222 N.W. 594 | S.D. | 1928
Plaintiff, a corporation doing business at Ponca, Old., made two sight drafts on defendant at Sioux Falls. To each
Plaintiff and defendant had been doing business in the above manner over ,a period of several years. At some time prior to the above transaction, plaintiff had made sight drafts upon, and sent bills of lading to, defendant through banks other than the Sioux Falls Trust & Savings Bank, and defendant had requested plaintiff to transact such business through the said Sioux Falls Trust & Savings Bank.
The above transaction took place on the 14th day of January, 1924, and at the close of business for that day, the superintendent of banks, deeming said bank insolvent, took possession, and ever since has been in possession, thereof. The amount of money named in the said check was not transmitted by said bank to plaintiff, nor had said amount been charged against defendant’s account in the bank when the superintendent took possession thereof. After the superintendent of banks took possession of said bank, he found the said check among the effects of the bank and forwarded it to plaintiff, but the same, nor no part thereof, has ever been paid.
Owing to a run that was made on the banks of Sioux Falls, the Sioux Falls Trust & Savings Bank was not, on the 14th day of January, 1924, permitting withdrawals in excess of from $5 to $25, but it was open for business all day and honored all checks that were issued in commercial transactions. Defendant had no knowledge of the insolvency of the bank when it took up the said sight drafts on the morning of the 14th, and there was sufficient cash on hand in the bank when the superintendent took possession thereof to have paid defendant’s check.
Upon the foregoing facts the court made the following conclusions of law:
*12 “First: That the plaintiff by transmitting its sight drafts and bills of lading to the Sioux Falls Trust & Savings Bank with instructions not to deliver 'bills of lading until payment of sight drafts, constituted and made the Sioux Falls Trust & Savings Bank its agent.
“Second: That the acceptance of the check of the defendant in payment of said sight drafts, and stamping the same paid and the delivery of the bills of lading, under the circumstances as set forth in the findings of fact, constituted actual payment by the defendant of said sight drafts and constituted full payment for the cars of gasoline as set forth in the stipulated facts and findings of fact herein.”
Judgment was entered accordingly, and.plaintiff appeals.
Appellant challenges both of the foregoing conclusions of law, and contends, first, that because respondent had requested appellant to draw its sight drafts through the Sioux Falls Trust & Savings Bank, said bank became and was the agent of plaintiff! In support of this contention appellant cites and relies upon Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co. v. Steen, 99 Miss. 504, 55 So. 47, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 734; Rivers v. House, 150 Ark. 452, 234 S. W. 641; Sutherland v. Bank, 31 Mich. 230; Smith v. Mills, 112 Or. 496, 230 P. 350. While in some respects analogous, these cases are not decisive, and none of them involves a sight draft. The rule is universal, at least we know of no voice to the contrary, that when a sight draft is drawn the drawer makes the payee the agent of the drawer for the purpose of collecting and remitting the proceeds of the sight draft. The mere fact that the respondent requested appellant to draw through the Sioux Falls Trust & Savings Bank did not make that bank the agent of respondent. It- was merely a request that appellant make that bank its agent for the purpose of collecting the sight drafts and delivering the bills of lading. The request did not make it obligatory upon appellant to select that bank as its agent, although it may have been done for respondent’s convenience. When the request was made does not appear from the record but the record does show that appellant and respondent had been transacting business in the above manner for several years, and the request may have been made one, two, or more years prior to the transaction involved in this case.
The judgment and order appealed from are affirmed.