51 F. 860 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota | 1892
This is a suit in equity to enforce the specific performance of a contract to convey a tract of about 170 acres of land near the city of Minneapolis, brought by Mary Jane Marr, who
In the consideration of this case it must be borne in mind that the entry upon, occupation, and use of this land by Mr. Marr, and the payment of the taxes thereon, were acts that both parties admit he agreed to and did perform. The complainant claims he performed them under his contract of purchase; the defendant, that he performed them under his contract of lease; hence the acts themselves, and their performance, do not strengthen the contention of either party. We must therefore look to other evidence to determine the only issue in this case, viz., whether the defendant made a contract of sale or a contract of lease with® Marr in November, 1866, and to the contract thus established the occupation and use must be referred. This issue is strenuously contested, and the existence of any contract of sale rendered at least doubtful by the testimony of the witnesses. It therefore becomes important to notice the circumstances and situation of the contracting parties, and to consider the probability of the existence of this contract. As disclosed by the record, they were these: The defendant was the sister of Dennis W. Marr. She lived in New England, sometimes in Scarborough, Me., sometimes in Springfield, Mass. Mr. Marr, in and prior to 1857, lived in a house in St. Anthony, now Minneapolis, Minn., which he or his wife owned, but which was mortgaged for morethan $2,000 to one May-all. In 1857, Mr. Marr failed in business, and was ever after that insolvent, until in 1868 he tookthe benefit of the bankrupt act. In 1859 he was unable to pay the mortgage on the house he occupied, and to prevent its foreclosure, and to save himself and family, which consisted
Under these ■ circumstances, it is insisted by the complainant that in November, 1866, the defendant contracted orally to convey this farm to Marr for $6,200, whenever he was able to pay this sum. The .witnesses most favorable to complainant, however,- go no further than to testify that in conversation with Marr at the time of the purchase of the farm the defendant told him she was buying the place for him to make a home for himself and his family, and that the farm should be his at any time he could pay back what she had paid for it, and Mr.
Specific performance of oral agreements to convey land, where the purchasers have entered under the contracts, and made permanent improvements upon the land, has long been enforced in equity, on the ground that a failure so to do would work a fraud on the purchasers through the loss of their improvements; but in the ease at bar the reason of this rule ceases, because the entire improvements made by Mr. Marr were far less in cost and value than the money he received from the defendant after he took possession of the farm, and which he never repaid. No equity, therefore, in favor of the complainant arises here on account of these improvements. Complainant’s witnesses seek to draw this contract, after a lapse of 22 years, from detached fragments of desultory conversations between defendant and Mr. Marr while she was visiting at his house on her errand of mercy in 1866, from family talk at meal times, and from subsequent admissions of hors to strangers that she had given Mr. Marr a chance to buy the farm by paying the original purchase price: but no witness testifies that Mr. Marr ever agreed with her to purchase, and pay this price; and, even if the defendant had offered to sell to him for $6,200 in 1866, such an unaccepted oiler would surely be of no avail 20 years later, and after the death of Mr. Marr.
On the other hand, the answer of the defendant unqualifiedly denies this contract of sale that is sought to he culled from these fragmentary, desultory conversations. It is clearly proved that the purpose for which Mr. Marr besought the defendant to come to Minnesota in 1866, and the purpose for which she did come, was to buy a farm for him, to get a living on for himself and his family as her tenant; that both parties at that time sent for one 13. F. Cutter to come to Minneapolis, to assist them in the purchase of such a farm; that he was present at Mr. Marr’s house with them, advised and directed the negotiations while the purchase was being made, and remained until the negotiations were closed; and he testifies that the agreement was that Mr. Marr should occupy the farm, pay the taxes and insurance, keep the improvements in repair, and have all he could raise on the farm, and that there was no agreement to sell it to him. It is clearly proved that Mr. Marr, in his sched
Specific performance of an oral contract to convey land ought not to be decreed 20 years after the alleged date of the contract, unless the proof of the contract is full, clear, and satisfactory. Purcell v. Miner, 4 Wall. 513; Colson v. Thompson, 2 Wheat. 336; Carr v. Duval, 14 Pet. 84; Lanz v. McLaughlin, 14 Minn. 72, (Gil. 55;) Pom. Spec. Perf. § 136, and authorities there cited. In this case the proof of the contract is vague, uncertain, and fragmentary, while the surrounding circumstances, the situation, relation, acts, and statements of the parties to it while both were living, and for 19 years after its alleged date, make its existence improbable. It is incredible that a man of ordinary intelligence, with the right to purchase for $6,200 a farm that as early as 1883 was worth $40,000 should rest for years in silence and poverty without exercising his right, and die without attempting to enforce it. The proof of the contract is far from full, clear, or satisfactory.
Again, an offer of sale of land must be accepted in a reasonable time in order to bind the proposer, and one which stands for 20 years, and until after the death of the party to whom it is made, without compliance with its terms or any agreement to comply therewith on his part, is abandoned by the lapse of time, and its subsequent acceptance will not bind the proposer. Leake, Eq. Cont. 41; Pom. Spec. Perf. § 65; Meynell v. Surtees, 25 Law J. C. H. 257, 259; Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. Collier White Lead Co., 4 Dill. 431.
Even if, as some of the witnesses testified, the defendant did tell Mr. Marr in 1866 that he could have the land by paying her the $6,200 she paid for it when he was able, inasmuch as he never did pay it, or agree to pay it, during the subsequent 19 years of his life, the complainant could not, after his death, accept the proposition, offer to perform it, and thereby make a contract binding upon the defendant.
Further, the specific performance of a contract in equity always rests in the sound discretion of the court, and where, upon a review of all the circumstances of the particular case, it is patent that it will pro-, duce hardship and injustice to either of the parties, they may be left to their remedies at law. In such a case a court of equity is not bound to render a decree of specific performance, even though the contract is es