94 Mass. 573 | Mass. | 1866
The effect of the ruling of the court was to withdraw from the consideration of the jury the question of damages. This was clearly erroneous. The evidence proved not only the utterance of slanderous words by the defendant, but also that they were spoken maliciously. Although it is true that no damages could be awarded for words spoken at any other time than that set forth in the declaration, yet it is also true that proof of the utterance of such slanderous charges on other previous occasions was competent, as- showing that the words charged were spoken maliciously, and thus tended to aggravate the wrong and injury for which the plaintiff sought to recover compensation in this action. It certainly cannot be contended that words spoken with malice and ill will towards a party
In all trials at common law, a jury are the proper judges of the damages. It can rarely happen that the question can be rightly withdrawn from their consideration. It is only when a mere technical invasion of legal right is shown, unaccompanied by any actual injury to person or property, that the court is authorized to instruct them to return a verdict for nominal damages only. The case at bar did not fall within this category. Sheffill v. Van Deusen, 13 Gray, 304, presented a very different question. There the plaintiff failed to prove any legal cause of action, and had no claim for damages, either nominal or substantial. Exceptions sustained.