300 Mass. 203 | Mass. | 1938
This is an action of tort whereby the plaintiff seeks to recover compensation for personal injuries sustained by him in falling on a common stairway in a building-owned by the defendant. There was evidence in its aspect most favorable to the plaintiff tending to show these facts: The plaintiff with his wife, on the afternoon of December 8, 1934, dined in a restaurant on the second floor of the building owned by the defendant. The proprietor of the restaurant occupied the premises used as a restaurant as tenant at will. After dining, the plaintiff left the restaurant and, going to the edge of the platform at the head of the stairs, put his right foot forward, with the ball of his foot on the edge of the platform, then started to lift his left foot, and as he did so his right foot slipped; he lost his balance and slid down two or three steps on his left foot; "then he dragged his foot” and fell down the stairway, sustaining injuries for which damages are sought in this action. He fell from the platform at the top of the stairway and not from the first step down. The stairs were about four and one half feet wide and the treads were made from some sort of composition resembling stone. There was a brass nosing on the edge of the steps and also on the edge of the platform. The testimony varies as to the thickness of the brass nosing from one eighth of an inch to one fourth of an inch, and as to its depth from the top to the bottom from one and one fourth to one and one half inches. The brass nosing was about one fourth to three eighths of an inch wide in the center of the platform, where it was worn,
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The single question of law presented on these exceptions is whether there was error in the denial of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict in its favor.
The plaintiff was a business visitor of a tenant of the defendant. His rights are measured by the legal obligation which the defendant owed to that tenant. The duty of the landlord in respect to a common passageway controlled by him “is that of due care to keep it in such condition as it was in, or purported to be in, at the time of the letting.” Andrews v. Williamson, 193 Mass. 92, 94. Griffin v. Rudnick, 298 Mass. 82, 84. Cushing v. Jolles, 292 Mass. 72, 75. Kirby v. Tirrell, 236 Mass. 170,171.
The answer of the defendant, to an interrogatory, to the effect that “The platform and brass edging have always been in good condition,” might have been taken to refer to the time of the beginning of the tenancy of the proprietor
Exceptions, overruled.