Mariner Financial Group, Inc. v. Bossley

GROUP, INC. MARINER FINANCIAL Moore, Jr., Petitioners, F.

and Joe P. and Carole BOSSLEY

H.G.

Bossley, Respondents.

No. 00-0325.

Supreme of Texas. Court

Argued Feb. 13,

Decided June Walker, T. Jackson Reynolds,

Norman McGraw, Mark & Looper Reed M. James Houston, McGraw, for Petitioner. Leufven, Garcia, Alon- Don K. Jim Luis Houston, Suarez, so, Cersonsky, Leuven & Respondent. opinion of issued Justice O’NEILL ENOCH, Court, in which Justice HANKINSON, BAKER, Justice Justice joined. Justice RODRIGUEZ Bossley to vacate sued H.G. and Carole favor of Mariner an arbitration award Moore, Corp. Jr. and Joe Financial complained partial because evidently chair was panel’s an adverse did not disclose one Bossleys’ expert impartiality might with of the to affect or rea- witnesses. summary judg- sonably appearance The trial court create an rendered confirming partiality ment for Mariner or bias. Persons re- and Moore award, appeals quested to serve as arbitrators but the court of re- versed, any holding should disclose such relation- that the arbitrator had they ships personally discover and disclose the relation- counsel, any party with or or its ship. 11 S.W.3d 349. We conclude that any with individual whom summary judgment improper was because been will told be witness. Mariner and Moore failed to establish as They any should also disclose mattеr law the arbitrator was not relationship involving members evidently partial. Accordingly, we affirm or their families their current em- appeals’ judgment. court of

ployers, partners, or as- business I sociates. (b) accept who requested Persons Corp.

Mariner Financial and Joe appointment as arbitrators should Moore, Jr., managed Bossleys’ retire- make a reasonable effort to inform ment account. After the account incurred any themselves of interests or rela- losses, substantial sued Mari- (a) tionships paragraph described self-dealing. ner and Moore for fraud and above. By agreement, arbitrated the

dispute under National Association NASD Code Arbitration ProceduRe (NASD) 10312(a)-(b). Securities Dealers Code of Arbi- § tration,1 parties’ agreement which the in- administrator The NASD selected A. provided The corporated. Code that a Bentley panel Nettles as chair. administrator NASD would select a three- then party’s administrator forwarded each panel designate one arbi- members, asking panel witness list to the panel trator as the chair. The Code also report any them review the names and imposed following duties on arbi- potential reported conflicts. Nettles trators: had a social with one of the

(a) Each arbitrator required shall be witnesses, Bossleys’ objected. but no one

disclose to the Director of Arbitration case, important to Bossleys’ More which might pre- circumstances list also M. witness included Laña Asmar clude such rendering arbitrator from expert as an witness. Nettles did objective impartial determina- report any conflict with Asmar. The arbi- tion. Each arbitrator shall disclose: proceeded, panel ultimately tration and the (1) decided the case in Mariner and Moore’s Any direct or indirect financial or favor.

personal interest the outcome of arbitration; later, re- About two months Asmar was (2) financial, Any existing past viewing or her files at officewhen she found a

business, professional, family, deposition given expert as an wit- relationships likely malpractice social that are ness action Net- 16, 1995, signed 1. The National Association of Securities Deal- tration November Inc., ers, Regulation, is now known NASD and refеrences to the NASD Code of Arbitra- Inc., and the Code is now known as the are to its contents on that tion Procedure NASDR Code Arbitration Procedure. The date. Bossleys’ agreement to submit to NASD arbi- issue, on the years bearing before the ties two and half almost Bossleys’ discovery tes- to rule on the deposition, In that Asmar declined arbitration. malpractice motion. tified that Nettles committed suit was ways.

in seven different settled, eventually the doc- and settlement II discovering were uments sealed. After argue that the Mariner and Moore immediately transcript, notified the Asmar reversing appeals court of erred the petitioned to vacate Bossleys, the then who summary judgment because trial court’s By them. the arbitration award no there is evidence that Nettles remem affidavit, she did not Asmar averred that should have recalled bered or until she discovered remember Nettles Asmar when the arbitration occurred and deposition transcript ‍​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‍arbitration. after the relationship thus no to infer that basis However, his Mariner influenced decision. Bossleys The contended that Nettles’s and not file no-evidence sum Moore did relationship with Asmar rendered prior judgment mary motion. See evidently grounds him which is partial, Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(i). prevail on their motion under To award under both vacating arbitration 166a(c), and had to 10(a)(2); Rule Mariner Moore § law. 9 federal and state U.S.C. evidently Nettles was not establish that Tex. & Rem.Code Civ. PRAc. 171.088(a)(2)(A). partial as a matter of law. See Tex.R. Civ. and § Mariner Moore 166a(c). Bossleys The contend that by judg- responded moving summary P. and could not Mariner and Moore did not ment, seeking the award confirmation of this Court’s meet this burden because both Bossleys’ The petition. and denial of the Burlington Northern Railroad decision Bossleys alleged motion either (Tex. TUCO, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629 Co. v. the award legal vacating had no basis for 1997), agreement itself or, any complaint had waived alternatively, relation Nettles to disclose his obligated partiality failing object to to Nettles’s by ship with Asmar. to Hoping the award. bolster until after partial, their claim that Nettles was TUCO, neutral panel’s an arbitration compel Bossleys also filed a motion accepted a referral arbitrator business of the sealed settlement docu- production law firm partisan dur- from a arbitrator’s malpractice case. ments from Nettles’s There Id. at 631. ing the arbitration. arbitrator knew Bossleys’ dispute dis no that the neutral The trial court denied relationship; only question judg about the covery granted summary motion failure to disclose rela- The court was whether ment for Mariner and Moore. partiality. reversed, evident holding pre tionship could establish appeals and Id. at 631-32. We determined relationship between Nettles existing ... Asmar, because “a neutral coupled with failure could Nettles’s ... if the arbi- it, Net a fact issue about exhibits raised which might, facts at 352. trator does not disclose tles’s evident S.W.3d observer, create a reason- objective Mariner court further concluded that partiali- impression of the arbitrator’s as a matter able had not established Moore test, objective right ty.” Id. 630. Under Bossleys waived the of law that the are di- consequences for nondisclosure object now to Nettles’s selection materiality of the unre- panel rectly tied to failing object convened. before (stating at 637 information. See id. appeals concluded vealed Finally, Id. the court of not disclose re- need had no a “neutral arbitrator settlement documents lationships relationship connections are trivi- verse between Nettles and As- al.”). relationship knew nothing TUCO arose mar that about. from lucrative business referral to one of Finally, argue Mariner and Moore the arbitrators and thus was not trivial. Bossleys had a themselves relationship The undisclosed was obvi- relationship discover the between Nettles arbitrator, known ously and we con- But and Asmar. whether or not the Boss- cluded that his failure to disclose the refer- leys duty, we do ral was a objectively material fact that decide, we note that Mariner and Moore impression par- created reasonable of his established that tiality. Id. discovered the than did through sooner reasonable here, summary judgment The record investigation. Summary judgment is however, is silent about whether Nettles appropriate therefore not on that basis. remembered Asmar ever knew of her. this, Without some evidence of we cannot Ill determine whether the undisclosed rela- concurring justices The it suggest that tionship is material to the issue of evident does not matter whether Nettles remem partiality. Clearly, the relationship could Asmar fail bered because arbitrator’s if, not have influenced partiality Nettles’s ure to can relationship adverse fact, he was unaware it during of of partiality not as matter law constitute Thus, arbitration. state Nettles’s complaining when the had party the means knowledge about Asmar ais fact issue to discover the The relationship. adverse to determining material his concurrence cites three cases from the sup Court Appeals Second Circuit As an alternative ground, Mariner port. These cases reason that the undis and Moore argue Bossleys waived relationship closed was waived be either any complaint by about Nettles’s it complaining cause was well-known to the not objecting participation to his before party, easily discoverable or rendered triv submission. But from summary judg ial by the arbitrator’s other disclosures. evidence, ment Bossleys we know that the Indus., Co., See Cook Inc. v. Itoh & 449 C. did not learn relationship about the be (2nd Cir.1971) 106, (party F.2d 107 aware tween Asmar and Nettles until after the relationship); of undisclosed see Andros also arbitration. Asmar did not reveal re Compania tima, S.A. v. Marc Mari lationship because she did not remember AG., Co., 691, 701, &Rich 579 F.2d 702 Nettles until two months after the arbitra (2nd Cir.1978) (failure to disclose trivial tion, and even then only made the connec disclosures); relationship light and other discovering tion after deposition tran Wiest, & v. F.2d Co. 432 853- Garfield script preparing while In move offices. (2nd (waiver). Cir.1970) summary affidavit, her explained Asmar that Nettles evidence, however, judgment sug does not deposition, did not attend her and that she Bossleys what gest means the had to dis met or never saw Nettles before the arbi relationship, cover this and thus these tration. Asmar also testified controlling cases no more here than no further involvement malprac with the our decision TUCO. tice ease that deposi Nettles after TUCO, tion. We agree therefore with the court of complaining did appeals that the could not waive know about the re- arbitrator’s undisclosed Thus, an objection prior lationship. that is based un- relationship on ad- was Appeals has ob- neither enth Circuit Court known in the sense was obvious, easily nor served: open, discoverable TUCO, S.W.2d complaining party. partiality” question the “evident neces- Industries, on the

at 681. In Cook other sarily inquiry. entails fact intensive hand, the undisclosed area the law This is one —that had done sub- employer highly dependent unique the arbitrator’s factual winning party— with the settings particular stantial business each case. employer sparse was well-known because the rules of law are black letter company in a is difficult to locate. largest analogous United States case law closely trading group knit and thus had Int'l, Med., Inc., Inc. v. CD Lifecare business with both done substantial (11th Cir.1995). F.3d ordinary to the arbitration course of to find a waiver The concurrence strains business, a fact the court concluded as Ap Second Court of under the Circuit complaining party law knew. matter of Industries peals’ rationale Cook Indus., 449 F.2d at 108. Cook TUCO itself declined Garfield, but that court has knowledge” cases are thus these “common beyond their limited to extend those cases opposite evidеntiary spec- on ends of Co., Ltd. v. Cook facts. Sanko S.S. See along this case falls that trum. Where (2nd Indus., Inc., 1260, 1265 Cir. 495 F.2d simply know on spectrum we do not based 1973) (“Unlike the and Cook Garfield relationship presented. The that the facts case, cases, as present it the record between Asmar and Nettles was existed stands, justify assump not [the now does obvious, nor it a matter open relationship was that the undisclosed tion knowledge. common It did not arise Sanko, parties].”). all known to community from of business interests forego it trial court stated that would by participants all in the arbitra- shared accept evidentiary hearing and Sanko’s relationship it a that tion. But neither was regarding facts of contested version Thus, could not have been discovered. prior dealings oppos arbitrator’s with knowledge to neither attribution of Cook’s Nevertheless, the trial court party. ing nor TUCO’s attribu- complaining party findings at variance with Sanko’s made appro- arbitrator is tion of that the position and concluded presented facts here. priate on limited The court of should not vacated. award remanded, conclud appeals reversed and why record is about Although the silent neces evidentiary hearing was ing that an relationship did not his Nettles na the full extent and sary determine Asmar, justices pre- concurring with relationships at issue. at ture of the They missing presume sume the facts. distinguished The court Garfield Asmar but did that Nettles remembered no there was conclusive and Cook because relationship because he not disclose the knew or should evidence Sanko either also re- that Asmar believed of the of the relation have known extent history their him and disclosed membered ship in Id. at 1265. question. posits concurrence Bossleys. to the Sanko, silence, did Like the trial court no other reason Nettles’s facts presume seeks summary concurrence here contrary is untroubled Acknowledging we, too, evidentiary no basis. could with judgment evidence. While expect silence, it be reasonable to that would not for Nettles’s our postulate reasons court records to Bossleys to research simply does judgment standard summary been Nettles had ever determine whether permit speculation. As the Elev- and, so, against summary judgment sued who had testified Mariner Moore him, prove assumed the burden to that no fact concurrence would nonetheless exists. Because did not meet excuse Nettles’s on the issue nondisclosure burden, affirm the court of ground appeals’ we presume he could the Boss- judgment. leys prior knew about the adverse relation- ship because Asmar should have remem- concurring Justice OWEN issued a Thus, bered it. the concurrence would PHILLIPS, opinion, in which Chief Justice excuse even an knowing arbitrator’s con- HECHT, and Justice Justice cealment evidencing par- joined. JEFFERSON

tiality long as there are facts from presume which the can OWEN, arbitrator the com- joined by Justice Chief Justice plaining PHILLIPS, HECHT, knew too. But the whole Justice and Justice of an purpose JEFFERSON, arbitrator’s to disclose concurring.

is very type speculative to avoid this aspect of this case that has troubled presumption and let the Bossleys’ me from outset is arbitration make the call. position They is inconsistent. say expert testimony their witness Asmar’s well-established,

It is and the con malpractice in a legal Nettles suit justices curring acknowledge, “a neu was so critical of him that he could not tral arbitrator a duty has to disclose deal impartial thereafter be ings of which aware ‘that case which Asmar testified. But the might impression create an possible ” say also testimony Asmar’s bias.’ (quoting S.W.3d Com was not significant enough Nettles Coatings Corp. monwealth v. Continental for though her recall even for knew Co., 145, 149, Cas. 393 U.S. 89 S.Ct. seven months before the arbitration hear- (1968)). L.Ed.2d 301 arbitration ing that Nettles would be one of the arbi- agreement incorporates here further the trators, present and she was during sig- Code, provides NASD not only that portion nificant of hearing the arbitration arbitrators should relationships disclose presided. which he that “might reasonably appear create an says The Court that whether Nettles bias,” ance of partiality ‍​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‍or but also that evidently partial should be resolved they should make a “reasonable effort” to a subjective test —what he knew and when inform of themselves such relationships. knew apply objective it. I would an NASD of Code Arbitration PROCEDURE test, TUCO,1 we did to determine 10312(a)-(b). Thus, § justifica no there is partiality. evident The test should be tion for the concurrence to shift the bur reasonably an whether arbitrator could be- den of disclosure from the arbitrator to lieve were undisclosed facts party. party known to set seeking aside IV arbitration award.

We conclude that Mariner and Moore An arbitration va- award should not be failed to establish aas matter of law that partiality” for solely cated “evident based evidently partial. Nettles was not Al- on if party seeking a failure to disclose though bear the ultimate bur- to vacate reasonably the award could den of proving partiality, expected the arbitrator’s been to know the undisclosed TUCO, Inc., Burlington (Tex.1997). N. Co. R.R. S.W.2d TUCO, FAA, we dard of review under neither the explained

facts. As when is a failure to partiality” agreement based on nor parties’ “evident the NASD Code disclose, it is failure to itself says comply that failure to with the NASD partiality because establishes requirements or its Code’s disclosure impression given arbitrator has investigate vacating is a for ground facts that he or she has concealed material Even the courts that arbitration award. party to a not otherwise available parties may held or indicated that might reasonably affect arbitration that expand of under the standard review sec- like partiality.2 In a case the arbitrator’s 10(a) required tion the FAA have cannot be today, the one before us there clearly do parties’ intent to so be ex- impression con- the arbitrator pressed in their The NASD agreement.4 information cealed material because specify any consequence does not Code not count on arbitrator could comply its disclosure and failure with expert memory to fail. witness’s requirements after the investigation arbi- principles These the basis Accordingly, any vio- tration is concluded. de- They “waiver.” are a framework for judged lation the NASD Code must be termining when nondisclosure by the FAA’s standards for vacatur. Fail- partiality. There itself constitutes evident ure with the is not comply NASD Code partiality could be waiver of evident based a basis for aside an award under setting party complaining nondisclosure comply the FAA unless that failure knew all the facts before the arbitration partiali- “evident independently establishes complain. But concluded and did not ty” grounds one for vacat- or other whether there was evident specified in the federal ing an award arbi- threshold, losing distinct issue. What the already tration statute. As discussed party to an arbitration knew should above, that an to disclose facts failure the question have known does answer reasonably believe were arbitrator could nondisclosure whether arbitrator’s seeking to set aside the known to the analysis exhibits evident An partiality.” cannot “evident this in cases as partiality evident could should focus on what the arbitrator final issue is whether breach reasonably losing party have believed the poten- that requirement the NASD Code’s knew. effort tial “make reasonable arbitrators of certain interests to inform themselves” in this are other issues raised There two itself, would, in relationships or and is, parties’ agreement did the case. One partiality under constitute evident under National Association of arbitrate “no.” There again FAA. I would hold (NASD) of Arbi- Dealers Code Securities in which circumstances certainly would be an enlarge grounds vacating tration partiality” find “evident a court should Arbi- award under the Federal to make rea- failure from an arbitrator’s question Act?31 would answer that tration or to inform himself herself effort without that sonable Assuming, deciding, “no.” un- that were relationships contractually enlarge the stan- about certain parties can Co., Computer Corp., 148 F.3d v. Sciences Inc. Cir.1998); Corp. (8th Tech. LaPine 10(a). § 3. 9 U.S.C. Cir.1997); (9th Kyocera F.3d 884 Corp., 130 Techs., Gateway Corp., v. MCI Telecomms. Inc. See, Kay Roadway Package Sys., e.g., Inc. v. Cir.1995). (5th 64 F.3d 993 ser, (3d Cir.2001); Mgmt. UHC 257 F.3d 287 party seeking known to set an an requirement aside tion statute’s arbitra- examples arbitration award. Some tion award must be vacated “if there has considered below. But under circum- partiality by been ‘evident an arbitrator ”6 case, stances of this partiality evident appointed as a neutral.’ But in both would not be established Nettles failed TUCO, Coatings Commonwealth and legal malprac- to contact his counsel facts were not disclosed were known against tice suit him per- or to review his to the arbitrator but unavailable to the regarding litigation sonal filеs to iden- party seeking to set aside arbitration. tify witnesses who may have testified today, very the case before us differ- against him. A “reasonable effort to in- presented. ent issue is Should arbitra- form” require oneself would not review potential tion award be set aside if the every lawyer matter in which a or witness fails to disclose material facts may have been adverse or critical that he or have be- potential arbitrator. lieved party seeking were known to the However, agree I that this case should vacate an award?

be remanded to the trial court. It has My turn, analysis does not Court come us on summary judgment. Aside asserts, improperly presuming on facts. alleging from partiality based The record must light be viewed in the disclose, Nettles’ failure to most favorable to the Bossleys, who were alleged Nettles engaged miscon- nonmovants,7 we all resolve doubts or duct was evidently partial because he against Moore, Mariner and the movants.8 pieces excluded certain of evidence and The record is silent on whether Nettles limited cross-examination. Mariner аnd knew Asmar I who was. therefore as- did Moore not address allegations these sume, as we must under the of the state their motion for summary judgment. record our summary judgment stan- They did not establish as matter law dard, actually that Nettles knew that As- evidently partial Nettles was not mar him testified he re- that he did engage in misconduct. Ac- called this fact before the arbitration cordingly, I concur in judg- the Court’s award was issued. The difference be- ment remanding case to the trial court approach tween my this case and the for further proceedings. Court’s is that I believe evident I objective should be measured test. It is well settled that a neutral Court concludes otherwise. The arbitra- tor duty has to Court’s is that knew dealings disclose result Nettles about of he or she is might testimony, aware “that an Asmar’s then he must create impression possible of evidently partial. bias.”5 been I This Court do believe Supreme followed the United States an arbitrator’s actual knowledge in Court’s decision Commonwealth Coat- should be determinative when he or she ings when we construed Texas arbitra- reasonably believe that the undis- Pritchard, P.C., Coatings Corр. 5. Commonwealth v. Continental 7. v. & Johnson Brewer 73 Co., 145, 149, 337, 193, C as. 393 U.S. (Tex.2002). 89 S.Ct. S.W.3d (1968). 21 L.Ed.2d 301 Moss, 836, (Tex. 8. Shah v. 67 S.W.3d Inc., TUCO, Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. 2001). 1997) (Tex. (quoting S.W.2d 629-30 Tex. 171.014). § & Civ. Prac. Rem.Code Industries, Inc. v. to The facts in Cook C. already facts were known closed Co., losing are instructive.11 The challenging the award. Itoh & Industries, complained party, Cook recognized court decisions have Federal of did not one the arbitrators disclose matter, an practical arbitrator’s as Cargill, busi- employer, his had extensive be limited to obligation disclosure must Itoh, party who dealings ness with won parties which the dealings facts or about Although many of the the arbitration. to reasonably expected be be cannot relationship facts about the arbitrator’s Ap- Court of aware. The United States dispute in at Cargill with and Itoh were has peals for Second Circuit said: hearing on to Cook’s motion vacate in Supreme Court Common- [W]hile the award, Cargill there was evidence that Coatings emphasized impor- wealth $50,000,000 approximately grain of sold disclosing “to the tance of an arbitrator Cargill’s single year.12 in a Itoh was Itoh parties any dealings might create important grain Japan, most customer in bias,” possible impression of an affidavit indicated that the arbitra- court, practical meaning giving Cargill’s of personally handled 95% tor obligation principle, has treated also Japan.13 The affidavit said sales subject being as which arbitrators performance Car- that the arbitrator’s parties which the dealings of Japan.14 judged by those sales gill was expected to cannot be be unpersuaded that The Second Circuit was i.e., aware, ordinary “not in the dealings evidence of evident any this constituted of course business.”9 that the district court It held Compania That in Andros court later said justified that Cook was concluding Maritima, Co., & AG.: S.A. Marc Rich Cargill of a between aware ] that emphasized [in “We Cook Industries said one and Itoh.15 The Second Circuit given ‘practical meaning’ we have many was that basis for its conclusion Coatings principle dis Commonwealth employees employees were former Cook’s to which by treating obligation ‘the closure that there had been Cargill and knew subject being as to disclose arbitrators are Another was that there were dealings. cannot rea dealings which the Cargill and that relatively few corn dealers ”10 to be aware.’ sonably expected losing party had done business with as Itoh. The circuit the arbitration well an arbitrator’s This articulation of that it found “noth- pointedly court noted common simply application sense. suggests exis- ing the record which cannot be attributed Improper motives extraordinary secret tence fails facts that he someone who to disclose Itoh, pre- who was dealings]” between reasonably expect those with or she could employ- the arbitrator’s dealing vailing party, and whom were to know. Cir.1971). Co., (2d Indus., F.2d 106 C. & 449 F.2d 11. 449 9. Cook Inc. v. Itoh (2d Cir.1971) (quoting Common Co., Coatings Cas. Corp. v. Continental wealth J., dissenting). (Oakes, 12. Id. at 108 149, 337, 145, 21 89 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 393 U.S. omitted)). ‍​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‍(1968) (citation See also Gar 301 13. Id. Wiest, (2d Co. 432 F.2d 854 & field Cir.1970). 14. Id. (2d Cir.1978) (quoting F.2d 700 10. 579 Indus., 108). at 107. at 15. Id. 449 F.2d Cook er, turn, Cargill.16 The case did not as court refused to vacate the award. On suggests, appeal complained Court Rich it Marc had knowledge” on “common an given adequate opportunity not industry. been losing party had why to show arbitration award should enough put access to facts it on inquiry be set aside. Second Circuit ob- about specific the arbitrator’s role in Car- blush, first served at Marc Rich’s gill’s dealings with permit- Itoh. It was not reasonable, request particularly “seem[ed] complain ted to it not did learn of in light discovery usually of the broad specific those more facts until after the in the federal But it allowed courts.”18 arbitration award. upheld nevertheless district court’s case before the today, Court As- confirmation of award arbitration n mar testimony against Nettles another without proceedings. further The circuit suit not “extraordinary was secret.” court grounds doing articulated three certainly Asmar most had actual knowl- First, holding so. it its' reiterated edge her role in the malpractice suit Cook19that an is only required arbitrator Nettles, even if time her “ ‘dealings disclose of which the memory failed. Nettles cannot be faulted reasonably expected cannot to be partiality” for “evident because failed ”20 Second, regard aware.’ it did not something he could reason- undisclosed information “as the sort of in- ably have believed was known to Asmar formation an arbitrator would only those who hired her as their regаrd creating as an impression possi- expert and principal in the witness arbitra- Third, ble bias.”21 the Second Circuit tion. concluded that Arnold’s Nelson’s The Second Circuit’s decision in together Andros “service panels directly focused more on what a no reason- was secret” since Marc Rich able “ able arbitrator expect complain- obtain this information after ex- ‘an ing case, haustive approximately know.17 In review Marc published Society Rich awards of the Mari- & Co. was the losing party in an ”22 Rich, time Arbitrators.’ Marc arbitration and investigated thereafter said, court “could have made prior neutral arbitrator’s service. Based re: easily just view as during before on that investigation, Marc Rich moved to arbitration rather than it its after lost vacate the award and offered affidavit case.”23 to the trial court that showed that arbitrator,

prevailing party’s non-neutral today, In the case us before would Nelson, participated in appointing the expect be reasonable to arbitrator, Arnold, neutral aas neutral court comb records to out if find Nettles nineteen so, other arbitrations. had ever been and if sued who testified cases, In each of those nineteen Arnold against him. But it would be unrea- voted way chief, the same expect Nelson. The trial sonable to Bossleys’ Cook, 16. Id. at 108. (quoting 20. F.2d at 700 449 F.2d at 108). Maritima, Compania 17. Andros S.A. v. Marc Co., A.G., (2d Cir.1978). Rich & F.2d 21. Id. 701. Id. at 697. Id. at 702. 19. 449 F.2d at 108. witness, Asmar, arbitrator in said that a reasonable paid, would remember be hired, would believed that expert position witness Nettles’ testified as a facts were unknown to the legal malpractice in the undisclosed

against Nettles suit potential Bossleys. A reasonable arbitra- Bossleys say that the involved hundreds Bossleys have concluded that The fact that Asmar tor could thousands dollars. in Asmar’s the mal- memory were aware of role lapse during pen- Indeed, it case. would have been practice dency of the arbitration does raise in for an arbitrator Nettles’ objective standard unreasonable fact under the question Bossleys did not to believe that judged be shoes nondisclosure should prior testimony know about Asmar’s deciding if an arbitration award must be in fact to conceal that information. objec- That desired vacated the arbitrator tive standard whether knew seven months reasonably losing could believe Laila they designated Asmar as their after the facts that were not party already knew on securities matters that only witness disclosed. be the neutral arbi- going Netties was hearing at the present trator. Asmar was and Andros that recognition Cook panel, including Net- when the arbitration partiality" must involve matters “evident when, tles, present in. sworn She was complaining party about which began, rep- the NASD expected hearing be aware before be Bossleys and Mari- resentative asked the comports with our rationale TUCO. objections they might TUCO, knew that three ner state Nettles would have hearing panel. have to the the arbitration be- weeks before memory on foolish to count Asmar’s law firm had received referral of been gan, his to conceal her attempting fail if he were law firm of his substantial matter from the It against him. would be prior testimony aside the did not set co-arbitrator. We silence to attribute Nettles’ of the referral unreasonable arbitration award becausе might will he to mask ill failed dis- desire but because the arbitrator circum- these Asmar. Under matter which the toward close a material about stances, objectively no rea- can be not reason- there parties to the arbitration could failure to impression that Nettles’ in sonable ably expected to know. We said partiality.” exhibited “evident emphasize that ... evident “We TUCO: from the nondis- is established has and Andros The rationale of Cook whether itself, regardless closure by the Sec- or “limited” not been undercut necessarily es- information nondisclosed Co., S.S. Circuit’s decision Sanko ond impres- An partiality or bias.”24 tablishes Inc.,25 Industries, as the Ltd. Cook the arbitrator sion had created that been the facts in Based on suggests. Court material facts knowingly failed to disclose Sanko, what Circuit focused Second is not parties. But that unknown to knew or should have losing party the case here. neutral arbi- than what the known rather reasonably have believed to assume trator could

Assuming, required arewe Sanko, par- standard, losing losing party knew. summary judgment under our arbitration, contended ty knowingly failed to disclose that Nettles forthcoming him, arbitrator was not it cannot neutral testimony against Asmar’s (2d Cir.1973). TUCO, (emphasis in 25. 495 F.2d 1260 S.W.2d at 636 original). company deciding when said which he to vacate an arbitration whether “ president dealings example, was had with Cook ‘of an award nondisclosure. As ” fact, a at spot company suppose nature’ when in his and Asmar that Nettles were subsidiary company was of a that ar- time married and one to one another had “ ‘swaps’ ranged and ‘sales’ from time to very contentious divorce. Counsel this, running time into the millions of dollars.”26 Mariner knew but counsel for the Bossleys Bossleys also The arbitrator failed to disclose that and the themselves did party’s repre- also prevailing attorney not. Nettles did not disclose this informa- Bossleys sented the company arbitrator’s and that tion and neither did Asmar. The previously, attorney when this had left his not until relationship did learn after firm, company former the arbitrator’s the arbitrators issued their decision. moved its business from that firm order Could the set aside award to continue to If employ solely same based on Nettles’ nondisclosure? lawyer.27 Circuit only The Second held that these inquiry “dis- were whether the Boss- crepancies” required a remand for an or leys reasonably evi- knew should have dentiary hearing.28 divorce, The court noted that marriage known Sanko and not yes, they Cook were “members of a be answer would could set aside single closely-knit trading group,” and from Judged Bossleys’ the award. importantly, facts, standpoint, more Sanko’s officers did know agents having any denied in affidavits they reasonably cannot be said that knowledge arbitrator’s contacts with should known. But there should facts, Cook or its Given these inquiry deciding another whether Net- attorney.29 the Second Circuit held evidently partial that under Com- on solely tles based Coatings, monwealth arbitrator had An his nondisclosure. Net- disclose. position The Second Circuit did tles’ could reasonably have be- not focus on what the arbitrator could lieved that his former wife had disclosed expect reasonably party relationship losing their who had know, but that does not mean that it would retained her their counsel. An arbitra- not do so if it were faced with facts like tor in these circumstances could not have those today. before our Court All that reasonably can concealing believed that he was Therefore, be said is Sanko that the Second Circuit material information. it cannot uphold would an award be said that he was evidently partial, and losing party “knew reasonably or should the award should not be vacated. “did, fact, have known” or know or have The Court does not seem to grasp these

reason know” of the undisclosed deal- my It position distinctions. characterizes ings.30 saying that “an arbitrator’s failure to There focusing is distinction between adverse cannot as on what arbitrator could matter of law constitute when focusing losing complaining believe and what the means to known, party knew or should but it But discover the adverse relationship.”31 important give concepts effect to in my analysis depend both does on whether Id. at 1262. Id. at 1265. 26. 29. Id. Id.

27. 30. at 1263. S.W.3d “the to learn II losing party had means” the facts but on whether the arbitrator agreed The case to con- this reasonably have believed that proceedings duct under arbitration party. losing facts were known Code, requires potential arbi- NASD which I says that find a Similarly, the Court a reasonable trators to “make effort But, explained, “waiver.”32 I have al- themselves” of certain interests or inform if the though there would be a waiver in the relationships enumerated elsewhere past testimony, of Bossleys knew Asmar’s if Nettles’ failure to dis- Obviously, Code. question that is unrelated to the of wheth- him against Asmar is close that testified partiality. a failure to disclose is evident er partiality even if he had actual not evident finally, says my analy- that And the Court fact, any of that failure on his knowledge depends sis on what “Asmar should have part to reasonable effort to inform make a is Again, inquiry remembered.”33 past with Asmar dealings himself about itself, nondisclosure, in and of whether partiali- establish evident similarly cannot precise The shows evident to disclose facts that he ty. Any failure case is whether an arbitra- question this would not show evi- would discovered reasonably tor could believe that Asmar partiality if those facts could have dent had informed the of her testimo- by been communicated Asmar Boss- Nettles, against not Asmar ny whether partial” “evidently not leys. Again, it is “should remembered.” that сan you to tell facts fail someone us, Asmar knew at the case before they know. Ac- reasonably assume that certainly time and had reason to know one I that failure cordingly, would hold But Nettles. she testified to “make reasonable effort Nettles says actually that she did remem- with past dealings about inform” himself34 evidence, agree this I with the ber. Given “evident Asmar cannot rise to level that Mariner did not establish as Court the FAA. partiality” under Bossleys knew matter of law that the agree with me on Court seems have known that Asmar testified should juncture in its point, at at one least not be against Nettles. But that should “Clearly, It opinion. says, The fact inquiry. the end partiali- influenced Nettles’ could not have past relation- Nettles did not disclose this if, fact, during was unaware ty being as an ship considered when he correctly the arbitration.”35 Court par- is of evident not evidence impression discerns actual knowl- tiality, even Nettles had simply by existence cannot be created signed on as an arbitrator edge when he arbitrator, facts, unknown to against him. that Asmar had testified to in- effort arbitrator’s “reasonable That аn arbitrator Nettles’ is because have revealed. would [him]sel[f]” form could not believe position Yet, in the inconsistency is there some concealing material information. he was point. opinion on this Near Court’s reasonably expect that An arbitrator could in a says the Court opinion, of its end witness communicate the expert would sentence, agree- single “[t]he their counsel. facts to her clients or 34. NASD Code Id. at 33. Procedure Arbitration 10312(b). § Id. at 35. 79 S.W.3d at 40. ment here farther recent incorporates the NASD The most Mastrobuono Code, Hutton, provides only that arbitra- Shear son Inc.37The arbi- Lehman relationships tors should agreement subject tration that case was ‘might reasonably an appearance create FAA, it agreement to the the said that but bias,’ they but also that should by be laws of New governed would the make a ‘reasonable effort’ to inform them- also, York and that the arbitration would relationships.”36 of such The selves Court with the be conducted accordance does not elaborate. are left to We wonder panel arbitration NASD rules. The whether the set аside Court would the York punitive damages. awarded New if actually award Nettles did not know that arbitrators, courts, not to law allowed but him, against Asmar had testified but Net- punitive damages. award The United determine did not make tles effort to Supreme par- Court held that the States had a past whether he connection with pu- agreement govern ties’ would whether Asmar. recovered, be damages nitive law. It then that state concluded there

Ill pro- was tension the between choice-of-law Bossleys The that the contend because specifying vision New York law and the arbitration agreement provides that the provision referring to that NASD rules applies, NASD Code the award must be ambiguity about created whether set comply aside Nettles did not with parties’ agreement punitive allowed dam- “ investigation Code’s and disclosure ages. The NASD allowed ‘dam- Code ” requirements. If Nettles had actual and, therefore, ages and “at other relief knowledge that Asmar testified ... contemplate^]” punitive least dam- him, or if a investigation by reasonable reasoned, ages, the and NASD Court Nettles would have past revealed his deal- given to manual arbitrators said that arbi- Asmar, ings Bossleys argue, with then “ punitive damages trators could ‘consider the award must vacated because he did ” remedy,’ as a Ambi- Court noted.38 dealings. not disclose those The contract said, guities, Court are resolved govern, ‍​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‍contend, should further, arbitration, favor of the Court to comply requires failure vacatur. As said, it unlikely petitioners was con- above, noted the Court does offer any templated giving up were guidance on this issue. right punitive by to damages recover can, It not at clear parties is all whether agreeing provision. to choice-of-law by agreement, their expand the standards Court pro- The “harmonized” the contract for judicial review of arbitration awards “encompass princi- visions substantive 10(a) specified are of the section ples that apply, New York courts would Supreme FAA. United States Court special but not to limiting include rules has that question, not resolved and there is authority of arbitrators.”39 split among circuit courts. There Supreme quoted extensively Court are two decisions of the United States Supreme at from its earlier decision Volt Court least instruc- Informa- tive, Sciences, however. Inc. v. Board tion Trustees 61, 36. 79 S.W.3d at 42. Id. at 115 S.Ct. 1212.

37. 514 U.S. 115 S.Ct. 131 L.Ed.2d 63-64, S.Ct. (1995). that arbitration will be conducted. University.40 Leland Junior Stanford though Where, here, that even agreed The Court held Volt agreement subject the arbitration arbitration, state rules of abide FAA, give would effect the Court enforcing according those rules law parties’ that California agreement agreement fully terms of the consis- law governed the extent California FAA, goals of even if tent with the goals policies did not “undermine stayed result is that arbitration is California law allowed of the FAA.”41 permit Act where the would otherwise proceedings stay courts to By permitting forward. the courts go litigation be- pending resolution related “rigorously agreements to enforce” such agreement to the arbitration tween a terms, give to we effect according their parties by it when and third not bound expecta- rights to the contractual rul- conflicting a of possibility there was parties, doing without vio- tions the of law or fact.42 ings on common issues by policies [sic] behind lence that “the FAA The Court said Volt does FAA.44 compel to arbitration of right not confer time; only any dispute it confers At least three United States Courts directing that right to obtain an order concluded, Appeals on the fore- based proceed provid- the manner ‘arbitration Volt, reasoning in Mastrobuono and going ”43 parties’] agreement.’ in [the ed for can, contract, to parties by add although elaborated that Court vacating for an arbitration award grounds require FAA laws that preempts state 10(a) of the FAA. The semi- under section to judicial agreed forum when nal Fifth Circuit’s decision case arbitrate, Inc. MCI Tele- Gateway Technologies, prevents the FAA it not follow that does held that Corp., communications which agreements to arbi- enforcement of an agreement to give courts must effect than under different rules those trate “ shall decision ‘[t]he that said arbitration Indeed, set in the Act itself. forth parties, binding on both ex- be final and quite would be inimical result subject cept law shall be that errors of purpose ensuring primary FAA’s ”45 The Ninth Circuit found appeal.’ agreements are en- private to аrbitrate persuasive and effect Gateway gave according their terms. Arbi- forced “ ‘The shall parties’ agreement that: Court Act is a matter tration under the (i) vacate, any award: modify or correct consent, coercion, parties are grounds referred upon any based their arbitra- generally free structure (ii) Act, where in the Federal Arbitration they fit. as agreements tion see Just fact are not findings arbitrators’ they may limit contract the issues evidence, (iii) or supported by substantial arbitrate, may they so too will of law the arbitrators’ conclusions under where they specify by contract the rules (citations 479, 1248, 468, 109 S.Ct. 1248 omit- 103 44. Id. at U.S. 109 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 40. 489 (1989). ted). 478, 1248. 41. Id. at 109 S.Ct. (5th Cir.1995) (emphasis 45. 64 F.3d omitted). Id. at 109 S.Ct. 474-75, (quoting 9 S.Ct. Id. at Volt)). (emphasis § 4 U.S.C. ”46 bring are erroneous.’ Third fol- Circuit arbitration award set aside must suit, speci- itself within the The statute holding [FAA]. lowed that contracting parties an grounds setting fies for aside limited “opt out of the FAA’s default vacatur arbitration award.”52 The court held that own,”47 standards and fashion their but “even if the failure to disclose [arbitrator’s] provision selecting that a choice of law was a material violation of ethical stan- Pennsylvania аnd provision law agreeing applicable proceed- dards to arbitration to arbitrate under the Commercial Arbi- ings, it does not that the follow tration Rules of the American Arbitration may judicially.”53 award be nullified “opt did not Association out” of the FAA’s Posner, Judge writing for court standards.48 Merit, explained holding: the basis for the At least four other circuit courts have great respect we Although conclusion, holding reached different Commercial Arbitration Rules and indicating that parties expand cannot Arbitrators, Code of Ethics for grounds for vacatur under the FAA. The proper point not the in- starting expressly Tenth Circuit declined to follow quiry validity into award’s under sec- Gateway Lapine in Bowen v. Amoco tion 10 of the United States Arbitration Pipeline give Co.49It refused to effect to Act .... The arbitration rules and code parties’ agreement the they that would do not have get the force of law.... [T]o “ right appeal have a to ‘on the grounds ag- the arbitration award set [the aside supported by the award is not grieved party] must itself bring within ”50 evidence.’ The Tenth saw Circuit specifies statute .... The statute distinctiоn allowing parties between grounds limited for aside ar- setting an compel the arbitration in itself accordance award. bitration with the agreement terms of their requiring agreement courts follow their The American Arbitration Association regarding grounds on which an award ... set may high its standards as or low FAA, could be 4 vacated. Section of the as it thinks its want. The customers said, the court expressly parties allows purpose statute has a different “ —to compel arbitration ‘in the manner provid- make arbitration by putting effective ” ed in for agreement,’ [the] arbitration force coercive federal courts be- but, observed, the court section 10 in- hind arbitration decrees that affect FAA, setting forth the grounds for vacat- terstate commerce otherwise award, ing any an does not contain lan- federal concern.... for The standards guage requiring par- courts to follow the judicial intervention are therefore nar- agreement.51 ties’ rowly integri- drawn to assure the basic

The Seventh Circuit in held Merit In- ty process of the arbitration without Co., surance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance meddling it.... The fact lоsing if the party “is to AAA get beyond statutory went stan- 930, Corp. Kyocera 46. LaPine Corp., Tech. v. 130 50. Id. at 933. 884, 887, (9th Cir.1997). F.3d 51. Id. at 935. ser, Roadway Package Sys., Kay Inc. v. (3d Cir.2001). F.3d (7th Cir.1983). 52. 714 F.2d 680-81 Id. at 293. Id. at 680. (10th Cir.2001). 49. 254 F.3d 925 plaining demonstrated a viola- drafting its own code of ethics has dards judicial for The ma- governing does not the threshold tion of the statute. lower and relevant facts an arbitrator intervention.54 terial may fails demonstrate his Chicago Subsequently, Typographical partiality” under federal [the “evident Sun-Times, Inc., Chicago v. Union However, non-disclosure, even act]. want, parties “If Seventh Circuit said: facts, independent legal sig- has no they appellate can contract an arbitra- for not in nificance and does itself constitute award. panel tion review the arbitrator’s grounds vacating for award.57 re- judicial But cannot contract for award; jurisdiction view of federal that of the A more recent decision is Holding contract.”55 Eighth cannot be created Circuit Delta Mine Co. Properties, Although Inc.58 AFC Coal Appeals The United States Court their agreed arbitra the Fourth has also concluded Circuit proceeding comply tion must with the to conduct an arbitration agreement rules of American Arbitration Associa adopted by under ethical rules tion, the court held that “arbitration rules providers setting cannot be the basis codes not have force ethical ‘do the FAA.56It is the aside an award under ”59 a reviewing law.’ The court said that governs, the court arbitration statute that exclusively on stat court must “focus [the] said: utory grounds” deciding whether the arbitrator]’s Even if failure to [the required arbitra arbitrator’s conduct [requiring disclose had violated Rule tion award aside.60 set disclosure to the AAA of circum- Eighth has said in The Circuit also UHC impartiality], that likely stance affect Computer Management Company, Inc. v. itself, not, by even require would or clear, however, is not Corp., “[i]t Sciences nullify permit a court to an arbitration say parties any that in how a federal agree to parties award. be bound When will review an arbitration award court rules, rules do not by the AAA those specific, ordained a Congress when has a court to vacate an give federal license a for how such re- self-limiting procedure other than those set grounds award сourt observed view is to occur.”61 The Thus, in al- [the statute]. forth federal provides 9 FAA that of the “[s]ection provide signifi- AAA rules though the grant’ an order con- courts ‘must federal arbi- helpful regulation cant and of the ‘unless firming an arbitration award process, they proper tration “are vacated, modified, is or corrected as award into an starting point inquiry for an in sections 10 and 11 of Merit, prescribed validity.” award’s 714 F.2d at ”62 continued, “Congress The court Rather, title.’ determining in whether award, de novo review of such did not authorize a court set aside an merits; it com- an award on its commanded only may consider whether omitted). (citations 59. Id. 54. Id. at 680-81 1501, (7th Cir.1991).

55. 935 F.2d 60. Id. Carolina, Cogentrix N. Co. ANR Coal of 1998). (8th 61. 148 F.3d Cir. (4th Inc., Cir.1999). F.3d omitted). (citation

57. Id. 62. Id. (8th Cir.2001).

58. 280 F.3d 815 exceptions apply, when the do not a feder- conduct check to attorney to a conflicts see al court has no choice but to confirm.”63 present represented firm if she or her has parties. one of the The failure conduct good arguments

There are on both sides simple such a check should be evidence of question parties of of the whether can lawyer might A evident аlso be agreement statutory add to the grounds required inquire spouse whether he of setting aside arbitration award. represented represents his firm or has or But I need not decide in this case which is parties. But beyond one these proper interpretation FAA. types investigate Even those courts that a failure is par- inquiries, have held that may expand scope judicial ties re- problematic. lawyer more Should a be by agreement any view said required to contact a former firm or firms agreement be explicit.64 must The arbitra- and ask them to checks and run conflicts agreement today tion in the case before us to see was opposing search files who coun- say does violation of the NASD and who testified or risk having sel else grounds Code is for vacatur. Nor does any the lawyer arbitration award which say the NASD Code breach its set participates aside? The answer should provisions grounds for vacatur. There required be no. Should is, therefore, applying any no basis for contact counsel in cases in or which he standards other than those set forth members of his firm have beеn sued to 10(a) section of the FAA in determining determine who the counsel and opposing whether the award this case be set must I Again, witnesses were? think the an- aside. Nor is there basis for conclud- To swer must be no. the extent ing that an arbitrator’s failure to “make a requiring Schmitz could be read as reasonable effort to [himself inform her- or investigation broad when rules such as the of potential past self]” conflicts deal- require NASD inqui- Code “reasonable” ings with or witnesses constitutes I ry, disagree approach. with that evidence of case. every must partiality.” touchstone be “evident circumstances which the failure may Failure to conduct a broader search to conduct an investigation can constitute particular provider’s a breach impartiality evident should be limited. arbitrations, rules conducting but not example, For the Ninth Circuit Schmitz every such breach amounts par- to evident Zilveti, posited v. that “parties expect can tiality. lawyer/arbitrator to investigate and dis- TUCO, In expressly approved this Court close conflicts has with actual to Schmitz, part reasoning of the but we arbitration,” and the fact “[t]hat did not consider Schmitz’s discussion of a lawyer forgot run to a conflict check duty investigate that is forgotten imposed by had that he previously rep- had an parties’ agreement.66 resented the is not I We did not consider excuse.”65 agree. It be simple should matter for an in TUCO whether an arbitrator with no panded judicial review of an arbitration award, parties' so intent to do must be Techs., Gateway 64. See v. Tele Inc. MCI unmistakably expressed.”) clearly and Cir.1995); (5th Corp., comms. 64 F.3d Corp. Kyocera Corp., v. LaPine Tech. 130 F.3d (9th Cir.1994). 65. 20 F.3d (9th Cir.1997); Roadway Sys., Package (3d Cir.2001). Kayser, v. Inc. 257 F.3d 287 TUCO, S.W.2d at 636. (“As Mgmt., See also UHC 148 F.3d at 998 suming possible that it is to contract for ex- vacating award unless the basis for an knowledge the undisclosed facts

actual investigate in and arbitrator’s failure to partiality” he or an would exhibit “evident has itself indicates that he or she chosen failed to conduct reasonable investi- of conflicts that could ignorant to remain gation past poten- contacts to determine by easily inquiries that be determined tial conflicts. considered routine. re expressly At least two courts have n n ;¡: ‍​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‍n n n jected proposition an аrbitrator’s investigate poten to determine failure reasons, only I concur foregoing For the finding support conflict can of evi tial to- that is handed down judgment in the Both of those courts partiality.67 dent day. an failure to have held that arbitrator’s cannot be unless knowledge of the he or she actual facts that an arbitrator

undisclosed Gianelli, duty investigate.68 no

has prior its Eleventh Circuit relied on International, v. Inc. decision Lifecare MEMORIAL HOSPITAL BOWIE Inc.,69 a/k/a Medical, explaining that even CD Hospital Bowie Bowie District d/b/a background if “the routine check most Authority Hospital District Bow- d/b/a in brought would have the arbitrator Petitioner, Hospital, ie Memorial no light,” the arbitrator had formation to past contacts to “duty investigate partiality.”70 avoid evident and P.L. Barbara WRIGHT for the District Appeals The Court of Wright, Respondents. reject- expressly has also Columbia Circuit No. 01-0814. investigate: ed a that, appearing, nothing else [W]e hold of Texas. Supreme Court has con- fact that 13, 2002. June sufficient un- investigation ducted marginally existence of facts cover the under

disclosable Commonwealth

Coatings sufficient to war- duty is not vacating an arbitration award

rant is, explicitly That we duty

hold there is no arbitra- investigation.71

tor make said, as far as go I I would not

As have investigate But any

these courts. parties’ agreement cannot

imposed by the (11th Cir.1995). 69. 68 F.3d 429 Money v. & Trust Gianelli Purchase Plan Inc., Servs., F.3d 146 ADM Investor Citibank, (11th Cir.1998); Al-Harbi Gianelli, at 1312. 146 F.3d (D.C.Cir.1996). N.A., F.3d 71. Al-Harbi, at 683. F.3d 1312; Al-Harbi, Gianelli, at 146 F.3d F.3d 682-83.

Case Details

Case Name: Mariner Financial Group, Inc. v. Bossley

Court Name: Texas Supreme Court

Date Published: Jun 13, 2002

Citation: 79 S.W.3d 30

Docket Number: 00-0325

Court Abbreviation: Tex.