Appellee IHM, Inc., filed a suit sounding in tort against appellant, a California corporation, and against a Georgia corрoration and two individual residents of Georgia. Appellant failed to file a timely answer, and a default judgment as to liability was enterеd against it. Appellant’s efforts to set aside the default judgment were denied, as was its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Appellee dismissed with prejudice the claims against appellant’s co-defendants, and a bench trial against appellant on the issue of damages resulted in the entry of a judgment of $77,773.29 in favor of appellee, from which judgment appellant now brings this apрeal.
1. Appellant maintains the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motions to set aside default judgment and to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Appellant asserts that he has not engaged in the “minimum contacts” with Georgia that are necessary before a Georgia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over appellant. We disagree.
In 1979, appellant and Integrity Insurance Company entered into an agreement whereby appellant became Integrity’s general agent with the power tо recommend the appointment of local agents for whose actions appellant was held responsible. Market, acting on behalf of Integrity, then contracted with a Georgia corporation, Alpha, in December 1980. Under the terms of that contrаct, Alpha sent weekly reports on its bond sales to appellant, and appellant had the right to inspect Alpha’s books and records; appellant had the right to
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authorize cancellation of bonds as well as the right to adjust, compromise, settle or commit in any way appellant and Integrity to liability regarding claims on the bonds; and appellant had the right to service any Georgia accounts it deemed not properly serviced by Alpha. Alpha sent approximately $70,000 in premiums to appellant, who еxtracted a commission and then sent the remainder to Integrity. We agree with the trial court that appellant’s arrangement with Alpha, which purported to sell bonds to appellee, established “meaningful contacts, ties, or relations” and a sign that appеllant had “purposefully directed [its] activities at residents in the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.”
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
2. Appellant also contends the trial court erred in failing to grаnt summary judgment to appellant after appellee dismissed with prejudice appellant’s co-defendants and alleged agents. Appellant, combining the holdings in
Cranford v. Carver,
3. Thе trial court included in its findings of fact the observation that “Market’s conduct has been sufficiently litigious so as to merit the assessment of attоrney’s fees against [it] and in favor of IHM in the amount of $10,000.” Appellant maintains the award was error inasmuch as there was no allegation of stubborn litigiousness in the pleadings and appellee had presented no evidence on the issue at trial.
Appellee asserts that OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) provides the trial court with sufficient discretion to make the attorney fees award. While the statute vests the trial court with the disсretion to award attorney fees sua sponte, that power is contingent upon the trial court finding that Market’s defense lacked substantial justification or that Market had
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unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by improper conduct. See OCGA § 9-15-14 (b);
Griggs v. Columbus Bank &c. Co.,
4. Appellant contends the trial court’s awards of $7,495 for premiums for uninsured surety bonds and $60,244.29 in lost profits were not supported by the evidence. Relying on testimony given in the bench trial on the issue of damages, appellant maintains there was evidence that bonds were issued to appellee. Appellant overlooks the fact that “[d]ue to [its] default [it] is in a position of having admitted each and every material allegation of [appellee’s] complaint except as to the amount of damages suffered by [appellee]. [Cits.] Defenses which go to the right of recovery are not available to the defendant in default even though the same defense may also go to the assessment of damages. [Cits.]”
Whitby v. Malay,
The issue of compensatory damages was the topic of much testimony and debate during the bench trial. While appellant disputed the amount of loss which appellee claimed to have suffered, we cannot say that, as a matter of law, the factfinder’s award was clearly erroneous. See OCGA § 9-11-52. Accordingly, we must affirm.
Nodvin v. Krabe,
5. In light of our disposition of Market’s appeal, we must dismiss IHM’s cross-appeal as moot.
Judgment affirmed in Case No. A89A0478 with direction that the award of attorney fees be stricken. Appeal dismissed in Case No. A89A0479.