*1 Co., F.2d Y., H. R. N. H. & N. PEARSON, Marilyn as Administratrix W. today reads public 1960), (C.A.2, Goods, and Credits of the Chattels gov- spectacular rather share Plaintiff-Ap Pearson, Deceased, John S. large “won on sums ernment takes pellee, quiz programs or in lotteries television public informed sweepstakes.” AIRLINES, INC., in income taken NORTHEAST of the amount that is Defendant-Appellant. large paid to busi- from salaries taxes executives, entertain- ness stars No. Docket 27350. large earners, and world and other ment Appeals United States Court of taken taxes that are the amounts Second Circuit. any we Have from estates. decedent’s Argued April before the Panel awarding 1962. juries, today’s assurance that range one before verdicts July Panel Decision 1962. that, us, $136,267.23, unlike are aware Rehearing en Banc Ordered they money, receipt of almost other Sept. 1962. guess a tax I free? would venture are Rehearing en Banc Decided lawyers number of substantial Nov. 1962. (excluding engaged personal those injury business) would unsure receiving $100,- consequences tax personal injury 000.00 verdict. Should jurors expect informed?
we better to be considering sub- cases Some of the merely would not be er-
ject that it hold give simple on the instruction ror argues here, plaintiff hold
point but, as matter should be left See, McWeeney judge’s discretion. trial supra, p. Y., N. H. & H. R. N. easily dispose so not think can I do we grant, above, subject. I stated might jurors’ im- deliberations that peded required, in com- if were calculating earnings past puting loss guess past earnings, of future regulations. Simple tax future advice, rates present however, that award their not be income tax reduced does will If, as seems vice. to be such have prejudice conceded, will be visited no advice, why plaintiff with- such my opinion, serious harm can ? In hold jurors’ defendant lack to a result They field. in this of information should Except for truth. loss know advantage, plaintiffs will suf- unfair knowing jury from a truth. I fer error to
consider reversible refuse subject. simple on the instruction judgment would reverse or-
I a new trial.
der *2 McGohey. Judge
was tried before
judge
recovery
plaintiff’s
ruled that
$15,-
arbitrary
not bound
limit
provided by
Chapter
section
*3
of
Laws.1
Massachusetts General
doing
holding
so
of the
he relied on the
Havens, New
Haight, Gardner, Poor &
Kilberg
Appeals,
New York
in
Court of
and
City (William Junkerman
J.
York
Airlines, Inc.,
v. Northeast
9 N.Y.2d
City,
Bowring,
Douglas
York
New
B.
(1961).
133, 172
211 N.Y.S.2d
N.E.2d
defendant-appellant.
counsel)
of
for
damages
jury
The
thereafter awarded
Speiser,
Sterritte,
Shu-
and
Frank G.
statutory
well in excess of the
maximum
City
Geoghan Law,
mate,
York
&
New
judgment
accordingly.2
and
was entered
De-
Speiser
M.
(Stuart
Florindo
and
M.
From
judgment,
this adverse
the defend
counsel)
City,
for
Rosa,
of
New York
appealed
Court,
ant airline
to this
claim
plaintiff-appellee.
ing,
alia,
recovery
inter
that the
should
Judge,
LUMBARD, Chief
limited,
Before
law,
have been
as a matter of
MOORE,
WATERMAN,
CLARK,
and
in accordance with the Massachusetts
KAUFMAN,
FRIENDLY,
SMITH,
appeal
by
statute. The
a
was first heard
Judges.
MARSHALL,
panel
Circuit
HAYS and
consisting
of this Court
of Chief
Judge
Judge
Lumbard,
Swan and this
Judge,
KAUFMAN,
with whom
Circuit
majority
held,
panel
A
writer.
of that
SMITH,
WATERMAN,
CLARK,
HAYS
my dissent,
over
Full
and
Faith
Judges,
MARSHALL,
concur.
and
Circuit
Credit Clause of the United States Con
question
principal,
considered
The
courts,
stitution barred New York
and
a federal
is whether
en banc
this Court
hearing
brought
a federal court
an action
sitting
of New
in the state
court
diversity juris
in New York
of
virtue
constitutionally “apply”
Massachu-
a
awarding
diction, from
unlimited recov
giving a cause of action
setts
ery
in a lawsuit “based”
Massa
refuse,
rea-
and
for
death
for
being
chusetts statute.4 The issue
one
policy,
provision
to follow
of state
sons
great significance
of
—the
would limit
which
that statute
of
develop
of the states to
conflict of
recovery
$15,000.
ques-
The
plaintiff’s
upon ap
ordered,
laws doctrine—it was
for
in an action
arises
tion
plication
plaintiff-appellee
and
plane
crash in
occasioned
brought
majority
of a
The
the affirmative vote
action was
Massachusetts.
for
judges
District Court
circuit,
ap
United States
in
of this
active
that the
York,
District
and
the Southern
peal be reheard en banc
Airlines,
Inc.,
Northeast
1. Pearson
$20,000.
Mass.Gen.Laws Ann.Ch.
§
(S.D.N.Y.1961).
F.Supp. 539
(Supp.1961).
of the Massachusetts Gen-
This section
2. jury brought
in a verdict
sum
“Damages
reads:
for death
Statutes
eral
$134,043.77.
judgment
court’s
negligence
of common
If
carrier.
later
amended to
was
include an addi-
pas-
proprietor
common carrier
of a
$26,160.88 of interest.
tional
*
* *
sengers
causes
the death of
passenger,
or it shall
IV.,
he
be liable in
“Full
Article
Section 1.
Faith and
damages
given
sum of not less than two
in the
shall be
each
Credit
State to the
Acts, Records,
more than fifteen thousand
nor
thousand
dollars,
and
Public
Judicial Pro-
every
to be assessed
reference to
ceedings of
other State. And the
culpability
degree
may by general
of the defendant
Congress
prescribe
Laws
agents,
or its servants
and
his
Acts,
or of
Manner
Records
provided
distributed as
Proceedings
and
proved,
recovered
shall
and the
persons
one, and to the use of the
section
Effect
thereof.”
proportions,
specified.”
therein
in the
Airlines,
Inc.,
v. Northeast
4. Pearson
has since been
The statute
amended
1962).
(2d Cir.,
F.2d 131
upper
recovery
limit
raise
46(c)
5. See
U.S.C.
consequence
re
of this
revenue from
As a
New York citizens. The
hearing
decedent,
and extensive reconsideration
New York citizen and domi-
authorities,
ciliary, purchased
flight
six
pertinent
the issues
his
ticket at the
n active
judges
reached New
have
of this Court
offices of
Northeast Airlines.
contrary
ma
plane
of the
He
to that
boarded the
a conclusion
jority
Northeast
La
adopt
original panel,
Airport,
City
Guardia
of New
York,
opinion of
Island,
from the
bound
dissent
this writer’s
Nantucket
Mas-
sachusetts,
evening August
F.2d 136
panel, appearing at 307
and on the
ruling
plane
that the
decedent’s
We hold
crashed in
vicinity
Appeals
Nantucket.
New York Court
pow
proper
state’s
exercise
having
action,
Another
no connection
*4
doctrine;
develop
of laws
er to
conflict
family,
already
with the Pearson
had
apply the limi
to
and the
refusal
court’s
been maintained in the courts of the
recovery provision
Massa
tation of
by
State of New York
the administrator
exercise
statute a constitutional
chusetts
Kilberg,
of
passenger
Edward J.
also a
judgment
power.
of
of such
flight
on the same ill-fated
to Nantucket.7
affirmed, as
therefore
District Court is
highest
court New York ruled in
panel’s
in accordance with
modified
action, by
that case that
of
virtue
holding
pre
on the issue of
unanimous
New
rules,
prop-
choice of law
was
requires
judgment
This issue
interest.
erly
by
founded
created
no further discussion.6
Wrongful
the Massachusetts
Death Act.
stated,
however,
additional considerations
It
Several
that.New York courts
discuss,
should,
con-
we
us that the
appropriate,
shall
convince
if
damages
award
compelled.
reached is
statutory
clusion we have
excess of
$15,000
maxi-
recovery required by
mum
the Massa-
dispute.
facts are not in
The essential
chusetts
statute.
Fundamental New
Marilyn
Pearson,
and adminis-
widow
W.
policy, given
expression by a state
Pearson,
of John
the estate
S.
tratrix of
provision
prohibiting the
domiciliary
New
of
citizen
and a
legislature
New York
enacting any
from
present
York,
action
commenced
limitation,
prevent
was held to
Airlines,
New
against
recov-
Northeast
Inc.
applying
York courts
husband,
damages
of her
for the death
limitation
er
by
negli-
means of
court-made
allegedly
law. The
defendant’s
caused
court
emphasized that the limitation
gence.
Airlines is a Massa-
deem-
Northeast
ed
the 1894 drafters of the state con-
corporation authorized to do
chusetts
stitution to be
unjust,
“absurd and
Pursuant to that
in New York.
business
measuring
pecuniary
authorization,
value of all
it maintains ticket offices
lives,
kin, by
next
actively
pro-
throughout
the same
arbitrary
transportation
effect,
standard.”8
use of its
fa-
In
motes
Appeals
York citizens means
New
State of
cilities
New
advertising.
Kilberg,
operates York,
widespread
It
fashioned a rule of
law
flights
allowing recovery
damages
from New York
full schedule
without
arbitrary limit,
airports
substantial
and earns
amount
modeledon the New York
768;
1652;
F.2d at 136.
Geo.L.J.
74
307
Harv.L.Rev.
6. See
36
723;
N.Y.U.L.Rev.
37 Notre Dame
Inc.,
Airlines,
Northeast
Lawyer
194;
Rutgers
620;
15
L.Rev.
supra.
357;
Syracuse
35 St. John’s L.Rev.
12
period
has,
in the short
case
This
395;
733;
L.Rev.
28 U.Chi.L.Rev.
39
resolution, garnered
an in
since
time
511;
271;
U.Cin.L.Rev.
15 Vand.L.Rev.
ordinately large
space
legal
amount of
47 Va.L.Rev. 692.
Albany
313;
periodicals.
See 25
L.Rev.
187;
Medinger
Brooklyn
257;
Heights
8. See
Ark.L.Rev.
B.U.L.Rev.
R. R.
Brooklyn
336;
Co.,
App.Div. 42, 46,
L.Rev.
Calif.L.Rev.
39 N.Y.S.
1497;
187;
46 Cornell
61 Colum.L.Rev.
637;
170;
30 Fordham L.Rev.
L.Q.
wrongful
although
Wrongful
Statute,9
death statute to this accident
Death
although
territory
as the
it occurred outside the
served
statute still
Massachusetts
adopting
approach
plaintiff’s
New York.
this
for
cause
foundation
Judge McGohey,
would concedethat the facts of this
death.
e., (a)
purchase
case—i.
Mr. Pearson’s
Klaxon Co.v.
constrained
the edict of
airplane
Mfg.
his
ticket at a New York office
Electric
Stentor
doing
large
corporation
of a
S.Ct.
part
York;
(b)
Tompkins,
of its business in New
Erie
R. R. Co. v.
attempt
York,
(1938), his
to travel from New
82 L.Ed.
regularly
domiciled,
applied
principles
where he was
on a
properly
flight
scheduled
York
berg
Kil-
most which was con-
conflict of laws enunciated in
York;
recognize
(c)
ducted over New
and declined to
the Mas-
wife,
upon liability.
New York domicile of his
adminis-
sachusetts limitation
Wrong-
beneficiary
tratrix and
under the
already
This writer has
criticized the
closely
ful Death Act—are so
related
argument apparently adopted by
pan-
State New York
have
that it would
opinion,
el
that New York was constitu-
the constitutional
its own
tionally
applying
disabled from
its own
litigation.
substantive rules of law to a cause of
*5
However,
proponents
of this consti-
arising
plane
out
a
crash in
analysis
contrary
tutional
would deem it
dissent,
Massachusetts. See
307 F.2d at
to the mandate of the Full Faith and
Although Judge
136.
Swan did not ex-
Credit Clause if
New
were to enter-
pressly approve
proposition
of con-
wrongful
a
tain
claim for
death “under”
law,
stitutional
the inference seemed in-
Massachusetts act but
escapable that,
effect,
panel
ma-
principles governing
York
permitted recovery.
the exent of
jority had exalted the lex loci delictus
summary,
In
to constitutional status with the conse-
urge
recog-
that once a New York court
quence that New York was barred from
wrongful
nizes a claim for
death based
applying
any part
the whole or
law,
on Massachusetts
that
con-
law must
policy
own
death
to the events
every
They
trol
incident of the claim.
occurring in Nantucket.10 If
in-
this is
argue
required
that New York is not
to
deed
panel’s opinion,
the rationale of the
give any faith or credit to the Massa-
then it is the first decision to “freeze”
act,
gives
chusetts
but once it
Massachu-
into constitutional mandate a choice-of-
setts law some
and credit
faith
it must
rule
derived from what
be de-
give
also
it
faith and credit.
full
Age
scribed as the Ice
of conflict of laws
jurisprudence
ju-
a time when that
—at
construction of the con-
find this
We
risprudence
stage
is in an advanced
Despite
untenable.
mandate
stitutional
majority
rejects
thaw.11 A
of this Court
arguments put forth in
resourceful
this rationale for the same reasons which
persuaded
behalf,
arewe
that
its
statutory
prompted
reject
this writer to
init
his
upon
limitation
the amount of
dissenting opinion.
money
be recovered should mer-
that
suggested, however,
greater
statutory
that
obeisance than
It is
a differ-
length
analysis supports
ent constitutional
addressed to
limitations
during
panel.
propo-
The
the action
reached
result
time
brought,
analysis
willing
parties
are
or to the
who
em-
nents of this
to as-
are
bring
suit, or to
powered
New York’s “contacts”
to
that
the sur-
that
sume
support
are
to
of the cause of action
the transaction
sufficient
or abatement
vival
injured party.
application
an
of New York’s entire
Buckley,
See,
g., Hausman v.
299 F.
9. See note
of this writer’s dissent
e.
11.
1962); Zogg
(2d Cir.,
opinion.
panel
v. Penn Mu
F.2d
at
2d 696
Cir.,
Co.,
(2d
Ins.
276 F.2d
tual Life
10. See 307 F.2d
139-140.
1960).
qualifies
applying
the Clause in
of limita-
the statute
its statute
each instance
obligations
rights
statu-
tions so as
to bar
still
to which
a cause of action
gives
viable in
tory
the locus
cause of action
birth.
delicti.
Wells
See
Co.,
Simonds
Abrasive
precedent,
no
to
are directed
We
(1953). The
logic
any compelling
unaware
and are
Wells case
even
tells us that
this is true
requires
precedent, which
independent of
though
refusing
ap-
the forum
to
state is
statutory quali
a state to enforce
ply a
into”
statute of limitations
“built
recog
it chooses
fications whenever
statutory
cause of action for
action.12
foreign-based
cause
nize a
“integral”
death as an
or “substantive”
numerous
example,
cases are
For
provision.
applies
own stat
forum state
which a
despite
Despite
fact
in Wells
effort
of limitations
ute
duration
period
pierce
different
is
limitations
core
the constitutional
incorporated
statute
expressly
occupied by
in the
la
mere
sue rather
is
than be
creating
jurisdiction
bels,
is not con
are
the case
we
told
g.,
See,
us,
Bournias v.
trolling
litigation
e.
be
cause of action.
before
(2d
220 F.2d
involve
Atlantic Maritime
cause
limitations
statutes
usually accomplished
1955).
judi
merely
Cir.,
“procedure”,
is
This
matters of
referring
limitations
house-keeping.
told
cial
are further
We
involving
“procedure”
proposition
is
mere
of this
buttress
legal
verbiage
say
niceties of such
“substance”.
difference
sheer
us;
legerdemain
it is the
$15,000
do not concern
between
limited to
loudly.
speaks
$160,000
mere
result
one that
run
specifically
a state
verbiage
held that
“procedure”.
equal
Court has
But
*6
any
Full Faith
Credit
ly
explain
the
does
violate
thin that would
constitu-
urged
say
on behalf of
preme
not,
case,
of
cases
12. Most
tlie
in
Court did
maximum-liability
principle that
completely
that South Dakota could have
inseparable part
provision
is an
ignored
applied
Ohio law and
own and
must be enforced
and therefore
having applied
that once
Ohio law on con
vested-rights
forum are relics of the
the
theory,
rights
apply
tract
it also had to
Ohio
sufficiently
discussed
regarding
law
the statute of limitations.
g.,
See,
140-42.
e.
writer in 307 F.2d at
What
the Court did do
was
there
ac
Mills,
451, 24
194 U.S.
S.Ct.
tually
Davis v.
compare
inter
balance the
;
(1904)
692,
L.Ed. 1067
Slater v.
48
ests and contacts of South Dakota and
Co.,
R.
194
Ohio;
National R.
U.S.
Mexican
it held that
the interests of the
120,
581,
(1904);
24 S.Ct.
13. There can be no doubt
“stale evidence” is not the
rea-
That
embody
for
of
a concern
son
statutes of limitations is
limitations
for
corrob-
very
speedy disposition of
within a rea-
claims
fact
same
orated
origin,
complex
may give
period after
for the
of facts
rise to
sonable
their
both a
quasi-con-
pro-
protection
of the defendant
action in contract or
cause of
litigation.
tort;
of
This seems
a
of action in
tracted fear
tract and
cause
it
very
period
universally
true that the
to be the
reason that
is almost
statute
wrongful
death
of limitations
cases is
of limitations
each
of ac-
cause
ordinary
length.
usually
than
of
tion
differ in
See
shorter
will
Restate-
negligent
ment,
899,
The fact that
Torts
b.
§
of
torts.
Comment
action
wrongful
limitations
death
of
statutes
language
usually
clas
14. Much
denominated “sub-
are
actions
maximum-liability provision
sifying
Restatement,
stantive”,
Conflict of
as
might
appeared
clearly
procedural
397,
poli-
have
some
Laws
reveals
§
subterfuge.
embody
merely
just
such a
are
those
be
But
of
cies
disregarded by
Compare
judicial housekeeping.
language has since been
N.X.
Appeals
McKinney’s
Dee.Est.Law,
of
Court
ConsohLaws c.
Kilberg interpreted
13,
(two-year period
an
as
affirmation of a
of limitations
§ 130
policy.
public
action)
strong
See Daven
state
with N.Y.Civ.
for
Webb,
392,
(three-year period
port
11 N.Y.2d
230 N.Y.S.
for
Prac. Act
(1962).
injury
property
person).
negligent
17,
N.E.2d 902
or
2d
argument advanced,
prin-
primer
once New tution
as a
fundamental
ciples
gives
developing
credit to
for
faith and
of a
some
conduct
give
system
federal
must
rather than manual
Massachusetts statute
is,
Supreme
inci-
each
technical rules.
credit—that
Court was
faith and
full
recently
en-
pro-
mindful
must
of this
dent of the
when it
cause
by the statute
nounced
precisely as
forced
defined
Indeed,
creating
it has
not new.
it—is
consequence
“As a
modern
by one of our
as unsound
been attacked
leading
practice
conducting widespread
of conflict
scholars
the field
throughout
business activities
described
Currie has
Professor
laws.
States,
entire United
this Court has
argument for someone
it as
natural
in a series of eases held that more
assumption
“schooled
states than one
seize hold
only
gov-
must
one state
law one and
part
local activities
which are
*
any
ern
transaction
the whole
multistate
regulate
transactions
and the Choice
“The Constitution
protect
interests of its
Law:
Interests
Governmental
people,
though
phas-
own
even
other
Function”,
Judicial
U.Chi.L.Rev.
might
es of the same transactions
underlying assumption is
That
regulatory legislation
justify
in oth-
expressed by
inconsistent with the views
Employers
er states.” Watson
Li-
ago
long
as
as
ability
Corp.,
Assurance
when Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Industrial
Commission,
532, 55
Accident
was decided.
recognizing
We construe this as
that a
recog-
expressly
In that case the Court
single
“transaction”
within
contain
rights
nized that
under the
asserted
legitimate-
itself several distinct “issues”
necessarily
statute of
one state
ly
subject
made
of more than
qualified
denied or
of another.
the law
one state.
necessity
the ex-
“The
decide
[to
True, New York reiterated its
tent ‘to
statute of one
partial adherence to the rule of lex loci
deny rights
may qualify
or
require
delictus. But does this
that New
under the
of anoth-
asserted
statute
deprived
any power
York be
is not
the less whether the
er’]
public policy
a fundamental rule of
to one
policy
statute and
up
of the forum is set
incident of the cause of action? New
brought
to a
as
defense
suit
nothing
ap
York has done
more than to
foreign
under
statute
ply a traditional choice-of-law rule which
up
is set
de-
designates the law of Massachusetts proceedings
fense to a suit or
under
the source of
case,
the local statute.
either
death.
It
absorbed the Massachu
*8
rights
each,
same.
conflict is the
In
corpus
setts
into the
rule
of New York
prevail
claimed under one statute
on-
purposes
adjudicating
law for
of
this
ly by denying effect to the other.
fairly.
Siegmann Meyer,
case
See
100
resolved,
the conflict is to
both
be
Cir.,
(2d
1938);
F.2d 367
Guinness v.
giving
by
automatic effect to the
Miller,
(S.D.N.Y.1923) (L.
fifteen degree culpabili- transactions within New York to with ty to the reference state, or events in a defendant or of his its serv- sister it does not follow agents, and ants and recovered dis- when New looks statute or to provided one, sister a claim tributed as in section state the source of pro- persons courts, enforceable its Constitu- to the use of the Although Supreme portions, specified.” decline, tion allows therein give Kilberg words, provide Court’s “to did not detail as to full faith just provisions supply credit to all New York what would those substantial place language only of the of the excised statute which in the cause save inhered of action or name there would be no limitation on the which conditions recovery, depend[s].” which amount to sue Ten- our brothers fill the gap; they Coal, George, nessee Iron & R. decide that in New York the Co. R. 587, 588, recovery 354, 360, amount U.S. Massachu- under the (1914); setts is Act to be of United measured the loss Order dependents Commercial sustained gard Travelers of America v. without re- Wolfe, degree culpa- of defendant’s U.S. bility. (1947). Appellant L.Ed. 1687 contends that the Full IY, Clause, Faith and Credit Art. why important reason a forum An and the Due Process Clause the 14th thereby do this that it Amendment forbid this. proper of ac- freedom interferes with superficially A attractive answer is legislature state. of the sister tion validly if York could arrive at that New claim cre- conditions of a The terms and theory i'esult on of contract leg- inevitably reflect ated through balancing or construction of amendment or of those considera- islature’s act, own the Constitu- oppose and of tions that those favor legisla- tion not demand liability. does a different conclu- imposition of sion goal through excising unwilling because New York attains the same quite create ture altering provi- allowing enforced it to be claim on terms say sion of “superficially I the Massachusetts Act. as most com- of amount without limit period since the rights be, attractive” two can or for a mon law processes only conceptually— differ not only by statutes of limitations bounded altogether unimportant ordinarily applicable. The Full Faith legal system designed in a that, maintain a in mak- insures and Credit Clause among degree fifty legislature creating ing certain order states choice, the n —but Although practically weigh as well. claim need not have to risk primary looking interest of the framers of the of sister states that the courts intergovern- rights Constitution in “public the area of acts” as a to its source disregard mental relations was doubtless to set substantial conditions will boundaries between new imposed Federal calculation which it has —a states, they Government and the were so numerous and would involve variables preventing also concerned unpredictable preclude encroach- intelli- ments Ogden one state gent another. inap- See This choice. consideration Saunders, forum, Wheat. plicable to instances where the 6 L.Ed. looking solely law, Madison character- its own substantive disregards ized the Full wholly Faith and Credit Clause as that of the sister among provide those permissible “which for the as the Court held harmony proper among Packers; nothing intercourse in Alaska there turns the States.” The Federalist No. not the 42. on whether or lawmakers Granted that whenever a New York sister acted or court state have how have judgment, enforcing enacting enters a True, it is acted. conduct in the “law”, given consequences and that New York diifer- state has been “The stand legislators A.L.R. 1159 from what ent *13 ard of inevitable under Massachusetts desired; the the but is state that law-making juris- punitive e., Death refer Act is ‘with duplicate
result of the
—i.
degree’
wholly
culpability
avoided
ence to the
of
be
that can never
diction
—not
Bonding
compensatory.”
system
Massachusetts
in our federal
even
—not
enacting
128,
legislators
States,
& Ins. Co.
v.
by
United
taken
132,
forum
77 S.Ct.
189
1 L.Ed.2d
which
in the absence of
state
(1956).
sure,
Recovery
in-
limited,
The
impose
all.
is
to be
at
would not
statutory
may
creasing scope
also,
liabilities
but there is a minimum
which
proof
pecuniary
be
lawmak-
recovered
particularly
that
without
makes it
vital
loss, Beatty
Fox,
216,
that'once
v.
328
102
of one
know
ers
state should
Mass.
(1952),
transitory right
N.E.2d
and,
781
created
a
has been
if the defendant
sufficiently
may
culpable,
be
them,
enforce-
it
the uniform
the award
will receive
damages sustained, as,
Full
outrun the
ment from other
which
for
states
example,
contemplated,
aged
in
person
the death of an
Faith and Credit Clause
or an
612,
infant.
609,
Hughes
Whether
means
Fetter,
see
v.
provi
that New York will enforce those
(1951),
980,
com-
sions of
providing
the Massachusetts Act
pare
10,
not
Id.
should
fn.
and that
larger recovery
a
than
would
obliged
speculate
states
to
that other
be
ordinarily allow or that New York will
may
reject what
take
is liked and
what
wholly
a
substitute
new
lia
standard of
might
prospect
well
is disliked —a
bility
damages,
judge
and
as the district
discourage
prevent
other-
enactments
thought,
here
F.Supp. 539,
(S.D.
199
deemed desirable.
wise
N.Y.1961), a
majority
view which the
adopts
cir-
explanation
without
not altered
is
other
The situation
than
dealing
original
dissenting
opinion,1
here
we are
cumstance
give
forum
result
is for
wrongful
If the
act.
New York
death
to
a
recovery in
disregard
on
limitations
Massachusetts
application
statute an
al
it
which
to
type
together
one
different from what the framers
rights,
when
at least
a source
looks as
of the latter
is,
intended. To allow that
many
New York
as
“contacts”
as
it
strange
indeed,
way
“provide
to
principle
here,
basis
I
see no
can
had
harmony
proper
and
intercourse
other,
every
why
not
so
do
among the States” which the Full Faith
majority appears
hold that
and Credit
pro
Clause was intended to
pe-
is a
Indeed,
case
the instant
view.
mote.
culiarly
one for reliance
weak
wrongful
relating
Kilberg opinion justifies
this,
death
all
special rule
The
departs
approve,
Massachusetts statute
on the
our brothers
basis
acts.
penal
open
us, therefore, particu
character.
in its
norm
is
that “It
exactly
strong public
larly
acts are
of our own
Massachusetts
in view
“[T]he
Campbell’s
damages,
Hud-
is not.”
policy
act
to death action
Lord
as
what
damages
Lynn
R.
185 Mass.
& Boston R.
measure of
son
treat
66,
being
procedural
519,
510,
“Their
71 N.E.
or remedial
case
damages
punish-
theory
pol
as to
question controlled
our own State
basic
compensation.”
41-42,
Porter
Sor-
9 N.Y.2d
at
N.Y.S.2d
ment
icies.”
837,
137, 172
ell,
182 N.E.
Mass.
N.E.2d at 529. It is true
at
culpa
primary purpose
that “the standard
147. The
the New
at
1. This
injury
disregard
legislation, certainly,
bility,
total
for the
and of “most”
acts,
probably,
actually
de
the decedent’s
death
sustained
James,
primary purpose
Harper
Torts,
pendents,
&
violates
Law
legislation,
clearly not of
in
24.2 at 1288
but
most
cluding
York,
is con
which New
of New
Massachusetts Act
pecuniary
plain
bene
loss of the
York here looks as the source
for the
cern
behind,”
F.2d
who
tiff’s claim.
remained
ficiaries
497-498,
85 L.Ed.
does
Clause
Full Faith
Credit
enforcing
that,
not demand
given by
for
statute of a sister
Although,
Appeals in
Court of
procedural
um must
own
abandon
Kilberg,
dicated in
there are cases where
rules.
ily
.and ordinar
Thus
forum
given question
issue
“whether
will
rules as to
its own
procedure”
one of
substance or
mode
discovery,
matters as
evidence
doubtful,
at
N.Y.2d
N.Y.S.2d
trial;
give
jury
would
free to
172 N.E.2d at
this is
*14
foreign
although
provid
trial
the
regards
one. That
the
Massachusetts
just
versa,
judge,
ed for trial to a
or vice
part
limit as an essential
of the cause
may disregard
it
as
limitations
venue
legislature
of action
created
giving
claim,
the statute
Ten
rise to the
beyond
only
peradventure.
clear
Not
Coal,
George,
nessee
supra.
Iron R.& R. Co. v.
together
does the
the
statute tie
words
foreign
When the
state has not
closely
possible,
as
unique
as
but the
na
period
qualifica
made
of limitations a
ture of
claim,
$2,000 payable
the
with
right,
may apply
tion on the
forum
the
regardless
damages
of the
and with
longer statute,
its own
Bournias v. At
varying
awards above that
with
de
the
lantic
Co.,
152,
Maritime
220 F.2d
154- gree
culpability,
plain
makes it
(2 Cir., 1955).
158
Likewise the forum
ceiling
integral
the
right
part
is as
may enforce a statute of limitations
is, moreover,
as the floor. There
enacting
shorter than what the
persuasive
state has other
evidence Massachu
right
legislative
in”
“built
setts’
no state can re
intent. Effective in
(cid:127)/
1959,
quire
the
keep
Massachusetts
open
another
General Court
its courts
rewrote
given
completely
the statute
the enforcement of
but de
a claim
“degree
clined to abolish
former’s
either the
law which
latter
would not
culpability”
or
solely by
standard
enforce if
limitation
created
its own.
recoverable;
on the amount
it
Co.,
instead
Wells v. Simonds Abrasive
345 U.S.
simply
514,
856,
1211
increased the maximum
from
(1953).2
73 S.Ct.
97
labeling
However, merely
$15,000
$20,000.
c.
a difference
Ann.Laws Mass.
“procedural”
229,
(Cum.Supp.1961),
as
Mass.Acts
or
law
from
§
year
238,
1958,
this
substantive will
c.
1. Just
the stat
rather than
§
“remedial”
again amended,
1,
application of
Full Faith
effective Jan.
ute was
defeat
change being
only
Clause,
1963,
John
Mu
178,
the rais
Hancock
Credit
Yates,
recovery
ing
$3,000
minimum
Life
U.S.
Ins. Co. v.
tual
clearly
$30,000.
129,
(1936),
Mass.Acts
81 L.Ed.
the maximum
57 S.Ct.
1962,
sense tells us
Klaxon
v. Stentor Electric
c. 306. Common
holds. Cf.
Manufacturing
Co.
right
part
Inc.,
487,
of a
is a
that “The size
U.S.
3. In
change
legislature
making
forum
No
holds that
con
this
case
explicitly
stitutionally
period
it,
disapproved,
“where a
had before
extend the
have removed
re
statute creates a new
and in the
bills which would
covery ceiling
altogether.
Legisla
or in
same act
See
same section
limits
583,
enforced,”
can
it
Record at
Commonwealth of
the time within which
tive
Mills,
451, 454,
Massachusetts,
1962,
Court
U.S.
General
Davis v.
of Committee Work and Busi
Bulletin
case,
Legislature
(Final Ed.,
to the Davis
Har
ness of the
In addition
214,
140,
(committee
risburg,
Sess.)
states
rec
(1886),
H. No.
the bill
L.Ed. 358
and Bournias v. At
ommendation
Co., supra,
passed,
based on
consideration
lantic Maritime
indicate
it
bills,
which,
two of
No.
do
is clear
three
H.
this when
right
creating
would have abolished
meant
No.
the state
H.
Report
ceiling);
Council, 37th
condition
Mass.Judicial
time limitation to be a
on it and
(“accepted”
(1961)
applicable generally.
June
— 47
thus
45
1962)
report
(adverse
on bill to eliminate
ceiling).
right,” Leflar,
of Laws
the Full
Conflict
Faith
On the
and Credit Clause.
layman would,
contrary,
clearly pointed
A
out
at 118.
was so
anyone could
indeed,
Mr.
Justice
John
astonished that
Brandéis
“merely procedural”
case,
acceptance
supra,
Hancock
characterize as
blind
a recov
rule of
increase
state
law which
characterizations made
ery
$160,000
courts
$15,000
way
well
would
or
be the surest
to under
beyond
though
appre mine
that,
guarantee.
he could
this
If.
even
defeating
wholly
the label
ciate
recov
affixed
rule
the forum
were
bringing
ery
conclusive,
equally
because of untimeliness
New York could
over
recovery
in this
ride
action was. Until
the law
now
Massachusetts limit on
departed
when
area
has not
so far from
did not have the
that it
contacts
understanding
had in
common
of men. The Su
field of
here.
also,
preme
question
“twilight zone”,
has said
“the
there
be a
damages
Sampson
proper
in
Channel,
measure
110 F.2d
separably
(1 Cir.),
756-757
denied,
connected with the
of ac
cert.
*15
* *
650,
Ry.
*,” Chesapeake
1099,
tion
60
;
S.Ct.
(1940)
& Ohio
Kelly,
630,
241
Co.,
v.
U.S.
36 S.Ct.
D’Onofrio Construction
v. Recon
Co.
632,
(1916),
60 L.Ed.
904,
(1 Cir., 1958);
1117
and this rule
255 F.2d
910
Iovino
applies
specifically with reference
to
Waterson,
41,
(2 Cir.,
v.
274 F.2d
48
wrongful
claims for
1959),
death. See North
denied,
949,
cert.
362
80
U.S.
S.Ct.
190,
Babcock,
ern Pac. R. R. v.
154 U.S.
860,
(1960),
4 L.Ed.2d
a de
867
where
197-198,
978,
14
958
38 L.Ed.
S.Ct.
by the
termination
forum
that a
(1894);
Ry.
Slater v. Mexican National
procedural
respected
.matter
is
will be
Co.,
120,
591,
48 L.Ed.
though
even
inde
another court
in its
(1904); Goodrich,
900
Conflict of Laws
pendent
judgment
regard the is
would
(3
1949), 105;
762,
ed.
15
A.L.R.2d
sue as substantive. The survival of a
(1951). A limit on the amount of re
against
claim
a deceased
defend
resident
covery
statutory right
on a
no re
bears
ant,
McAuliffe,
859,
Grant v.
Cal.2d
* *
*
“limitations
semblance to those
(1953),
pree, S.Ct. U.S. Tungus (1953), 592-593, Skovgaard, dealing S.Ct. 3 L.Ed.2d “procedure” “substance” application acts of state to maritime claims. COMPANY, SOUTHERN RAILWAY Appellant, only consider There remains York has done what New contention CAMPBELL, Mary Appellee. I. Mrs. Employers supported Watson v. No. 19438. Liability Corp., 348 U.S. Assurance That Appeals L.Ed. 74 States United validly Fifth Circuit. could case held that Louisiana *16 company subject insurance 1962. Nov. contracted, Louisiana, had outside Rehearing Denied Jan. judgments pay amounts awarded resulting injuries in from or settlements Louisiana, in- to a direct action despite stipu-
jured person a contractual against an in advance
lation judgment Louisi- or settlement. impose permitted ana was thus borders new insurers risks within its
liability, by it, wholly independ- created duty insured,
ent of the contractual Casualty Lumbermen’s Mutual Co.
see Elbert, differing many respects,
the latter essential
Collins v. American Automobile Ins.
supra, 419-422; 230 F.2d at Louisiana enforcing “public purport did not to be altering
act” of then pleasure, it to suit as New York is
doing might here. The Watson decision sustaining
well be cited as opera-
New York to make defendant’s ap-
tions within its borders a basis for
plying its own statute to deaths in the flights
course contracts made com- mencing York; way in New in no does invoking uphold New York’s the Mas- right
sachusetts Act as the source of the transforming
and then into one
