Petitioner 1 Maricela Fernandez came to the United States without inspection in 1985. She has two American citizen daughters, Stacey, age 15, and Amy, age 12. The record indicates that Fernandez’s husband, whom she married in Mexico in 1974, is a lawful permanent resident. At her removal hearing in 1998, Fernandez applied for cancellation of removal based on her qualifying relative children. The *595 immigration judge (IJ) denied the application after determining that Fernandez had not shown that the children would be subject to exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if Fernandez were removed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), applying its streamlining regulation, summarily affirmed without opinion the results of the IJ’s decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4). Fernandez filed a timely motion to reopen, attaching “additional evidence of hardship, loss of educational opportunities, and loss of acculturation since the time of the[ ] merits hearing over four years ago.” The BIA denied the motion as “insufficient to show prima facie eligibility for cancellation of removal.” Fernandez thereupon filed a timely petition for review of the BIA’s decision.
We are asked to decide the extent of our jurisdiction over the petition for review, in light of the jurisdictional bar to review of “any [discretionary] judgment regarding the granting of [cancellation of removal]” contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
BACKGROUND
Fernandez testified at her removal hearing that her children would accompany her back to Mexico if she is removed. Stacey also testified, stating that she did not want to go to Mexico. The IJ’s decision denying relief commented that “we’re dealing with two minor children, ages seven and four. Stac[e]y appeared and it is very obvious that bilingual education has not made her fluent in English, nor has it produced results that show concepts in either Spanish or English.... ” The IJ noted that Fernandez’s husband had work authorization in the United States and stated that “at no time does [Fernandez] have to take either [child] to any country if she chooses not to, since they have a home.” The IJ added that “[e]xtended family- members all live in Mexico,” drawing on Fernandez’s testimony about her seven siblings and mother. Although Fernandez “has health insurance which allegedly covers the whole family,” the IJ noted, she “related ... an average result if, in fact, the children would have- to leave the United States and would accompany her. However, she has ample family, specifically a spouse who works and who could take care of the two United States citizen children presumably.”
The additional evidence included with the motion to reopen at issue focused on “four additional years of hardship” resulting from the children’s education and acculturation since the removal hearing. The additional evidence was generally cumulative with that presented at the removal hearing. Some was new, however, particularly a letter from Fernandez’s husband — who did not submit evidence to the IJ — which mentions their three American citizen grandchildren. This letter states that, without Fernandez, “we will lose our home that we worked so hard to get for our children. My daughters will lose a good mother. I will not be able to provide a healthy family environment for my two youngest.” The evidence submitted also includes school records for Fernandez’s two children, as well as supporting affidavits from friends, Fernandez’s pastor, and Stacey.
In denying the motion to reopen, the BIA first explained the legal standards it was applying:
A motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c) will not be granted unless the movant establishes a prima facie case of eligibility for the underlying relief sought. See INS v. Abudu,485 U.S. 94 ,108 S.Ct. 904 ,99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988). As a general rule, moreover, we will reopen removal proceedings on the basis of new *596 evidence only “where the new facts alleged, when coupled with the facts already of record, satisfy us that it would be worthwhile to develop the issues further at a plenary hearing on reopening.” ... The new evidence submitted by the respondents in connection with their motion to reopen does not satisfy these standards.
The Board then stated:
We have no doubt that the respondents’ removal from the United States will be highly disruptive to the lives of their families, yet there is simply nothing in the record or the motion to reopen which persuades us that these relatives will suffer hardship that is substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally be expected to result from the removal of aliens with close family members in the United States. Although the motion demonstrates that the respondents have qualifying relatives ... this fact alone is insufficient to show prima facie eligibility for cancellation of removal. In addition, there must be some indication that the relatives will suffer hardship in connection with the respondents’ removal that is so excessive and uncommon as to be “exceptional and extremely unusual.” While the motion to reopen demonstrates that the respondents’ removal would be an occasion of sorrow and great inconvenience for those left behind, that is commonly the case. It is not “exceptional and extremely unusual.”
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction
A. General Principles
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) states in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatuto-ry), ... except as provided in subpara-graph (D) ... no court shall have jurisdiction to review — (i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 212(h), 212(i), 240A, 240B, or 245 [8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(h), 1182(h), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255].” Cancellation of removal is relief granted under the Immigration and Nationality Act’s section 240A.
Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) “eliminates jurisdiction only over decisions by the BIA that involve the exercise of discretion .... [W]e retain jurisdiction over the BIA’s determination of ... purely legal and hence non-discretionary question[s] .... ”
Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft,
Our most detailed analysis of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s effect on our jurisdiction to review motions to reopen that im
*597
plicate discretionary determinations appears in
Medina-Morales v. Ashcroft,
[W]e conclude that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not withdraw our jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of Medina-Morales’ motion to reopen. Because Medina-Morales abandoned his petition for adjustment of status and instead accepted voluntary departure, the IJ never ruled on Medina-Morales’ adjustment of status petition but instead granted his request for voluntary departure. Medina-Morales does not, therefore, appeal the denial of an adjustment of status application under § 1255 or a denial of voluntary departure under § 1229c. See Zazueta-Carrillo v. Ashcroft,322 F.3d 1166 , 1169 (9th Cir.2003) (rejecting the government’s argument that the denial of an alien’s motion to reopen “involve[d] a ‘judgment regarding the granting’ of voluntary departure” within the meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), where the alien had been granted voluntary departure). Rather, Medina-Morales’ appeal “involves a decision regarding the denial of a motion to reopen,” Zazueta-Carrillo,322 F.3d at 1169-70 .
The denial of Medina-Morales’ motion to reopen is a decision under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), the provision relied upon by the INS as the basis for his removability. See Rodriguez-Lariz [v. INS,282 F.3d 1218 , 1223 (9th Cir.2002)]. The BIA’s decision is not, therefore, a judgment “regarding the granting of relief under” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c or 1255, the provisions listed in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). We hold, accordingly, that § 1252(a)(2)(B)® does not preclude our review of the discretionary aspects of the BIA’s denial of Medina-Morales’ motion to reopen.
Fernandez contends that
Medina-Morales
rested, as had
Arrozal v. INS,
In
Medina-Morales,
however, we did not conduct a mechanical inquiry into the statutory ground of removability. Instead, we asked whether the denial of the motion to reopen “was a judgment regarding the granting of relief’ under an enumerated provision in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
Medina-Morales's transitional rules predecessor,
Arrozal,
is distinct from Fernandez’s case for similar reasons. Arrozal sought “reopening so that she can request suspension of deportation under § 244 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act.”
the BIA’s order denying [Arrozal] Yeh-dego’s motion to reopen should be treated as an order under § 241(a)(2), the overstay section of the INA. But § 241 is not one of the INA sections listed in § 309(c)(4)(E) of the IIRIRA, the section that precludes an appeal from certain discretionary decisions.
Hence, this court has jurisdiction under the IIRIRA’s transitional rules to hear [Arrozal] Yehdego’s appeal from the BIA’s denial of her motion to reopen.
Id. at 432. Arrozal thus decided the jurisdictional question by looking at the ground of Arrozal’s deportability, not the underlying relief she requested. But, once again, Arrozal was requesting relief for the first time, so no prior discretionary determination existed regarding the granting of the relief sought. In Fernandez’s case, by contrast, there has been such a discretionary determination — a “judgment” — made by the IJ and summarily affirmed without opinion by the BIA.
Out-of-circuit decisions applying § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) support a distinction between motions to reopen seeking consideration of a form of relief not previously sought and those seeking a redetermination regarding the denial of a form of relief.
4
In
Pilica v. Ashcroft,
it is clear that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the Attorney General’s discretionary determination of whether an alien should be granted adjustment of status. Here, however, Petitioner does not appeal from a discretionary determination denying him an adjustment in status. Rather, he appeals from the BIA’s denial of his motion in which he sought a remand in order to permit him to apply for an adjustment of status.
Id.
at 945;
see also Guerra-Soto v. Ashcroft,
Manzano-Garcia v. Gonzales,
Fernandez asks us to review a denial of a motion to reopen where the BIA denied the motion on the ground that there was no basis for reconsidering an earlier denial of the relief sought, and that earlier denial was based on an unreviewable ground, hardship. The cases discussed above addressing Courts of Appeals’ jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to reopen concerning discretionary relief where there was a refusal to reopen for the purpose of considering the granting of freshly-sought relief are not directly pertinent to that question. Where the denial of the motion to reopen is of the former variety— as it was in this case — the question whether a court would “have been precluded from reviewing the original determination of the BIA[or the IJ],”
Manzano-Garcia,
B. Grounds for Denying a Motion to Reopen
The BIA can deny a motion to reopen for various reasons. As explained in
INS v. Abudu,
There are at least three independent grounds on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen. First, it may hold that the movant has not established a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought.... Second, the BIA may hold that the movant has not introduced previously unavailable, material evidence.... Third, in cases in which the ultimate grant of relief is discretionary ... the BIA may ... simply determine that even if [the other requirements] were met, the movant would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief.
Id. at
104-05,
This distinction is supported by
Prado v. Reno,
In this case, the government contends that we lack jurisdiction over the non-constitutional component of the petition for review, because the BIA did not rely on a statutory or regulatory provision to deny Fernandez’s motion to reopen. Instead, the BIA concluded that she did not establish a prima facie case concerning hardship, a discretionary factor that would be unreviewable if it were the basis of a BIA decision on direct appeal.
See Martinez-Rosas,
Our conclusion that we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denials of motions to reopen for failure to establish a prima facie case if a prior adverse discretionary determination was made by the agency does not preclude this court from reviewing denials of motions to reopen discretionary determinations in other circumstances. Motions to reopen involving the submission of an application for new relief and those denied on procedural grounds have already been discussed.
There is, in addition, another category of cases over which we have jurisdiction, pursuant to the principle that applications for new relief are distinct from motions to reevaluate a prior denial of relief: Where the relief sought is formally the same as was previously denied but the evidence submitted with a motion to reopen is directed at a different basis for providing the same relief, the circumstances can take the matter out of the realm of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). This category covers cases in which the newly-submitted evidence is not cumulative, and thus directed at collaterally attacking the agency’s initial decision on the same basis as it was originally made, but does seek the same type of discretionary relief as was originally sought. The BIA’s consideration of such evidence in deciding whether to reopen the case is reviewable for abuse of discretion, as the petitioner is presenting a basis for relief that was not previously denied in the exercise of the agency’s unreviewable discretion.
An example would be the submission of evidence, subsequent to a denial of cancellation of removal, concerning a newly-discovered, life-threatening medical condition
*602
afflicting a qualifying relative. If the BIA were to refuse to reopen the removal proceedings to make a hardship determination on this new basis, it would not be making a “judgment regarding the granting [of cancellation of removal],” within the ambit of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), but rather making a decision, under the removability provision at issue, whether to reopen for new proceedings, just as in
Medina-Morales
and
Arrozal.
As this court has “jurisdiction to determine whether jurisdiction exists,”
Aragon-Ayon v. INS,
Finally, in motion to reopen cases in which an independent claim such as ineffective assistance of counsel is at issue, we have jurisdiction to determine whether a petitioner was prejudiced, an assessment that can depend in cancellation of removal cases on hardship evaluations.
See, e.g., Maravilla v. Ashcroft,
In sum, we have jurisdiction over motions to reopen regarding cases in which: (1) the agency has not made a prior discretionary determination concerning the relief sought; (2) the agency’s denial of a motion to reopen applies a procedural statute, regulation, or rule, as opposed to determining that the movant did not establish a prima facie case *603 for relief that merits reopening a prior decision denying relief on an unreviewable discretionary ground; (3) the evidence submitted addresses a hardship ground so distinct from that considered previously as to make the motion to reopen a request for new relief, rather than for reconsideration of a prior denial; and (4) an independent claim such as ineffective assistance of counsel is at issue. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars jurisdiction, however, to review the denial of a motion to reopen that pertains only to the merits basis for a previously-made discretionary determination under one of the enumerated provisions, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, and 1255.
C. Application to this Case
In Fernandez’s case, the BIA’s denial of her motion to reopen was a discretionary determination, based on consideration of the new evidence provided, that Fernandez still did not, prima facie, meet the hardship requirement for cancellation of removal. In relevant part, the BIA stated that
to show prima facie eligibility for cancellation of removal ... there must be some indication that the relatives will suffer hardship in connection with the respondents’ removal that is so excessive and uncommon as to be “exceptional and extremely unusual.” While the motion to reopen demonstrates that the respondents’ removal would be an occasion of sorrow and great inconvenience for those left behind, that is commonly the case. It is not “exceptional and extremely unusual.”
This decision did not rely on the eviden-tiary requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), or on any other procedural regulation, statute, or rule. Moreover, the evidence Fernandez presented was not so different in kind from what was before the IJ as to constitute an application for new relief rather than a request for reconsideration. The lion’s share of the documentation was either cumulative or pertained to the inevitable passage of time between Fernandez’s removal hearing and the BIA’s adjudication of her appeal. The new letter from Fernandez’s husband does not alter the core of her claim, as it addresses the same basic hardship grounds considered previously. Accordingly, the BIA’s decision was a “judgment regarding the granting of relief under section ... 240A,” and we lack jurisdiction to review it under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). We therefore dismiss this portion of the petition for review.
II. Due Process
Fernandez contends that her due process right to a full and fair hearing was violated by the BIA’s
“de micromis
recounting of the [new] evidence” she submitted. We review due process claims de novo.
See Cano-Merida v. INS,
Fernandez also relies on our requirement that “the BIA must issue a decision that fully explains the reasons for denying a motion to reopen.... [T]he BIA is obligated to consider and address in its entirety the evidence submitted by a peti
*604
tioner.”
Mohammed v. Gonzales,
Conclusion
For the reasons given, we dismiss the petition for review in part for lack of jurisdiction and deny it in part.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.
Notes
. Shortly after this petition for review was filed, the court ordered Fernandez’s adult daughter Danelia Fernandez Covarrubias, who was part of the proceedings below, to file her own petition, which she did not. At oral argument, pro bono counsel for petitioners informed us that Covarrubias wishes to withdraw from this petition. We now formally dismiss Covarrubias as a party.
. Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
. The stop-time rule, which prevents aliens from accumulating continuous physical presence after the charging document is issued, was not applicable in
Arrozal. See generally Ram v. INS,
. Consistent with this distinction, the government recognized that we would have had jurisdiction over the now-dismissed component of this petition for review that pertained to Fernandez's adult daughter Danelia Fernandez Covarrubias, for whom the IJ never made a discretionary hardship determination.
. As we have “interpreted [§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) ] to encompass all discretionary decisions involved in the cancellation of removal context, including the ultimate discretionary decision to deny relief,"
Romero-Torres,
. The requirement that a motion to reopen establish a prima facie case for relief is not regulatory, although 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) does state that "[t]he Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” The prima facie case requirement was instead developed by the BIA in its case law.
See INS v. Wang,
. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) states in relevant part:
A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation. A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing; nor shall any motion to reopen for the purpose of affording the alien an opportunity to apply for any form of discretionary relief be granted if it appears that the alien’s right to apply for such relief was fully explained to him or her and an opportunity to apply therefore was afforded at the former hearing, unless the relief is sought on the basis of circumstances that have arisen subsequent to the hearing.
This provision pertains to the facts available at the time of the original hearing, not thereafter. See Bhasin v. Gonzales,423 F.3d 977 , 987 (9th Cir.2005) (”[B]oth the statute and the regulation indicate that the evidence must not have been available to be presented at the former hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).... The government's argument that the information was previously available because it became available during the pendency of the appeal to the Board does not comport with the statute and regulation.”).
. Our holdings in
Munoz v. Ashcroft,