Mark Giannullo v. City of New YorkMark Giannullo v. City of New York
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- Kearse
Lead Opinion
Judge KEARSE dissents in a separate opinion.
RAKOFF, District Judge.Rule 56.1 of the Local Civil Rules of the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York (“Local Rule 56.1”) requires a party moving for summary judgment to submit a statement of the allegedly undisputed facts on which the moving party relies, together with citation to the admissible evidence of record supporting each such fact. See Local Rule 56.1(a), (d). If the opposing party then fails to controvert a fact so set forth in the moving party’s Rule 56.1 statement, that fact will be deemed admitted. See Local Rule 56.1(c). However, as we held in Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir.2001), “[t]he local rule does not absolve the party seeking summary judgment of the burden of showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and a Local Rule 56.1 statement is not itself a vehicle for making factual assertions that are otherwise unsupported in the record.” In the instant case, as in Holtz, the record does not support certain critical assertions in the defendant’s Rule 56.1 statement on which the district court relied, with the result that, even though plaintiffs Rule 56.1 counter-statement failed to specifically controvert these assertions, the unsupported assertions must nonetheless be disregarded and the record independently reviewed. See Holtz, 258 F.3d at 74.
The issue here arises on the appeal of plaintiff-appellant Mark Giannullo from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Sterling Johnson, Jr., Judge) granting summary judgment to defendant-appellee, the City of New York. Plaintiff had brought suit under
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir.1994). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
A review of the record discloses that the following facts are supported by admissible evidence and are beyond genuine dispute. At around 8 a.m. on November 19,1999, an undercover police officer who was conducting surveillance in the vicinity of a methadone maintenance clinic in Staten Island saw Giannullo exit the clinic and walk over to a second individual, Kevin Oliver. After a brief exchange, Giannullo returned to the clinic and emerged about five minutes later with a brown paper bag, which he handed to Oliver. Giannullo and Oliver then left the scene, walking in opposite directions. A short distance away, Oliver removed an item from the bag, placed the item in his pocket, and discarded the bag. Oliver was then arrested, and there was found on his person two bottles of methadone — one of which had someone else’s name on it — as well as a glassine of heroin. Meanwhile, other officers stopped Giannullo and arrested him. Despite his protests that he was a licensed drug counselor at the methadone clinic and that the bag he had given Oliver contained only a “bleach kit” that he was authorized to distribute in the community,3 Giannullo was held in custody until about 5 p.m. He was then released, with no criminal complaint being filed against him, upon the representation of the Assistant District Attorney that “there is insufficient nexus between the drugs [found on Oliver] and this defendant.”
On these facts, a reasonable fact-finder, drawing inferences favorable to plaintiff, could readily conclude that, ‘prior to the arrest of Oliver and the discovery of the illicit methadone, no policeman could reasonably believe that he had probable cause to arrest Giannullo. Prior to that time, the police knew nothing about Giannullo or his relation to Oliver, had observed no drugs in the possession of either of them, had seen no money pass nor other exchange of consideration, and had overheard no incriminating conversation between them. The mere fact that Giannullo had gone back into the clinic and had returned with a paper bag that he gave to Oliver, who in turn, out of Giannullo’s presence, discarded part of the contents and kept an item, might be sufficiently suspicious to warrant questioning Giannul-lo; but it can hardly be said to constitute probable cause to believe that Giannullo had committed a crime, warranting his immediate arrest. To hold otherwise would mean that nearly any suspicion, however vague, would justify an arrest or, at least, would insulate the arresting offi
What led the district court to conclude nonetheless that a police officer could have reasonably believed that he had probable cause to arrest Giannullo was, first, that there had been prior “reports of drug activity in the area” that gave context to what the police observed, and, second, that the police arrested Oliver prior to arresting Giannullo and therefore, in some collective sense, had knowledge before arresting Giannullo that an illicit bottle of methadone had been found on Oliver’s possession. The record, however, supports neither of these assertions.
In support of the assertion that the police had received complaints of drug activity in the area, the district court cited, not to admissible evidence, but to the defendants’ memorandum of law, which is not evidence at all. In addition, the district court quoted the statement in paragraph 2 of defendants’
By contrast, if the police collectively “knew” at the time they arrested Giannullo that Oliver had been found to be in possession of an extra methadone vial bearing another person’s name, they would have had reasonable cause to believe, at least to the standard of qualified immunity, see Lee v. Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir.1997), that Giannullo had delivered the purloined methadone to Oliver in the paper bag. See United States v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir.2001) (“Under the collective or imputed knowledge doctrine, an arrest or search is permissible where the actual arresting or searching officer lacks the specific information to form the basis for probable cause or reasonable suspicion but sufficient information to justify the arrest or search was known by other law enforcement officials initiating or involved with the investigation.”). This presupposes, however, that Oliver’s arrest preceded Giannullo’s arrest.
The district court accepted that Oliver’s arrest (and accompanying search) occurred prior to Giannullo’s arrest, based solely on the fact that plaintiffs
It follows that the record does not support the district court’s determination that defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, either on the basis of probable cause or qualified immunity.6 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. The district court also granted summary judgment to Officer Quinn, who was named as a defendant in the Amended Complaint but not as an appellee in this Court. It is clear from the parties’ briefs to this Court, however, that appellant seeks reinstatement of the Amended Complaint against Officer Quinn as well, and that appellee agrees this Court should consider the matter as to both defendants. Appellee’s Br. at 4 & n. 3. Accordingly, we consider all arguments raised by the parties, including those relating only to Officer Quinn.
. The dissent correctly states that, under the doctrine of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), a defendant may move for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to adduce any evidence of an element of plaintiff’s claim, and if the plaintiff fails in response to contest this assertion or adduce such evidence, defendant, without more, will prevail. But such a situation is wholly distinguishable from the instant case where it is defendant who is affirmatively asserting that, as a result of a particular sequence of events, the police had sufficient collective knowledge to justify a facially defective arrest. Nothing in Celotex, or in
. “Bleach kits,” consisting of bottles of bleach, bottles of water, cotton, and elastic tourniquets, are given freely to methadone and other addicts in connection with preventing infection in their needle use.
. The relevant portions read as follows:
14. Mr. Oliver was then stopped by members of the NYPD and found in possession of a bottle of methadone with someone else‘s name on the bottle as well as a glas-sine of heroine which tested positive in a field test. Exhibit D.
15. Plaintiff was then stopped by members of the NYPD and was placed under arrest by Detective Quinn. Exhibit B.
. While, as the dissent argues.
. Because we have concluded that the district court erred in considering it established that Oliver was arrested prior to Giannullo, we need not determine whether the “collective knowledge” doctrine, in fact, applies to the particular circumstances of this case. See, e.g., Colon, 250 F.3d at 135-38. We leave this determination to the district court.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s view that the district court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of defendants on the ground that there was probable cause for the arrest of plaintiff Mark Giannullo should be overturned. The facts asserted in the statement pursuant to Local
Giannullo, a counselor in the methadone clinic, was eventually released, and no criminal charges were filed against him. He commenced the present action under
In ruling on defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the district court stated that the issue of whether Giannullo’s arrest was based on probable cause — the existence of which would of course defeat Giannullo’s claim of arrest without probable cause — is for the court to decide as a matter of law “[w]here there is no dispute as to the information the defendants had prior to the arrest.” Memorandum & Order dated March 8, 2002 (“Decision”), at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted) (em
The majority of this panel, while not disagreeing that a sequence of events as set out in defendants’
[a]U material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party.
Local
Nonetheless, citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158, 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), the majority states that “summary judgment must be denied,” “where the movant ‘fail[s] to fulfill its initial burden’ of providing admissible evidence of the material facts entitling it to summary judgment.” Majority Opinion ante at 140 (emphases added). In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), however, the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that a defendant is not entitled to summary judgment based on the plaintiffs inability to prove an element of his claim unless the defendant itself provides admissible evidence. In Celotex, the Supreme Court considered a court of appeals decision reversing a grant of summary judgment because the moving defendant had
“made no effort to adduce any evidence, in the form of affidavits or otherwise, to support its motion.” [Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.] 244 U.S.App.D.C. [160], at 163, 756 F.2d [181], at 184 [(D.C.Cir.1985)] (emphasis in original). According to the [court of appeals] majority,Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure , and this Court’s decision in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), establish that “the party opposing the motion for summary judgment bears the burden of respondingonly after the moving party has met its burden of coming forward with proof of the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.” 244 U.S.App. D. C., at 163, 756 F.2d, at 184 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
477 U.S. at 321-22, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, finding “no express or implied requirement in
We think that the position taken by the majority of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with the standard for summary judgment set forth inRule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . UnderRule 56(c) , summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” In our view, the plain language ofRule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as to any material fact,” since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law” because the nonmov-ing party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.
477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (“we do not think ... Adickes ... should be construed to mean that the burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact ... with respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof. Instead, ... the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’ — that is pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” (emphasis added)).
The majority here also relies on subsection (d) of
[ejach statement of material fact by a movant or opponent must be followed by citation to evidence which would be admissible, set forth as required byFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) .
Local
I note further that although the majority analogizes the present case to Holtz, see Majority Opinion ante at 140, the two cases are not alike. In Holtz, the plaintiff, a pro se litigant, had filed no
The majority’s statement that “ ‘[t]he local rule does not absolve the party seeking summary judgment of the burden of showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,’ ” Majority Opinion ante at 140 (quoting Holtz, 258 F.3d at 74), is true but inapposite here. The requirement that the moving party show its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law means simply that those facts as to which there is no genuine dispute must be legally sufficient. This requirement does not suggest that dispositive facts that are undisputed must nonetheless be proved.
Our precedents state that a district court “has broad - discretion to determine whether to overlook a party’s failure to comply with local court rules.” Holtz, 258 F.3d at 73 (citing cases). But the majority’s decision today eliminates half of that discretion by reading subsection (d) of
When Local
In the present case, Giannullo disputed certain of the assertions set out in defendants’