Marilyn J. Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners

for the costs of town to reimburse M.C. place awith dissatisfaction to voice their (2d tuition for the 1997-98 private school ....”), Cir. 101 F.3d 686 aff'd, ment year; school (table). ex 1996) district court As the (2) proceedings REMAND for further “cannot, Wilks, in fair parents plained opinion; with this consistent [they] ness, expenses for expect to recover (3) judgment the of the Dis- REVERSE contacting the school prior to incurred trict insofar as it ordered Volun- Court with dissatisfaction [their] board about town to reimburse M.C. for the costs Wilks, IEP.” child’s] [their psychological counseling. private 1167. appeal award costs of this We decline to case, parents M.C.’s present In the R.App. 39(a)(4). P. party. either See Fed. respect to the any with to raise issue failed coun- psychological or nature extent for M.C. his provided

seling services 27, eight 1997—at least May until

IEPs with Dr. treatment months M.C.’s after par- M.C.’s had ended. Because Gardner Marilyn BARTLETT, J. appropri- in issue the place failed to ents Plaintiff-Appellee, IEPs, impossible “it is M.C.’s ateness of any certainty whether with determine YORK STATE BOARD OF LAW NEW neces- were indeed expenditures [their] EXAMINERS, al., et Defendants- ... complaint prompt sary, or whether Appellants. for those the need have obviated might No. Docket 97-9162. Wilks, F.Supp. at 1168. expenditures,” circumstances, we conclude Under these Appeals, United States Court to reimbursement that M.C. is not entitled Circuit. Second Dr. costs of his treatment for the Argued June Gardner.9 Sept. Decided III. Supreme from the On Remand Aug. Court above, sum, for the reasons stated In we:

(1)VACATE of the Dis- judgment the insofar as ordered Volun-

trict Court school, give parents did not written long-term practical, effect We note that the agency public of the infor- may notice to the holding be limited. our in this case (aa); provide Congress the IDEA to mation described in division amended part: relevant (III) finding upon judicial of unreason- (iii) on reimbursement Limitation by respect to actions taken ableness with private edu- [for The cost of reimbursement parents. may or ... be reduced services] cational 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii). This amend- 20 U.S.C. denied— recog- codify previously appears to ment (I) if- or bar of a court to reduce nized discretion (aa) meeting that at the most recent IEP parents fail to raise reimbursement where prior parents to removal of attended timely an in a man- appropriateness of IEP school, par- public the child from the apply amendment does ner. The the IEP Team that ents did not inform psychological services reimbursement M.C.’s pro- they rejecting placement were claim, however, relevant because all events agency provide a public posed 4, 1997, the prior occurred to June that claim their appropriate public education to free See, amendments. date of the 1997 child, effective including stating their concerns G., at 86 n. 3. Accord- e.g., Warren 190 F.3d to enroll their child in and their intent not, not, ingly, effect, and do consider we need public expense; private school at 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) this any, (bb) days prior ... 10 business public case. from the removal of the child Spitzer,

Eliot Attorney General of the York, of New Forte, State A. Dep- Robert General, uty Solicitor Nossel, Deon J. As- General, sistant Solicitor State of New York, NY, NY, For Appellants. Simon, NY, Jo Anne Brooklyn, Ruth Lowendron, Mueller, Roberta Marianne Lado, Engelman Gresham, John A. New Lawyers Interest, York for the Inc., Public NY, NY, Appellee. For Lewin, McGovern, Robert James Kevin Curnin, T. Cunningham, J. James Stroock Lavan, York, NY, & Stroock & New for Amici Curiae The Association on Higher Education Disability, Disability Rights Advocates, Rights Disability Education Fund, Inc., and Defense The International Dyslexia Association, Learning The Dis- America, abilities Association of The Na- tional Association of Protection and Advo- cacy Systems, The National Center of Higher Learning Education for Problems Program, The New York Branch of the Association, Dyslexia International The Society Teachers, of American Law United Palsy Cerebral Associations of New York State, Inc., The National Coalition For Students With Disabilities Education and Fund, Defense The Bazelon Center for Law, Health Mental American Associ- of People ation With Disabilities. Lee, Bill Lann Acting Assistant Attor- General, ney D.C., Washington, Mary Jo White, Attorney, United States Sara L. Shudofsky, Assistant United States Attor- ney, York, Southern District New New York, NY, Silver, Dunsay Jessica Marie K. McElderry, Attorneys, Department of Jus- tice, D.C., Washington, for Amicus Curiae The United States. CABRANES, court reading, we held that the district MESKILL

Before: NICKERSON,* account Bart- not have taken into should Judges, Circuit “self-accommodate,” stating ability to lett’s Judge. District “history of self-accommoda- that Bartlett’s concurs A. CABRANES Judge JOSÉ tions, roughly to achieve allowing while part separate in a part and dissents (on measures) some average reading skills opinion. general population, compared when protective do not take her outside MESKILL, Judge: Circuit (internal ADA.” Id. at 329 provisions of the whether appeal we consider In this omitted). Because we quotation marks Bartlett has a Marilyn J. plaintiff-appellee that Bartlett was concluded meaning of the Ameri disability within the we did not reading, limited with 1990(ADA). Act of Disabilities cans with whether she also was substantial- consider dyslexia, diagnosed with Bartlett has been ly respect working. Id. We However, not ev impairment. learning solely vacated and remanded as to disability un constitutes ery impairment compensatory damages. proper measure of der the ADA. petition at 331-32. A for rehear- See id. rehearing for en ing, suggestion include “a defined to “Disability” is banc, denied. was impairment that sub- physical or mental one or more of the stantially limits Supreme granted The Court certiorari ADA of an individual. life activities” light and vacated and remanded Sut 12102(2)(A). 3(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. Lines, Air 527 U.S. ton v. United that Bartlett was not district court found (1999), 144 L.Ed.2d 450 Mur S.Ct. respect to substantially limited with Serv., 516, phy v. United Parcel 527 U.S. learning, or reading life activities such 2133, 144 (1999), 119 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 484 substantially limited with but that was she Albertson’s, Kirkingburg, Inc. v. 527 U.S. activity work- major life respect to the 555, 2162, 144 L.Ed.2d 119 S.Ct. 518 court held that ing. Therefore the (1999). See New York State Bd. Lawof York State defendant-appellant New Bartlett, 1031-32, v. 527 Examiners U.S. (the Board) was Board of Law Examiners (1999) 2388, 144 L.Ed.2d 790 119 S.Ct. Bartlett with reason- required provide (mem.). that, although We now hold on York able accommodations the New properly district court considered correc Bartlett v. State Bar Examination. See mitigating tive or measures such as Bart Examiners, Bd. Law New York State see, self-accommodations, g., e. Al- lett’s (S.D.N.Y.1997) (.Bartlett F.Supp. 1094 bertson’s, 565-66, 527 U.S. at 119 S.Ct. I); York see also Bartlett New State applied wrong it nevertheless Examiners, 2 F.Supp.2d Bd. Lawof it found that Bartlett legal standard when (S.D.N.Y.1997) (Bartlett II) (denying mo- substantially respect limited with was not relief). post-judgment tion for reading “roughly because she has aver (on measures) appealed. reading affirmed skills some age The defendants We part compared general population.” and remanded. to the part, vacated when I, at 1120. It is not See Bartlett v. New York State Bd. Law Bartlett (2d Cir.1998) Examiners, average F.3d 321 that Bartlett has skills on enough (Bartlett III). measures if her skills are below agreed We Bartlett “some” disabled, In on measures to an grounds. average was but different other extent substantially particular, determining whether Bartlett that her read is fact, In court found substantially respect was to limited. district * York, Nickerson, sitting by designation. Eugene H. United of New Honorable Judge States District for the Eastern District “slowly, haltingly, that Bartlett ing reads and licensing applicants seeking admis- 1099; laboriously.” Id. at see also id. sion to the New York State Bar. (“She simply not read in the manner does Since Bartlett has taken the bar Therefore, average person.”). of an we examination five times. On at least three determine, remand for district court possibly separate occasions, four she instance, in the first whether Bartlett applied reading as a disabled candidate to major limited in the life activ- take the bar examination with accommoda- ity reading by speed, her slow reading requested tions. She accommodations for “conditions, manner, or by any other or the July February 1993 July duration” that limits her “in com- 1993 examinations. Bartlett did not seek parison people.” to most See 28 C.F.R. Pt. accommodations for the February 1992 bar (1999). A, App. § 35.104 examination, and the record is unclear as disagree We also with the district to whether sought she accommodations for analysis court’s of whether Bartlett was the July 1992 exam. With to the substantially limited exam, July 1992 the district court found activity of working. The district that “[Bartlett] claims she [applied for ac- court held that plaintiff’s disability “[i]f commodations], but the Board has no rec- prevents her from on a competing level I, ord of request.”

playing field with other bar examination F.Supp. at 1102. applicants, then her disability implicat- has

ed the life activity of working.” sought unlimited or extended However, 970 F.Supp. at 1121. time to take the test and permission to enough plaintiff is not for a prove tape record essays and to circle her impairment an “implicates” major multiple choice answers the test booklet required prove that the rather than completing the answer sheet. —she impairment “substantially limits” that ac- The Board request time, denied her each case, tivity. In this it has been shown contending application that her does not inability practice Bartlett’s law re- support a diagnosis of a reading disability sults from her reading impairment, rather dyslexia. total, Bartlett has taken than from other factors that might prevent the examination four times without accom- her from passing Therefore, the bar. we yet modations and has to pass. July On determine, remand for district the court to 20, 1993, after the Board her denied most if necessary, whether im- Bartlett’s application recent accommodations, for she pairment, rather than factors such as her commenced this action the district court education, or experience ability, innate alleging, among things, other violations of that “substantially limits” ability her to titles II ADA, and III of the 42 U.S.C. work. § 12101 et seq., and 504 of the Rehabili- Act,

tation 29 U.S.C. 794. In her com- plaint, sought, she among things, other BACKGROUND injunctive relief the form of reasonable trial, After a 21 day the court district testing accommodations and compensatory found the following relevant facts. Bart- punitive damages. lett has a cognitive impairs disorder that ability July her On 1993—a Despite limitation, days read. mere her two be- she has July a Ph.D. fore the 1993 bar earned Educational examination —the Administration from New University, parties stipulation. York entered into a Under terms, a law degree School, some, from Vermont Law its Bartlett received but not all, and has met prerequisites all to sit for the sought, accommodations in- she New York Bar State cluding Examination. The time-and-a-half for the New York Board is a entity charged state with test- portion the and the use of an test aman- performed per the 30th cants who above questions and to the test read

uensis1 centile,- occasionally addition, although he would the responses. record benefit of “give applicants an- the doubt” to mark the Bartlett allowed Board their Attack or Word Identifi portion of the either Word multiple choice swers to the 30% or 1 or than cation were below booklet rather scores in the test examination points above. Id. percentage Howev- answer sheet. computerized on a if Bartlett er, agreed that parties applied for accommoda- When Bartlett examination, would results passed examination, July 1991 bar tions for in this prevailed she certified unless not be she Woodcock Word Attack submitted accommodations, Despite lawsuit. scores that were above Identification Word the examination. failed request and her for percentile, the 30th When she was denied. the Board denied accommodations July Prior July for the applied be- accommodations accommodations requested Bartlett’s for examination, disabilities, a new 1993 bar she submitted learning expert on cause its Dr. Vellutino, psychologist, from a clinical did not believe evaluation R. Dr. Frank Heath, reading indicating F. least one dyslexia or Richard that Bartlett had percen- the 30th score below opinion was Word Attack disability. Dr. Vellutino’s Nevertheless, did not Dr. Vellutino perfor- tile. on Bartlett’s grounded primarily “the give Bartlett benefit doubt” subtests of the Woodcock mance on two (the accommodations he recommend because Mastery Test —Revised Reading anomaly.” “an to be considered score Woodcock), commonly battery of tests Id. learning disabilities. employed to assess trial, Dr. At challenged Velluti- at issue are Wood two subtests

The opinion. presented expert testi- no’s She Identifica Attack” and ‘Word cock “Word that her mony and other evidence Vellutino, these According tion.” to Dr. solely disability could not be measured subject’s measure a designed are tests expert lead wit- the Woodcock. Bartlett’s phonetic decod “[w]ord [^Identification ness, opined A. Hagin, Dr. Rosa (ability to analysis skills ing or word disabled, placing learning Bartlett was I, word).” out’ a ‘sound emphasis” per- on “considerable Bartlett’s (internal marks quotation F.Supp. at 1112 Diagnostic Reading formance on the Test omitted). Attack” Specifically, the “Word (DRT), plaintiffs “demonstrat[ed] which subject sound out requires subtest Id. rate of On reading.” slow complexity. words of varying nonsense DRT, compared college when fresh- subtest, “Word Identification” men, reading rate of 195 words Bartlett’s hand, subject’s other measures a minute, timed, per placed her in 4th identify 106 real words isolation reading rate of 156 percentile, while her more diffi range simple a “is” to the from minute, untimed, placed her be- per words tests are untimed “zymolysis.” cult Both Id. at 1110. Dr. percentile. low the 1st not incorrect and the scores do reflect Hagin “plaintiff that concluded does a correct Be precede tries that answer. condition, in read same manner or learning of disabil- cause “the incidence average adult in duration reader of population in the is estimated it[ies] auto- plaintiff does not read id., 20%,:” Dr. 5% between and Vellutino maticity speed average of an reader.” reasonably cutoff is concluded that a 30% Id. applicants. capture all certain disabled 3, 1997, July the district issued Accordingly, he On court generally recommended appli opinion thorough and After a against providing its order. accommodations " Cir.1996) (quoting employed 1. write Webster’sSeventh New Col An amanuensis is 'one ” manuscript.’ (1965)). copy legiate Dictionary from dictation or Burd, (2d United States v. F.3d evidence, painstaking court, however, discussion of The district did not find the district court found fatal infirmities that Bartlett limited in the Dr. reliance on the Vellutino’s Woodcock major life activities of reading or learning, subsequent rejection and the Board’s reasoning that “history her of self-accom- disability. Bartlett’s claim of Specifically, modation has allowed her to achieve ... (a) the court found the Woodcock could not (on roughly average reading skills some “automaticity,” measure Bartlett’s lack of measures) compared when general i.e., recognize printed a word population.” Rather, court, Id. relying accurately and read it immediately on regulations promulgated under Title I (b) thinking; without the Woodcock was ADA, held is disabled not timed and thus could not measure the in her ability to “work” because her read- reading important slowness of charac- —an ing compared rate unfavorably with “per- Bartlett, dyslexics teristic of adult like who comparable skills, sons of training, had demonstrated a reading compara- rate (internal abilities.” Id. at 1Í21 quotation percentile ble to the bottom fourth of col- omitted). marks Specifically, the court worse; (c) lege freshman or the Woodcock concluded that inability Bartlett’s to com- designed principally was to assess children pete on the bar examination constituted a enough and did not have items in the work disability, stating:, (d) range; difficult Bartlett’s Wood- cock results exhibited discrepancies, re- If plaintiffs disability prevents her vealing high reading comprehension scores competing from playing a level field low, comparison average, but Word with other applicants, examination bar Attack and Word Identification scores. then her disability implicated has Furthermore, id. See the district major life activity working because court found that Dr. Vellutino’s use of a given she is not compete chance to percentile 30th cutoff was arbitrary and fairly on is essentially employ- what an flawed because other studies demonstrated test, ment necessarily precluded she is dyslexia one third of adults with potential from employment that field. percentile scored above that on similar sense, In this the bar examination clear- tests. id. See ly implicates sum, In agreed the court with Bartlett’s ing. work experts that “a reading disability is not concluded, alia, Id. The quantifiable court then inter merely test scores.... [Djiagnosing learning disability that Bartlett disabled requires within the mean- judgment.” clinical regard, Id. this ing of the ADA and 504 of the Rehabili- district court found that Bartlett’s low Act, tation id. at and that Woodcock, “test scores on the combined Board’s failure accommodate her consti- with clinical observations of her [slow and tuted violations of those statutes. halting] manner reading amply support remedy found, aAs for the violations automaticity conclusion that she has an injunctive court ordered in the form relief Id.; problem.” and a rate see also in- testing reasonable accommodations Moreover, id. at 1107. agreed the court cluding taking double time in the examina- experts with Bartlett’s that her “earlier tion over four days, computer, the use of-a work as a school phonics teacher where permission multiple to circle choice an- were stressed allowed to develop [her] booklet, in swers the examination and ‘self-accommodations’ that account for her large print on both the New York State ability spell perform better and to bet- and Multistate Bar Exam. at Id. 1153. ter on identity word and word attack tests compensatory The court also than awarded expected would be of a reading dis- 1109; $12,500 person.” damages abled in Id. at see also the amount of for fees id. paid and the cost of review courses taken in with the five connection examina- the bar Rehabilitation Act recip- because is a funds, tions that Bartlett failed. Id. at 1152. ient of federal see id. at 329-30. We also adhere to our earlier determina- 14, 1997, July On the Board tion that Bartlett compensa- is entitled to or, from the in judgment for relief moved tory damages if her rights under the ADA alternative, judgment, the to amend the violated, were see id. at 331 (finding that 59(e) 60(b). pursuant and to Fed.R.Civ.P. exclusive reliance on two Woodcock sub- denied, was When that motion see Bartlett tests constituted “deliberate indifference II, 396, F.Supp.2d appeal the Board strong to a likelihood of ... violating fed- legal present ed. identified the issues We erally protected rights”), provide but we to be: appeal ed the guidance question additional on the of the (1) the district court in whether erred proper measure compensatory damages. refusing to defer to the Board’s determi- turnWe now to whether Bartlett suffers disabled; nation that Dr. Bartlett is not from a statutorily cognizable disability (2) whether the district in court erred and, so, proper the compen- measure of concluding that Dr. Bartlett is disabled satory damages. ADA under the and the Rehabilitation Act in to work and thus DISCUSSION entitled to taking accommodations in I. Whether Bartlett A Disability Has (3) Examination; Bar New York State II, Title subtitle A of prohibits the ADA court whether district con- erred entities, by public discrimination such as cluding subject that the Board is to the Board, on disability: Act; basis strictures of the Rehabilitation (4) whether the district court erred in Subject provisions title, to the of this awarding Dr. compensatory qualified no individual with a disability $12,500 damages shall, in the amount of from by reason of such disability, be paid Board for fees connection participation excluded from in or be de- with the five examinations that bar she nied services, the benefits of pro- failed. grams, or public activities of a entity, or subjected be by any discrimination III, 156 F.3d at 324. Because the entity. such Supreme Sutton, Court’s decisions Mur- phy and Albertson’s no bearing § have on ADA § 42 U.S.C. 12132. Regula- (1) (3), issues we adhere to our earlier tions promulgated by the Attorney Gener- words, resolution of those issues. other (Department al of Justice regulations) pur- III, for the reasons stated in Bartlett we suant delegated authority, see ADA hold that the § Board is not entitled to def- § 42 U.S.C. specifically pro- question erence of whether Bartlett vide public entity may “[a] not admin- suffers from a disability under the ADA ister a licensing or certification program in Act, the Rehabilitation id. at see 327 a subjects manner that qualified individu- (“The Board expertise has no in assessing als with disabilities to discrimination on disabilities.”), learning hold that we disability.” basis of C.F.R. 35.130(b)(6) Board subject (1999).2 § strictures 2. Bartlett-also asserts a claim title III under offer arrangements alternative accessible provides ADA.Title III of the ADA for such individuals. pertinent part: ADA 42 U.S.C. 12189. In the con- person Any case, offers examinations or text of this title II and title III of the applications, courses related certification, licensing, largely ADA impose requirements, the same credentialing or secondary for so we do address title III ADA education, or post-secondary professional, Likewise, separately. we separately do not or purposes trade shall offer examina- such Act, address the "pro- Rehabilitation which place tions courses in a and manner type hibits the same of discrimination” as the persons accessible to with disabilities or (1999). disability §

An has a individual under C.F.R. 35.104 The Board con- if, alia, ADA inter that individual has tends that Bartlett does not suffer from a physical impairment “a or mental sub specific learning disability merely but is stantially limits one or more of the slow reader average with otherwise read- life activities of such individual.” ADA ing rejected skills. district court 3(2)(A), 12102(2)(A). Thus, § 42 U.S.C. Board’s argument: to decide whether an individual has a dis reading disability [A] is not quantifiable ADA, a three-step inqui under merely test By very scores.... its first, ry is called for: we must decide nature, diagnosing learning disability whether individual suffers from a requires clinical judgment. Clinicians second, “physical impairment; or mental” patient need to examine a ensure we must determine whether the life activi disparate low or scores are not the re- ty on which the individual relies amounts sult intelligence, of low or emotional or third, “major” activity; to a life we other social problems.... [A]s much as must ask specified impair whether the Board would like easy to find an test ment “substantially limits” that life discriminator for a reading disability in Abbott, activity. Bragdon v. See 524 U.S. applicants, its such test does not exist. 624, 631, 2196, 118 S.Ct. 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998). 970 F.Supp. at 1114. The dis- trict court’s conclusion that Bartlett suf- analysis guided by Our is impairment, fers from a mental in this case Department of Al regulations. Justice “an automaticity and a reading prob- rate though agency delegated “no has been au lem,” and not from “low intelligence, ” thority interpret the term ‘disability,’ problems,” emotional or other social is not Sutton, 479, 2139, 527 U.S. at 119 S.Ct. id.; clearly erroneous. See see also Bart- agency authorized regulations to issue II, 2 F.Supp.2d lett n. 394 4. implementing specific provisions of the ADA is “great entitled to deference” on B.Major Activities Life meaning “disability” as used Next, we must decide whether the provisions. Costello, those Muller See (2d Cir.1999) (ac implicated life activities 298, allegedly by Bart 187 F.3d n.& 5 impairment “major” lett’s are life activi cording “great Equal deference” to Em ‘major activit[y],’ by ties. “The term life ployment Opportunity Commission’s inter pretation ordinary meaning, its and natural directs “disability” employment I). distinguish us to discrimination case under title between life activities of As not previously, Attorney greater significance.” ed and lesser General has Reeves v. Servs., authority to regulations implement issue Johnson Controls World 140 F.3d II, A, (2d Cir.1998) (alteration ing title subtitle under which this in origi arises, nal); case Department so the Bragdon, Justice see 524 U.S. at regulations interpreting “disability” are question S.Ct. 2196. The is whether the great entitled to deference. activity “major” contemplated is ADA, whether the life A.Physical Impairment or Mental particularly important plaintiff. Reeves, regula 140 F.3d at 151-52. The step With to the first of our “major tions list analysis, provide life activities that are regulations that the se,” phrase per activities id. at “car “physical impairment” including or mental self, “[a]ny ing performing means mental or for one’s manual psychological dis retardation, tasks, order such as organic walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, mental syndrome, brain emotional ill breathing, learning, working,” or mental ness, (1999). specific learning disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. 35.104 list ... “[T]his Meriden, (2d Cir.1997). City

ADA.Francis v. 129 F.3d 80 comparison or run “in ability and not exclusive.” to walk illustrative

meant to be Reeves, at people'.” F.3d 150. most See id. 140 case, Bartlett claimed that In this Supreme acknowledged The Court respect her with limits impairment Sutton, point in this Sutton. Su learning, read activities major life “if preme person held that a Court test-taking and studying, ing, writing, for, or taking mitigate, measures to correct F.Supp. at 970 working. See impairment, mental the ef physical or court, However, district and the positive fects of those measures —both primarily on the appeal, focused parties on negative be taken into account —must reading working. life activities person judging when whether that is ‘sub Therefore, decide life we do not whether major activity.” life stantially limited’ test-taking studying as activities such Sutton, 482, 2139; 527 U.S. at 119 S.Ct. sufficient for us to hold “major.” It is are 521, at Murphy, see also 527 U.S. 119 major “working” are “reading” 2133; Albertson’s, at 527 U.S. 565- S.Ct. III, 156 F.3d at life activities. See 66, noted, how 119 S.Ct. 2162. The Court v. (reading); 328 n. 3 EEOC R.J. Galla ever, that the of corrective or use devices (5th 645, Co., F.3d 654-55 Cir. gher not, itself, mitigating by “does measures 1999) Indeed, (working). pres the Board Sutton, disability.” relieve one’s 527 U.S. contrary. arguments ents no 488,119 at S.Ct. 2139. example, pros- For individuals who use Limitation C. Substantial may thetic limbs or wheelchairs be mo- Thus, ques we reach the central capable functioning society bile and presented by appeal: this whether tion but still be disabled because of a sub- “substantially impairment Bartlett’s limits” stantial limitation on their to walk her with life activities may run. or The same be true of indi- an indi working. or Whether take viduals who medicine lessen the substantially vidual is symptoms impairment they of an so that question to a is a mixed can function but nevertheless remain See, g., e. Bridges City of law and fact. v. substantially limited. (5th Cir.1996). Bossier, 329, 92 F.3d Thus, Id. we must account for Bartlett’s aspect We therefore review this determining self-accommodations See, judgment de novo. district court’s disabled, she is whether but the fact that e.g., Spanakos, 104 F.3d Hirschfeld she is able' self-accommodate does not (2d Cir.1997). itself determine whether she is disabled. Department regulations of Justice depends determination “[T]hat whether phrase “substantially do not lim- define actually the limitations faces are [Bartlett] its,” preamble to regulations but the in fact Id. limiting.” provides: person “A is considered an indi- disability ... required vidual with a when the indi- show substantial,” important any vidual’s activities are re- limitations “are in fact conditions, manner, amounting stricted as to the only a “mere difference” “conditions, manner, they duration under which per- can be or duration.” See Albertson’s, 564-65, in comparison people.” to most U.S. 119 S.Ct. formed (1999) (em- § AApp. C.F.R. Pt. 35.104 necessarily 2162. The burden is not an added). Thus, one, phasis person fact, who has onerous and in certain limitations a leg “ordinarily” qualify lost but who is able to walk or run will disabilities. prosthetic of a (agreeing the aid limb is still See id. 119 S.Ct. 2162 if that person considered disabled is sub- that monocular vision will be a ordinarily “conditions, ADA); stantially any also disability limited man- under the see Heil ner, or duration” that limits his or her 32 F.3d Hosp., weil v. Mount Sinai Cir.1994) (“Because (2d omitted)). quotation ed and internal [Rehabili- 722 marks statute, speed Act is a remedial it and the reading clearly tation] Slow is a condition it regulations promulgated under are to be present or manner that can a substantial unlike, broadly.”). construed perhaps, wearing con- limitation — Sutton, tact lenses. 527 at U.S. Cf. Re- Substantial Limitation With petitioners 119 2139 that (noting S.Ct. did Reading spect to not claim that the use of contact lenses III, was itself substantially limiting). In we that “Bart- Alterna- Bartlett observed automaticity tively, reading a lack Bartlett’s slow may lett suffers from rate be that viewed as a phonological processing sig- “negative defect side suf- effect[] ability identify to nificantly by restricts fered an individual resulting from the word, timely decode the written that of mitigating use measures.” id. at See is, compared 484,119 to read as the manner S.Ct. 2139. person which average

conditions under population general can read or fact, the district court found III, at learn.” Bartlett 156 F.3d 329. We that slowly, haltingly, Bartlett “reads substantially concluded Bartlett was I, laboriously.” Bartlett 970 F.Supp. at our reading, limited but simply 1099. “She does not read in the premised part conclusion was on mis- average person.” manner of an Id. The belief that taken Bartlett’s self-accommo- court credited the testimony Hagin, of Dr. dations should have been considered witness, expert Bartlett’s lead see id. at evaluating when her condition. See id. 1110, 1114, who testified that Bartlett (“ ‘A disability should be assessed without condition, “does not read in the same man regard availability mitigating to the ner or average duration adult reader measures, such as reasonable accommoda- in that does not read [she] with the auto ” auxiliary tions or aids.’ (quoting maticity reader,” or speed average of an 101-485(11), (1990), H.R.Rep. No. (Dr. 1110; id. at see also id. at 1107 334)). reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. Heath, experts another of Bartlett’s credit court, ed the district “noted in his Although the district court evaluation that ‘Dr. Bartlett decoded properly accounted for Bartlett’s self-ac ”). slowly and automaticity.’ words without commodations, rely we cannot on its con The district court’s finding, factual substantially clusion Bartlett is not automaticity Bartlett lacks and is a slow reading because the reader, However, clearly is not erroneous. apply court did not the correct legal stan dispositive, is not because the ultimate In particular, dard. the court on relied its “ question is whether Bartlett’s lack of auto finding that ‘rough Bartlett had achieved maticity and slow of reading rate amount (on ly average reading skills some mea comparison to a substantial limitation in sures) compared general pop when ” people only most or added) “mere difference.” (emphasis ulation.’ Id. at 326 Albertson’s, See 527 H.S. at I, 1120). S.Ct. (quoting F.Supp. point 2162. The evidence on the mixed. enough It is not that Bartlett average has Massad, experts, One of Bartlett’s own Dr. skills “some” measures her skills are passage had asked her read a test aloud average below on other to an measures get reading “to a feel” for her rate but extent that her to read is substan see anything “didn’t remarkable to re tially Compare limited. Gonzales v. Na Examiners, port.” at 1105-06. tional Bd. Medical 225 F.3d (6th Cir.2000) results, Bartlett’s DRT test show a (quoting expert tes which timony reading percentile that “in rate in the fourth or all areas that were as sessed, freshmen, ... performed compared college in the below as [Gonzales] value, average superior (emphasis range” proper add- are of limited because the argues The Board that the district court people,” “most not col- group is reference Therefore, the EEOC definition of adopting we remand to erred lege freshmen. determine, “substantially in the first limits” and that Bartlett court to the district only disabled if she is instance, substantially should be considered whether compared to the aver- reading limited in the limited rate, person population. by any age general other by her slow that Bartlett is not ex- “conditions, manner, argues that lim- Board also or duration” jobs, only most cluded from a class of but from comparison “in to its her job attorney.” In “practicing the of addi- people.” tion, the of Medical Exam- National Board iners and the Federation of State Medical Re- Limitation With 2. Substantial America, Boards of the United States of Working spect to Inc., appeal as on the initial amici curiae court held that the district Although case, in that the argued this district court substantially limited with Bartlett was failing require erred in to a causal “nexus” it held that Bartlett respect reading, to impairment and her between Bartlett’s substantially was was because she disabled purported substantial limitation with re- respect working. can- limited with We spect working. agree do not with We finding court’s of not affirm the district but we find merit arguments, the Board’s ground. disability on this alternative position in the of the amici curiae. applied The court the definition district is one of agen The EEOC three promul- that was “substantially of limits” regulations cies authorized to issue to im gated by Equal Employment Opportu- the Sutton, plement the ADA. See 527 U.S. at (EEOC), nity holding that Commission grant 119 S.Ct. The 2139. EEOC is interpretation “the of substantial EEOC’s authority regulations imple ed issue limitation in the context menting employment provisions the of title of, part activity working of is both I, provisions rather than the title II at with, of Jus- Department consistent the here, id., issue see so it is not entitled II, 2 regulations.” tice’s Bartlett “great the same deference” we accord F.Supp.2d regulations at 390. The EEOC regulations promulgated by Attorney the that, provide to the respect Nevertheless, the General. EEOC’s views “substantially working, of the term body experience “constitute a of in limits” restricted in “significantly means judgment formed to which courts and liti jobs ability perform the either class of properly gants may guidance.” resort for jobs or a in various classes range broad of Bragdon, 524 See U.S. 118 S.Ct. compared person having average to the (internal omitted). 2196 quotation marks comparable and abilities.” training, skills generally See Christensen Harris Coun (1999). Thus, 1630.2(j)(3)(i) § 29 C.F.R. — U.S. -, 1655, 1662-63, ty, 120 S.Ct. comparing rather than av- (2000) 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (discussing various erage person general population, in degrees agency of deference to which an district her to “the compared court aver- entitled). interpretation may be age person comparable training, having skills, determining correctly recog wheth- court abilities” district that, er permitted by Bartlett was nized the relevant I, working. regulations, phrase “substantially lim F.Supp. at The district its” given meaning 1120-21. court should be consistent ADA, signifi- throughout especially then that Bartlett was light concluded cantly perform “cooperative spirit regula in which the restricted jobs” practice the “class of involving promulgated.” tions were Perritt, F.Supp. (citing Henry law. Id. at H. Jr., jobs classes,” Americans With Disabilities Act various id. (3d ed.1997)); § 1.9 see 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C), Handbook also limiting the inquiry to v. National Medical Price Bd. Examin geographical area “to which the indi- (S.D.W.Va. ers, 425 & n. 2 access,” vidual has reasonable id. 1997) (“Congress clearly intended for the 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A). With to “a (and, therefore, ‘disability’ phrase jobs,” term class of a court must consider “[t]he limits’) ‘substantially job to have a uniform which from the individual has been ADA.”). meaning throughout the But see disqualified impairment, because of an Gonzales, 225 F.3d at 601-31. types the number and jobs utilizing training,

similar knowledge, skills or abili- earlier, Department As noted § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B). ties.” Id. regulations Justice do not define “sub The district weighed court “the stantially preamble limits.” The types jobs number of involving and regulations provides guidance some and practice alone, of law in City New York specifies impairments that must be evalu much in less the broader geographical in comparison people,” ated to “most but market plaintiff to which has reasonable ambiguous is it “neglects insofar as to access,” and found that of these “[a]ll explain[] people’ whether ‘most refers jobs' opportunities countless are fore people general most in the population or to I, plaintiff.” closed to F.Supp. Bartlett 970 most in people engaging particular that 1122; at see also id. at 1123-26. Even I, activity.” F.Supp. 970 at 390 n. though, below, explained Bartlett has conclude, Department 2. as the We of Jus not shown that her exclusion from those tice as amicus curiae argues, that jobs” “countless was a of her impair result regulations EEOC defining “substantially ment, we do not many doubt that the respect limits” with working are not jobs utilizing legal varied training consti Department inconsistent with the of Jus jobs.” a Department tute “class of of Robbins, regulations. tice Auer v. Cf. 519 Cf. Labor, Dictionary Occupational Titles 452, 461, U.S. of S.Ct. 137 L.Ed.2d (4th ed.1991) 84-86 (fisting jobs under (1997) (holding agency’s interpretation “Occupations the heading in Law and Ju of regulation its own “controlling be risprudence” including twelve of categories plainly unless erroneous or inconsistent lawyers). (internal regulation” with the quotation omitted)). marks Therefore the district begin by identifying We Bart court did not err in relying on the EEOC pertinent “training, lett’s knowledge, skills regulations. abilities,” compare jobs or and then we Next, the argues utilizing qualifications jobs Board that Bartlett’s those with the impairment only excludes her from “one from is and ask which excluded type job practicing attorney.” of Howev- whether exclusion from the sig latter is a — er, not we do find clear error in the nificant respect district restriction with to the for See, painstaking analysis court’s of this e.g., 1630.2(j)(3). issue. mer. 29 C.F.R. See Bartlett at “significant,” necessary 1121-26. To be it is not that provide regulations job EEOC that an individ- Bartlett be from every excluded for see, qualified, Fjellestad ual is to which e.g., she is working America, if “significantly she restricted v. Pizza Hut 188 F.3d of (8th Cir.1999) (“[T]he perform jobs either a class of Act does not require range jobs or a showing absolutely employment broad of various a no (1999). exist.”), § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) opportunities classes.” 29 C.F.R. but it is also not regulations enough only The further elaborate on what to be from for her excluded jobs,” job, job, is meant a type specialized “class of id. “one or a choice,” Sutton, § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B), range particular job or “broad 527 U.S. jobs the Court un- generally generally, 29 mechanic so 2139. See 492, 119 S.Ct. plaintiff derstandably In this concluded that 1630.2(j). App. Pt. C.F.R. regarded as “failed to show that he is case, qualification is pertinent jobs.” perform a class of Id. and earned unable to law school completed Thus, neither Sutton whether Bart- 119 S.Ct. we ask degree, a law our conclusion: prac- Murphy nor undermine from the exclusion purported lett’s person bars a with a law impairment rela- an restriction significant of law is a tice law, im- practicing then that jobs degree a law from utilizing to the class tive court, ADA.3 pairment disability is a under the we answer Like the district degree. argues that cer- the Board yes. Although however, end, In the we dis profession are not jobs legal in the

tain the district court’s conclusion agree with Bartlett, e.g., professor law foreclosed substantially limited with that Bartlett consultant, jobs, if fact legal those working. The court reasoned her, exception are available as follows: the rule. plaintiffs disability prevents If decision Supreme Court’s playing field competing from level Sutton, distinguishable.

Sutton is applicants, with other bar examination position Supreme Court held implicated disability then her has only single job a “global pilot” airline was major activity working life of because utiliz positions other among “a number of compete given she is not a chance to skills, phot -regional ing [flying] such an fairly essentially employ- on what is a to name few.” Sut pilot instructor test, necessarily precluded ment she is ton, 493, 2139. How 527 119 S.Ct. U.S. employment in that field. potential from ever, practicing lawyers of the number sense, this the bar examination clear- In law, people of hold relative to the number activity life ly implicates the of pro surely larger ing degree, a law is ing. work global airline portion than the number of However, I, people F.Supp. 970 at 1121. pilots who Bartleti relative to the number prove to that Similarly, Murphy, enough plaintiff it is not for a fly. hold to licenses impairment “implicates” major an a employable as plaintiff “generally was mechanic,” prove he ex or she must that it is that was but claimed —he impairment “substantially that jobs required that limits” cluded from mechanic words, activity. In other the definition motor vehicle. See driving commercial (“a 524, “disability” physical or mental im- 527 119 S.Ct. 2133. Murphy, U.S. require pairment substantially that that limits one or jobs The number of mechanic activities”) pre encompass- ... driving a motor vehicle is more commercial small, impair- es the that it be the sumably requirement relative to the number law, "ability” practice to unless she 3. The that there is no evi- dissent contends dence, passes bar exam. is limited in the to show that Bartlett “ability lawyer, merely perform” as a but is interpretive guidance The EEOC also un- ineligible, having pass failed to the bar exami- interpretation the dissent’s of the dermines Gonzales, nation. 225 F.3d at 631 n. See also explains regulation. EEOC that an indi- purpose Considering the remedial allergic vidual who is to substance found ADA, 308-09; Muller, see see F.3d at also high buildings 187 rise office but not found else- Heilweil, 722, we believe that the 32 F.3d at be limited re- where would with unjustifiably dissent narrow spect working. takes an See 29 C.F.R. Pt. limited, However, regulation. by (1999). "Ability” of the definition, is not App. 1630.2(j) the dis- competence; aptitude interpretation, Web- sent’s such an individual ster's, disabled, example, it to include also she for defines would not be because he or "legal "ability perform” power perform.” lack the as a See Merriam- would not banker, (10th Dictionary secretary, lawyer, office Collegiate Webster’s 2 or other em- ed.1994). definition, By ployee. lacks

85 factors, ment, and not some other factor or her from passing July the exam. The 1993 limitation; See indicator, that causes substantial examination an especially poor is Sklar, Gleeson, Sawyers v. Hainke & given that Bartlett not granted was accom- LLP, F.Supp.2d 890 Cumpata until days modations two before the exam (N.D.Ill.1999) no limi (finding substantial apparently had no opportunity “to working absent'“any tation practice amanuensis, with her an accom- showing [plaintiffs] fatigue chronic previously modation she had never used.” problems were the cause of sleeping F.Supp. See Bartlett at 1104. We tardiness”); see Hill v. Metropoli her also therefore for remand the district court to Auth., Rapid tan Atlanta Transit 77 determine, if necessary, plaintiff whether (N.D.Ga.1999) (“No 1291, 1296 F.Supp.2d impairment, has shown that it is her rather presented showing medical evidence was education, than experi- factors such as her any [plaintiffs] kind of a link between ence, ability, or innate that “substantially tardiness.”). impairments Compare limits” to work. Aquinas Express Corp., v. Federal (S.D.N.Y.1996) F.Supp. (finding that Compensatory II. Damages poor work attendance was “unrelated to” condition) plaintiffs medical with Dutton In I the district court awarded County County Johnson Bd. $12,500 compensatory $2,500 damages, (D.Kan. Comm’rs, for each of plaintiff the five times that the 1994) (finding plaintiffs headaches took the bar exam. See id. at 1152. The absenteeism). significantly” “contributed argued Board that Bartlett was not enti- cases, course, most the causation compensation tled to for three of the ex- requirement obviously person met. If a ams, requests two where Bartlett’s for ac- impaired he has lost a leg because and is commodations were late and submitted one substantially respect to the where granted. accommodations were major activity walking, life of is there little rejected The district court the Board’s ar- impairment room to doubt that the is the gument. respect to the With late-filed limitation. In cause substantial this applications, the court that found case, however, it has not been shown that “consistently through years Board con- inability practice Bartlett’s law results untimely applications” sidered and that the reading impairment, from her rather than clearly denials were decisions on the mer- might prevent from other factors that II, 2 F.Supp.2d its. Bartlett at 396 n. 7. I, from the bar. passing Bartlett 970 respect Cf. grant With to the of accommoda- F.Supp. at (denying damages 1152 for lost tions, recovery the court held that was wages and benefits defen- “[a]s because proper “given that the accommodations out, correctly point ‘plaintiff dants has granted plain- were neither those that the prove failed to that with accommodations requested tiff nor those to which the. Court passed she would have the Bar exam.’” plaintiff has deemed was entitled.” Id. court)). (quoting letter submitted award, appeal On we vacated the However, prove Bartlett need not that explaining “only that the Board was liable passed she would have the bar examina- for expenses bar examination incurred tion “but for” the of denial accommoda- tions, where the Board denied accommodations because even under the best of cir- illegal because of discrimination.” Bartlett qualified may cumstances a well candidate III, case, 156 F.3d at 332. Because Bartlett did pass any given sitting. In this February not seek accommodations for the notwithstanding pass Bartlett’s failure exam, exam, that is not July, 1993 bar we held “the Board may Bartlett be damages arising able to show that the of liable for from its failure denial accommoda- tions was a substantial factor preventing to accommodate.” Id. applied that the District Court to our earlier reason cludes adhere

We addition, purposes for of de- wrong legal we note that the district standard ing. In consider, termining' if it finds a disabili whether Bartlett is disabled court should enough respect major activity had infor with to the life the Board ty, whether (2) Bartlett judgment that dis vacates the mation to determine was words, the district court that In other remands to the District Court on ba- abled. However, may conclude that Bartlett is I sis. cannot concur the ma- reading, but it limited her slow rate jority’s decision to vacate and remand for requests that the for may not be the case proceedings further on whether Bartlett is accompanying and the re accommodations respect major to the disabled with life provided to the Board reflected ports view, my activity working. the evi- limitation. See supports only con- dence the record one (“[E]ven experts in plaintiffs own namely, Bart- clusion on that issue— evaluations did not address or identi their lett is not disabled with to the plaintiffs reading problem with clari fy major purported activity working— (Dr. ty.”). But see id. at 1107 Heath majority contrary reaches con- in his evaluation that ‘Dr. Bartlett “noted only by equating clusion the act of test- slowly and without auto decoded words taking fundamentally with the different act ”). maticity.’ requests If Bartlett’s for ac working. judgment I would reverse provide enough commodations did not in of the District insofar as that Court Court formation for the Board to determine that concluded that disabled disabled, the Board be she was would not to the of work- Heilweil, (“[A]n hable. See F.3d at 725 I ing, respectfully and therefore dissent in only responsible employer employ for part.

ment decisions based on information avail decides.”). I. it

able to it when The Americans with Act Disabilities CONCLUSION (“ADA”), 12101 et §§ seg., U.S.C. de- reasons', foregoing For the we affirm the fines individuals with disabilities to include (1) district court insofar declined to any “a physical individual with or mental defer to Board’s determination that impairment that substantially limits one or does not disability, suffer from a more of the life activities of such (2) subject found the Board is 12102(2)(A). individual.” Id. agree I (3) Act, strictures the Rehabilitation and majority with the that dyslexia Bartlett’s compensa- held that Bartlett is entitled to impairment. constitutes a mental For tory damages if rights under the ADA purposes I opinion, agree of this also that were violated. major a working is life under the Lines, ADA. But Sutton United Air (1) cf. We vacate and remand as to whether Inc., 471, 492, 527 U.S. 119 S.Ct. disability Bartlett has a under the ADA (1999) L.Ed.2d (noting may “that there (2) Act, so, and the Rehabilitation and if conceptual difficulty be some in defining proper the compensatory measure of dam- work, life activities to include for it ages. it to We leave the district court on (internal argue seems to in a circle” quota- remand to decide whether to allow the omitted)). However, tion marks I cannot parties to submit further evidence or agree majority with the insofar as it holds whether to questions resolve these on the substantially limited with that Bartlett is existing record. respect working to long dyslexia so as her CABRANES, substantially her ability JOSÉ A. pass limits to the Judge, Circuit bar examination. concurring part in in dissenting part: I concur in majority’s thorough majority’s the To the in holding state this (1) opinion respect well-reasoned insofar as it con- to is reveal fundamental flaw However, respect test-taking.2 Taking the bar exami- to even reasoning: its in argument assuming for that test-tak- working. regulations nation is not ing “major activity” is a within the Employment promulgated by Equal ADA, meaning prove to (“EEOC”) that she is with Opportunity Commission substantially respect limited in that I ADA to Title state respect applicable regulations require Bartlett to substantially re- person “significantly that she is re- demonstrate “signifi- she is spect working he or stricted,” § 1630.2(j)(l)(ii), 29 C.F.R. 'perform cantly restricted her test-taking compared when to “most jobs.” class of 29 C.F.R. A, people,” App. 28 C.F.R. Pt. (1999) added).1 (emphasis § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) 35.104, § average person or to “the in the or not Bartlett is excluded from Whether population,” general C.F.R. practicing lawyer by as a virtue of her 1630.2(j)(l). contrast, In treating (a inability pass the bar examination test-taking working, majority per- as predicament by many non-dyslexic shared mits to prove that she is disabled candidates) is, whether or not bar —that test-taking merely by with perform legal such eligible showing substantially that she is limited record only work—the evidence compared average person when to “the ability to perform with to her having comparable training, skills and lawyer suggests that she is not limited (em- 1630.2(j)(3)(i) abilities.” 29 C.F.R. activity. See Bartlett v. added). phasis In doing, majority so Examiners, New York State Bd. Lawof significantly makes it easier for Bartlett— (S.D.N.Y.1997) 1101-02 similarly any situated candidates for (“Bartlett I”) (discussing Bartlett’s em- examination, number of like the tests bar Moreover, reason, ployment history). Test, including Aptitude the Law School majori- as the District did and the Court Test, Aptitude College Medical does, ty that Bartlett would be entitled Licensing the United States Medical Ex- on the accommodations bar examina- prove amination —to that she is disabled “compet[e] tion if she is unable to on a under the ADA. playing field other exami- level bar is entitled to defining who accommo- applicants,” nation id. at assumes ADA, Congress dations under the struck a inquiry— the conclusion of the ultimate explained, delicate balance. As one court namely, that thus is disabled and designed “The ADA is hot to allow individ- requires accommodations on the bar ex- professional positions uals to advance to compete playing amination to on a level Rather, through a back door. is aimed field. rebuilding profes- the threshold of a (and does) so, sure, capable people To be Bartlett can ar- sion’s front door gue that she is limited with with unrelated disabilities are barred purposes opinion, working, argued 1. For of this assume that and she before the I regulations meaning dyslexia the EEOC on the of District Court that her also limits her “substantially respect respect major activity limited" with to the to the life of test- with concluded, major activity working taking. life of are both valid The District Court cor- view, applicable rectly my asking to cases under Title II or III of whether Bart- the ADA.But v. National Bd. test-taking respect lett with Gonzales is disabled cf. Examiners, (6th Medical 225 F.3d 630-33 asking essentially the same as whether she is Cir.2000) (holding regulations that the EEOC respect reading. disabled with See Bartlett apply do not to cases under Title III of the (“For purposes F.Supp. of this ADA). majority Insofar as the decides these case, plaintiff’s disability collapses claimed issues, express analysis I no views on its average per- inability into an to read like the conclusions. examination, son on tests like the bar for that plaintiff is the skill that claims constricts her (cid:127) Although appeal engage in all the other relevant 2. Bartlett focuses in this al- activities.”). exclusively major major life most on the life activities of entering from alone threshold by that v. National Bd. Price front door.” Examiners, 421-

Medical (internal (S.D.W.Va.1997) quotation omitted). I believe and citation

marks

that, test-taking as working, by treating today upsets this delicate bal- majority

ance, permit decision will some and that its positions professional

“to advance proverbial back door.” Id. at

through the

II. sum, respectfully I dissent from the

majority’s opinion insofar as vacates and proceedings on wheth-

remands for further

er Bartlett is disabled with activity working. I would

reverse the of the District Court judgment point pro-

on that and remand for further

ceedings only to whether dyslexia

Bartlett’s limits her of reading. individually WIWA,

Ken and as Admin Estate his

istrator of the deceased Saro-Wiwa, Wiwa,

father, Ken Owens Blessing Kpuinen, individually

and Administratrix of the Estate husband, Kpuinen, John and Jane

Doe, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Ap

pellees,

ROYAL PETROLEUM COM DUTCH

PANY, Transport Shell Trad P.L.C.,

ing Company, Defendants-Ap

pellees-Cross-Appellants. 99-7223,

Docket Nos. 99-7245. Appeals,

United States Court of Circuit.

Second Oct.

Argued: Sept.

Decided:

Case Details

Case Name: Marilyn J. Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Date Published: Aug 30, 2000

Citation: 226 F.3d 69

Docket Number: 1997

Court Abbreviation: 2d Cir.