Marian P. v. StateMarian P. v. State
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Hargrave
On February 6, 1979, a petition seeking an adjudication that four-year-old Lyni P. was a deprived child was filed by the Lincoln County District Attorney’s Office on behalf of the state in the District Court of that county. The petition also sought termination of the parental rights of the appellant, natural mother, Marian P. In response to the petition and its accompanying order for Lyni’s temporary custody with the Department of Welfare, appellant requested án evidentiary hearing. This hearing resulted in an order specifying temporary custody over Lyni remain in the Department of Welfare pending a later hearing on the allegations contained in the petition.
Appellant filed a motion to bifurcate the adjudicatory and termination phases of the proceeding. The trial court denied the motion. After taking testimony, the court adjudicated Lyni a deprived child and entered an order terminating the parental rights of the appellant mother. This order was based on a specific finding that the appellant had physically abused her child and the conclusion that to terminate parental rights under
As a result, appellant perfected an appeal
1
to this Court alleging first that for the provisions of Title 10
The statute in question provides:
A. The finding that a child is . . . deprived shall not deprive the parents of the child of their parental rights, but a court may terminate the rights of a parent to a child in the following situations:
5. A finding that a parent has physically abused a child subsequent to having been found guilty of child beating or child abuse either in a criminal action or specifically so found in a child dependency neglect action in a proceeding in the juvenile division of a district court.
A reading of the statute mandates agreement with appellant’s interpretation of the statutory language. The language of
This Court, in In re J. F. C., 577 P.2d 1300, 1301 (Okl.1978), stated that “[t]he termination statutes . . . attempt to provide for protection of the parent’s constitutional right to due process. They provide for hearing and notice and require the court to make specific findings of fact prior to ordering termination.” This requirement of specific findings of fact was addressed again by this Court in In re T. M. H., 613 P.2d 468 (Okl.1980). The Court stated that
in order to protect the procedural due process rights of parents . . . it is necessary that Referees and/or Trial Judges adequately apprise parents of the conditions which resulted in their child being declared dependent or neglected, in order that they may be aware of the conditions which need to be altered. Specifically, courts are required to make written findings of the conditions resulting in the child’s being adjudged dependent and neglected. The trial court’s failure to adequately apprise the parents of those conditions . . . constitutes separate grounds for reversing the trial court’s order.
M at 471.
Final termination of parental rights under
different stages of adjudication and disposition; thus providing the parent with notice of what conduct resulted in the adjudication of dependent and neglected status and that those same conditions must be corrected to prevent termination of parental rights. The entire crux of the argument supporting the constitutionality of our statute is that it provide the parent notice of the conditions which must be corrected.
Id. at 1040 (citing In re J. F. C., 577 P.2d 1300 (Okl.1978).
The Court stated further that
[i]f no standards of conduct are set out at the adjudication stage, the parent is given no notice as to what he or she will be called upon to prove in a later termination hearing. The trial court cannot be heard to terminate the rights of a parent for failure to correct conditions which indicate wilful neglect or harmful conduct to a child when those standards or conditions have never been brought to the attention of the parent in the first place.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
Due to the inapplicability of the other subsections to
For the reasons that the trial court erroneously interpreted and applied
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All Justices concur.
Notes
. The order by Judge Foster adjudicating the child deprived is not on appeal.