207 Wis. 151 | Wis. | 1932
It is undisputed that the employee, E. R. Krentz, became disabled because of pneumonoconiosis and
After hearing the evidence the Industrial Commission found “that the applicant first became disabled as a result of pneumonoconiosis and pulmonary tuberculosis while in the employ of the respondent Marquette Granite Company, on January 26, 1929, and was totally disabled” since that date, excepting “that he worked from March 4 to March 23, 1929.” Plaintiffs contend that the evidence does not warrant the commission’s finding that disability first occurred on January 26, 1929; that the commission should have determined the date of the first disability, and whether there had been a recovery from the disease which caused that disability before Krentz ever entered the employment of the Marquette Granite Company, or whether the ultimate disability was but a mere recurrence, and not because of a new onset of the disease which had caused the first disability; and that the trial court erred in not remanding the record to
Plaintiffs’ contentions as to the alleged errors on the part of the Industrial Commission and of the trial court are largely based upon and prompted by the decisions in Zurich Gen. Acc. & L. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm. 203 Wis. 135, 233 N. W. 772, and Outboard Motor Co. v. Industrial Comm. 206 Wis. 131, 239 N. W. 141, as to the issues and the procedure in compensation cases involving occupational diseases which resulted in ultimate disability, after exposure during successive employments.
The decision in the Zurich Gen. Acc. & L. Ins. Co. Case was filed on December 9, 1930. Consequently, when the commission filed its findings herein on January 9, 1931, it was undoubtedly well aware of the importance and necessity of determining when the disability, which constituted the end result, first occurred; and that if it found that there had been disability which was but partial, and that there had been a recovery and a subsequent disability with subsequent exposure, that then it was necessary to determine whether the subsequent disability arose from a recurrence, or was due to a new onset induced by a subsequent exposure. Howhver, when the commission, with the rules and principles applicable well in mind, determined unequivocally that the applicant first became disabled by the occupational disease while employed by the Marquette Granite Company on January 26, 1929, and was totally disabled ever since that date, with exception only that he worked for that same employer from March 4 to March 23, 1929, there’ was no occasion for further inquiry or findings in relation to the matters of pos
On the other hand, there is the applicant’s testimony that he did not feel well when he asked for a vacation in November, 1927; that his family physician testified in May, 1930, that the applicant had become practically disabled in November, 1927, from continuing his regular employment; and that several medical experts, who had not examined him until after September, 1929, or had made only X-ray examinations after September, 1929, testified that in their opinion the applicant was disabled in November, 1927, and the fact that he had worked for about three months, and again for six weeks,
The facts and opinions thus proven, together with the other evidence before the commission, admitted of conflicting inferences, which it was the duty of the commission to consider, and its findings as to the ultimate facts cannot, under the circumstances, be disturbed. The unequivocal effect of its finding that disability first occurred on January 26, 1929, is not impaired or rendered doubtful by any other finding, because of which the record should be remanded as was done in Outboard Motor Co. v. Industrial Comm., supra. The award must be affirmed.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.-