent tendencies of trier оf standard for review tional fact” into considera- taken could not have both first, evidentiary sufficiency assumes priors to appellant’s evidence of tion the properly instruct- the trier of has been fact response to an affirmative determine second, ed whether the record and followed the special issue and also second guilt finding of reasonably support could given, the determina- instruction as since Looking at the beyond a doubt. reasonable made. Given guilt already been tion of Fain, appellant’s we said that claim shown, appellant totality of evidence constitute val- presented claim as did not See been harmed. cannot be said to have and con- of insufficient evidence id claim State, supra. Fain v. Appeals did not of Court cluded alternative, de- the Court predicate In the should addressing instead the err State, of the Benson attempt application cide to charge Fain v. jury error. claim to the indict- a reference standard without supra, at 202. capital offense, committing the instant in a using special merit instead issues and by gauging sense incorporation broader submitted as the basis for question night vis-a-vis his intent on determination first charge, be giv propensity for future violence. It charge. the correctness of the made may the circum en that the review State, supra. charge If the See Benson v. capital itself de stances of the offense restrictive, unnecessarily is correct also but proper response is termining a changing the increasing or State’s burden State, sue Keeton v. 724 S.W.2d 58 two. proof objection, may without State State, (Tex.Cr.App.1987); Santana v. phase at held to that burden either (Tex.Cr.App.1986) and cited cases analysis, trial under a Benson but Benson Premeditation, calculation, therein. mode progeny its should not be authoritative and showing and manner of the killer’s conduct given patently charge incorrect where aforethought planning play and a role objection, especially sans where trial each relates the decision and factor previously denied court has a defendant’s appellant intent in connection with requested covering essentially instruction capital Landry See offense. the same matter and where both State and (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Demou attorneys defend- defense have discussed a (Tex.Cr. chette prior ant’s extraneous offenses and/or con- App.1979). From the it is record clear that during argument final duct before “rolling appellant process objection. An such as without instruction drunks” in a certain area of town. Befоre here, light of given the one viewed in its assaulting robbing and the deceased source,1 incorrect, boilerplate both in companion, appellant had terrorized application, apparently substance and but brothers, kidnapping gun them Flading party jury. had no effect on either area, driving point from another bar ignoring defense action in Given counsel’s robbing them to a more remote scene discussing priors, I put More than once them. any would hold that has waived by shoving a brothers in fear for their lives insufficiency upon claim based the incor- threatening gun in their faces and kill charge. rect after ran them. A short time the brothers upon All percep the above is based robbed, away, being after drove wholly tion im that the instruction was the same area where he had accost back to incorrect, majority proper and and that the brothers, bar, Flading ed chose another today, analysis, applies without the Benson the altercation with Reed and entered Appellant line of to a distin cases factual context left returned Weaster. but *18 apparently procuring guishable by form trial car after order. How victim’s killing ever, pistol vehicle. The is from his own perception a second also viable. followed. instruction, of one of two victims literally, сharges The read jury may it extraneous mat consider Flading involving the prior incident impact only ters to extent matters appellant’s “in intent brothers underscores on the intent of connection “in capital Ap- with” the offense. connection Legalistically, our im offense.” accomplice an pellant out with instruction, mediate reaction is that night question to rob and terrorize. given has no commonly guilt-innocence, at ongoing and prior demonstrates incident punishment phase. at But what place conduct, which not course isolated phrase “in with the does that connection appellant’s dangerous- future turn evinces mean, post not ex offense” to this Court as “in ness. The intent connection with” reviewer, repeat per- trier of jury capital facto but to the as here shows a offense writ and more vio- I as with same motive fact? submit that the instruction formance least, appellant’s It not intent review lent result. jury, at the ten allowed issue; at the offense that was prior to commit immediately conduct verbatim, except three instruction was taken materials 1. Examination various resource words, McClung's Charges source, Jury puzzling from the brought light not the ed). (1985 rationale, question. Texas Criminal Practice for the instruction already question decided that guilt-innocence. Rаther, it was his intent REYES, Appellant, Ruben Garcia “in connection with” the as offense shown premeditated by the and calculated acts prior during charged conduct Texas, The STATE Appellee. today. that we be concerned with No. acts, 731-85. demonstrating appellant’s Those de- determination, sign and his state of mind in Court of Appeals Texas, Criminal offense, capital connection with the are cir- En Banc. properly which cumstances were before the improper even with the restrictive and Nov. 1987. instruction. pen packets I also would include the de- scribing appellant’s prior aggravated vio-

lent properly conduct evidence before jury. non-testimonial, This physical ev- admitted objection

idence without and dis- during closing argu-

cussed both sides purview was not

ments excluded from limiting instruction, although any testi-

mony relating packets could objection

considered. Since there was no

to the records themselves and because appellant, through attorney, acknowl- offenses, edged the we are not concerned

with how connected packets connecting ‍‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‍or whether such testi-

mony through limiting was excluded

instruction.

Lastly, I disagree majority with the at-

tempting to turn appellant’s subsequent into “mitigating” sup-

conduct

port reformation of just sentence. The pur-

fact that an individual from his hides violently po-

suers or fails to confront attempted mitiga-

lice when arrest no already

tion perpe- heineous conduct Roney I also trated. believe that (Tex.Cr.App.1982) is distin-

guished appellant, on its facts and that perhaps demonstrating

while an attitudinal *19 offense, way

coarseness toward the in no

approaches the cold and calculated violent perpetrated by appellant

conduct Marras evening ques-

on several individuals that

tion. reasons, respectfully

For these I dissent. JJ., WHITE, join.

McCORMICK

Case Details

Case Name: Marras v. State
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Oct 28, 1987
Citation: 741 S.W.2d 395
Docket Number: 69141
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
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