28 Ga. App. 368 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1922
This case was tried upon an agreed statement of fact as follows: “ It is hereby agreed by and between the parties to the above-stated case that the following statement is a true and correct one of the facts-in this case: City Ordinances Appointing Policemen. ‘ Section 556. All appointments to the police force and pro
The plaintiff in this case contended that her deceased husband, who was a policeman on the force of the City of Savannah, was an employee of the mayor and aldermen of the city and was entitled to be classed as such, and that she was entitled to the benefits of the Georgia workmen’s compensation act (Ga. L. 1920, p. 167). It was contended by the plaintiff that under section 2 (b), her deceased husband was an employee. The particular part of section 2 (b) pertinent here is as follows: “ Employee shall include every person, including a minor, in the service of another under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied.” The sole question presented here for determination is whether this policeman was an employee or a public officer. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Yirginia, upon a statute almost identical with the Georgia act, has held that a policeman is a public officer, and not such an employee as is contemplated by the act. Mann v. City of Lynchburg, 129 Va. 452 (106 S. E. 371). Indeed, the Georgia precedents, where the question whether a policeman was an employee or an officer has been considered in actions of tort against municipalities, are uniform that a policeman is a peace officer, whose duties are connected with the public peace, and is a public officer. The deceased policeman in this case was not an employee under contract, express or implied. Under the provision of the act here, the relation of employer and employee must exist in order to sustain the award. Without hesitation, we conclude that the provisions of the workman’s compensation act do not include the plaintiff’s deceased hus
Judgment affirmed.