484 U.S. 872 | SCOTUS | 1987
Lead Opinion
Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;
C. A. 11th Cir.;
Sup. Ct. Nev.;
Sup. Ct. Ark.;
Sup. Ct. Cal.;
Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;
Ct. Common Pleas of Lexington County, S. C-;
Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;
Sup. Ct. Ga.;
Sup. Ct. Nev.;
Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist.;
Sup. Ct. Ala.;
Sup. Ct. Tenn.;
Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.;
Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;
Sup. Ct. Tenn.;
Sup. Ct. La.;
C. A. 11th Cir.;
Sup. Ct. Ariz.;
Sup. Ct. Neb.;
Sup. Ct. Mo.;
Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;
Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;
Sup. Ct. Ariz.;
Sup. Ct. Va.;
Sup. Ct. Ga.;
Sup. Ct. Fla.;
Sup. Ct. Ark.;
Sup. Ct. 111.;
Sup. Ct. Fla.;
Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.;
C. A. 11th Cir.;
Sup. Ct. Fla.;
Sup. Ct. Tenn.;
Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist.;
C. A. 5th Cir.;
Sup. Ct. 111.;
Sup. Ct. Pa.;
Super. Ct. Ga., Butts County;
Sup. Ct. Fla.;
Sup. Ct. Fla.;
Sup. Ct. 111.; and
Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.