9 Tenn. 452 | Tenn. | 1830
Opinion of the court delivered by
Joel S. Enloe was sheriff and collector of Obion county.
Marr sued Enloe in trover, for a sack of coffee, which Enloe siezed as sheriff and collector of the State and county taxes, of Obion county for the year 1828, for an alleged balance due by Marr of his county levy. The parties agreed to the following facts. That at the January _ session 1828 of Obion county court, a majority of the justices proceeded to lay or assess, the following tax for the year 1828, viz:—
Contingent tax on each 100 acres of land, - - 181 cts.
Jury tax on the same,.181
Public building tax on the same, - - 181-
Navigation tax on the same,.12k
County tax assessed on each 100 acres for 1828 681-
Marr gave in for taxation for that year, in the county of Obion, 9626 acres. The State tax of 181 cents per hundred acres added to the above made the tax 87¿ cents on each hundred acres, and Marr’s taxes amounted to the sum of $84 25; of this sum he had paid $66 21 to the sheriff, and refused to pay any more. The sheriff claimed $18 04, as abalance due on the tax list in his hands, levied upon a sack of coffee, and sold it to satisfy such
The foregoing taxes were assessed by the county court, by virtue of the act of 1827, ch. 49, sec. 1, which provides “that the courts of pleas and quarter sessions, in the several counties in this State, a majority of twenty-five of the acting justices being present, shall at the first court in each and every year, levy a tax to meet the current ex-pences of their county for the ensuing year, upon all polls and property subject to taxation by the laws of this State.”
It is contended for Marr, that that part of the act of 1827, conferring unlimited powers of taxation upon the county courts, is unconstitutional and void, because it vests in the justices legislative authority upon a subject j; of the most vital importance to the citizens of every go- !l vernment, that of talcing from them their property by ■: way of taxation, not through their representatives, who . are responsible and dare not oppress them, but by a few individuals in each county, holding permanent offices and who are wholly irresponsible to the people whom they oppress with exorbitant burthens — acting without control as to the amount of tax imposed and collected, and almost equally so in the mode of its expenditure. That if the county court can tax the citizens one dollar each year on the hundred acres of land, it can with equal claims to power, tax each hundred acres $¡100, single year bankrupt every land holder, at least, er citizens, whose lands are generally of an infe\ lity- _ _ h0 9
_ _ The constitution declares “the legislative authority of this State shall be vested in fhe General Assembly
Js taxing the people an act of legislation ? That the taxing power belongs to the legislature, — and that exclusively, and is, if not the most important, at least of equal magnitude, with any power entrusted by the constitution to the General Assembly, — is a truism, never doubted or denied in Tennessee! Can this constitutional right, by an act of Assembly, be vested in a few individuals in each county, who are not dependent on the people, to tax without limit and even spend at pleasure, without responsibility and without control? Such are unfortunately the powers attempted to be conferred by the act of 1827. The right to tax themselves through their Representatives, in General Assembly, is a constitutional right in the people. Representation and taxation are of necessity in our Government inseparable, as they must be in every free country. Whenever the people are oppressed and bowed down with ruinous taxes, imposed without their consent, their fancied freedom is an idle delusion, and poverty and misery will as certainly overtake them in Tennessee, as under the sway of an Asiatic Prince, or Spanish King, whose will is law, and whose exertions are limited alone by his desires. Our Fathers fought, conquered, and separated from Great Britain to poor purpose, to preserve the principle, “that taxation without representation was tyranny,” if we are at this short day compelled to submit to its exercise in practice, by a few individuals in each county. In truth, the preservation of this principiéis the chief corner stone, on which our political fabric rests; take it away, and our Government is not worth preserving. It has been truly inquired of us, what limit to exactions is imposed by the act of 1827, in the county courts? We answer none. They may tax every acre of land in their respective counties to its full value, and if the tax is not paid, cause the land to be sold and bought in by the sheriff for the use of schools, if there be no other bidders.
Until county courts by its order (clearly amounting to
No doubt the abuses of the county courts, when in the exercise of the taxing power oí North Carolina, was one of the reasons why the foregoing clause was inserted in the. constitution. Few of the lands in Tennessee in 179ÍT were cultivated, and the most fertile sold at very low prices; hence there was little of seeming impropriety in
It is not assumed for defendant that the legislature can tax the lands of one county at one rate, and those of another at a different, but that by act of Assembly, the county courts of the respective counties may be authorized to do this for county purposes. The legislature have no power to tax unequally; it cannot escape observation, that that body can communicate none to the county courts. The principal has no authority; of course can transfer none to the agent. The constitution makes no distinction — it refers to all taxation on lands, collected
Such is the constitution of Tennessee, which it is our sworn duty to support. It is an appalling absurdity truly, that anhundred acres of land, worth fifty cents an acre, should pay one dollar tax, and that another hundred acres, worth fifty dollars the acre should pay the same amount of tax; we wish it were otherwise, but it is for the people to alter the constitution, if desirable, — not the legislature.
Having disposed of the act of 1827, we will next en-quire what portion of the taxes, ordered to be collected by the county court of Obion, from the plaintiff, was subject to be imposed upon his property by the existing laws, not subject to constitutional objection.
The act of 1797, ch. 3, authorizes the respective county courts to levy and collect annually, a tax of 124 cents on every hundred acres of land for the contingent expenses of the county. The county court of Obion taxed the plaintiff’s land 181 cents on the hundred acres, — of course Qi cents more than is allowed by law. For so much the order is void.
The 2d charge is 18} for a building tax. The act of 1809, ch. 81, authorizes the charge; although, we fear from the facts in the record, this item is an abuse, and not intended to be appropriated to the purposes of building; of this, however, it is notour province to judge.— The foregoing appropriations are for specified objects, and collected by virtue of general laws, taxing all lands equally, although the county courts may collect less
The 3d item levied on plaintiff’s lands, was, 181 cents as a jury tax. 4 This was collected by virtue of - the act of 1807, ch. 7, and 1809, ch. 49, sec. 15. The number of jurors, their time of service, and daily compensation are fixed, and the laws general, still the county courts assess the amount of tax, and it may be impossible to preserve uniformity; but on the validity of these laws we will not undertake now to determine. The matter is of vast importance to the State, and we are not satisfied either way — the cause can be determined without it; the practice unobjected to for twenty-three years, under these statutes, must involve itself mainly in their construction.
4th. Plaintiff’s lands are charged 12¿ on each hundred acres as a navigation tax. This was assessed by thé act of 1824, cb. 128. It is a partial law, authorizing the county courts of 10 of the counties in the Western District, Obion being one, to lay a tax of 124 cents on each 100 acres, for five years, to be applied in clearing out the streams in the counties respectively. This law imposes upon every hundred acres lying in the ten counties to which it applies, 124 cents more than on any hundred in other counties. The tax is unequal. — The act imposing it is obnoxious to the constitution, and void. Hence the county court of Obion had no lawful authority to assess 6i cents of the contingent tax — or the navigation tax— making 181 cents on the hundred acres. These items appear as part of the tax list, and amount to $>18 20. Marr had paid all that was lawfully due, and some cents over. The order to collect $84 25 made by the county court, was made without power or jurisdiction in that tribunal, and communicated no authority to the sheriff to seize the property of Marr. We therefore reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and order it to be entered on the case agreed for the plaintiff to the value of the coffee.
In the county of il’Nairy they are for the year 1830 ¡¡¡2 87| the 100 acres.