Case Information
*1 Before W OOD Chief Judge, B AUER R OVNER Cir cuit Judges .
R OVNER Circuit Judge
On around December Marquise arrested by police officers employed Calumet City, Illinois (the “City”). officers have arrest warrant time arrest. As characterized officers, incident underlying arrest involved murder one shooting multiple other people, admitted having 16 2219 gun scene. At a minimum, was to be charged with unlawful use a weapon by a felon, a felony offense, assistant state’s attorney instructed City’s officers to wait criminally charge Wright until lab results came back establishing gun carried by Wright matched casings and bullets recovered scene.
On December 24, 2014, while still custody on ar rest, Wright filed an action under U.S.C. § against City alleging violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing provide him a judicial determination probable cause within hours ar rest. At time, Wright had been custody for nearly hours. On December presented a bond hearing and judge made a finding probable cause detain Wright. In § action, asserted City policy practice authorizing officers detain persons arrested without warrant up hours before permitting arrestee appear before judge, sought pursue claims. two classes district court Federal Rules Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) 23(b)(3): one, involving “[a]ll persons future detained Calumet City police officers so they do receive judicial determination probable cause within hours arrest;” one consisting “[a]ll persons who, following arrest warrant after Decem ber until date notice disseminated, were de tained Calumet City police officers so they receive judicial determination probable cause within hours arrest.” With respect latter class, determined consisted of, most, dividuals, members were unlikely to geograph ‐ ically dispersed given nature of allegations, joinder was impracticable. court denied because Wright failed to classes were sufficiently numerous to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Proce ‐ dure 23(a)(1), which requires putative class establish that: (1) is so numerous joinder of all members impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to class; (3) claims putative representative are typical claims defenses class; (4) putative representative fairly adequately protect interests class.
After Wright’s petition permission certi ‐ fication issue immediately denied, City made fer judgment pursuant Rule Federal Rules Civil Procedure. qualifi cation, which provided that: Defendant Calumet City, Illinois, agrees
allow Plaintiff Marquise take against it, comprised $5,000.00 Plaintiff all brought under this law suit, inclusive attorneys’ fees costs date accrued pursuing this action Plain tiff’s behalf, excluding costs accrued pursuing this lawsuit as action. Despite accepting granted him relief “all brought under this lawsuit,” now ap peals court’s certi fication. Because aggrieved person per sonal required 16 ‐ 2219 Article III of Constitution, dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal, only asserted court erred denying of con sisting of himself “[a]ll persons who future be detained Calumet City police officers so they do receive judicial determination of probable cause within hours arrest.” He does certifica tion other class, involving approximately per sons been detained.
Under III Constitution, federal court juris diction limited “cases” “controversies,” therefore federal courts are restricted resolving “’the legal rights litigants actual controversies.’” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk ___ U.S. ___, S. Ct. (2013), quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United Separation Church State, Inc ., U.S. (1982). Accordingly, plaintiff seeking invoke federal court ju risdiction “must possesses legally cognizable interest, ‘personal stake,’ outcome action.” Genesis Healthcare S. Ct. at 1528. Moreover, stake evincing actual must be pre sent at stages review, merely at inception lawsuit. “’If intervening circumstance deprives “personal outcome lawsuit,” any point during litigation, action can longer proceed must dismissed moot.’” Campbell Ewald Co. Gomez ___ U.S. ___, S. Ct. (2016), quoting Genesis Healthcare S. Ct. A becomes moot “’only when impossible grant effectual relief whatever prevailing party.’” ., quoting Knox v. Service Employees S. Ct. (2012).
We turn, then, initial issue this case, which is whether Wright’s acceptance elimi ‐ nated claim such lacks case or controversy required by Article III. Su ‐ preme Court well as appellate courts have applied Ar ‐ ticle III case controversy analysis widely varying factu ‐ al scenarios resolving individual class including but limited to: voluntary settlement claims; involun tary judgments plaintiff’s favor; voluntary settlement individual claims with reservation class certifi cation issue; settlement but with retention various interests impacted class certi fication issue. As Supreme Court recently held, unac cepted offer—even if offers relief case—does render moot when party seeks relief on behalf himself class persons, least where amount deposited with court. Campbell Ewald Co. S. Ct. Where terms exempts certification issue, courts are divided whether plaintiff retains sufficient meet requirement Article III. See, e.g. United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty U.S. n.10 (1980)(reserving issue “as named settles after may, con sistent III, adverse ruling certification”); Rhodes E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. 2011)(“when putative plain tiff voluntarily dismisses underlying request certification, … there longer ‘self 2219 interested party advocating’ class treatment in man ner necessary satisfy Article III standing requirements.”); Muro v. Target Corp. F.3d 485, (7th Cir. 2009) (the reservation in settlement right appeal certifi cation issue insufficient establish interest necessary under III); Richards v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. F.3d (D.C. Cir. 2006) ) (plaintiff settled in dividual claims but reserved right appeal class claims retained class claim, including shifting other litigation costs). before us presents different situation accepted reservation exempt class certification issue, but our decision Muro nevertheless instructive. Muro brought an action Truth Lending Act (TILA), U.S.C. § et seq ., alleging an individual based claim. After certification was denied, Muro settled her claim, but reserved right appeal certification. Muro F.3d 491–92. We considered whether, having therefore lacking cognizable interest our evalua tion court’s decision issue, Muro nevertheless court’s decision denying certification class. We noted Muro “[m]ost circuits have considered issue have ‘a named plaintiff’s unqualified release relinquishes his also his certification.’” quoting Toms Allied Bond Collection Agency, Inc. 1999). Where express reservation was part settlement, those courts differed alone sufficient permit prospec tive representative settled to certification. Muro F.3d 490. We agreed with circuits mere reserva ‐ tion insufficient alone satisfy or controversy requirement; must demon strate a personal concrete personal appeal. Id . We reasoned requirement extends stages litiga tion, must be demonstrated appeal. Id mere ex pression a desire appeal, a reservation option a settlement, does itself establish concrete terest. We set forth appropriate analysis follows:
A voluntary prospective representative often means that, practical matter, settling has elected divorce himself litigation longer retains community interests prospective class. Only if issues prospective representative remain alive litigation can be assured there remains sufficient adverse ness ensure issue presented truly adversarial manner and, consequently, litigated comprehensive ly clearly. An abstract matter never has been considered sufficient basis maintenance of—or continuation of— litigation federal courts. .; see also Premium Plus Partners Goldman, Sachs & Co. 2011) (where litigator has litigat
ed won, acceptance extinguishes ‐ live similar the one by the remaining members the class).
Thus, a mere desire appeal denial certification insufficient. A “personal stake” required assure form capable judicial resolution – is, ‐ volving “sharply presented issues concrete factual set ‐ ting self ‐ interested parties vigorously advocating oppos ‐ ing positions,” resolution which have direct conse ‐ quences on parties involved. Geraghty U.S. at 403; Genesis Healthcare S. Ct. at 1528. Accordingly, plaintiffs seek appeal despite their individual issues must they retain issue.
As noted Muro, Supreme Court Deposit Guar ‐ anty National Bank Roper U.S. (1980), provided example type could persist on appeal despite individual claims. In Rop er plaintiffs filed suit alleging defendant vio lated National Bank Act, U.S.C. §§ & charg ing plaintiffs they sought represent usu rious finance charges. Id . at 328. After district court de nied certification, bank offered each maximum amount they recover their but they refused offer. Id . 329. The plaintiffs extended counter which would reserve adverse ruling, coun ter was declined bank. Id . nev ertheless entered tendered amount, which deposited court’s registry, dismissed case. Although their thereby been satisfied, certification. Id. The Court that the plaintiffs retained sufficient interest in the appeal the denial, because throughout the litigation the plaintiffs had asserted continuing interest shifting part of the cost of litigation including attorneys’ the members. Id. 336.
Applying rationale Muro noted that Muro had received settlement compensation her costs of action her reasonable fees. Therefore, cause Muro had retained other remaining benefit, even though she reserved set tlement right denial certification, she lacked type live, would allow her appeal.
We discussed another type ongoing Espen scheid Directsat USA, LLC 2012). In Espenscheid plaintiffs settlement their they reserved ap peal court’s decision decertifying class. We recognized where plaintiffs settle case, possi ble injury from denial members proposed classes, if plaintiffs have stake continuation suit they lack standing certification. Id . plaintiffs Espencheid however, avoided fate because provision agreement stated they were seeking incentive reward their services representa tives. That incentive reward contingent certifi cation class, therefore prospect award gave tangible financial getting denial of revoked. 875; McMahon LVNV Funding, LLC 2014).
Similar to in Muro Espencheid Wright accepted settlement offer as to his claims. Wright has an even weaker argument than that presented Muro howev er, because Wright accepted Rule offer did purport to preserve his to certification. To contrary, Wright by terms resolved his retaining neither an interest his individual claim nor an interest pursuing claim as representative putative class. Wright does argue he preserved interest an incen tive reward, he has failed he re tained such alone would sufficient confer standing.
The language Rule by this clear. It provided $5,000 resolve “all claims brought under this lawsuit.” A plain reading language instructs involves indi vidual claim as well as claim. bring multiple individual claims against City this case; included complaint only claim City violated his Fourth Fourteenth Amendment rights failing provide him judicial determination probable cause within hours his arrest. re maining complaint were based chal lenges based two purported classes persons. Ac cordingly, language declaring included “all brought lawsuit” necessarily referred seeking represent well claim, common meaning *11 11 phrase and because this case the plural reference “all claims” would be misnomer if applying only the singu lar individual claim the case. Moreover, the offer distinguished between the individual and class claims the ensuing sentence, determining that attorney ‘s fees would included for the claim not for the upon which Wright received no measure suc cess. distinction for purposes ascertaining attorneys’ fees, but not for identifying that are included judgment, further affirms offer judgment re solved claims. has accepted offer full redress for his therefore cannot ongoing per
sonal matter. See Campbell Ewald S. Ct. at n.5 (recognizing where plaintiff has received full redress for injuries asserted complaint, case remains); Rhodes F.3d (recognizing where parties settle their entirely court, plaintiff lacks standing required un der III on appeal). argues he has ongoing similar Roper because did not obtain claim, but reliance on Roper misplaced. First,
Supreme Court in Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., U.S. (1990), held an “interest in attorneys’ fees is, course, insufficient create an Article III case or controver sy where none exists on merits the underlying claim.” Supreme Court in Genesis Healthcare , S. Ct. n.5 (2013), recognized tension between Lewis and Roper , determined “[b]ecause Roper is distinguishable on facts, we need not consider continuing validity in light our subsequent decision in Lewis … ” In Premium Plus , we recognized position person whose claim moot can still file suit seeking attorneys’ fees “was advanced, flopped, in Diamond v. Charles , U.S. 70–71 (1986) again Lewis Continental Bank Corp ., U.S. (1990).” Premium Plus , We ed Lewis flatly attorney’s fees, costs expenses insufficient create III or controversy where none otherwise exists on merits underlying claim. Id. Those cases caution cannot rely mere possibility fees basis meet requirement.
But like Supreme Court Genesis Healthcare, need determine rationale Roper impacted Lewis because even reasoning Roper Wright’s argument would insufficient. In contrast plaintiffs Roper has failed assert identified continuing shifting costs litigation members. More fundamentally, Roper agree termination plies, Pastor explicitly resolved damages claim only, acceptance ability pursue such relief appealing reserved. suit; the district court entered the judgment based the de fendant’s tender even though the plaintiffs rejected the offer, the judgment offered them less than the full relief sought. Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted a continuing shifting part the cost of litigation the members, the involuntary termination the district court provide them re lief. Roper U.S. In contrast, voluntarily agreed accept a judgment which terminated all agreed calculation attorneys’ fees set forth judgment. voluntariness settlement dispositive factor determining standing issue. See Wrightsell v. Cook County, Ill., F.3d (7th Cir. 2010). But relevant considering district court judgment granted plaintiffs all relief sought plaintiffs retained unsat isfied judgment. Where plaintiffs voluntarily agree settlement, acquiescence can manifest their agreement provides all relief seek. In accepting qualification offer, accepted as satisfaction relief he court. Although allo cation fees settlement provided for fees costs for for claim, plaintiff may agree forego fees upon which obtained success, just may determine fees awarded upon which obtained some degree success. See Hensley v. Eckerhart U.S. (1983); M.B. ex rel. Berns Hamilton Southeastern Sch. 2011). Nothing preserves seek issue later time, and can point nothing dicates he retained concrete interest fees. He there fore lacks personal claim required under Article III. See Rhodes F.3d at (“a putative class member who voluntarily settles his case and releases his claims, under language providing for release ‘any and all’ monetary … may thereafter ap peal adverse class ruling”); Richards F.3d (“a plaintiff who, agree ment, relinquishes ‘any and all’ his claims, including class agrees dismiss entire ‘action,’ has ceded any interest he once and can no longer appeal class certification”). There no other named plaintiff this proposed action, nor even possibility one given he certify. See Premium Plus (discussing could “keep warm so someone with live claim intervene.”) abandoned consisting those persons who were detained for more than hours between December and date notice disseminat ed, and he appeals only consisting himself persons future detained for more than hours. With Wright’s claim, future detainees remain proposed there no one live intervene.
Wright’s arguments are therefore merit, asserts other arguments standing this court. has failed identify remains this thus lacks “personal stake” required III. Accordingly, dismiss lack jurisdiction.
[1] also relies Pastor State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. 2007), case unhelpful same reason Roper unavailing. Citing Roper Pastor discussion modest judgment terminating because “offer did resolve dispute between unnamed members de fendant so did render moot.” 1043–44. Although Pastor otherwise explain its holding, City included Pastor briefing court; Roper cite im