8 F.2d 231 | 8th Cir. | 1925
Plaintiff in error, herein referred to as defendant or as Marr, was convicted on the first count of an indictment which charged him and others with devising a fraudulent scheme and using the post office in its execution. Penal Code, § 215 (Comp. St. § 10385). The record presented to us contains 2,441 pages, the greater part of which is a transcript of the proceedings during the progress of the trial. Questions to witnesses and their answers are set out in full, also many colloquies between counsel and between court and counsel. All of this is embodied in a so-called hill of exceptions extending from page 102 to- page 2418 of the printed record. As said in Linn v. United States, 251 F. 476, 483, 163 C. C. A. 470, the so-called bill of exceptions in this case is such in name only. We are painfully aware of the fact that such a practice has become too common. It is expensive to litigants and burdensome to the court. It ought not to be permitted. Only such parts of the trial proceedings which bear on the claimed errors of law committed below should be brought into the record by a bill of exceptions. Everything else is foreign to the issues here and confusing. There can rarely • be any reason given for embodying questions put to witnesses; and this is true even in eases, which sometimes occur, wherein it can be reasonably contended that the verdict is wholly without support, hence all testimony must be considered. That, confessedly, is
On July 7,1922, defendant executed a declaration of voluntary trust, and on the same day filed the same in the proper office of Union County, Arkansas, in which records of deeds for that county are kept. This declaration of trust is entitled, “The Trust Estate, The Double Barrel Gusher Syndicate.” The defendant therein declared that he was about to take title to certain oil and gas leases as trustee, that he would hold those leases and all other, property, real and personal, which might be conveyed or transferred to him as trustee thereunder, upon the trust thereinafter declared, that the beneficiaries in the trust estate would be the persons who might subscribe for and pay for certificates of $10 each to be issued by the trustee, but the declaration did not state what property or what leases the trustee intended or expected to' acquire for the trust estate. The form of these certificates to be issued was set out in the declaration. .The defendant reserved to himself unrestricted control, management and disposition; and that he or his successor in trust might terminate the trust estate by merger or reorganization in any manner or form whatsoever. It gave him power to manage and control the property of the trust estate according to his own judgment, and prohibited the holders of certificates that might be issued any participation therein. It provided that he might expend any portion of the trust funds or profits necessary in carrying out the trust, that he would keep all business transactions as trustee in record form in detail, and that he would be entitled to 25 per cent, of the profits and of the corpus of the trust estate, the certificate holders would be entitled to share prorata the remainder thereof. Defendant at once entered upon a campaign to induce the general public to take and pay for certificates to be issued by him. This was carried on by circular letters sent through the mails and newspaper advertisements. On August 19, 1922, he sent through the United States mails from El Dorado; Arkansas, a circular letter in which he said he had organized the Pat Marr Double Barrel Gusher Syndicate, that it had no capitalization, that it was operated on the actual cost plan, that he was out to raise only $32,400, with which he would drill oil wells in section 29 of the El Dorado field, that-he guaranteed that both of these wells would be gushers that would spout oil over the crown block, that he guaranteed to pay every person who invested with him 400 per cent, in dividends, that he expected to drill 20 gushers and to pay 4,000 per cent, instead of 400 per cent., that he had done this before many times and was out to do it again,that he was an oil man whose merit had been tried and proven in every oil field in the Great -Southwest, that he guaranteed two gusher wells and 400 per cent, in dividends. His advertising campaign resulted in his selling certificates to the amount of more than $177,000.
On September 23, 1922, he filed another declaration of trust identical in form with the one filed on July 7th preceding, which he called “Pat Marr’s Camden Syndicate No. 2.” This was followed up by a campaign of advertisement through newspapers and circular letters for subscribers for certificates, and he received something more than $255,000, for which he issued certificates of $10 each in Camden Syndicate No. 2. On December 11, 1922, he filed another declaration like the two preceding, wherein he created another trust estate which he called “The Pat Marr Company.” This was immediately followed up with another newspaper advertising and circular letter campaign, and he admittedly received $1,391,000 (the district attorney says $1,960,000), for which he issued certificates of $10 each in The Pat Marr Company. He acquired oil leases and lands supposed to be valuable for oil deposits and proceeded to develop them. Some of them were of great value and some were not. ’ On October 28, 1922, he declared another trust in the same form as those we have considered, under the title, “Pat Marr Oil Company,” but it does not appear that he sold certificates in that. He also organized and controlled several corporations, among them Marr Oil Corporation, under the laws of Maryland, with a capital stock of 1,500,000 shares of no par value, 25,000 thereof to be known as Class A, which were to manage and control the corporation, the remainder as. Class B. The record shows many assignments of leases and conveyances, some by Marr. as trustee to named persons, some by 'Marr as trustee to the corporations which he organized and controlled, and some by Marr as trustee to himself as trustee, but not indicating for what trust he was acting either as grantor or grantee; and there is no explanation in that respect. On November 27, 1922, acting as trustee for Pat Marr’s Camden Syndicate No. 2, he transferred to the Texas Company, a corporation, leases covering certain lands for a consideration of $250,000. He also
It may be conceded that the facts that have been stated, standing alone, do not prove a fraudulent scheme. All may have been done with an honest intent, though carelessly conducted. But the indictment returned by the grand jury on December 12, 1923, charged that Marr and his associates, named in the indictment, devised a fraudulent scheme in organizing the four trust estates and the corporations, all named in the indictment, for the purpose of obtaining the moneys of those who could be induced to pay for certificates in said trust estates, that a part of said fraudulent scheme was to take many of the leases in the name of Marr as trustee without designating what trust estate or what company they were held for, and in this way it was intended to confuse, conceal and hide from those who might purchase certificates in the trust estate the properties that respectively belonged to those estates, that some of the corporations were organized to be used for the purpose of aiding the defendants in concealing from the certificate holders the properties that would belong to the separate trust estates, and thereby the defendants would be enabled and were enabled to convert to their own use and benefit properties of the trust estates. The indictment then alleges at length the false representations and pretensos as a part of the scheme which the defendants intended to make and did make for the purpose of inducing purchase of certificates in the trust estates. One of these false representations, established by the proof, was that defendants, through circular letters and advertisements, stated that on September 7, 1922, Thurlkill Well No. 1 for the Double Barrel Gusher Syndicate had brought in a g-usher
The indictment was attacked by demurrer, which was overruled. It is argued that this was error, because the letter set out in the first count and alleged to have been written and put in the United States mails by Marr at El Dorado, Arkansas, on October 13,1923, addressed to James Grant, Huntington, Ark., shows on its face that it was not so deposited in the mails for the purpose of executing the scheme or attempting to do so. This letter was in response to a letter from Grant, and it appears from Marr’s letter, set out in the indictment, that Grant had sent to Marr a cheek in payment for certificates in Camden Syndicate No. 2. Marr says in his letter to Grant that he is not allowed to accept any money from Arkansas unless he would first have all' of his properties examined by bank commissioners. He then says: “If you will send your check to Howard R. Ferrell, 1609 First National Bank Build- . ing, Detroit, Michigan, he will be glad to issue you units in the Camden Syndicate No. 2 which will be just as good as if you had received them direct from me. Yours very truly, Pat Marr.”
Thereupon Grant sent a cheek as directed by Marr to Ferrell and received from. Ferrell certificates in Camdeh Syndicate No. 2. There was evidence of co-operation between Marr and Ferrell under a prior arrangement, and we think it apparent that this letter was an aid in execution of the fraudulent scheme charged. It was a direct aid in inducing the public, as charged, to purchase trust certificates. It more than measured up to the requirements of the law. Stewart v. United States (C. C. A.) 300 F. 769, 775.
The point most strongly pressed in behalf of defendant is that the court erred in overruling his plea in abatement, because the evidence submitted to the grand jury was obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution; and also because the court erred in admitting in evidence at the trial, over objection, testimony of some of the facts so ascertained.. On August 30, 1923, a United States Commissioner issued a search warrant directed to the Marshal for the Western District of Arkansas, commanding him to enter what was known as the Pat Marr Building in El Dorado, Arkansas, and to there search for and seize the records, books and advertising matter of the trust estates that have been named, and of the several corporations, naming them, which, as heretofore said, were organized and controlled by Marr. This warrant was issued on the affidavit of post office inspectors Ross and Thompson, which set forth that defendant and two other named persons had formed a scheme to defraud and to obtain from James Grant of Huntington, Ark., and from many other persons, by
Of course, we do not intend an expression of approval of the search and seizure. We only mean to sa,y the facts do not support the proposition relied on. The other contention noted above is based on a ruling of the court permitting two witnesses from the Moore Advertising Agency to testify at the trial over objection. It is claimed that the procurement of these two witnesses by the prosecution and their testimony was based on information gained by post offiee inspectors on their examination of the seized records and papers. Again the district attorney joined issue and testimony was taken. We think it sufficient to say that on the facts the motion was properly overruled and the evidence of these two witnesses admitted. Other rulings of the court in the admission and exclusion of evidence are challenged as error. They have been considered and we think complaints of those rulings are without merit. None of them were prejudicial. An exception was saved to one brief comment of the court in its instructions to the jury. It is based on counsel’s claim as to its meaning and probable effect on the minds of the jury. We think the remark of the court cannot be given the meaning attributed to it by counsel, nor could it have the prejudicial effect which they claim. In view of the testimony in the case we regard it as a proper comment. There were also exceptions to the court’s refusal to instruct as requested by counsel. The instructions that were given covered fully the issues in the case, and were unusually clear and fair to both prosecution and defense. In them every applicable principle of law to the charge in the indictment and the evidence was stated.
We have found no reversible error, and the judgment of conviction is affirmed.