Marin Motor Oil, Inc. v. MichaelsMarin Motor Oil, Inc. v. Michaels
In the Matter of MARIN MOTOR OIL, INC., Debtor.
OFFICIAL UNSECURED CREDITORS' COMMITTEE
v.
David P. MICHAELS, Trustee of Marin Motor Oil, Inc. and
Honorable Hugh Leonard, U.S. Trustee.
Appeal of Nicholas MARIN, Nick-O-Mar Realty Corp., Petrobras
Company, Inc., Marin Retail Gasoline Sales Company, Marin
Oil Co., Inc., Fra Mar, Inc., Marin Mercantile Oil Exchange,
Marin Drilling Corp., Marin Holding Company.
Nos. 81-3083, 81-3084.
United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit.
Argued July 20, 1982.
Decided Sept. 29, 1982.
Nolan, Bell & Moore, Newark, N.J., for appellee, Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee; Daniel E. Straffi, Newark, N.J., (argued), on brief.
Kleinberg, Moroney, Masterson & Schachter, P.A., Millburn, N.J., for appellants, Nicholas Marin, et al.
Ravin, Katchen & Greenberg, P.A., Newark, N.J., for appellant, David P. Michaels, trustee; Jack M. Zackin, Newark, N.J. (argued) and Walter J. Greenhalgh, Millburn, N.J. (argued), on brief.
David N. Ravin, Ravin & Kesselhaut, West Orange, N.J., for appellant Isle Marin.
Before ADAMS and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges, and TEITELBAUM,* District Judge.
OPINION OF THE COURT
ADAMS, Circuit Judge.
We are called upon in this appeal to determine whether a creditors' committee in a bankruptcy reorganization has the right to intervene in adversary proceedings instituted by a trustee. We first decide that we have jurisdiction under
I.
On April 21, 1981, Marin Motor Oil, Inc. filed a voluntary petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. All outstanding shares of Marin were owned by Nicholas Marin. Marin and his wife, Ilse Marin, also owned and controlled several related companies.
Two weeks after the petition was filed, the United States Trustee1 appointed the Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee ("Committee") pursuant to
The Trustee entered into a stipulation on June 16 with the Marins and the various Marin companies, freezing their assets; the stipulation was to terminate in 45 days. On July 2, the Committee voluntarily withdrew its complaint with the understanding that an order freezing the assets of the Marins and the Marin companies would be sought and that the Trustee would vigorously pursue his own complaint.
The Trustee then instituted the two adversary proceedings in which the Committee ultimately sought to intervene, and which gave rise to this appeal. The first adversary proceeding, instituted July 14, 1981, sought to recover for the estate a home and furnishings in Tenafly, New Jersey. The home was purchased with money that Nicholas Marin had borrowed from Marin Motor Oil. Nominal title to the home was held by the Marin Holding Company, a company under the complete control of Nicholas Marin. The Trustee asked for the imposition of a constructive trust on the home and furnishings, and for a declaration that Marin Motor Oil was the beneficial owner. The second adversary proceeding, instituted July 17, 1981, sought to extend the pending Chapter 11 proceedings to include the Marins individually and the various Marin companies besides Marin Motor Oil. The Trustee's complaint alleged that the various companies had been operated as a single economic unit, without observance of the requisite formalities; that the Marins had "complete control" over the various companies; that the Marins' personal assets were inextricably intertwined with those of the companies; that Marin Motor Oil financed the other companies; and that the purpose and effect of forming the other companies was to delay and defraud creditors.
During the following months, the Committee became increasingly dissatisfied with the Trustee's performance. It was especially disturbed that the Trustee had allowed the stipulation freezing the assets to lapse, although another stipulation was eventually extended to September 14. In early October, the Committee sought, under
Reading
II.
Before we can reach the merits of this dispute, it is necessary for us to determine that we have appellate jurisdiction at this juncture of the proceedings. Although the question is not free from doubt, we conclude that there is jurisdiction.
The usual rule in this Circuit is that "(w)hen an absolute right to intervene in a lawsuit is claimed, and the claim is rejected, the order denying intervention is considered final and appealable." Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Rizzo,
These rules, however, were developed in appeals under
Notwithstanding section 1482 of this title, a court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of an appeal from a final judgment, order, or decree of an appellate panel created under section 160 or a District court of the United States or from a final judgment, order, or decree of a bankruptcy court of the United States if the parties to such appeal agree to a direct appeal to the court of appeals.
There is no reason to doubt that the order of the bankruptcy court, denying a claimed absolute right of intervention, was final. Had the parties agreed to a direct appeal to this Court of that order, we would have had appellate jurisdiction under
As reluctant as we are to adopt an expansive interpretation of finality, see Bachowski v. Usery,
In Universal Minerals, supra,
In re Bildisco,
Policy considerations, as well as the language of Bildisco and Universal Minerals, also support a determination that the district court's order was appealable. Many of the principal rationales for narrowly construing finality are based on an understanding of the proper relation between a trial court and an appellate court, and have less applicability when one appellate court is asked to review what is in effect a lower appellate court. As one authority explains, "(t)he starting point of the final judgment rule, so obvious that it is ordinarily taken for granted, is found in the nature of the relationship between appellate and trial courts." This is because the trial court's "primary responsibilities for fact finding, standard application, and procedure mean that most rulings that precede factfinding do not lead to reversal, and that often a court of appeals can satisfactorily identify the controlling legal questions only after factfinding has been completed." C. Wright, A. Miller and E. Cooper, 15 Federal Practice and Procedure § 3907 (1976). The commentators go on to note that "(m)any of the justifications for postponing review beyond the point at which the trial court has finally decided a particular matter are cast in terms of saving time and avoiding unnecessary appeals." Id. at § 3907. But when the trial court has already issued what is concededly a final judgment, and has not merely "finally decided a particular matter," then some of these justifications may have less force. For example, although two appeals may delay the trial more than one appeal would, and delay is a serious problem that the final judgment rule is designed to ameliorate, the damage if any to a speedy and coherent trial is occasioned for the most part by the initial appeal.2
Another consideration leading us to construe finality somewhat less narrowly under
These policy considerations alone might be insufficient to persuade us to modify our usual finality rules. In combination with the language of Bildisco and Universal Minerals, however, policy considerations convince us that the district court order appealed from below should be considered final. But it is important to stress the limited nature of our holding on jurisdiction. We hold only that when the bankruptcy court issues what is indisputably a final order, and the district court issues an order affirming or reversing, the district court's order is also a final order for purposes of
III.
A.
Having established that there is jurisdiction, we next consider the merits of the dispute. The language of the statute would seem clearly to favor the position espoused by the Committee:
A party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter.
Appellants do not deny that
The Rules of this Part VII govern any proceeding instituted by a party before a bankruptcy judge to (1) recover money or property, other than a proceeding under Rule 220 or Rule 604, (2) determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien or other interest in property, (3) sell property free of a lien or other interest for which the holder can be compelled to take a money satisfaction, (4) object to or revoke a discharge, (5) obtain an injunction, (6) obtain relief from a stay as provided in Rule 401 or 601, or (7) determine the dischargeability of a debt. Such a proceeding shall be known as an adversary proceeding.4
Most litigated matters in a bankruptcy case are adversary proceedings, see Trost, Trial Practice Under the New Bankruptcy Rules, 47 Am.Bankr.L.J. 111, 112 (1973); consequently the appellants' proposed reading of
The precise scope of the term "adversary proceeding" is of little significance here, since it is conceded that the two actions in which the Committee seeks to intervene are adversary proceedings. The crucial issue is whether we should read "case" to exclude adversary proceedings. Appellants would have us believe that "case" refers "to the general administration of a Chapter 11 proceeding leading up to the confirmation of a plan of reorganization by the Bankruptcy court." Appellants Brief at 15. We find no reason to adopt this crabbed definition. Appellants point to the fact that under
Attention is also called to the exact language of
B.
Any doubt about the meaning of the language of
(p)rovides, in unqualified terms, that any creditor, equity security holder, or an indenture trustee shall have the right to be heard as a party in interest under this chapter in person, by an attorney, or by a committee. It is derived from section 206 of chapter X (11 U.S.C. 606).
S.Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 116 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5787, 5902 (emphasis added). Section 1109(b) was of course passed as a very small part of the major overhaul of the bankruptcy laws embodied in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
It would be a strained construction to read this "unqualified" right as being limited to participation in the general administrative aspects of cases. More importantly, the derivation of section 1109(b) from section 206 of Chapter X suggests that Congress had no intention of upsetting the long line of section 206 cases granting a broad, absolute right to appear and be heard. Section 206 had provided that "(t)he debtor, the indenture trustees, and any creditor or stockholder of the debtor shall have the right to be heard on all matters arising in a proceeding under this chapter." Chapter X Bankruptcy Rule 10-210(a), which according to the Advisory Committee Note to the Rule was derived from section 206, provided that:
(1) The debtor, the indenture trustees, and any creditor or stockholder of the debtor shall have the right to be heard on all matters arising in a Chapter X case.
(2) A labor union or employees' association, representative of employees of the debtor, shall have the right to be heard on the economic soundness of a plan affecting the interests of the employees.
13A Collier Bankruptcy P 10-210.02 (14th ed. 1977), remarks, on the relation between Rule 10-210(a)(1) and section 206, that "(t)he slightly altered language does not affect (sic) any change in the statute." Congress' obvious borrowing in section 1109(b) from the language of Rule 10-210(a) is further evidence that Congress intended for there to be no sharp break between section 206 and section 1109(b).
The statutory provision which section 206 replaced had given creditors and stockholders an absolute right to be heard on only a limited number of issues, and it was to remedy perceived deficiencies in this system of limited rights that section 206 was enacted. This Court explained the legislative history of section 206 in In re Keystone Realty Holding Co.,
See also In re Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co.,
The standing conferred by Section 206 of the Bankruptcy Act and Chapter X Rule 10-210(a)(1) was absolute and unlimited, and gave the debtor, creditors, stockholders and indenture trustees the same rights as if they were successful intervenors in the case, but without the necessity of a formal order of intervention. Those within the specified categories who sought to participate in the reorganization, therefore, were by statute parties to the case. Accordingly, it was clear that there was no need to seek intervention in order to be entitled to full participation in the reorganization of any creditor, stockholder or indenture trustee, or of a duly authorized creditors' or stockholders' committee or other representative since Chapter X Rule 10-210(a) (1) gave every substantial right or privilege that intervention could give.
(footnotes omitted)
For a recent example in the apparently unbroken line of cases that support the broad and absolute reading of section 206, see Matter of Duplan Corp.,
It should also be observed that there was a permissive intervention provision under Chapter X. It was not section 206, however, but section 207. It provided that "(t)he judge may for cause shown permit a party in interest to intervene generally or with respect to any specified matter." See also Chapter X Bankruptcy Rule 10-210(b). When Congress chose to derive section 1109(b) from section 206 rather than from section 207, it understood that it was adopting the mandatory and not the permissive provision. Indeed, the lack of a counterpart to section 207 in the current Code leads to an anomaly in the appellants' position. Although they assume that the bankruptcy court had discretion to permit or deny intervention by the Committee, they point to no statutory provision other than section 1109(b). But under their analysis, section 1109(b) is mandatory as to "cases" (narrowly understood) and is completely inapplicable to adversary proceedings. Thus, under appellants' analysis, it is unclear how the bankruptcy court could have allowed intervention even if it had wanted to do so.6
There is no basis for concluding that by changing the statutory language from "all matters arising in a proceeding under this chapter" to "any issue in a case under this chapter" Congress meant to effect a sweeping restriction in the right of interested parties to participate in litigated matters connected with bankruptcy reorganizations. This is confirmed by the fact that the section 1109(b) phrase "any issue in a case under this chapter" is taken virtually verbatim from a Bankruptcy Rule under section 206, Rule 10-210(a), quoted supra. The legislative history, which explicitly derives section 1109(b) from section 206 and which calls the right to be heard as a party "unqualified," strongly reinforces the impression that Congress did not mean for section 1109(b) to introduce the radical narrowing of rights that appellants would have us find.
The fact that rights under section 206 were mandatory and wide-ranging is significant not only because section 1109(b) is derived from section 206, but also because it suggests that the appellants' policy arguments are unrealistic. Appellants claim that the confusion, disorder, and expense that supposedly would be entailed by allowing each creditor or stockholder to intervene in adversary proceedings are such that it is "clearly unthinkable" that Congress could have intended to allow such a result. But the unqualified right of creditors and stockholders to intervene appears to have been the rule under section 206 for approximately 40 years, and the legislative history of section 1109(b) shows no dissatisfaction with it.
Appellants are unable to provide any support for their speculation that multitudes of individual creditors and stockholders would intervene in adversary proceedings unless we reject the broad and absolute reading of section 1109(b). Surely relatively few individuals would have enough interest in the outcome of an adversary proceeding to seek to intervene. The applicable Bankruptcy Rules and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would afford to the bankruptcy courts sufficient means to control any confusion, disorder or expense that might result from the intervention of those parties who do seek to intervene. And even if the means are insufficient, that insufficiency is certainly not so patent that we would be forced-in the face of considerable evidence to the contrary-to conclude that Congress could not possibly have intended the reading of section 1109(b) urged here by the Committee. Moreover, in a case such as the present one, where intervention is sought by an official creditors' committee that hopes to speed up the proceedings and prevent dissipation of the estate, there is little danger that intervention will unnecessarily deplete the estate, delay the conclusion of the case, or prejudice any party.
C.
The cases decided thus far under section 1109(b) support our view that this provision should be given as broad and absolute a reading as section 206 had received. In re Penn-Dixie Industries, Inc.,
According to In re D. H. Overmyer Telecasting Co., Inc.,
Sapolin Paints was decided on the basis of
The language of the statute seems clearly to require that more than mere participation as an amicus be allowed. Section 1109(b) says that a party in interest may "raise ... any issue in a case under this chapter." But an amicus's participation is limited to the submission of briefs on issues already raised and considered. See e.g., Knetsch v. United States,
Appellants cite In re Cloud Nine, Ltd.,
It is completely understandable that Congress would have given a creditors' committee greater rights to participate in reorganizations than in liquidations. As one commentator explains:
In contrast to the advisory role of a creditors' committee in chapter 7 cases, the very nature of a chapter 11 case (the attempt to continue the debtor's business, generally the continuation of a debtor in possession, and the need to address both the determination of assets available for secured and unsecured creditors and equity security holders and the determination of the allocation of said assets among creditors and equity security holders) dictates a much more active role for committees in chapter 11 cases.
DeNatale, The Creditors' Committee Under the Bankruptcy Code-A Primer," 55 Am.Bankr. L.J., 43, 51 (1981). See also Congress' remarks on the role that creditors and equity security holders committees are expected to play under
This section provides for the appointment of creditors' and equity security holders' committees, which will be the primary negotiating bodies for the formulation of the plan of reorganization. They will represent the various classes of creditors and equity security holders from which they are selected. They will also provide supervision of the debtor in possession and of the trustee, and will protect their constituents' interests.
H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 401, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5963, 6357. The failure of
At oral argument appellants called our attention to In re Segarra,
Sec. 1109(b) provides that various entities including a creditor and a creditors' committee may appear and be heard on any issue in (sic) case. This section permits their intervention during the development of a Chapter 11 case when plans are being negotiated, the business conduct of a debtor being investigated, and the need for a trustee considered; this is the meat and potatoes of a Chapter 11. However, Congress has added to this standard bill of fare what we call adversary proceedings and has provided by creating our pervasive jurisdiction that they, too, may be heard by the Bankruptcy Court. But we do not read in the act or anywhere else that Congress intended in expanding our jurisdiction to create new causes of action in favor of creditors and committees. To the contrary, the Congressional history indicates that Congress was solely interested in providing an additional forum where existing causes might be heard. Thus Congress hoped to reduce the delays resulting from the prior division of the juridical business of bankruptcy courts. Sec. 1109(b) applies to cases and not to proceedings.
id. at 878, footnote omitted. The Segarra court seems to have conflated two distinct questions: first, whether section 1109(b) creates "new causes of action in favor of creditors and committees"; second, whether 1109(b) gives creditors and committees an absolute right to intervene in adversary proceedings already initiated by a trustee or debtor in possession. Only the former issue was present in Segarra. To the extent that the court may have intended to express a negative answer to the second question-and we are uncertain if this is what was intended-its statements are dicta.11
The strongest support for the appellants appears in 5 Collier Bankruptcy Practice Guide P 83.08(6) (1st ed. 1981), which states in part:
A creditors' committee is not necessarily a party to an adversary proceeding unless named as such, or unless it is permitted to intervene under Bankruptcy Rule 724 ... (1109(b) ) does not necessarily mean that a creditors' committee may appear and be heard on any issue in every adversary proceeding pending in a case under Chapter 11.
The Practice Guide cites no authority for this statement, and in view of the language of the statute, the legislative history, and the case law, we are puzzled by it. We doubt if the Practice Guide can be considered as reliable a source as the well-established Collier on Bankruptcy, which takes an absolutist view of Section 1109(b).12
It is appropriate to add a point stressed by the district judge and by the Committee in its brief, namely that the broad and absolute construction of section 1109(b) comports with the usual expectation of parties in interest that they will have a right to be heard, as parties in interest, by the tribunal adjudicating their interests. This expectation has its roots in notions of due process and fair play, even though there is no allegation here that denial of a right of intervention to the Committee would itself violate due process. We are especially reluctant to adopt the extremely strained interpretation of section 1109(b) proposed by appellants when to do so would frustrate this expectation of participation.13
IV.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
Notes
Honorable Hubert I. Teitelbaum, United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation
The United States Trustee pilot program is currently in effect in the District of New Jersey and several other districts (
In the present case, the adversary proceedings in the bankruptcy court apparently continued unaffected by the appeal brought in this court
The term "proceeding" is used in
As used in (
Collier on Bankruptcy P 3.01 at 3-33, 3-34 (15th ed. 1982) quoting S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 153-54 (1978), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1978, p. 5787. Note the Senate Report's assumption that "adversary proceedings" are among the things that "(occur) in a bankruptcy case."
Under Section 405(d) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2685 (1978), Bankruptcy Rules in effect on September 30, 1979-as Rule 701 was-remain in effect under the Bankruptcy Reform Act to the extent not inconsistent with the Act, until repealed or superseded by new rules prescribed and effective under
The Senate Report actually referred to this section as 1109(a), since prior to final amendment 1109(a) and 1109(b) were the reverse of their final version. Legislative History of § 1109, 1981 Collier Pamphlet Edition, Bankruptcy Code, Part 3 at 400
In re Citizens Loan & Thrift Co.,
See e.g. In re Casco Bay Lines, Inc.,
Sapolin Paints' unconditional interpretation of section 1109(b) may technically be dicta, since the court stated that it was
unnecessary, for purposes of the present proceeding, to determine whether Chemical is entitled to intervene as of right, or only as of grace, because even if the Court were not satisfied that § 1109(b) confers an unconditional right to intervene, it would permit such intervention as a matter of discretion under FRCP 24(b).
Id. at 584. Citizens Loan, supra, however, ruled that section 1109(b) was absolute even though it stated in dictum that it would allow intervention even if section 1109(b) were inapplicable and the intervenor were forced to rely only on the permissive intervention provision of Rule 10-210(b). See also In re Commercial Finance Corp. of Nevada,
The Committee has not claimed a right to intervene under
The Committee here claims that Watkins involved a claim of intervention under
On the standing of a creditors' committee to bring suit, see Matter of Joyanna Holitogs, Inc.,
According to 5 Collier On Bankruptcy P 1109.02 at 1109-23 (15th ed. 1982),
Section 1109(b) merely states that certain designated parties are "parties in interest" and thus presumably do not have to formally intervene in a chapter 11 case. Although section 1109 grants party in interest status to creditors, equity security holders and certain of their representatives, section 1109 does not purport to deprive the bankruptcy court of its discretion with respect to allowance of a petition for intervention in a reorganization case by other parties.
Footnotes omitted. We have already seen that Collier on Bankruptcy would include adversary proceedings within the definition of "case." Supra at 12. Thus, the passage quoted here implies that the bankruptcy court has no discretion to deny intervention to creditors in an adversary proceeding connected with a Chapter 11 case.
Because we have held that section 1109(b) affords an absolute right, we need not consider the Committee's contention that even if section 1109(b) is permissive the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying intervention