Aрpellant, Maria Parker, brought this action in the Eastern District of Michigan challenging the Secretary’s determination that her claim for Social Security disability benefits was barred by administrative res judicata. 1 The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons expressed below, we rеverse and remand.
On February 24, 1966, Parker filed her first of four applications for Social Security disability benefits. She alleged that she had been totally disabled since September, 1961, due to an arthritic back condition. This application was denied, on April 21, 1967. The notice of denial informеd Parker that an applicant must meet both an earnings requirement and a disability requirement to be eligible for benefits. She was advised that she last met the earnings requirement on December 31, 1966, and that she did not meet the disability requirement. The letter also explained that Parker could request reconsideration within six months. No such request was filed.
On May 12, 1970, Parker filed a second application for disability benefits. Once again she alleged a disability as of 1961 due to an arthritic back condition. This application was denied on June 24, 1970, on the basis of administrative res judicata. Parker was again nоtified of the administrative appeals procedure and was advised that she could submit new evidence of disability that existed prior to December 31, 1966, without filing a new application. No request for reconsideration was filed.
Parker’s third application was filed on January 22, 1973. Oncе again she alleged disability as of 1961, as a result of an arthritic spine condition. This third application, Parker’s first request for reconsideration, and her first request for a hearing were denied on the basis of res judicata. This finding was adopted by the Appeals Council as the final determination of the Secretary on December 3, 1974.
A similar fate met her fourth application, filed on September 30, 1975, which, unlike her initial application, was filed with assistance of counsel. This application alleged disability as of 1961 due to “nerves.” This application and the subsequent request for recоnsideration were denied on the basis of res judicata. Before ruling on her request for a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) requested a psychiatric examination. After receiving this report, which indicated that, although there was a history of psychiatric disorders going back to 1959, there were no presеnt psychiatric problems and that Parker’s nervous condition was closely related to her back pain, the ALJ denied her request for a hearing on the basis of res judicata. No finding was made by the ALJ or by the psychiatrist concerning Parker’s psychiatric condition during the time following her first applicatiоn when she failed to pursue her administrative remedies. In January, 1977, the Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s determination.
On March 8, 1977, Parker filed the instant action claiming that:
*1201 [The Secretary’s] failure to ascertain whether [Parker’s] failure to pursue her administrative remedies [following the denial оf her first application] might have been due to a psychiatric disability and the [Secretary’s] subsequent application of the doctrine of res judicata has resulted in a denial of [Parker’s] rights to due process.. ..
Parker’s Complaint, K18. 2
Initially the district court, on motion of the Secretary, dismissed the actiоn, concluding that it was barred by
res judicata.
The court then vacated its order of dismissal and remanded the case to the Secretary “for further administrative action.” Finally, relying on
Califano v. Sanders,
In Sanders, the Supreme Court addressed the question whether federal courts have jurisdiction under Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or under Section 205(g), 42 U.S.C. 405(g), of the Social Security Act to review a final decision of the Secretary not to reopen a claim for disability benefits. The Court held that Section 10 of the APA was not an implied grant of jurisdiction for such review, and went on to state with regard to Section 205(g):
We also agree that § 205(g) cannot be rеad to authorize judicial review of alleged abuses of agency discretion in refusing to reopen claims for social security benefits.
Id.
at 107-08,
The Court was, however, careful to distinguish cases such as
Weinberger v. Salfi,
Cоnstitutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing procedures and, therefore, access to the courts is essential to the decision of such questions.
Sanders, supra,
Since the advent of
Sanders,
the courts have held that, absent a colorable constitutional claim, federal courts are without jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s denial of benefits on the basis of
res judicata. See, e. g., Rios v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare,
The Secretary’s regulations require that an applicant seeking disability benefits proceed through four administrative stages: the initial determination, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.-905-908 (1980); the reconsideration, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.909-916 (1980); the hearing, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.914 — 40 (1980); and Appeals Council Review, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.945-952 (1980). The regulations further provide that notice of the agency action taken at each stage and the right to proceed to the next stage be transmitted to the claimant. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.908, 404.916, and 404.-937a (1980). At any stage of this procedure, if the applicant fаils to timely proceed to the next administrative stage, the last determination made will become final. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.908, 404.916, and 404.940 (1980). After the Appeals Council Review, the final administrative stage, a claimant may bring an action in federal district court under Section 205(g), 42 U.S.C. 405(g). Failure to bring such an action will operаte to render the decision of the Appeals Council final. See C.F.R. § 404.951 (1980). Any determination that becomes final for failure to proceed to the next level of consideration may operate to bar future consideration of the claim, 20 C.F.R. § 404.937(a) (1980), although some procedures are available to mitigate the effect of this rule. See,- e. g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.957 (1980).
Additionally we note that, although administrative
res judicata
is recognized as a helpful tool in limiting relitigation of claims once decided, courts have noted that it is applied with less rigidity than its judicial counterpart.
See, e. g., United States v. Smith,
We recognize that these cases arose before Sanders was decided, but we consider them valid authority for the proposition that indiscriminate application of administrative res judicata to all claims that technically come within its ambit may well be an improper application of the doctrine. Although because of Sanders federal courts may not consider mere claims of unfairness or injustice when administrative res judica-ta is applied, we may consider those claims that raise a colorable constitutional question. See Matos, supra, at 286-87.
The claim presented here by Parker alleges, in effect, that it is a denial of due process for a claimant to be precluded from litigating her claim for benefits because of a failure to proceed in a timely fashion from one administrative stage to the next when the claimant did not receive meaningful notice and the opportunity to be heard. The alleged defect in notification does not concern the content of the standard notices, which were admittеdly mailed and received, but relates to the ability of the claimant to understand and act upon them. Parker’s contention is that, because she did not have the mental ability to understand and comply with the notice of further administrative procedures, she did not receive meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard.
It is axiomatic that Section 205(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b), and due process require that a claimant receive meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard before her claim for disability benefits may be denied. A substantial questiоn exists in this case whether Parker has received this fundamental guarantee. Medical evidence submitted with a later application indicates some degree of mental illness that predates the filing of her initial application. The complaint also contains allegаtions of mental disability. Further, the district court’s remand of this ease to the Secretary indicates doubts that the court had concerning Parker’s mental condition at the time she initially failed to pursue her administrative remedies. We think Parker presents a colorable argument that she failed to understand and act upon the notice she received because of her mental condition, and that a denial of benefits based upon this failure is a denial of due process. This type of contention seems peculiarly apropos in the context of Social Security disability benefit proceedings in which, as here, the very disability that forms all or part of the basis for which the claimant seeks benefits may deprive her of the ability to understand or act upon notice of available administrative procedures. Thus, we conclude that Parker hаd presented a colorable constitutional claim and that therefore the district court was correct when it exercised jurisdiction by remanding to the Secretary.
Accordingly, we remand to the district court with instructions that it direct the Secretary to make a determination, after considering such evidence as may be presented, whether mental illness prevented her from understanding and pursuing her administrative remedies following the denial of her first application for benefits. Once such a determination is made, the district court will have a sufficient record befоre it to decide what relief, if any, is consonant with due process and the Secretary’s regulatory scheme. At the same time, such a remand will give the Secretary ample opportunity to remedy any injustice that may have occurred in Parker’s case and, if further proceedings are had before the district court, the Secretary will have the opportunity to present his position on the issue of what effect, if any, Parker’s mental condition should have on the application of res judicata to her claim. See, Torres, supra, at 468-69.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Notes
. 20 C.F.R. § 404.937(a) (1980), provides as follows:
The presiding officer may, on his own motion, dismiss a hearing request, either entirely or as to any stated issue, under any of the following circumstances:
(a) Res judicata. Where there has been a previous determination or decision by the Secretary with respect to the rights of the
same party on the same facts pertinent to the same issue or issues which has become final either by judicial affirmance or, without judicial consideration, upon the claimant’s failure timely to request reconsideration, hearing, or review, or to commence a civil action with respect to such determination or decision (see §§ 404.911, 404.918, 404.946, and 404.-951).
. The complaint also сontained allegations that Parker suffers from “chronic severe agitation” and “depressed reaction.” Parker further alleges that “[t]he testimony in the record that [Parker] suffered from a severe and refractory psychiatric illness remains uncontradicted.” The record shows, аnd the complaint alleges, that the psychiatrist who examined Parker at the ALJ’s request made no finding as to her condition as of 1967, at the time she failed to pursue ayailable administrative remedies. We surmise that it was these allegations and the facts shown in the record that induced the district court initially to remand this case to the Secretary.