MARITIMES & NORTHEAST PIPELINE, L.L.C., Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Nicholas J. DECOULOS, as Trustee of Willowdale Realty Trust, Defendant, Appellant, 1.55 Acres of Land, More or Less, In Peabody, Massachusetts; Danvers Savings Bank; Mattress Giant Corporatiоn; Cellco Partnership, d/b/a Verizon Wireless, Defendants.
No. 04-1371.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Aug. 16, 2005.
495
James T. Finnigan, with whom Rich May, P.C., was on brief, for appellee.
Before TORRUELLA and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges, and BARBADORO,* District Judge.
PER CURIAM.
This appeal arises out of an action for condemnation of lаnd pursuant to the Natural Gas Act (“NGA“),
Appellee Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, L.L.C. (“Maritimes“), a natural gas company as defined in thе NGA,
Maritimes attempted to purchase the easement rights over the course of several
Thereafter, Maritimes filed a motion for partial summary judgment and/or immediate entry, seeking an order from the district court to gain easement title to the required property by eminent domain. Notwithstanding Decoulos’ opposition, the motion was granted, allowing Maritimes to enter the property to install the pipeline. On April 9, 2003, the district court entered an additional order authorizing Maritimes to take the requested permanent right of way and easement. The matter then proceeded to trial for the purpose of determining the damages to be paid by Maritimes for the takings in quеstion.
The case was tried before a jury, which entered a verdict determining the value of the permanent easement to be the amount of $68,063. This appeal followed, in which Decоulos raises four issues: (1) whether the district court erred in allowing Maritimes to proceed based on a complaint which allegedly failed to identify “the interest to be taken” as required by
Decoulos argues that
This court has held that Rule 71A(c)(2) “is consistent with the notice theory of pleading embodied in the Federal Rules,” id., under which we “do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim . . . [because of] the liberal opportunity fоr discovery and the other pretrial procedures . . . to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues,” id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Thе complaint at issue more than sufficiently notified Decoulos of the substance of the action sought by Maritimes. See Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Land, Cullman County, 197 F.3d 1368, 1375 (11th Cir.1999); East Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 830 (4th Cir.2004).
After deciding the partial summary judgment in favor of Maritimes, and before triаl, the district court also decided Maritimes’ motion in limine to the effect that Decoulos would not be allowed to introduce any evidence of Maritimes’ alleged bad faith negotiatiоns because, as ruled upon by the court, bad faith was irrelevant to the issue of just compensation.
It is unclear to what Decoulos anchors his claim that good faith negotiations must prеcede the filing of the condemnation action, as the NGA contains no specific lan-
When any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property tо the compensation to be paid for, the necessary right-of-way to construct, operate, and maintain a pipe line or pipe lines for the transportation of natural gas, and the necessary land or other property, in addition to right-of-way, . . . it may acquire the same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of the United States for the distriсt in which such property may be located, or in the State courts.
Once a CPCN is issued by the FERC, and the gas company is unable to acquire the needed land by contract or agreement with the owner, the only issue before the district court in the ensuing eminent domain proceeding is the amount to be paid to the property owner as just compensation for the taking. See Guardian Pipeline, L.L.C. v. 529.42 Acres of Land, 210 F.Supp.2d 971, 974 (N.D.Ill.2002); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 2 F.Supp.2d 106, 110 (D.Mass.1998). Absent any credible authority making good faith negotiation a requirement precedent to the condemnation action, see Kansas Pipeline Co. v. 200 Foot by 250 Foot Piece of Land, 210 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1257 (D.Kan.2002) (“The plain language of the NGA does not impose an obligation on a holder of a FERC certificate to negotiate in good faith before acquiring land by exercise of eminent domain . . . .“), cf. National R.R. Passenger Corp., v. Boston and Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 423, 112 S.Ct. 1394, 118 L.Ed.2d 52 (1992) (refusing to interpret statutory language referring to parties being “unable to agree” to require Amtrak to engage in good faith negotiations before it could invoke its condemnation powers under the Rail Passenger Service Act), but seе USG Pipeline Co. v. 1.74 Acres, 1 F.Supp.2d 816, 822 (E.D.Tenn.1998) (noting that “[c]ourts . . . have imposed a requirement that the holder of the FERC Certificate negotiate in good faith with the owners to acquire the property“), we decline the invitation to сreate one in this case. Furthermore, we do not imply that the negotiations at issue here were not in good faith.
Appellant‘s due process argument is intermingled with his “good faith” issue, and results in a similar outcome. Decoulos claims that “Maritimes, by acting in bad faith and arbitrarily . . . deprived The Trust of its property rights.” The district court rejected an offer of proof by appellant to the effect that there was lack of uniformity in Maritimes’ exercise of the power of condemnation as between the various property owners. The district court was undoubtedly cоrrect in ruling that this matter was outside the scope of the only triable issue: the value of the property condemned.
The last question raised by appellant regards a claimed errоr by the district court in its failure to give a requested instruction dealing with severance and stigma damages. There are several reasons why this contention should not prosper. First, Decoulos fаiled to properly preserve this claim in accordance with Rule 51(c).
We have considered all other arguments and issues raised by appellant and find them as frivolous and lacking in merit as the rest of this appeal.
Affirmed. Appellant is granted 10 days within which to show cause why double costs should not be imposed against him.