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Mark Langford v. Warden, Ross Correctional Inst.
593 F. App'x 422
6th Cir.
2014
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*1 self-evidently greater or less is not amount-in-controversy re the federal than removing defendant must

quirement,” a of the evi by “preponderance

prove controversy ex that the amount in

dence” threshold. jurisdictional ceeds Gafford LANGFORD, Petitioner- Mark (6th Co., F.2d v. Elec. Gen. Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Cir.1993), grounds by abrogated on other Friend, v. Corp. Hertz 1181, 175L.Ed.2d 1029 WARDEN, CORRECTIONAL ROSS burden, Bank satisfy its Attempting INSTITUTION, Respondent- showing that points America to records Appellant/Cross-Appellee. bank currently owes Nowieki $66,577.04 to the According 13-3855, on her loan. Nos. 13-3857. “[t]herefore, bank, if were to [Nowieki] Appeals, United States Court of claim], of contract her breach [on succeed Sixth Circuit. be re- only America] would [Bank $66,577.04 ..., to write off the but quired Nov. 2014. damages ‘in an subject it could also be $25,000.’” amount in excess of But the figures

bank cannot be liable for both time; either Nowieki owes

the same loan,

$66,577.04 on the or it owes her $25,000 In in credit on the loan.

excess event, $66,577.041 falls figure $75,000

short of the threshold.

Because the bank fails to demonstrate

by preponderance of the evidence controversy exceeded amount removal,

$75,000 at the time of the district jurisdiction. subject

court lacked matter Gafford, 997 F.2d at 158.

See

Accordingly, we VACATE the district judgment and REMAND with in-

court’s remand the action to state

structions to

court. Moreover, $66,577.04 subject-matter ju- propriety we claimed Bank assess risdiction “at the time of removal.” William- of America includes interest fees assessed Co., through September v. Aetna Ins. 2014—well after the son Life Cir.2007). (6th The bank offers no evidence to federal court in bank removed this case concerning time. February acknowledges, the value of the loan at that 2011. As the bank

ment in Jones’ murder. *5, WL In *7. about February 2006, law reopened enforcement the case as a result of this information. Id. at *2. DONALD, BEFORE: BOGGS and Law enforcement located Nichole Smith in HOOD, Judges; Circuit Judge.* District they also interviewed the two

prisoners claiming to have information OPINION Langford. about Id. On October an Ohio grand jury again indicted DONALD, BERNICE BOUIE Circuit ford on two counts relating to Jones’ Judge. murder, death: aggravated in violation Petitioner Mark Langford, an Ohio state 2903.01, Ohio § Rev.Code Ann. and mur- prisoner, filed writ of habeas corpus der, § in violation of *4 2903.02. Id. Each pursuant 2254, § to 28 claiming U.S.C. count included what Ohio “spec- law calls a grounds several for relief from his state ification,” charging Langford that pos- trial court conviction for murder. The dis- sessed a during firearm the offense. The granted trict court and petition denied the firearm specification exposed Langford to in part, and both appealed. sides For the a mandatory minimum sentence under follow, reasons that we AFFIRM the dis- 2929.14(B)(1)(a). § trict court in respects. all

Langford moved the state trial court to I. BACKGROUND dismiss the indictment ground on the that pre-indictment delay violated his state 1995, In Langford Mark and Marlon and federal due process rights and his Jones were members of rival gangs. State right present Langford, defense. 9AP-1140, Langford, No. 3042185, Langford WL argued (Ohio 3042185, 2010). 5, at *6 Ct.App. Aug. key that several including Paul witnesses— In rivalry, the course of this Langford was Mike”) Michael (“Big Ross Don Gentry retaliation, up. beaten Id. In July (also Mike”), “Big known as and Deshaun 1995, Langford, friends, possibly and his Williams —were now deceased. Id. at *2- shot at the they individuals whom believed 3. Additionally, evidentiary at an hearing, *1, had attacked Langford. Id. at *6. a detective testified that law enforcement gunfire. *1, Jones died in the Id. at *6. destroyed had two pieces of forensic evi- 4, 1995, On August the State of Ohio in- dence: the bullet that killed Jones and a dicted Langford for Jones’ murder. Id. at cartridge containing box Langford’s fin- trial, *1. At witness Nichole Smith did not gerprint. Id. at *2. On June subpoena honor her and appear testify. court, judge, trial in open denied Lang- Subsequently, Id. on November ford’s Langford motion to dismiss because indictment, the state dismissed the and the did not demonstrate that that pre-indict- court entry ordered an of nolle prosequi. delay ment caused him prejudice. actual In prisoners, 2005 two federal Ar- Jason Id. at *3. Jackson, nold and Isaac informed law en- forcement they that heard while On October proceeded the case incarcerated, he was confess to involve- to trial. The presented State of Ohio two * Hood, Page Michigan, Honorable Denise sitting by designation. United Judge States District for the Eastern District finding Lang- Lang- required that murder at trial. The first was that

theories shooter, actual and therefore caused the death of anoth- “purposely ford was the ford offender in the homicide. principal Finally, the court instructed er.” theory was that was an second as a could be “convicted accomplice. Nichole Smith testified complicitor or as a or an principal offender spend time with “De- in she would or all counts and aider and abetter that in She further testified boys.” troit in The in- specifications the indictment.” “F boys” “Detroit and the July 1995 the stated: structions (named for Fairwood and group” and L guilty the defendant you Before can find Roads), was a of which Jones Livingston complicitor of a crime as a or aider drugs.” had a feud over “territorial part, abettor, beyond a reason- you must find boys” L “beat that the “F and She testified ... aided able doubt that pretty bad.” Smith testi- [up Langford] commit- purposely or abetted another July she night fied that on the The defendant ting the offenses.... alleys,” “hanging out guilty complicity cannot be found un- get it was “time to [the ford told her that committed, actually less the offense was boys].” F and L Smith also testified may guilty complicity be found but he confederates had three Langford and his of- attempt in an to comit [sic] (two rifle), handguns and one but weapons .... is one fense An aider or abettor Langford did not have the rifle. *5 aids, assists, supports, encourages, who boys walked with the Detroit Smith with, advises, or incites an- cooperates F L and she group, direction of the and crime, partici- to comit a and other [sic] boys witnessed the Detroit with the rifle in the commission of the offense pates group. at the F and L Smith testi- shoot act, word, gesture. by some Langford fied that she also witnessed shooting group. at the F and L The two 2009, 27, jury On returned October prisoners, Jason Arnold and Isaac federal One, jury ac- its verdict. On Count Jackson, con- also testified quitted Langford aggravated of murder in Jones’ death. fessed to his involvement but convicted specification and the firearm charged On October 2009 the court of mur- him of the lesser included offense One, in- jury. On Count the court Two, jury convicted der. On Count jury that in order to convict structed acquitted him Langford of murder but of murder, aggravated of it needed specification. the firearm The court sen- Langford “purposely and with to find Langford, only, Two to tenced Count design and caused the prior calculation years imprisonment. fifteen to life Jones,” provided Marlon and it a death of Appeals, the Ohio appeal On Court Ohio Rev. “purposely.” definition of See assignments five of er- Langford raised (“A pur- § acts person Code Ann. 2901.22 rors, only one of which was sustained. See specific when it is his intention to posely at *1. The ”). Langford, cause a certain result.... accept Lang- did not Supreme Ohio Court murder, also instructed on the elements 127 (as appeal. Langford, ford’s See State v. a lesser charged in both Count One (2011) offense) N.E.2d 1266 Two, Ohio St.3d 939 included and and was Count (table). Appeals The Ohio denied Court in the “purposely” told that the word used Langford’s application reopening, for definition of that crime had the same again did not Supreme the Ohio meaning previously explained. as the court appeal for review. accept Langford’s stated Specifically, State v. 128 Ohio St.3d facts light presented evidence (2011)(table). N.E.2d in the State court proceeding. Langford petitioned in federal district 2254(d). § 28 U.S.C. The “unreasonable court for a writ of corpus, habeas seeking application” clause authorizes federal (1)

relief on grounds: several pre- courts grant the writ when a “state- indictment delay rights violated his to due court decision unreasonably applies the (2) process trial; and a fair the trial judge law of Supreme [the Court] to the facts of failed to instruct on the rea mens prisoner’s case.” Williams v. Taylor, (3) complicity; for his appellate coun 529 U.S. 120 S.Ct. sel was ineffective failing sev raise (2000). L.Ed.2d 389 The state-court appli- eral issues to the state court of appeals. A cation of federal law must be “objectively magistrate judge recommended that unreasonable.” Id. grant district court relief on the second claim and deny relief on the others. See III. ANALYSIS Langford Warden, Inst., v. Ross Corr. No. A. Jury Instruction

2:12-CV-0096, (S.D.Ohio 2013 WL 459196 2013). Feb. court district condition granted ally Langford relief on

instruction issue Langford’s and dismissed “The gives Constitution a criminal other Warden, claims. See Langford v. defendant the right to have a deter Inst., 2:12-CV-96, Ross Corr. No. mine, doubt, beyond reasonable guilt his (S.D.Ohio 2013). WL 3223379 June every element of the crime with which charged.” he is Gaudin, United States Respondent appeals Warden the district 506, 522-23, court’s decision granting Langford a condi- L.Ed.2d 444 law, Under Ohio tional writ of corpus habeas on the jury defendant can be convicted under a theory instruction claim. Langford appeals the *6 of accomplice liability if he with “act[s] the district court’s dismissal of pre-indict- his kind of culpability required for the com delay ment claim and his ineffective assis- mission of an offense.” Ohio Rev.Code tance of counsel claim. 2923.03(A). § Ann. A person guilty of II. complicity STANDARD OF prosecuted “shall be pun REVIEW ished as if he principal were a offender.” We review the district court’s legal con- 2923.03(F). § Id. support a “[T]o convic regarding Langford’s clusions peti- habeas tion for complicity ... the evidence must de tion novo. Lafler, v. Davis 658 F.3d show ... that the defendant shared the (6th Cir.2011) (en banc). A feder- criminal intent of the principal.” State v. al may court grant not a petition for a writ Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 754 N.E.2d of corpus habeas “any for claim was Langford argues that the adjudicated on the merits State court trial court’s failure to so instruct violates proceedings,” unless the state proceedings: Supreme Court law. (1) resulted in a decision that con- to, trary or involved an unreasonable Here, the trial court instructed the of, application clearly established Feder- that it could Langford convict anas accom- law, al by determined the Supreme plice if it found that he “aided or abetted States; of the Court or United another in purposely committing the of- (2) resulted in a decision that was based fenses.” The trial court did not instruct on an unreasonable determination of the the jury that complicity required that review, then, is at 785. Our Id. culpability required with the

Langford act decision that i.e., Appeals’ Ohio of murder, The Ohio Court purposely. mens rea did the trial court to instruct on noted that failure Appeals Court meaning right. Langford’s jury on trial did instruct violate reasoned: The court “purposely.” is whether question pivotal “The verdict, found that its jury, by The [Supreme application court’s state intention specific had a Id. “A state was unreasonable.” law] Jones, either Marlon the death of cause a claim lacks court’s determination the tran- or by his own intention relief so habeas federal precludes merit who was of the shooter spired intent disagree jurists could long as fairminded Ruger .357. The actually using the the state court’s deci on the correctness of by the misled not have been could (internal omit quotation sion.” Id. at 786 it have found charge given, nor could ted). may grant the writ based “[W]e an error in upon based Langford guilty only in jury instructions errors in state jury charge. Lafler, Daniels v. extraordinary cases.” The Cir.2007) (6th (citing explain It did not did not elaborate. court 764, 780, 110 Jeffers, Lewis v. U.S. determined jury “by its verdict” how (1990)). As 111 L.Ed.2d 606 S.Ct. intention to specific had the noted, must prosecution previously verdict form jury’s murder Jones. doubt, every reasonable prove, beyond a “f[ou]nd simply stated Gaudin, charged. element of the crime the lesser included of- guilty of 2310; 522-23, 115 S.Ct. see 515 U.S. at count “guilty as to fense of murder” 358, 364, 90 Winship, In re also for murder.” two of the indictment (“[T]he (1970) 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 mens rea or verdict form did not address the accused protects Due Process Clause may have con- anything indicate be except upon proof against conviction rea. Langford’s mens cluded about every fact nec yond a reasonable doubt of reasoning for the state court’s Although the crime with which essary to constitute jury instruction claim rejecting Langford’s Montana, charged.”); Sandstrom he is terse, the state our concern is with L.Ed.2d 39 2450, 61 adequacy, decision—not court’s (1979) jury instruc (finding that deficient Indeed, we reasoning. its logic, even constitutional tion violated the defendant’s deference to state accord the same *7 the state requiring not rights on the mer- of a claim adjudication court’s of element of the criminal prove every any it regardless provides of whether its doubt). Here, beyond a reasonable fense Richter, reasoning Harrington at all. however, not instruct the trial court did accomplice, as an jury the that conviction “[Djetermining L.Ed.2d law, that the defen requires Ohio under resulted a state court’s decision whether principal. the the same intent as dant have con- legal unreasonable or factual from an correctly rea magistrate As the an that there be require clusion does not soned, law. Supreme violated Court this the explaining the state court opinion from *13. Langford, 2013 WL See AEDPA reasoning.” Id. state court’s contrary the state court’s Accordingly, give court to require not a state “does necessarily an unreason conclusion was can be deemed before its decision reasons ” law. Supreme Court application able on the merits.’ ‘adjudicated to have been specifications of the indictment.” in- structions you continue: “Before can find Respondent dispute does not guilty defendant of a crime as a com- trial court failed to instruct on the mens plicitor abettor, or aider and you must find complicity, rea of but presents instead a beyond a reasonable doubt that ... variety arguments suggesting, essential- defendant aided or abetted another in pur- ly, any error Respon- was harmless. offenses_” posely committing the Addi- instructions, dent first argues jury that the tionally, the instructions jury: informed the entirety, their sufficiently instructed the “An charging indictment a defendant as a jury on the mens rea element. ap- This principal charges offender also the defen- pears theory to be the that the Ohio Court dant with aiding and abetting that crime.” of Appeals relied on as well: instructions as whole were ambigu- agree We with the magistrate judge: ous. See Langford, 2010 WL the state court decision is an unreasonable find, however, *5. We that there noth- application law, Supreme even ing convey instructions to viewing when instructions in their that an principle accomplice need act with entirety, given the instructions’ failure to mens rea principal same as the offend- include language informing the jury er in to be guilty order found as a compli- about the mens required rea of complicity. One, citor. Beginning with Count See twenty-four page jury first ad- instructions Although the instructions did not directly dressed the elements of aggravated mur- state that complicity is a strict-liability der, the specification, firearm the doc- and crime, they also did not affirmatively state trine of transferred intent. The trial court Rather, the correct mens rea. the instruc- then turned to the lesser included offenses tions omitted mention of the mens rea for of murder and involuntary manslaughter. complicity altogether. The instruction on the lesser included of- indicated, As the trial court instructed fense of murder you states: “Before can the jury that conviction under a theory of find the defendant guilty, you must find accomplice liability required the jury to that the proved beyond State has reason- find “aided or abetted an- able that the doubt defendant ... purpose- other in purposely committing the of- ly caused the death of another.” fenses.” adopt We decline to the proposi- Beginning on the fourteenth page, tion that' “purposely” the word in this then instructions address Count Two. clause was sufficient. In order to instruct again state: you “Before correctly, comply with Ohio’s Murder, find the guilty you instruction, model the adverb “pur- must proved find State has be- posely” must have modified the verb yond a reasonable doubt that ... the de- phrase In “aided abetted.” the in- fendant purposely caused the death of struction actually given, the adverb “pur- Marlon Jones.” Seven para- additional posely” instead modifies the verb “commit- graphs specification discuss the firearm not, ting.” argues, This as the dissent *8 the and lesser included offense of involun- insignificant minor “misplacement of a tary manslaughter. instructed, “Purposely,” word.” as modi-

Then, the complici- verb, instructions address fies completely different in and ty: may “The defendant be doing convicted as a so open question the leaves as to the principal offender or complicitor as a anor manner in Langford which must have “aid- aider any and abettor to or all counts and ed and abetted another.” When properly

430 per- of another “thereby causes the death abetting an- aiding and “purposely placed, accurately held the Supreme murder committing in son.” Id. other” that, as a in order to be convicted conveys on causa- court’s failure to elaborate trial have had the Langford must complicitor, judge trial was not error where “the tion to aid and abet the murder specific intent statutory lan- jury” the exact read to the placed, the improperly When of Jones. There, 153, at 97 1730. gúage. Id. S.Ct. erroneously that in order informed jury is prejudice “claim of [was] the defendant’s complicitor, as a to convict give any explana- to based on the failure another, or abetted must have aided ford statutory reading beyond tion “purpose- that the other and it is sufficient element.” the causation language itself of These two murder. fully committ[ed]” added). (emphasis 1730 Id. at 97 S.Ct. equivalents. functional are not scenarios that a trial court requirement There no is Thus, say it is insufficient the elements of do more than instruct on correct, error is or that its instruction however, Here, the trial court an offense. fully discussed more below— harmless —as language even read the did not “purposely” ap- simply because the word 2923.03, complicity § Ohio’s statute.1 in the sentence. Accord- pears somewhere “purposely” complic- the word ingly, Further, reviewing even the “totali ity reasonably cannot be read instruction trial, are ty of the circumstances” at we convey must accurately persuaded not was sufficient for complicity required act with the kind of the mens rea needed for com ly aware of underlying offense. McNeil, Middleton v. 541 plicity. Citing addition, Respondent’s reliance In 124 S.Ct. 158 L.Ed.2d Kibbe, 145, 97 on Henderson v. 431 U.S. (2004), Respondent asks us to consider (1977) is mis- S.Ct. 52 L.Ed.2d light prosecu instructions of the the facts of this case. placed applied argument at trial. In Middle closing tor’s Henderson, robbed an In the defendant ton, law does the Court found that federal him on an man and abandoned intoxicated appellate a state court from prohibit in near zero-de- unlighted night road at prosecutor’s argument that a assuming thereafter, the man gree Shortly weather. jury charge. an Mid ambiguous clarifies Id. at was hit a truck and died. dleton, charged The state the defen- S.Ct. 1730. Here, reproduces in his brief Respondent a statute that dant with murder under eight pages prosecutor’s closing of the ar circum- provided guilt when “under provides accompa but almost no gument, evincing depraved indifference to stances legal argument. Having reviewed nying life, recklessly engages in human [one] argument, we do not find prosecutor’s risk of grave conduct which creates a analysis. Respondent it alters thereby person, another death to use of suggests prosecutor’s Id. person.” the death of another causes “intend,” “intentions,” “want like words (alteration marks 97 S.Ct. ed,” them,” eight pages over omitted). “help sought The defendant habeas shows that the closing argument, somehow relief, that the trial court should arguing in the meaning prosecutor cured defect instructed the on the have 1730. A of New York’s in Henderson 1. Also relevant for the Court initially appeals first raised the chal- intermediate court of that the defendant did not from the court’s affir- sufficiency in his dissent lenge issue Henderson, id. the defendant’s conviction. See U.S. at mance of appeal. direct See *9 Respondent’s instructions. argument is principal. See Langford, 459196, 2013 WL persuasive. not hardly It needs stating at *15. the use of words like “intend” and

“wanted” in the course of discussing the narrative of the crime do not inform a jury Finally, Respondent argues that that an accomplice must share mens any failure to instruct on an element of the rea of the principal. prosecutor’s offense was harmless error. A trial closing argument, if anything, rendered court’s failure to charge an element of an applicable law more opaque. For in- offense subject to harmless error analy stance, Respondent highlights the follow- States, sis. See Neder v. United 527 U.S. ing statement made the prosecutor at 1, 12, 1827, L.Ed.2d 35 one point in closing argument: “It doesn’t (1999). Supreme Court has further matter who actually fired the bullet that recognized that a trial court’s failure to killed Marlon Jones. Everybody helped. instruct fully and accurately the nec about Anybody helped who in any way is equally essary mens for accomplice rea liability is guilty, equally guilty complicity.” This reviewed for harmless error. See Califor statement, if anything, compounded the er- v. Roy, 3-4, nia 117 S.Ct. ror in instructions. (1996). 136 L.Ed.2d 266 On federal habe- review, as the omission of an element is reject We also Langford’s charac not harmless error if there is “grave doubt terization of the record. argues about whether a trial error of federal law jury’s acquittal on the firearm had ‘substantial injurious and effect or in specifications under Counts and One Two ” fluence determining the jury’s verdict.’ demonstrate concluded that McAninch, O’Neal v. 432, 436, 513 U.S. Langford did possess a gun and was (1995) 115 S.Ct. 130 L.Ed.2d 947 not the Therefore, principal offender. he (quoting Abrahamson, Brecht v. 507 U.S. argues, the jury must have found him 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 123 L.Ed.2d 353 guilty of only murder under the accom (1993)). plice-liability theory. We decline draw that inference. As the magistrate judge Two cases illustrate how the harmless cogently explained, “[a] need not act error doctrine operates in the context of either rationally or consistently when it faulty-jury-instruction Neder, claims. In returns a verdict in a criminal case.” convicted the of multi- fraud, We ple fraud, counts of mail wire cannot question even inconsistent verdicts. filing false income-tax returns. 527 U.S. Powell, United States v. 119 S.Ct. 1827. The ruled that 83 L.Ed.2d 461 An materiality aof defendant’s falsehoods inconsistent may verdict result because anis element of fraud offenses. Id. at 20. jury, “the convinced of guilt, properly Nonetheless, the Court found that the trial reached its conclusion on compound court’s failure materiality to instruct on offense, mistake, through then com an element was harmless error because promise, lenity, arrived at an inconsis “overwhelming” trial evidence “incontro- tent conclusion on the lesser vertibly offense.” Id. established] [the defendant’s] 65, 105 magistrate S.Ct. 471. The false statements were material.” Id. at correctly reasoned that may we not as 119 S.Ct. 1827. Additionally, the defense’s sume the theory on which the jury convict theory did not turn on the materiality ele- ed Langford an accomplice ment, or as a and the defense argue declined —as *10 at shooting men were that three found confessed could be statements

that the false three, Jones, Langford was one short, that the erroneous Id. In immaterial. shooting a .22- was Langford the omit- that because was harmless instruction testimo- handgun. “[N]o Id. “uncontested and caliber was ted element both fa- Langford fired the ny Id. establishes that overwhelming evidence.” by supported Here, jury was Although Id. the enti- the instruc- tal shot.” 1827. at inferences and convict to its supported nor tled draw own neither uncontested tion is offender, “it at is principal as a overwhelming evidence. by so, it more likely, if not least as States, re we v. United In Dawson an aider and abettor.” him as convicted a de which petition a habeas viewed *15. at We Langford, convictions for his fendant claimed that the any conclusions about to draw decline were infirm possession firearm unlawful It jury’s conviction. actual basis for the jury the instructed the trial court because was not the evidence suffices to note that theory of con on a that it could convict Neder, “overwhelming,” alone great —let 347, 349 possession. structive 1827—that at 119 S.Ct. 527 U.S. Cir.2012). (6th giving the We found offender. The failure was a principal ford was er instruction constructive-possession complicity, mens rea of on to instruct testimony sug no there “was ror because therefore, influence in a substantial had constructive defendant] gesting [the determining jury’s verdict. firearm.” Id. at 350. ly possessed Nonetheless, the error we held that was because, “[vjiewing record harmless a recognize high bar that We whole, jury it clear the found a [wa]s re before obtaining must clear petitioner theory on a based guilty defendant]

[the “The bur claim. jury lief on a instruction Id. possession.” actual of an demonstrating that erroneous den of matter, agree we with the In the instant that it will prejudicial was so instruction appears this “case magistrate attack on the constitu support a collateral situation.” just opposite present judgment court’s validity of a state tional 459196, at *15. “It Langford, 2013 WL showing required greater even than that,” trial had the court be said cannot appeal.” on plain error direct to establish con- that it could instructed the Henderson, at 97 S.Ct. 1730. accomplice while also Langford as an vict such, cases” only “extraordinary merit As com- mens rea of failing to instruct on errors habeas “based granting relief undoubtedly would “the have plicity, Daniels, 501 F.3d state instructions.” a of- being principal of petitioner convicted at 735. trial, any- if at fender.” Id. evidence case, court trial failed theory In this with of thing, is more consistent required on a element liability. instruct the principal liability than accomplice not involve noted, case does the offense. This Appeals Jones the Ohio Court As give the failure to following: Ruger “a fired from killed bullet instruction, unnecessary but handgun.” desired large gauge or other .357 1730; Henderson, 155, 97 S.Ct. *4. Ni- U.S. Langford, 2010 WL affirmatively allow- express an instruction two men were Smith testified that chole theory on an invalid ing convict Jones and one was shooting handguns at Pulido, Hedgpeth v. guilt, Id. One of the an assault shooting rifle. (2008); 172 L.Ed.2d 388 informants testified

prison the failure to instruct on an Daniels, element that Additionally, in we noted that *11 Neder, trial, was uncontested at 527 U.S. the trial court accurately stated the mens 1827; 119 S.Ct. or an instruction requirement Daniels, rea twice. correctly that thrice stated the law and at 742. This “made clear that the jury it, Middleton, incorrectly once stated 541 could not convict [the defendant] without 437-38, 124 finding S.Ct. 1830. that” he shared the mental state of principal the offense. Id. at 742-43. This case differs even from in- others arguably misleading “[O]ne statement of volving claims that a trial court erred in the requirement,” said, mens rea we was incorrectly instructing on the mens rea of not “likely to have caused the jury to complicity. instance, Lafler, Daniels v. for ignore repeated prior statements of the involved a defendant convicted of murder requirement.” correct Here, Id. at 743. and assault for helping a friend burn down the trial court properly failed to instruct house, a killing three children. 501 the on the mens rea of complicity. J.). (Boggs, F.3d at 737 On petition for relief, habeas petitioner argued the B. Pre-Indictment Delay passage one in the might instructions Langford also seeks relief on the have led the him convict even if it ground that delay the between the offense did not believe that prosecution proved and the indictment right violates his to a requirement mens rea of complicity. fair trial present and to a defense. Jones Id. at 740. In rejecting petitioner’s July was shot on grand 1995. A claim, we observed that challenged indicted Langford on October instruction necessarily was not even inac- Langford argues that thirteen-year this curate, as it necessary “state[d] condition delay was unconstitutional. guilt, for not a sufficient condition.” Id. at Due “[T]he Process Clause of the Fifth 742. We also noted that there was no [may] require Amendment dismissal of evidence challenged instruction indictment if it were [an] shown ... constituted an incorrect statement of pre-indictment delay ... caused sub- Here, Michigan contrast, law. Id. even prejudice stantial appellees’ rights to a Ohio’smodel suggest fair trial and that the delay was an inten- the trial court’s failure to instruct on the tional gain device to tactical advantage mens rea of complicity significant. over the accused.” United States v. Mar- The model instruction states: ion, 307, 324, 404 U.S. charged The defendant is complici- with (1971). L.Ed.2d 468 It is insufficient for a ty. in the commission the offense of petitioner merely pre-indict- to show that 0specify offense). you Before can find delay ment prejudice. caused him actual guilty, you defendant must find be- process Due prosecution does not “ba[r] yond doubt, a reasonable ... whenever a defendant suffers prejudice as (insert culpable mental state preindictment a result of delay.” United required one is the commission if Lovasco, States v. principal offense) [aided or abetted] S.Ct. 52 L.Ed.2d 752 Unless another in committing the offense petitioner can prosecution show that the {specify offense). sought a “tactical advantage” or acted with Here, 2-OJI-CR 523.03. the trial court disregard” “reckless to their rights, “pro- improperly inserted the culpable mental secutpng] a defendant following investiga- state wrong before the verb. delay tive deprive does not him of due a federal claim has have at 784-85. “When might if defense even his

process, to a state court and lapse presented of been by the prejudiced been somewhat relief, may it be state court has denied n. 97 S.Ct. 2044. Id. at 795 time.” adjudicated that the state court presumed argues pre-indictment the merits.” Id. Our review the claim on certain prejudice him because delay caused decision that is of the state court’s available at the longer was no evidence claim fails. pre-indictment-delay ford’s thirteen-year During his trial. time of concluded, after magistrate the bul destroyed law enforcement period, *12 evi- analysis of the trial court’s cartridge thorough and a box that killed Jones let hearing Langford’s on motion to fingerprint. Lang dentiary containing Langford’s dismiss, 3042185, may have suffered Langford Langford *2. that at ford, 2010 WL delay. prejudice as a result of three defense witnesses some argues that also 459196, Langford, 2013 WL at *7-9. to his indict See during years prior died unnecessary repeat analysis that that Deshaun It is to Langford submits ment. appeal, we assume Lang- purposes have testified that here. For Williams would deciding Langford without that suffered in Jones’ homicide. ford was not involved 3042185, inquiry prejudice. process *2. Don But “the due at Langford, 2010 WL Mike”) (known delay as must consider the reasons Gentry “Big purportedly as to the accused.” Lo prejudice was not the well as the Langford information that had (em vasco, 790, 2044 WL 431 U.S. at Langford, fatal shooter. 2010 added). 3042185, phasis Paul Absent an intent on the Langford at *3. submits that (also Mike”) in part delay prosecution State’s to order “Big known as Michael Ross defendant, provided gain advantage to an over the have testified that he would justify can dismiss prejudice an other than no amount of Magnum .357 individual 3042185, delay. ing pre-indictment Lang at a case for Langford, 2010 WL Langford. 459196,at *10. prior ford, died 2013 WL *3. All three individuals Langford’s 2008 indictment. that The trial court determined delay prosecution’s and con was not undertaken to applied

The trial court Lovasco gain advantage Langford. a tactical over Langford did not demonstrate cluded that “I delay. Lang The trial court stated: don’t know how from the prejudice actual 3042185, proceed why at *3. The Ohio or the State was able ford, 2010 WL why with its case or or how it chose not to Appeals, applying a four-factor Court of pursue again 407 this case until 2008.” Wingo, derived from Barker v. test 2182, Appeals 101 Ohio did not address 33 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. trial (1972), delay reasons for the but affirmed the similarly Langford determined that Langford, ruling. of the court’s WL prejudice no as result suffered magistrate judge at *5. The cor- magistrate delay. Id. at *3-5. As noted, rectly noted: ultimate result correctly “[T]he the Ohio Court of courts is entitled to legal stan reached the state applied the incorrect Appeals analytical AEDPA deference even if the Langford, 2013 WL dard. See respects.” in some delay post-indict process was flawed *7. “Pre-indictment Langford, issues.” 2013 WL delay present separate ment suggesting offers no evidence Schaffer, 586 F.3d ford States United (6th Cir.2009). noted, But, delayed the indictment or- prosecution we do over the gain advantage der to tactical legal court’s reason not evaluate state Lovasco, 431 U.S. at Harrington, 131 accused. ing, however flawed. See Instead, asks us to have raised additional arguments about presume bad part instructions, faith pros an argument that a only ecution because “the rational explana prejudicial witness’ comment warranted a mistrial, delayed tion is that the State indicting and an argument the trial gain order to a tactical advan court erred in failing to suppress certain tage.” We decline to draw inference. statements. Langford presented these ar- It is incumbent on Langford guments to show that to the Ohio Court of Appeals in delay was prompted by a desire to gain his motion to reopen the appeal. See a tactical advantage trial. United at *16-18. Brown, (6th States v. Cir. law, Under federal to establish ineffec 1992). Where a has no direct tive counsel, assistance of a criminal defen faith, of bad previously evidence we have dant must first repre show “counsel’s to infer improper prosecutorial declined an sentation fell objective below an standard motive. Id. of reasonableness.” Strickland v. Wash a showing prosecution Even *13 ington, 2052, 466 U.S. 104 S.Ct. prepared was to proceed to trial earlier (1984). 80 674 L.Ed.2d inquiry This looks than it did is insufficient to meet the Lo- at whether trial fell counsel below the Lovasco, standard. vasco U.S. standard of a competent attorney. Id. at 97 S.Ct. 2044. The magistrate judge spec 688-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052. There is a strong ulated that part of the thirteen-year delay presumption that counsel’s conduct falls may have been the product of lack of within the range wide of pro reasonable interest or lack of Langford, effort. fessional assistance. Id. at 104 S.Ct. But, WL at *11. the magistrate Secondly, 2052. to succeed on an ineffec noted, judge correctly “that is not the claim, tive-assistance a criminal defendant designed same conduct to make it more must show that counsel’s ineffectiveness difficult for a defendant to mount a de 692, 104 prejudiced him. Id. at S.Ct. 2052. ' fense.” Id. For fully reasons more set is, That must defendant show that magistrate forth in the judge’s Report and that, there is a reasonable probability but Recommendation, there is no basis to con errors, unprofessional for counsel’s the re that the prosecution delayed clude indict sult of the proceeding would have been in order to gain ment advantage. tactical different. Id. at 104 S.Ct. 2052. It is See id. The essential is that point very difficult for a to surmount state court’s presumptive conclusion to high Strickland’s bar. See Cullen v. Pin that effect is not unreasonable. — holster, —, U.S. 131 S.Ct. 1404-08, (2011) 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (rejecting

C. Ineffective Assistance defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim Appellate of Counsel even when perform counsel failed to A criminal the right defendant has investigation before a penalty-phase hear to effective assistance of counsel on a ing sentence); first that resulted in a death see appeal right. as of Lucey, Hook, Evitts v. Bobby 4, 9-13, 469 also v. Van 387, 396-97, (2009) (re 83 L.Ed.2d 175 L.Ed.2d 255 Langford argues that he jecting defendant’s ineffective assistance entitled to habeas relief because his coun claim based on counsel’s failure to investi sel appeal on direct was ineffective for gate more thoroughly and present more failing to raise several issues. Langford evidence), mitigating rev’g Van Hook v. argues that his appellate Anderson, (6th Cir.2009). counsel should 560 F.3d 523 relief, denied Appeals of The Ohio Court Jury Instructions really issue was not an stating: “Causation counsel appellate Langford argues to The victim was shot in the case. failing argue ineffective for 459196, at Langford, death.” declining to instruct in court erred trial similarly de- magistrate *17. The at the scene presence mere likely “would not this claim termined that under to convict crime is insufficient appeal.” if on direct have raised succeeded The trial liability. theory accomplice of Further, Langford agree. *21. Id. at We “[Mjere pres- jury: instructed the court federal, case, indicating no state or cites if it is enough [to convict] can be ence incorrectly charged the court that the trial of- primary to and does aid intended jury on causation. held Appeals The Ohio Court fender.” appellate not have charge given Finally, Langford argues would

that “the solely trial guilty argued based have findings counsel should allowed declining give in an instruc- [Langford’s] presence.” court erred upon may magistrate place it advising tion WL issue, testimony jail- reviewing weight on the judge, independently diminished gave made it The trial court agreed “that the house informants. instruction, peti- telling to find sufficiently clear that order general theory, he had complicity credibility on a of witnesses” guilty tioner “consider bias, any, act furtherance if to- to have committed some “interest and to consider magistrate the crime.” Id. at *19. all the facts and circumstances gether with specific testimony.” The Ohio surrounding *14 further stated: “Even the judge objected— Langford’s claim [Langford] Appeals to which denied language Court enough if it is not required ‘mere can be that Ohio does presence ground on the that of- cell- primary charge given to and does aid the to be when special a intended pres- than testify. Langford, that the more mates or fellow inmates fender’—told (ie. complicitor’s magistrate the fact that the The at *18. ence WL of- actually- primary the that this issue would not presence judge aided determined fender) convict.” on direct needed in order to succeeded if raised likely have Langford, citing State appeal. Id. Id. Nelson, 79, 303 36 Ohio St.2d N.E.2d that on our Langford relies statement (1973), a requires law claims Ohio crime at the scene of the presence “mere requested jury instruc- give trial court to a defendant enough ... not to convict [is] tion if it contains a correct statement States v. aiding abetting.” United proposi- stands for no such law. Nelson Cir.1991). (6th Head, 1361, 1373 tion. that the tri- argues Additionally, Langford incorrect instruction on gave al eourt an Prejudicial Comment The trial court instructed causation. Warranting Mistrial to act is an act or failure jury: “Cause examination, prosecu direct sequence On the natural continuous which prison of the informants tion one and without asked directly produces death his Langford discussed involvement why it not have Cause would occurred. which responded: The witness Jones’ is the natural and murder. occurs when the death me, up it to he brought first to “When he or failure result act foreseeable killed some things like he had say used to Ohio law re- Langford submits that act.” before, Ap- The Ohio Court of so.” instruction. one causation quires different peals found that the trial court “sustained statements, randa. In these objection an to the statement it sometimes acknowledged because being nearby the could be referring construed as to one scene of the or crime but denied being the more shooter. Langford, other homicides and made it clear to at they should *17. Langford did not testify consider at trial. any purpose statement The whatsoever.” Ohio of Appeals denied claim, ford’s stating: WL “Nothing *17. in the rec- trial court Langford’s denied ord motion for a before us indicates that the trial court Langford argues mistrial. should appellate have sustained the motion sup- to counsel press was ineffective for failing argue Langford’s statements or that this was error. statements actually were harmful to Lang- ford’s case.” Id. magistrate judge The Ohio Appeals Court of determined determined that even any if statements court trial was within its discre- about being near the crime scene merited tion deny a mistrial. Langford, 2013 suppression, “there was enough other evi- WL magistrate *18. The placing dence petitioner at or near noted that a trial ruling deny court’s scene of the crime any statements in mistrial be “will sustained on ‘ab- appeal ” which he conceded as much would have sent an abuse of discretion.’ Id. at *20 largely been cumulative.” Id. at 21. Treesh, (quoting State v. 90 Ohio St.3d (2001)). 739 N.E.2d Our thor- of a state After review court’s determina oughly analyzing the tion that exchange between a criminal defendant received prosecutor trial, and the witness at effective particularly assistance is deferen magistrate judge tial. apply reasoned: We do not Strickland directly. Rather, the question pivotal is whether the ambiguous

Given the nature of the ref- state court’s application of the Strickland erence, immediate objection, the lack standard was unreasonable. Harrington, additional testimony argument 131 S.Ct. at 785. apply Were we to Strick murders, about other heavy and the bur- land analysis directly, would no be den would upon petitioner which rest if, *15 different than for example, this Court appeals court had this issue been were adjudicating a Strickland on claim raised —not to mention the appeals direct of a review criminal in a conviction court’s that it determination found United States district court. Id. com The ruling to have been within the trial highly bination of the deferential stan judge’s discretion—it is not unreason- 2254(d) dards of § Strickland and of able to conclude that even if appellate “doubly makes for deferential judicial re counsel assigned had this as er- matter view.” Mirzayance, Knowles v. ror, it not have would affected the out- S.Ct. 173 129 L.Ed.2d 251 come appeal. of petitioners case, In this the Ohio court was Id. Langford presents no ques- basis for not in concluding Lang- unreasonable tioning conclusion. this ford’s was not counsel ineffective for fail 3. Suppression Langford’s ing to Statements raise the above issues. argues appellate also Additionally, appellate attorneys are not

counsel failing was ineffective for argue required raise all claims desired a trial court erred in suppress counsel, defendant if profes- as a matter of ing certain statements that judgment, made sional present decides not to to law Barnes, enforcement in violation of points. Mi- those v. Jones 463 of a guilty find the defendant you can 77 L.Ed.2d Straub, an aider and

(1983); complicitor v. also Caver crime as see Cir.2003). (6th Langford also abettor, ... find ... you must on ineffective-assistance prevail cannot abetted an- aided or purposely lack merit. underlying if the issues claim the offenses.”1 Be- committing other Mitchell, F.3d See Moore misplace- that the I do not believe cause Cir.2013). (6th Accordingly, Langford five “purposely” by ment of the word ground. on this obtain habeas relief cannot relief, respect- I gives words rise to habeas fully dissent. CONCLUSION IV. the defense rested On October jury that a requires law Supreme Court counsel, judge, its case. The trial defense every element of guilty

ñnd defendant preliminary then held a prosecutor and the Gaudin, 515 U.S. at charged. the crime jury instructions. discussion about law, 522-23, Ohio 2310. Under judge counsel told the Langford’s same must act with the accomplice an ver- given proposed him a prosecutor had guilty of the principal criminal intent as previous Johnson, jury of the instructions at 801. The sion 754 N.E.2d crime. jury he trial court did not instruct counsel stated that day. Langford’s a mens rea element. The complicity has version but prosecution’s reviewed the had contrary to the state court’s decision objections requested modifi- had some language of light unreasonable in judge invited defense counsel cations. and the record as a jury instructions to do a prosecutor and the into chambers whole. The state court’s decisions through sort those issues.” “preliminary claims, though perhaps Langford’s other so, to do and the agreed Both counsel unrea- questioning, from are not not free adjourned court. judge Court law. applications Supreme sonable afternoon, and resumed later that magistrate judge’s with the agree We re- parties conducted an on-the-record Report and Recommendation thorough judge view of the instructions. Ac- with the district court’s decision. prose- that defense counsel and the noted we AFFIRM the district court’s cordingly, provided judge separate cop- cutor had judgment. instructions. As the ies of BOGGS, “integrated counsel dissenting. explained, defense Judge, Circuit to include addition- those giv- that was The actual instruction like to have al instructions that he would you “Before can find the defen- en read: deletions provided to the as well as *16 complicitor or guilty dant of a crime as like for the Court to consid- that he would abettor, ... you and must find an aider originally provided er were ... aided or abetted the defendant agreed The to work from parties State.” committing the of- purposely another in preliminary in their integrated copy parties agree All that the ideal fenses.” jury “Before review of the instructions. jury instruction would have read: principal required for the commission of the model 1. This instruction tracks Ohio’s instruction, offense) you which states: "Before can in commit- abetted] or another [aided you guilty, offense).” must find be- find the defendant (specify ting offense of 2-OJI- doubt, yond that ... the defen- a reasonable CR 523.03. (insert culpable mental state if one is dant discussion, During this the judge asked judge parties and both agreed to conduct a counsel if they any objections had to the second on-the-record review of the revised complicity section of the proposed jury prior closing argu- instructions. Langford’s flys- counsel ments the following week. At the end of peeked the very issue that now forms the the discussion, Langford’s counsel as- basis Langford’s petition. habeas The sumed responsibility for e-mailing a re- following discussion among occurred vised version of the instructions to the (Mr. judge, prosecutor Lowe), and de- prosecution. judge The adjourned then (Mr. Gatterdam). fense counsel court until Monday afternoon.

THE COURT: I think that there was Court resumed as scheduled on Monday the complicity issue that was discussed afternoon. judge noted that she had in chambers. received a revised version of the in- structions prosecution. from the MR. LOWE: Okay. Judge, complici- and the parties conducted a second ty think Mr. agrees Gatterdam —I on-the-record review of instructions, and/or, we can do but I think what we including the complicity instruction. The decided to was I do think going we were following discussion occurred: to take out procured “solicited or anoth- THE else, Counsel, COURT: Anything or,” er to commit the offense and I think we need to change? we just are go going “aiding with MR. GATTERDAM: I typo have a abetting another in committing the of- page 11. I you’re don’t know if page fenses.” THE Okay. COURT: Mr. Gat- 11 now or 12. It was the full para- last terdam, you do is, see where that text or graph, with, starts you “Before can find do you have comment? the defendant of a crime complici- aas MR. I GATTERDAM: do. I guess I tor.” preliminarily just want to make sure THE Yes. COURT: That’s page still it, that-and until we see I I guess don’t MR. GATTERDAM: On or about the know whether I can respond. 18th day blah-blah, July, Agg. Mur- The complicity says section you der or or Murder aided and abetted need to culpable insert the mental state another in “knowingly committing" in- go then into the aided abetted ” stead “committed. language and definitions, and I pre- THE sume that will be done COURT: All right. we revise. Got you. Okay. MR. LOWE: Yes.

MR. added). GATTERDAM: So I will probably (emphasis Thus, Langford’s coun- objection, now, have no but as it is I’m very sel examined the that is sentence now not clear. fact, closely enough, in to catch a issue— typo. yet MR. And agree objection LOWE: We counsel made no mental state needs about the “purposely” to be there. in being word wrong place in the sentence. added). (emphasis Thus, it appears that this version of proposed jury instruc- Additionally, any error in in- omitted mens rea element tions error, structions is harmless light *17 complicity. Langford’s specifically counsel evidence that presented was at trial. A requested that the court the culpa- “insert trial court’s charge failure to an element of mental ble go state and then the into aided an offense is subject to harmless-error or abetted language and definitions.” analysis. States, The v. Neder United 527 U.S.

440 immediately the attack avenge to 1827, 35 tion and 144 L.Ed.2d 119 S.Ct. is, simply no there was has, That Langford.

(1999). partic in Supreme jury allowed the have evidence that would failure ular, a trial court’s recognized that strict-liability under a Langford convict accurately about the fully and to instruct complicity. of liability conception accomplice rea for necessary mens error. See Cali for harmless reviewed is was that that the instruction It is true 2, 3-4, 117 S.Ct. Roy, v. fornia model instruc- track Ohio’s does not given habeas, (1996). On 136 L.Ed.2d instruction fact that But “the tion. it “had sub harmless unless an error is law is under state allegedly incorrect in influence injurious effect or and stantial relief.” Estelle for habeas not a basis Brecht v. verdict.” determining jury’s 71-72, McGuire, 112 S.Ct. 502 U.S. Abrahamson, 113 S.Ct. (1991). “Federal L.Ed.2d 385 1710, 123L.Ed.2d 353 relief, grant do not habeas courts therefore court, simply States, might appellate a state we re- In Dawson v. United may have been the instruction in a de- because petition which viewed a habeas to the mod- comparison [state] in deficient his convictions claimed that fendant 475. The essen- invalid el.” Id. were possession firearm unlawful ailing instruc- is “whether question tial instructed the the trial court because the entire trial infected tion itself so theory a of con- convict on that it could violates due resulting conviction that possession. structive “that the Cir.2012). It is insufficient (6th giving process.” Ibid. found that We erroneous, undesirable, was er- instruction instruction constructive-possession Donnelly v. universally condemned.” sug- even testimony no there “was ror because 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. constructive- gesting defendant] that [the (internal (1974) quo- L.Ed.2d 431 firearm.” Id. at 350. ly possessed the omitted). citation tation marks and Nonetheless, that the error was we held record as “[viewing the harmless because may grant “we court has said that Our whole, jury found [the it clear the [wa]s in state writ based on errors theory of on a guilty based defendant] extraordinary in cases.” only instructions possession.” actual Ibid. (6th 735, 741 F.3d Lafler, Daniels v. Cir.2007). Daniels, claim we denied a In Here, evidence at trial established though “even one Langford’s similar boys” up “F L beat and contained therefore, had a motive sentence that misleading state- confusing arguably Additionally, Nichole revenge. to seek Here, the Id. at 737. ment of the law.” that she witnessed Smith testified given was not the that was And instruction group. at the F and L shooting ford been ideally would have exact one that Arnold and prisoners, Jason two federal wrong not so Jackson, given. It was con- testified Isaac involved, discussions indicated whose death. those his involvement Jones’s fessed to right, no- trying get it they were to disbe- certainly was entitled That of one word. displacement no evi- ticed testimony, but there was lieve this relief. for habeas provide a basis under a does support conviction dence at all to there is a only “whether must consider Lang- We liability where theory accomplice has likelihood reasonable ford, production in a say, performed way instruction challenged applied motivat- and, thereby, unwittingly Hamlet Estelle, violates the Constitution.” ac- purposeful to take ed Jones’s shooter *18 (internal 112 S.Ct. 475 omitted) quotation (emphasis marks add-

ed). Because I do not believe there in light

such a likelihood as a record

whole, respectfully I dissent. America,

UNITED STATES of

Plaintiff-Appellee, MENDEZ,

Israel Gonzales

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-2148. Appeals,

United States Court of

Sixth Circuit.

Nov. COOK,

BEFORE: MOORE and Circuit STEEH, Judges; District Judge.* * Steeh, George Michigan, sitting by designation. C. Honorable United States Judge District for the Eastern District

Case Details

Case Name: Mark Langford v. Warden, Ross Correctional Inst.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: Nov 12, 2014
Citation: 593 F. App'x 422
Docket Number: 13-3855, 13-3857
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
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