Mario Lopez v. Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services

PREGERSON, Before BOOCHEVER and REINHARDT, Judges. Circuit REINHARDT, Judge: Circuit of Health and Human a partial stay pending Services seeks of a preliminary injunction by the issued United District States Court the Central District of California.1 See Fed.R.App.P. 8(a); 6(h). Ninth Circuit R.App.P. The or- der requires the restoration of disability a large benefits to number of Social Securi- 28,000 78,000 From recipients. indi- eligible. reject viduals We the Sec- retary’s request for a and allow the preliminary injunction to stand.

BACKGROUND The underlying dispute before the district court involves a challenge class action2 policies procedures used Secre- terminating Security disabili- Social See ty benefits. 401-431 U.S.C. §§ (1976 Supp. 1980) (Social IV Security (SSDI) Insurance Disability workers); abled 42 U.S.C. §§ (1976 Supp. 1980) (Supplemental IV (SSI) Security persons Income benefits for Cal., Ackel, Elena H. Los Angeles, disabled). Lew poor who are both Accord- Hollman, Pacoima, Cal., Iwaskai, ing findings court, Bruce made district by the Hollé, Marilyn Ellen Finkelberg, Frankel & since Security March 1981 the Social Finkelberg, Angeles, Cal., plain- Los drastically Administration has increased the tiffs-appellees. rate per- at which it reviews the status of requested any August recipients “in event after and SSI under temporary stay.” previously We have denied ‘grandfather Security clause’ of the Social request. Act been or will be considered for termination after consid- plaintiff 2. The district court certified as the being having eration been for the asserted Supplemental Security class those Income reason claimant’s Security Disability recipients Social Insurance ceased” [footnotes omitted]. who live within Ninth “who Circuit and have been or considered will be for termination challenged by was policy As a This receiving disability benefits.3 sons suit is framed court. Plaintiffs’ who have had result, people the number challenge as a constitutional large part annually has dou- their benefits Plaintiffs nonacquiescence. policy 98,000 from the dis- removed bled—from principles violates the argue year fiscal ability rolls in powers and stare decisis separation of of year 1982. in fiscal equal process due and rights well as their the procedures contend that Plaintiffs protection. Secretary of Health and Hu- by the used careful, 16, 1983, in a thorough, On June the benefits of terminating man Services decision, District and well-reasoned Senior of are in direct violation disabled persons P. Gray granted plaintiffs’ William In Patti v. court. two decisions motion for a preliminary injunction. (9th Cir.1982), F.Supp. 26. The court restrained the Secre- Matthews, 641 F.2d Finnegan follow, “[fjrom failing to implement or that we held precedential accord effect to” Finnegan Security disability benefits can Social from implementing Patti and the nonac- recipient ground terminated on the quiescence policy announced Social Securi- disabled, Secretary must is no longer 82-10c, 82-49c, Rulings and 81-6. recipient’s introduce evidence that improved. prin- has The medical condition these Secretary did not seek The these decisions is cipal underlying rationale court’s order. Rath- aspects of the district Security Administration’s Social er, the fol- requested that of disability initial creates a determination injunc- of the district court’s lowing portion presumption person remains pending appeal: stayed benefits, then, abled. To terminate (60) days following (c)(i) sixty Within ” to ‘meet or rebut’ Secretary “required order, will of this the defendants date “with evidence that presumption [the had (a) each class member who notify recipient’s] improved in the condition has Security In- receiving Supplemental been Patti, interim.” 669 F.2d at 587. See also under 42 Disability come benefits U.S.C. v. Weinberger, Rivas who was terminated 1382c(a)(3)(E), and § Cir.1973) (“Once present- has been evidence August benefits after from such that a supports finding given ed which (b) all other have been persons presumed condition it is in the ab- exists se- either Title II social terminated from proof contrary sence or XVI disability insurance Title curity remained unchanged.”). condition has Disability Security Income Supplemental August purported after The and Human Secretary Health disability her reason that his or she subsequently Services announced that ceased, such has person whether or not acquiesce” “does and therefore would that: appealed, court’s in Patti and holdings follow this for reinstate- person may apply Such Finnegan.4 Security Rulings See Social if he or she believes ment of benefits Instead, Secretary 82-10c and 82-49c. has that his or her medical condition has Security disability ordered that Social following the improved granting ground benefits be terminated on benefits. disability disability regardless lack of of whether the such recipient’s (ii) Upon receiving application, has improved medical condition will forthwith reinstate disability since time of the initial deter- the defendants monthly benefits in the amounts Security pay mination. 81-6. Ruling See Social year Supreme not seek in calendar did Court district court found that 1980, 185,639 in either Patti or Finne- Disability Investiga- review of our decisions Continuing gan. litigants in individual the two cases conducted; (CDIs) year tions were fiscal however, did, relief mandated receive the 1982, 435,262 CDIs undertaken. were this court. such person receiving Monday, been On Secre- had his or her benefits not inter- tary, compliance (c)(i) with paragraph rupted. order, the district court’s notified reinstatement,

(iii) plaintiff Following eligi- members class their agents employ- the defendants or their bility reapply disability benefits. ees conduct a investigation remaining issue before us is whether screening person, they comply must now with the set apply standards forth in Patti (c). of paragraph remainder In other Finnegan Schweiker and v. Matthews words, prelimi- while from and, if they conclude that such person’s nary injunction order is must pending, improved medical has he or condition reinstate those dis- disabled, she is no longer they will identi- persons abled who 'file applications, and fy the upon evidence relied reach then may she terminate those benefits only conclusion. required accordance with the procedures (iv) review, Following persons by our decisions in Finnegan Patti and ? are notified an initial determina- tion that shall shall their benefits cease STANDARD OF REVIEW given opportunity an to contest The standard for evaluating stays review, pending determination and appeal is that pending employed similar to they pro- shall continue to receive aid as deciding district courts in whether vided in current laws regulations. grant a preliminary injunction. See Neva request The Secretary’s partial stay for a Airlines, Bond, 1017, da Inc. v. 622 F.2d for temporary stay, a characterized (9th Cir.1980). 1018 n. 3 In this circuit motion,” government an “emergency there legal are two interrelated tests for Thursday, was filed on August 1983—56 injunction. of a preliminary issuance days after pre- the district court issued the are These tests “not but separate” rather liminary injunction and only days four be- represent “the outer ‘of a single reaches ” fore the Monday on which the continuum.’ Los Memorial Angeles Coli required notify recipi- was terminated seum Commission v. National Football ents of their eligibility reinstatement. (9th League, Cir.1980). This court the lengthy received papers continuum, At the moving one end record in on Friday, this case August required a party probability to show both August 13, 1983. On Saturday, we issued a on the the possibility success merits and page six order re- rejecting irreparable injury. Id. See Miss quest temporary stay declining for a Universe, Flesher, Inc. F.2d “on emergency request act an basis” on the (9th Cir.1979). At the end of the a partial Our stay. decision was based continuum, must moving party demon part on that the fact the requirement legal strate that serious questions raised recipients terminated be notified hardships the balance tips 15,1983 August potential of their eligibility Angeles its favor. sharply in Los Memorial only for benefits was obliga- immediate 1201; Commission, F.2d at Coliseum imposed upon government. We Universe, Miss 605 F.2d at 1134. “[T]he reasoned that the bulk of the administra- hardship to the is the “crit parties” relative tive costs and the cost bene- reinstating deciding point ical element” fits —the source of injury which along stay justified. the continuum a Secretary argues justifies a stay —would As Lodge Benda v. Grand of International later, not start to accrue until when Machinists, etc., sociation recipients begin former ben- reapplying for dismissed, Thus, efits. no necessity we saw to issue a 937, 99 60 L.Ed.2d 667 temporary stay grant partial stay or a addition, such as the in cases one pending “emergency” on an basis— us, is a factor to especially given unexplained delay Springs relief. Warm seeking such considered. See strongly Gribble, stay pending appeal of a in the absence Task Force Dam Cir.1977). admin- solely on the financial and premised reinstating disability bene- costs of istrative case, seeks a In this According recipients. fits to former preliminary injunction. aof pending appeal Therefore, recipients to determine whether Secretary, in order legal ques- raised serious has of their were notified probabili- she has shown tions whether for benefits. reapply eligibility merits, we must evalu- of success on every one government estimates overturning arguments ate her bene- reapplies for recipients these former injunction ap- preliminary trict court’s fits, restoring cost of monthly total rule, As we have general held peal. of claims readjudication pending preliminary issuing denying an “order puts $12,000,000. government will be only be reversed if the lower injunction will implement- cost administrative total or based its deci- court abused its discretion $10,300,000.5 ing district court order at Los upon legal premises.” sion erroneous Commission, un- Angeles Memorial Coliseum injunction will The district court’s F.2d at 1200. on the impose some burden doubtedly accept if we the Secre- government. Even DISCUSSION however, value, tary’s estimates at face INJURY, THE BAL- has demonstrated that I. IRREPARABLE HARDSHIPS, ANCE AND THE OF On tips in its favor.6 hardships balance of PUBLIC INTEREST. agree we with the contrary, hard- the balance of court’s conclusion Secretary’s contention that plaintiffs. government hardship ships strongly suffer in this case favors will substantial Third, ig- government’s are in cost estimates 5. These estimates contained the Secre- tary’s by placed state and amended declaration received this the increased burden nore local taxpayers by Ac- court 1983. The cost estimates actions. previously supplied by study presented by plaintiffs, to cording the district court one to government high: Security were almost three times as Supplemental those Income 48% monthly reinstating the put cost of benefits was Michigan subsequently recipients in $32,000,000, at and the total administrative government-funded eligible for other became $28,000,000. at cost was sidering Even con- estimated programs, psychiat- while entered welfare 7% estimates, higher much cost these facilities, prisons jails, ric entered 5% 4% disability district court did find that services, outpatient mental health received endangered by insurance trust fund would be Similarly, New York state officials died. 2% preliminary injunction the issuance of a the or that Secretary’s disability termina- that the estimate hardships tipped govern- in the balance and local would New York state tions cost ment’s favor. annually governments $234 million addition- $165 as an extra million al costs as well welfare 6. There are several reasons to believe that expenditures. annually in health care mental Secretary’s arguments regarding financial to the tax- estimates harm begin exaggerated. harm are somewhat To payer completely ignore these other costs. We with, of the most increased administrative public seriously question interest whether holding hearings workload—the —will merely by shifting the is tax served in case rather, automatically; hearings occur necessary bewill govern- from to state and local burden federal only in cases in the that which Heckler, See, e.g., v. ments. Leschniok can believes that there evidence she (9th Cir.1983)(noting “a shift improvement in introduce condition, show an medical to another, program one to burden from welfare proper thus a basis terminat- primarily primarily to state federal from ing benefits. Security funds,” Social as a result of sources Second, is no evidence in the record there terminations); Mental Associa- Health benefit by expenditures that the the necessitated increased F.Supp. Schweiker, 554 of Minnesota imperil order the So- district court’s (“There public (D.Minn.1982) no Security contrary, plain- cial trust fund. To the responsibility shifting financial interest indicating presented tiffs have evidence psychiatrically from a solvent disabled the trust cur- fund for insurance is government.”). ability and local to fund state rently long-term and that actuarial solvent solvency. predictions for the fund also indicate attempt Plaintiffs do not match in in dire quently financial due circumstances and cents the monetary disability, truly by dollars harms to his made whole allegedly by govern- payments be suffered retroactive he has had to without.”); well Mental year survive over Yet the suf- physical ment. emotional Health Association Minnesota record fering shown F.Supp. us is compelling far more than (D.Minn.1982) (“[C]lass members who have inconven- of some administrative possibility denied benefits or have had [disability] monetary government. ience or loss have benefits terminated suffered serious Gray’s ample support We find harms ... are not recompensable [that] “that some who persuasive finding through benefits.”). a retroactive award of already suf- unexpectedly lost benefits have necessities, fur- of life’s deprivation fered Here, question public of the interest very illness, or death from even ther inseparable the issues relating from them Secretary deemed disabilities hardship the relative suffered the liti- conflict with such a have.” Faced now, Up we have gants. discussed preventable only concerns and interest in the narrowest government’s financial between difficulty terms —the administrative financial im- we have little suffering, human preliminary injunction. For pact hardships balance of concluding determining hard- purposes relative favor. plaintiffs’ decidedly tips it ship parties, appropriate that, judge also it crucial because government’s We consider do so—to narrow largely as a In plaintiffs’ litigant. the members of class are interest terms of its role however, sense, disabled, government’s a broader infirm and their and life resources public is the as the interest. same limited. spans extremely definition just must be concerned not Deprivation might of benefits trial pending with the public fisc but with the hardship, cause economic or even suffering interest, weal. this broader we assessing death. Retroactive restoration of benefits litiga- government’s are not bound the would be to these hard- inadequate remedy Rather, we make posture. indepen- an of his review ships.7 Following thorough the interest. judgment public dent as to record, a similar Gray reached the plain- relief conclusion: “Retroactive only [for It is not the harm to the individuals too be inadequate, perhaps assessing involved we must consider in tiffs] late, purpose the of Social to ensure that public society the interest. Our as a whole benefits, i.e., of Security disability provision poor, when the hun- neglect suffers we the disabled, the when we them living poor gry, deprive for the minimum standard rights in- disabled, privileges. Society’s also of their be served.” See will affording lies on side of fair Heckler, 520, at terest the v. 713 F.2d Leschniok though to even the procedures persons, all (9th Cir.1983) (“We comprehend fail to 524 Secretary’s the argument financial is re- expenditure governmental funds date, compensation at some should tragic, only future It would be not from quired. prevail, mitigates the claimants survive and standpoint the of the individuals involved hardship standpoint society, the which is visited claimants also from the upon but their be day.”); poor, people families each and were disabled to every elderly, Califano, 9, (1st v. wrongfully Caswell 583 F.2d 14 of essential benefits deprived Cir.1978) (“It simply that a It unfor- any period is true of time. would be benefits, tunate, society, claimant for infre- but far harmful to were less note, place empha- Secretary’s recoup right payments 7. We also but do not much on, government subsequently recipient sis have fact that will if the Finnegan. opportunity that were with Patti and This to recover benefits accordance illusory paid practical erroneously. The district has ex- be more an than a court well receipt remedy. Eldridge, pressly 319 at v. 424 U.S. conditioned the of reinstated Mathews 347, 908, preliminary injunction 47 under L.Ed.2d 96 893 1438 v. 1362, (D.Ariz.1983); Siedlecki overturning 1364-65 to succeed Sehweiker, 43, (W.D. 46-48 F.Supp. 563 but be unable injunction preliminary Harris, Wash.1983); v. 547 Hillhouse funds. portion or a recoup all Moreover, 88, (W.D.Ark.1982). F.Supp. 93 hardships summary, In balance support cases cited favor litigants sharply lies between the In inapposite. position appear her of the When plaintiffs. short, case law our of the relevant review overwhelming. included, that balance chance that that there little indicates argument that Secretary will succeed in her ON OF SUCCESS II. PROBABILITY or, to legitimate policy, is a nonacquiescence EXIST- MERITS AND THE THE persuade it more that she put precisely, QUES- LEGAL SERIOUS ENCE OF legal the district court committed us that TIONS. strong was a concluding that there error argu- two principal makes would ulti- probability merits of her regarding ments issue. on this fundamental mately prevail granting preliminary from the order that, Second, even it should obvious First, injunction. Secretary attempts nonacquiescence issuance of her “nonacquiescence” to defend Patti regarding Finnegan and does rulings defense, This with federal court decisions. Constitution, each of her violate the the government’s in a presented footnote on those rul- decisions based department’s brief, begin To persuasive. is far from summarily whenever rejected will be ings with, circuits that have considered little We see challenged in circuit. question rejected the Secre- already will convince this chance can tary’s argument agency that a federal contrary.8 Court court legitimately ignore appeals federal attention majority See, Laughlin Jones precedents. e.g., & argument: her second is devoted to (3d Marshall, v. Gorp. Steel F.2d juris- exercised improperly district court v. Cir.1980); ITT World Communications plaintiffs’ some members diction over FCC, (2d Cir.1980); Ithaca 635 F.2d juris- its premised district court class. NLRB, (2d College v. 405(g), pro- diction 42 U.S.C. § Cir.), denied, 101 S.Ct. review judicial avenue of vides limited Mary 237 (1980); Thompson L.Ed.2d within 60 complaint of a upon filing NLRB, Hospital, Inc. v. Secretary.9 of a final decision of days (7th Cir.1980); Hospital General Allegheny NLRB, (3d Cir.1979). 405(g) the section satisfy order sev- Sehweiker, must overcome F.Supp. requirements, plaintiffs

See also Chee Secretary argues dently ground jurisdiction” nonac- adequate that her for in a quiescence rulings in dealing challenge” issued after the decisions case with a “constitutional Finnegan reg- Patti superceding security and constitute illegal to the termination of social dis Heckler, Be- ability ulations defer. to this Court should Leschniok v. insurance benefits. Finnegan cause the Patti were decisions v. (9th Cir.1983). See also Elliot 713 F.2d at 522 Weinberger, any way particular 1977), 1219, in on Health and based F.2d 1226 564 Cir. part, part grounds regulations, think other sub Services we do not atfd rev’d on Human nom., Yamasaki, Secretary prevail argu- 682, likely v. the to Califano on 442 U.S. 99 ment. L.Ed.2d Plaintiffs S.Ct. 61 176 that, Secretary’s flagrant light of contend the Finnegan, noncompliance with Patti man- appropriate the court’s “the 9. There be a basis for district damus because claim jurisdiction duty 405(g). Plaintiffs and the officer § than clear certain (1976) provides plainly prescribed an to be claim 28 1361 so U.S.C. ministerial and § Weinberger, independent jurisdiction. v. free from doubt.” Elliot Sec- 564 basis for such juris- gives “original tion contend that sec- 1361 the district court F.2d at 626. Plaintiffs also they any jurisdiction manda- because are diction of action in the nature of tion 1361 exists compel making challenge proce- employee of the to mus to an or a officer constitutional perform by Secretary any agency rather seek- dures than United States thereof used benefits, citing Ringer v. duty plaintiff.” ing payment We have recent- owed to Sehweiker, ly indepen- at 1296. Since the held that 1361 offers “an section 1439 First, plaintiffs obstacles. procedural retary’s nonacquiescence eral policies. The presented Second Circuit has held that the must have a claim for benefits to exhaustion requirement should be waived where consti- Secretary. Contrary Secretary’s challenges tutional similar to the ones in assertion, authority there is substantial Califano, this case are raised. Jones v. See that this is sat- proposition requirement 576 18-19. v. F.2d at See also Mathews oppor- an Secretary isfied once has had 424 at 96 Eldridge, U.S. S.Ct. at to act tunity actually and benefits have (“It expect L.Ed.2d at 30 is unrealistic to Califano, been terminated. Ellison v. See Secretary would consider substan- (5th Cir.1977). 1164 F.2d tial changes current administrative requirement second under sec review at the behest aid system single of a 405(g) is that a final decision must raising recipient challenge constitutional Secretary. have been made This by in an adjudicatory Secretary context. The requirement may waived Secre by required would not be to even consider excused or with by deemed complied Second, a challenge.”). the Third Circuit See, the court. e.g., Eldridge, Mathews v. that, has decided even as to rath- statutory 893, 899, U.S. issues, er than constitutional the exhaustion Califano, (1976); L.Ed.2d 18 Jones v. can be requirement waived whenever (2d Cir.1978); F.2d Alli Liberty has taken a “final position” Califano, ance for the Blind F.2d question. Liberty v. Alliance See Califano, Blind v. test (3rd Cir.1977). (“The Some of the named of a an statutory exhaustion issue in plaintiffs and an unknown number ... individual case should be whether plaintiff class have exhausted all adminis taken a final position has remedies and deci trative obtained final issue. class context the test should sions; these are indisputably different.”). be no See also Jones v. Califa- properly the district court. The Sec no, (waiver at 19 of exhaustion argues, however, retary there is no when requirement “the Secretary had jurisdiction over plaintiffs. the other posi- ample opportunity modify ... his court Secretary’s district ar evaluated tion.”). guments plaintiffs’ and decided that Finally, emphasized court failure exhaust their rem administrative due undesirability, obvious as well as the edies was excusable because it equal process protection implications, of require plaintiffs pursue futile the dual benefit review created system administrative remedies in the face nonacquiescence policy. policy nonacquies announced noted, court As the district analysis cence. district court’s finds an- nonacquiescence [t]he strong support two that were decisions nounced creates two thoroughly considered and discussed governing claimants standards whose Gray in opinion: Weinberger his ability benefits terminated as a result Salfi, 749, 765-66, 422 U.S. 95 S.Ct. nonacquiescence. If such a claim- 2466-67, 45 (1975); Ringer L.Ed.2d 522 ant has the determination and the finan- (9th Cir.1983), 697 F.2d 1291 strength long cial and and lives physical - -, granted, 103 S.Ct. make enough through it the adminis- 3535, L.Ed.2d (1983). 77 1386 he trative can turn to the courts process, is much There additional for the support ultimately the expect them to apply district court’s conclusion that the section Finnegan. in law as announced Patti and 405(g) requirement exhaustion not ap- does falls If exhaustion overtakes him and he First, this ply in case. plaintiffs such along leading the road somewhere relief, raised constitutional the the challenges nonacquiescence Sec- ultimate judge jurisdiction 405(g), question. found § under resolve the section necessary he not find it did to consider or alia, specific evidence of medical im- Particu- that termination stand. resulting the required was provement individ- respect types larly with resources, Smith, however, concerned, In could be terminated. whose here uals are, had successfully all the named individuals by prospective longevity health and and were limited, their terminations actu- appealed such a dual definition, relatively at question benefits in the ally receiving and unfair. the prejudicial of law system Moreover, no consti- litigation. time the view expressed a similar Circuit The Second made by similar to that challenge tutional 19.10 Califano, 576 F.2d at Jones the here was raised. While plaintiffs under section requirement The third take comfort from some must have plaintiffs’ appeals 405(g) is that comments con- analysis some of the days Secre within brought been opinion, Circuit’s tained in Second Secretary argues decision. tary’s final effect of opinion may while the have the challenged not within all decisions that Califano, supra, to Jones v. some limiting a res and thus have unappealed days extent, unlikely to affect appears Smith Be proceedings. in later judicata effect our view of the issues before significantly can waived day requirement cause the 60 us.11 Eldridge, Mathews v. parties, Secretary may have raised Although (1976); n. 9 at 899 at 328 n. S.Ct. U.S. failed to legal she has questions,” “serious 763-64, Salfi, 422 at Weinberger v. U.S. of success on showing probability make a 2465-66, into at it need not be taken S.Ct. individually both the merits. Considered appeal not raised before consideration arguments collectively, Id. See also Rowland the district court. is probabili- us that there a persuade do Califano, (5th Cir.1979). There 588 F.2d 449 the district that this court reverse be currently no indication the record preliminary a in- grant court’s decision to was day requirement fore us that the 60 junction. below; nor is there Secretary raised requirement in the dis any mention of CONCLUSION event, any

trict decision. court’s position has the weaker judicata ordinarily Secretary res administrative bar govern- of the interrelated test aspects when an decision both applied agency’s hardships tips Cali The balance of challenged grounds. ing stays. on constitutional Sanders, plaintiffs, even without sharply fano v. toward factor, and it is public including 51 L.Ed.2d 192 will succeed probable cited In a recent decision in footnote from the order on the merits of her brief, government’s Circuit Second preliminary injunction. Finally, granting dismissed, jurisdiction, for lack of a class denial supports interest strongly by persons action filed whose dis complaint the stay. ability benefits had been terminated. is DE- for a (2d request partial Smith v. 709 F.2d 777 Cir. 1983). inter persons argued, The disabled NIED. the district

10. Jones involved conflict between the Secre- also contends that Department’s Appeals injunction preliminary and the Council. awards retroac- court’s Despite Appeals improperly fact plaintiffs Council tive and thus relief claimants, repeatedly in ruled favor of the plaintiffs “grants all the affirmative relief disapproved continued to adhere to a sought.” disagree. The district court’s We regulation. The held Second Circuit any benefit order does not award retroactive requirement exhaustion need not met said, payments. As would be the court “[i]t light change his refusal inappropriate grant an award policy. The case so was remanded controversy juncture has not ... because this propriety of district court could consider litigated fully have not and the class-wide relief and thus avoid “two standards requested relief.” calculation, one benefit for claimants Appeals seek review Council and one claimants do 576 F.2d at 19. not.” PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I concur completely Reinhardt’s

opinion. I write separately only empha- my

size concern over the Secretary’s policy

avowed of nonacquiescence with

Ninth Circuit law as enunciated Patti v. F.2d 582 Matthews,

Finnegan v. F.2d 1340

Cir.1981). The Secretary’s ill-advised

of refusing obey the decisional law of

this circuit is akin repudiated pre-

Civil War doctrine of nullification whereby

rebellious states recognize refuséd to cer-

tain federal laws within their boundaries.

The Secretary’s nonacquiescence not only circuit,

scoffs at the law of this but flouts

some very important principles basic to our

American system government rule —the law, separation doctrine of of powers constitution,

imbedded in the and the tenet judicial supremacy laid down in Marbury Madison, (1 Cranch) 5 U.S. L.Ed. 60 expects its citizens

to abide by the law—no expected less is

those charged with the duty to faithfully

administer the law.

SAN DIEGO REGIONAL EMPLOYMENT

AND TRAINING CONSORTIUM

(RETC), Petitioner, LABOR,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

Respondent, Caukin, al., Party

Bruce Lee et Real

in Interest.

No. 82-7223.

United Court of Appeals, States

Ninth Circuit.

Argued May Submitted 1983. Aug. 25,

Decided

Case Details

Case Name: Mario Lopez v. Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Date Published: Aug 24, 1983

Citation: 713 F.2d 1432

Docket Number: 83-6126

Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.