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Marguerite Hicks v. The Gates Rubber Company
833 F.2d 1406
10th Cir.
1987
Check Treatment

*1 (1985); The missioner, term of those leases. decision (CCH) 228 50 T.C.M. Commissioner, (CCH) tax court is AFFIRMED. v. 50 T.C.M. Hunter Commissioner, v. (1985); Sanders without (1984), (CCH) T.C.M. aff'd opinion, F.2d 174 Cir. published Commissioner, v.

1985); T.C. Peterson And, (CCH) government

M. issue, depend on all sides

has been advantage gained. This to be

ing on v. Bloomberg also See example. is case HICKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, Marguerite Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1368 (1980)(written altered).9 may not be lease terms COMPANY, The RUBBER GATES However, yet no court has held that Defendant-Appellee. ap- “reasonably contemplated use” test is No. 84-1232. reducing fixed term of a propriate for approximating under circumstances lease Appeals, Court of United States reasoning upon Based our those here. Tenth Circuit. theory respect taxpayers’ to the above with Nov. applying the substance over form doc- case, reasoning elsewhere trine in this

herein, argument reject the we

taxpayers’ contemplation of ear- reasonable agree-

ly cancellation overrides actual lease term. Just as in

ment as to the fixed form, agree- the written

substance versus parties expresses also their

ment of the lease,

contemplation respect to the estopped repudiating they are drafted, they

document which themselves unexpressed understanding

in favor of an alleged contemplation to have existed at

the time.

III.

CONCLUSION taxpayers’

We have considered all addressing

arguments, specifically those necessary. considered We conclude

we question on their face fail

that the leases qualify for investment credit. four

parties fixed the term of the leases at fifty percent

years which is excess of equipment.

the useful life of the leased early privi-

The existence of an cancellation the fixed

lege does not void or override Following Recent Judicial Inter tests ment Tax Credit a discussion of the confusion of 9. For 46(e)(3)(B), deny employed by government tax bene Tax pretations 37 The Section O’Connell, area, Wiesner, (Fall 1983); in the investment credit see Lawyer fits Traditional Credit, Maximizing 42 N.Y.U. ERTA?, the Investment Tax Leasing: 41 N.Y.U. Is There Life After Vitale, (1983); Note Inst. on Fed. Tax’n 5.03[5] Inst. on Fed. Tax'n 11.07[2] —Noncorporate the Invest- Lessors Retention of *3 Moran, Denver, (John Mosby, Elisa Colo. Denver, Colo., brief), for was also on the plaintiff-appellant. Denver, (David Biskup,

Steven F. Colo. Gorsuch, Kirgis, Campbell, R. Gorsuch of Colo., Grover, Denver, was on Walker and brief), defendant-appellee. HOLLOWAY, Judge, Before Chief CROW, SETH, Judge, and Circuit Judge.* District HOLLOWAY, Judge. Chief Marguerite appeal by Plaintiff This an (“Hicks”) judgment by the Hicks from a in favor district court a Title action (“Gates”). Company The of Gates Rubber that case arose out of a series incidents brief, during eight period month occurred a of Hicks Gates. elements, Hicks’ Stripped to its essential subjected to racial claim was that she was in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981 harassment (1982), subjected to racial and that she was sexual harassment in violation of Title Rights Act of VII of the Civil addition, seq. 2000e et In U.S.C. alleged complained she that when Equal Employment to the (“EEOC”), Opportunity she Commission defense, retaliatorily discharged. In was maintained that Hicks was neither Gates harassed, and she sexually racially nor discharged solely of unsatis- was because An of the factory job performance. outline evidence follows.

I woman, 15, 1980, Hicks, July a On black guard. security hired Gates as a working, em- began the time she At security force. ployed thirty people in its in the only woman Hicks was the black Kansas, sitting by designation. Sam Crow of the District * The Honorable force, security and one of two black jump foot dock, off a loading III R. guards. 51-52; Lyons, and that in contravention of procedure, standard permit would not her primary responsibility of the securi- to sit while conducting plant inspection. ty guards patrol at Gates was to the Gates R. Ill 52. She asserted that on one occa- plant grounds. To ensure the thor- sion Holec refused to allow oughness patrols, of these Gates had devel- to take her lunch break at time, oped an usual system elaborate as —known instead requiring her to relieve “walking a white keys” monitored a —that coworker, 54; III R. and that guard’s progress Holec patrol. insist- essence, ed that she ride in a car even system required though guard carry each passenger wet, seat was time patrol consequence clock on which was activated which was that she was keys forced strategically placed to “walk ninety-three at plant pants with wet various the rest patrol locations on the route. Ill shift.” R. 55. guard When a Hicks also reached one claimed locations, *4 during her period he or she probationary inserted key the into clock she was the sexually which harassed. She recorded the time guard’s recounted an inci- during dent trip arrival. a Although to patrol the time hangar involved in the “walking where Holec keys” the reached over vary depending could her and rubbed thigh said, factors, on and optimal external “I you’re the going rate for think to patrolling make it.” grounds Ill R. the was fifteen 55. keys per Finally, Hicks deline- half examples hour. In ated guards addition of hostility by carried exhibited co- short-wave radios and were workers. subject peri- to odic radio checks. Guards were also re- Evidence offered Gates differed radi- quired to maintain daily logs that detailed cally from Hicks’ probation- account of her any variation from patrol the normal rou- ary period. According Gates, to Hicks had tine. difficulties performing her duties as a se- When employee a new began working at curity guard from very beginning of Gates, employee was automatically employment. her trainer, Lyons, Her testi-

placed on ninety day a period, probationary fied that during her training, Hicks was during which time he or she could be dis- unable to accurately remember the loca- charged without cause. keys along tions patrol route, V 449-54, R. and as a trial, consequence, At he was sought Hicks to establish that instructed by his to simplify the work during environment at Gates her training program to probationary period her accommodate permeated was memory problems. Lyons racial and testified hostility. Gates’ employ- performance Hicks’ ees testified so atmosphere that an was deficient that existed in by the week, end of the which first jokes begun racial slurs and he had were tolerated. question Ill R. to her ability 40-42. At adequately per- one to supervisor, least Gleason, form the work. V Lyons referred to R. 450. “niggers,” blacks as also III R. at found it necessary and to “coons.” IV R. extend Hicks’ 162. On train- occasion, ing period one Gleason was from the said to normal time have of one made a to reference week four “lazy to weeks. R. niggers V 457. Even at and weeks, Mexicans” end of appeared to four did spe- Lyons really have been not cifically capable directed feel she fully at was performing Hicks. IV R. In a vein, similar one of her duties a guards, security guard. as security Brawley, referred to Hicks as “Buffalo Gates challenged also interpreta- Hicks’ Butt.” IV R. 164. tion the events cited her as evidence Hicks early claimed that probation- her disparate treatment. The loading dock ary period she subjected was disparate to event was to said be a minor incident that treatment supervisors both and cowork- occurred when Hicks’ trainer took short a complained ers. She trainer, that her up cut to make lost on patrol time Lyon, forced her to make a four or five route. The pants got incident when Hicks’ warning, Ely record of Ely. In the verbal an inad- the result of described as

wet was job five areas which Hicks’ Finally, delineated R. 468. oversight. V vertent (1) unsatisfactory: miss- performance was Hicks’ conten- strenuously disputed many keys during patrol, too her sexually harassed that she had been tion walking keys per less than fifteen half miscon- Holec, asserting that Hicks had hour; (2) taking long inspecting too gesture of Mr. and harmless an innocent strued (3) hangar; failing to Gates’ house and encouragement. instructions; supervisor’s follow her difficulties, successfully Hicks Despite many missing reporting late on too radio period, becom- completed probationary her checks; (5) failing report to all devia- guard time on October ing a full patrol route on her tions from normal However, began to Hicks said she soon again daily report. On December supervisor, experience difficulties with her by filing responded discipline a claim to On November Gleason Gleason. with the EEOC. of retaliation put up Hicks “that he would his foot told long receiving warn- go Not after the verbal ass so far that would have [her] [she] again sexually ing, Hicks said that she was take it out.” Ill R. 56. to clinic to taking following She addition, day, harassed Gleason. Hicks said that up in a patrol her on the on when Gleason drove Gleason touched break November “ said, stopped caught “I going get you go-cart. He said ‘I’m buttocks and ” time, got Ill you,” you.” or “I R. at 70. He yet.’ III R. 56. At about this grabbed manager security, allegedly Hicks' breasts and instructions from the then *5 over, got top began making notations she “fell and he Ely, Gleason also [her].” Ill denied such acts. job performance. R. 70. Gleason on Hicks’ 3, 1981, January injured Hicks her problems with some of On Hicks also had 18, 1980, leg, slipped and head she and her November for back when coworkers. On walking instance, step ex- fell on a broken while Hicks had a heated verbal Gleason, Although supervisor, change guards, Phyl- keys. her with one of the other step, of the broken he did not warn lis Adams. This altercation was the sub- knew including meeting guards swing Ely an informal with on the on the ject of shift— 12, danger. February 19. He Hicks that he Hicks—of the On November warned claim, alleg- going Hicks filed her fourth EEOC “not to have this kind of action was ing for injury Ill R. 61. Hicks filed a that her was retaliation out of [her]....” having previous complaints. charge Equal filed the EEOC of discrimination with Employment Opportunity Commission injury, As a result of her Hicks missed (“EEOC”) alleged on November She returning days, for six to work on work arising out of racial and sexual harassment return, inju- January her her On environment, general as work as well resumption prevented an immediate ries specific instances harassment. guard Consequently, her she was duties. by given “light duty slip” a the Gates clinic November Hicks was involved

On return, following relieving security for the week her an incident with another Gates Roe, alleg- walking keys. she guard, in which Hicks her from When Patricia however, duties, fight. regular her challenged Roe to a After an resumed edly pain in by Ely, persistent Hicks Hicks continued to have investigation of the incident job per- her Nota- her back that interferred with Derogatory was issued a Personnel giv- (“DPN”) February Hicks was 1980 and formance. On tion on December response, poor job performance. en a DPN for suspended days. for three charge filed of discrimina- Hicks a second received a verbal February On alleging tion with the EEOC that the sus- weapon when warning mishandling for for her earlier pension was retaliation gun accidentally dropped. On her was charge of discrimination. again disciplined February Hicks was involving mis- incident Hicks received a for a second On December 17, a by handling weapon. her On March warning poor performance verbal for 14H hearing proclivities, at which Hicks dis- was held was and there was never a sugges- charged poor performance. by work On tion made Mr. Gleason that submission complaint to April 20 Hicks filed her final his attentions was a condition of favor- EEOC, contending supervisory had able with the she treatment him or con- retaliatorily discharged employment. for her tinuation of her been four Indeed it appears that Mr. prior complaints. Gleason guilty

gratuitous personal acts of boorish conduct II unrelated to implicit overt or demand responsive invitation him for conduct trial, After a bench the district court of any by plaintiff. kind dispute It is in as rejected racially Hicks’ claim of a hostile to whether Mr. plain- Gleason’s acts toward environment, along work with all her brought tiff were to the attention of Mr. disparate retaliatory claims of racial Ely, Division, of the Guard treatment and sexual harassment. The tri- court find no basis for [the could] alia, stated, inter judge’s findings al resolution of the conflict.” I R. 59. plaintiff’s trainer determined that she re- The court quired learning job additional time in her recounted the as several com- plaints by plaintiff filed learning she was slow the location of all the EEOC and noted July that on keys required punch. she was Addi- EEOC plaintiff notified it could find no training plaintiff’s tional was a result of reasonable support plaintiff’s cause to complaints. needs and there was impermissibly not an discriminatory reason for additional train- With respect to the December indicating training and no evidence complaint EEOC, with the the court found rigorous was more or abusive than that this challenge was the result of a issued required non blacks or that it was de- plaintiff fight another female security signed quitting. to harass her into guard, the challenge provoca- was without tion, and it was by provocative attended

The court found that there was no evi- unjustified plaintiff. behavior support plaintiff’s dence to claim that de- warning verbal delivered to permitted fendant maintained and a work Ely, subject of her third EEOC com- openly environment hostile to black em- *6 plaint, was regular issued as a result of a ployees. only suggestive evidence of spot semiannual check of time charts and disputed testimony this was specific of daily reports, spot and the check was not workers, by statements fellow but there by Ely any purpose instituted for other and was no evidence that defendant condoned plaintiff singled spot was not out for the such conduct. Plaintiff testified about cer- check. The court found that the December tain acts of unwarranted violation her of warning poor perform- 1980 verbal person by supervisory personnel. The (missing many keys, failing ance too to court patting found the incident of her hour, etc.) meet the keys per standard of 15 thigh by Hollec was an isolated incident in had a basis fact. which there was no sexual advance intend- ed. respect plaintiff’s With to fourth EEOC complaint concerning the fall when she was alleged The court found acts to have allegedly stair, unwarned about a broken by (squeezing been committed Gleason her the court found that Gleason had been ad- touching buttocks one time and her breasts vised of the broken stair but failed to warn another) on only were found to be in dis- guards plaintiff’s of the shift of the pute violation, degree as to the dangerous condition and that there was no plaintiff subjected that “the by was Mr. singled basis for the assertion that Gleason Gleason touching to unwarranted of her plaintiff out or that his failure to warn her person and to familiarities neither invited was based on malice toward her. encouraged by nor I her.” R. 58. The notwithstanding court found Finally plaintiff’s that the evi- the court found that dence discharge indicates these incidents were on March 1981 followed an consequences Ely “the investigatory hearing of Mr. Gleason’s own before Mr. VII; personnel

two members of defendant’s of- violation of Title in concluding fice; charges the basis for the on that Gates had legal, articulated a nondis- discharge which the were made was the criminatory for terminating basis Hicks’ warning same as the verbal of December addition, employment. Hicks claims a 15, 1980, poor performance; and that der- variety evidentiary errors at trial. rogatory personnel giv- notations had been warnings poor en Gleason about Ill performance. The court found that at the investigatory hearing plaintiff time of the Racial Harassment responded performance that her had been prohibits Title VII discrimination employees; at same level as other but employer “against any individual with that she did not deny specific otherwise respect compensation, terms, to his condi charges poor performance. She assert- tions, privileges employment, because inability perform ed her rounds within race, color, of such religion, individual’s keys per standard of 15 half hour was sex, origin_” or national 42 U.S.C. injury because she sustained in Janu- 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982). The trial court re- ary 1981. The court found that there “is a jected Hicks’ claim that Gates had violated specific poor basis fact for the acts of by failing Title provide “to and ensure performance upon disciplinary which the a work environment free from racial hostil- discharge invoked.” I R. 62. The ity and harassment and I intimidation.” R. guards court found that no other employed Instead, the court found that “[t]he by defendants sustained the difficulties of only evidence [supporting the is dis- claim] plaintiff achieving the standard or other- puted testimony specific statements performing assigned wise the same tasks workers, made fellow is no there to her and that there is “no evidence that evidence whatever that the defendant con- plaintiff treatment of the was different doned such conduct.” I R. 68. Because guards.” from treatment of non-black I R. we conclude that the trial court’s erroneous, clearly uphold was not we must The court concluded was not rejection its of the racial harassment claim. subjected disparate treatment on the gender defendant; It is basis race or well established she that “a work subjected was not to the sort of environment dominated racial slurs cognizable under Title VII “be- constitutes violation of Title VII.” John cause her tolerance of or consent to the Bunny Co., son v. Bread 646 F.2d acts of either Mr. Hollec or Mr. (8th Cir.1981). Gleason 1257 Accord Walker was not made a condition continued Co., Ford Motor employment_ The defendant dis- Cir.1982). “To racially establish a hostile *7 charged of her because inabili- environment, however, work plaintiffs ty adequately perform to job for which prove must more than a few isolated inci she was hired and for no other reason.” I enmity.” dents of racial Snell v. Suffolk good R. 64. Defendant articulated a faith Co., 1094, (2d Cir.1986). 782 F.2d 1103 Ac plaintiff's business reason for discharge as Rock, City cord Gilbert v. Little 722 of punitive taken, well as the other action (8th Cir.1983), denied, F.2d 1394 cert. actions, punitive including the dis- 972, 104 466 U.S. 80 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 820 charge, specific non-pretex- were based on comments, “Casual or accidental or grounds tual they were not in retalia- conversation, sporadic trigger eq will not filing complaints tion for with EEOC. pursuant uitable relief to the statute.” Snell, appeal, alleges

On 782 F.2d Rogers at Accord that the trial (1) determining Equal Employment court erred Opportunity that Hicks Comm’n, (5th Cir.1971), had not subjected been to 454 F.2d racial harass- proscribed by denied, ment Title VII and U.S.C. cert. 406 U.S. S.Ct. 1981; (2) finding (1972). “Instead, that Hicks had not L.Ed.2d 343 there § must been the victim of sexual steady barrage opprobrious harassment be racial Johnson, 646 F.2d at 1257. Ti- environment comment.” harassment arises when sexu- tle is violated al conduct where the work “has the purpose or effect of “heavily polluted unreasonably environment is so interfering with an individ- destroy discrimination as ual’s performance the emotional work or creating an in- psychological stability timidating, hostile, minority or offensive working en- [employee].” Rogers, Vinson, F.2d at 238. vironment.” at —, 477 U.S. S.Ct. at quoting 29 C.F.R. 1604.11 § We judge’s conclude that the trial find- (a)(3) (1986). “For work environ- [hostile ings rejecting the claim that Gates main- sexual harassment to actionable, ment] be it permitted tained and a work environment must be sufficiently pervasive severe or ‘to openly that was employees hostile to black alter the conditions of employ- [the victim’s] are not clearly erroneous. The evidence ment and create an abusive working envi- shows incidents that were essentially occa- ” Vinson, ronment.’ at —, 106 S.Ct. at Snell, sional and incidental. 782 F.2d at 2406, quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904. Whether the sexual conduct complained of sufficiently is pervasive to create a hostile

IV or offensive work environment must be de- termined Sexual totality Harassment of the circum- stances. Henson, 682 F.2d at 904. Accord Sexual harassment, like racial 29 1604.11(b) C.F.R. (1986).1 The trial harassment, is now universally recognized court found that while Hicks had been the as employment discrimination within the victim of “unwarranted touching ... and meaning of Title VII. 1 A. Larson & L. familiarities,” I R. she had not been Larson, Employment Discrimination “subjected to the sort of sexual harassment 41.62 See, e.g., Meritor Sav. cognizable under Title VII because her tol- Bank v. Vinson, —, 106 erance of or consent to the acts of either 91 L.Ed.2d 49 Mr. Hollec or Mr. Gleason was not [sic] (“Without question, when a supervisor sex- made a condition of her employ- continued ually harasses a subordinate because of the ment.” I R. appeal, 64. On Hicks chal- sex, subordinate’s ‘discrimi- lenges the trial court’s determination on sex.”); on the basis of Equal Em- nate[s]’ grounds. First, two Hicks contends that the ployment Commission, Opportunity Final evidence was insufficient to support Guidelines on Sexual Harassment court’s conclusion that she had not been the Workplace, 29 1604.11(a) (1986) C.F.R. § quid pro quo sexual harassment. victim of (“Harassment basis is sex a viola- Second, Hicks maintains that the trial VIL”). tion of Sec. 703 of Title court failed to consider whether she had been subjected to hostile work environment Although sexual may sexual harassment. variety forms, take a courts have con- Quid Quo A. Pro Sexual Harassment sistently recognized two categories distinct quid pro of sexual quo harassment claims: The trial court’s that Hicks harassment, and hostile work envi- had not quid pro quo subjected been Dole, ronment sexual harassment. Katz v. sexual harassment must be assessed under Cir.1983). Quid 254-55 the standard delineated in Fed.R.Civ.P. pro quo harassment occurs when submis- 52(a) (1982). City Anderson v. Bessem *8 sion to sexual conduct is a made condition City, 564, 573, er 1504, 470 U.S. 105 S.Ct. of employment concrete Henson benefits. 1507, (1985). 84 L.Ed.2d 518 Under Rule City Dundee, v. 897, (11th 682 52(a), F.2d 908 “[f]indings of fact shall not be set of Cir.1982). Accord 29 erroneous, clearly C.F.R. unless aside and due re 1604.11 (a)(1-2) (1986). given Alternatively, gard opportunity shall be to the hostile work 1. In findings with the opinion connection trial court’s he did not have benefit of the or its here, we note that Vinsonwas decided well after reliance on Henson. judge’s the trial and the district so that decision

1414 credibility of the judge the court to acts ... was not made trial a condition of 52(a) (1982). 64, her employment,” continued I the witnesses.” Fed.R.Civ.P. R. it ‘clearly seems clear that finding may “A be deemed court believed that fact only Hicks could recover only finding quid pro quo if the is without erroneous’ result, sexual if harassment. As a support in the record ... or court factual failed to consider whether the “unwarrant- reviewing court on the entire evidence is touching ed ... and firm familiarities” to which left with the definite and conviction 58, subjected, Hicks was I R. and other made.” that a mistake has been Colon- evidence established Marsh, hostile work environ- 78, v. 733 F.2d 81 Sanchez noted, ment sexual denied, harassment. As Cir.), 855, 469 U.S. cert. judge trial did not explica- have Vinson’s 181, (1984). L.Ed.2d 115 “This standard tion on the “hostile theory. environment” reviewing plainly does not entitle a court to finding of the trier reverse of fact findings “When are infirm because of an simply because it is convinced it would law, erroneous view a remand is the differently.” have decided the case proper course unless the permits record Anderson, 470 U.S. at 105 S.Ct. at only one resolution of the factual issue.” finding quid pro quo 1511. And the of no Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at sexual harassment —whether as to a sub- Vinson, S.Ct. at 1792 See also sidiary or ultimate fact—must be reviewed 57, —, 2399, 2406, 106 S.Ct. 91 L.Ed. clearly under erroneous standard. (1986) (“Since appears 2d it Swint, Pullman-Standard v. 456 U.S. findings District Court made its without 102 S.Ct. 72 L.Ed.2d 66 considering ever the ‘hostile environment’ theory harassment, of sexual the Court of Appeals’ correct.”). decision to remand was say We cannot that the trial court’s Nonetheless, argues Gates that even under no quid pro quo sexual harass standard, a hostile work environment “the clearly ment was grava erroneous. The permits only record one resolution of the quid pro quo men of a sexual harassment factual issue.” Because the trial court tangible job claim is that benefits are condi found “two isolated events of sexual employee’s tioned on an submission to con Hicks,” Appellee’s conduct toward Brief at duct of a sexual nature and that adverse argues that Hicks “failed to dem- job consequences employ result from the onstrate ‘pervasive’ conditions suffi- ee’s refusal to submit to the conduct. cient to allow the trial court to find that an any suggestion record fails to disclose working abusive environment had been cre- explicitly implicitly Hicks—either or —that grant ated.” Id. at 31. employment her was conditioned on ing sexual favors to or It is true Gleason Holec. that “casual or isolated man- Similarly, discriminatory the trial court found that ifestations of a environ- ment, slurs, job consequences adverse such Hicks suffered as a few ethnic or racial may did not arise from acquiesce her refusal to not raise a cause of action.” Bundy conduct, Jackson, supervisors’ (D.C.Cir. v. sexual F.2d 943 n. 9 rather, 1981). solely inadequate were due to her “For sexual harassment to be ac- tionable, job performance. sufficiently “Where there are two it must be severe permissible evidence, pervasive views the fact- ‘to alter the conditions of [the finder’s choice between them cannot be and create an abusive victim’s] ” clearly Anderson, Vinson, working erroneous.” environment.’ 470 U.S. at 477 U.S. at —, quoting S.Ct. at 1512. 106 S.Ct. at Rogers Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, (5th Cir.1971). B. Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment considering Gates, In position light legal the trial court’s conclu questions there are three involved: sion “cognizable that Hicks’ claim was not overtly whether acts that are not under Title VII because her ... consent to can nevertheless constitute “sexual” acts *9 VII; (2) pervasive, comprise incidents of illegal Title whether an under condition of that are directed at em- under Title sexual harassment VII. plaintiff can be used ployees other than of hostile work environment as evidence then, Clearly, if a consistently harassment; inci- sexual whether physical uses force toward an employee may, by dents of racial harassment which employee’s sex, because of that the use

themselves, support insufficient to a be may, pervasive of such force if enough, racially claim can hostile work environment illegal form an ‘condition of employ- incidents of sexual be combined with pattern ment.’ So too a of mixed sexual prove pervasive pattern a of harassment physical advances and may force il- be discriminatory harassment in violation of legally discriminatory if based on the em- Title VII. ployee’s sex.... McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1138-39. agree We with the McKinney in- in- opinions there were Before terpretation prohibition of the broad in Ti- dicating predicate underlying that the acts making tle VII it “an unlawful employment clearly a sexual claim had to be practice employer for an ... to discrimi- e.g., sexual nature. Downes v. Fed See against any nate respect individual with Admin., 288, 290 eral Aviation compensation, terms, conditions, his or (Fed.Cir.1985); Int’l, Flagship, Jones v. privileges of employment, because of such (5th Cir.1986), F.2d n. 5 cert. race, color, sex, individual’s religion, or na- — denied, —, origin.” 2000e-2(a)(l) tional 42 U.S.C. § L.Ed.2d 1001 See also C.F.R. (1982). Thus on the remand that is ordered 1604.11(a)(1982)(defining sexual harass- here, relating all the evidence to sexual advances, ment as re- “[u]nwelcome harassment within the accept standard we favors, quests for sexual and other verbal McKinney should be considered. physical of a or conduct sexual na- Hicks introduced evidence of at least two

ture....”). harassment, incidents of serious sexual judge they district found that occurred.

In the District of Columbia Court addition, Hicks Appeals rejected introduced evidence of of this narrow definition Dole, physical threats of violence and incidents of McKinney of sexual harassment (D.C.Cir.1985). verbal abuse. evidence F.2d 1129 Such should be There the determining considered in directly whether court confronted with the has established a hostile question work environment physically aggressive “whether a sexual harassment claim. explicitly not sexual act a male supervisor against employee may a female part prohibited pattern constitute of a of

sexual discrimination.” Id. at 1131. The question in- The second is whether responded: court cidents of sexual harassment directed at have held employees plaintiff

We never that sexual harass- other than the can be unequal proof plaintiff’s ment or other treatment of an used as of a of claim employee group employees or that oc- hostile work environment. The answer employee inquiries curs because of the sex of an seems clear: one critical must, illegal VII, to be under Title take a hostile environment claim must be the general the form of sexual advances or of other environment. Evidence work clearly atmosphere instances with sexual overtones. therefore —as well as evidence Rather, specific hostility And we decline to do so now. directed toward the important we hold that harassment or other an factor evaluat- —is Indeed, unequal employee treatment the claim. “such evidence case, group employees plaintiff’s that would not occur could be critical to a where employee but for the sex of the or em- cannot estab- a claim of harassment be ployees may, showing if isolated sufficiently patterned or lished without a

1416 discriminatory may indicia of a aggregate environment.” evidence of racial hostility (D.C.Cir.1985), Taylor, 141 Vinson v. 753 F.2d with evidence of hostility. sexual We con- part part, clude permissible. and rev’d in 477 that such aggregation is aff 'd 57, 2399, U.S. 106 S.Ct. 91 L.Ed.2d 49 purpose The of Title VII is “the (1986). artificial, arbitrary removal of and unneces- The few courts that have addressed this sary employment barriers to when the bar- issue have generally concluded that inci- operate riers invidiously to discriminate on employees involving dents other than the impermissible basis of racial or other plaintiff establishing gen- are relevant a classifications.” Griggs v. Duke Power erally hostile Co., work environment. Vin- 401 91 S.Ct. 28 son, the District of Columbia Ap- Court of L.Ed.2d 158 Title prohibits peals rejec- employer concluded that the trial court’s from discriminating against any tion of evidence of harassment of individual female because of race or because of employees plaintiff other than the sex. “The use was im- of the word ‘or’ evidences proper. Congress’ tending prohibit “Evidence Tay- show intent lor’s working harassment of other women discrimination based on or all of the alongside listed directly Vinson is relevant to the characteristics.” v. Harris Jefferies question Ass’n, Community whether Co. he created an environ- Action (5th Cir.1980). ment violative of Title VII.” Id. at 146. The court held that no evidence of sexual In Jefferies, plaintiff made claims of specifically harassment directed toward the race and sex arising discrimination out of plaintiff necessary for a claim under promote defendant’s failure to her and Title VII: “Even a woman who was never its decision to terminate her. When the herself object might of harassment -trial court dismissed her claims of race have a Title VII claim if she were forced to discrimination, discrimination and sex atmosphere

work in an where such harass- plaintiff appealed, arguing that the court pervasive.” ment was Id. at 146. This refusing had erred in to consider her claim support view finds in racial discrimination of discrimination based on both race and brought cases under Title VII. Rogers See sex. agreed. The Fifth Circuit Relying on Equal Employment Opportunity cases disparate treatment of a sub- Comm’n, (5th Cir.1971), 454 F.2d 234 cert. class of women would constitute a violation denied, 406 U.S. 92 S.Ct. VII, e.g., Phillips Title see v. Martin L.Ed.2d 343 Corp., Marietta 400 U.S. 91 S.Ct. (1971), 27 L.Ed.2d 613 the court concluded Here Hicks introduced evidence that a against that “discrimination black females employees number of had sexually been exist even in the absence of discrim- [could] supervisor, harassed Gleason. On against ination men or white black wom- remand, such evidence should be con- en.” Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032. We are sidered judge trial in determining persuaded that the ruling is cor- whether a hostile work environment Jefferies rect.2 harassment claim has been established. evidence introduced that her supervisor, Gleason, had made serious ra- question whether, third is against cial slurs Such blacks. evidence determining pervasiveness should be considered on remand to deter- against plaintiff, harassment a a trial court mine pervasive whether was a there dis- Corp., F.Supp. treated.”); Club, See also Graham v. Bendix Chambers v. Omaha Girls (N.D.Ind.1984) (“Under VII, Title (D.Neb.1986). F.Supp. 946 n. 34 But see protected as against a black woman is Degraffenreid Corp., v. General Motors grounds discrimination on the double of race (E.D.Mo.1976), F.Supp. part, rev’d in aff'd sex, employer singles and an who out black part grounds, other 558 F.2d 480 Cir. females for less favorable treatment does not 1977) (black special a women not Title VII plaintiffs by showing defeat case that white class). unfavorably females or black males are not so combining prove by preponderance the ra- Hicks failed to criminatory atmosphere, evidence, so the evidence that Gates had actual or cial and sexual con- *11 any harass- hostile work environment structive notice of hostile that a work envi- may claim have been established ronment sexual ment harassment. As a conse- though held that the quence, argues Hicks. Even we have that it cannot be sufficiently supports the discrete evidence any liable for harassment to Hicks.3 did not maintain a work that Gates employer The issue of liability par- blacks, openly hostile to Part environment Vinson, 477 U.S. tially clarified 106 III, on racial treatment that evidence 91 L.Ed.2d 49 The Su- pur- considered for this combined should be preme repudiated Court espoused the view evi- pose here with the sexual harassment by the District Columbia Circuit that “em- dence. ployers always automatically are liable for sum, expressing any view on without sexual harassment supervisors.” their merits of the ultimate determination the at —, Id. However, 106 S.Ct. at 2408. hostile that should be made on the work appeared the reject Court an absolute harassment claim of environment sexual requirement “[Ajbsence of notice. of no- Hicks, that claim is remanded to the dis- employer,” tice to an the Court noted “does court for reconsideration. We are sat- trict necessarily not insulate employer that findings conclusions in isfied that the Id. liability.” Moreover, the Court also judge of the trial the written order show rejected any notion that “the mere exist- quid pro quo of the consideration grievance procedure ence of a policy and a sexual harassment claim and that the alter- against discrimination, coupled with [an hostile work environment sexual native employee’s] proce- failure to invoke that harassment claim was not considered. As dure must employer] insulate from lia- [an Vinson, in that claim must remanded be Instead, Id. bility.” suggested the Court judge, taking for consideration the trial that the issue of employer liability should types account into the evidence of the we be determined with agency reference to ger- have discussed above and held be However, principles. the Court struck a mane. caution, recognizing note of agency that principles “may not in be transferrable all V to Title VII.” Id. particulars the Notice guidance find in We the Restatement (Second) Relying Agency on the trial court’s inabili of 219 Under 219(1), ty to determine employer any whether “Gleason’s acts is for tort liable by an plaintiff brought employee committed toward were to the atten acting “while Id. Ely, supervisor scope employment.” tion of Mr. of the of How- ... Division,” ever, noted, argues Guard I R. Gates as one commentator “[s]exual (D.C. proof lenged required Taylor, In some instances has been in Vinson v. 753 F.2d 141 employer 1985), knew or should have known part part, Cir. and rev’d in aff’d prompt of the harassment and failed to take adequate (1986), 106 S.Ct. 91 L.Ed.2d 49 See, e.g., remedial action. Henson v. (11th rejected any requirement. Relying which notice Dundee, City F.2d Cir. heavily on the EEOC’sGuideline on Discrimina- ("Where 1982) plaintiff ... seeks to hold stan- tion Because of Sex—which endorsed a employee responsible for the hostile environ- liability dard of strict Title VII decisions —and ..., plaintiffs supervisor created ment discrimination, arising religious or racial employer she must show that knew or Appeals District of Columbia Court of conclud- ques- have should known of the harassment requirement ed that a notice "would be retreat action."); prompt tion and failed to take remedial protection from the level of Title VII has con- Dole, v. tz Ka afforded, sistently designedly and take a Cir.1983) (‘We believe that in a ‘condition of Jepps step_” See also backward Id. at 152. case work’ must demonstrate that Wunnicke, (D.C.Alaska F.Supp. en v. employer the edge had actual or constructive knowl- 1985) (‘‘[E]mployer knowledge is not an eleriient sexually of a existence hostile work- discrimf- prompt hostile Title [a environment] environment and took no and ade- sex action.”). case.’’). quate remedial That view was chal- nation simply job is not within the Accordingly reject we Gates’ assertion of description any supervisor other lack notice as an absolute defense. On remand company’s any reputable liability worker business.” Holtz its su- pervisors’ acts should be Trelz, determined in man & Development Recent in the light agency principles we have dis- Law Sexual Harassment: Abusive En cussed. vironment Claims Savings Meritor after Vinson, Bank 31 St. Louis U.L.J. VI (1987). Thus, “[cjonfining liability ... to situations in which a acted Evidentiary Rulings *12 scope within the authority of his conceiva- We turn now to the claims of error bly could lead to the ludicrous result that evidentiary in rulings which should be con employers would become accountable sidered before the remand is made. if they explicitly require or consciously al- The main evidentiary controversy con- supervisors low their to molest women em- cerns admissibility the of clock charts and ployees.” 141, Taylor, Vinson v. 753 F.2d daily reports. The clock charts are a me- (D.C.Cir.1985), 151 part rev’d and aff'd chanical record which key records the num- part, 57, 2399, 477 U.S. 106 S.Ct. 91 punched ber at the exact time and location. L.Ed.2d 49 A can then review the charts to 219(1) Although of the Restatement of § determine keys the number of punched in a Agency provides scant assistance in assess- given period of time. IV R. 272. daily The ing employer liability VII, under Title reports contain by notations made the se- 219(2) helpful. is more particular, § curity guards duty. while on Id. 219(2) employer creates liability § when (1) reckless, negligent or the master was Prior to during trial, and vigorous- (Second) Restatement Agency ly objected to the introduction of the clock 219(2)(b)(1958), where the § serv- daily charts and reports noting job purported ant speak act or to on behalf performance performancé and the of those of the principal and there was reliance on security guards similarly situated. Hicks' apparent authority, or he was aided ac- basis for the objection was that the doc- complishing by the tort the existence of the uments were selectively maintained in vio- agency relation.” (Second) Restatement lation of 29 (1983).4 C.F.R. 1602.14 § Agency 219(2)(d)(1958). In view of § 219§ regulation requires that an employer noti- (2), allegations, and Hicks’ might Gates be charge fied of a preserve discrimination held for liable acts of sexual harassment personnel relevant records until the committed Gleason. charges’ disposition. final See EEOC v. provides: personnel 4. Section 1602.14 charge records relevant to the or disposition charge action until final of the or (a) Any personnel employment or record "personnel the action. The term records rele- kept by employer (including made or an but charge," example, vant to the for would in- necessarily application not limited to forms personnel clude or records relat- by applicants submitted and other records aggrieved person to the and to all other having tion, transfer, hiring, promotion, to do with demo- employees holding positions similar to that termination, lay-off or rates of sought by aggrieved person held or the pay compensation, or other terms of and se- application papers completed by forms or test training apprenticeship) lection for or shall be applicant an unsuccessful all other preserved by employer period the for a of 6 position candidates for the same as that making months from the date of the aggrieved involved, person applied which the and was personnel record or the action rejected. disposition The date of “final whichever occurs later. In the case of invol- charge expi- untary employee, or the action” means the date of per- termination of an the statutory period ration of the sonnel within which records of the individual terminated aggrieved kept person may bring period an action in a shall be for a of 6 months or, charge the date of U.S. District Court action is termination. Where a where an filed, brought against employer discrimination has been or an action an either Commission, brought by Attorney aggrieved person, the Commission or the or General, VII, General, against employer Attorney under title the date on which such respondent employer preserve litigation shall all is terminated. 54, 35, 104 Co., personnel n. not records 78 and as defined 466 U.S. Oil Shell 1602.14(a) 80 L.Ed.2d kept 1636 and n. but records for insurance S.Ct. § & (1984); The Great Atlantic purposes light EEOC v. is untenable of the testi- (3d Co., Tea mony Therefore, of its own witness. we Pacific dismissed, Cir.), 469 U.S. cert. conclude that Gates violated the EEOC ad- 83 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. requirement ministrative preserva- tion of all records relevant to the claim. many of acknowledges that generated by daily reports charts and clock We believe that because Gates violated guards security plaintiff and other by destroying personnel 1602.14 to its routine destroyed pursuant were records,5 Hicks is entitled to the benefit of Gates, however, ar- practices. business presumption destroyed doc- “person- not gues the documents were uments would have bolstered her case. employment” records under nel Capaci Inc., Besthoff, See v. Katz & 1602.14, “performance” rather (5th Cir.1983), F.2d 661 n. 7 cert. de purposes. audit kept for insurance records nied, 80 L.Ed. agreed, court R. 275-76. The district IV (1984); 2d 182 see also Anderson v. Mt. daily clock charts and re- that the Co., 680, 687-88, Pottery Clemens 328 U.S. sought introduced as evidence ports to be *13 66 S.Ct. 90 L.Ed. 1515 personnel not records as set com- were Wigmore, generally See Evidence § in pany policy, that the documents were (Chadbourn rev.1979). argues vigor- personnel not records as defined fact ously any presumption such was con- 1602.14, and that the documents were § vincingly by the rebutted record evidence. gauging kept purpose per- for the the Capaci, See 711 F.2d at 661 n. 7. This guards respect security with formance should be determined the district court requirements to the of the insurance carri- on remand when the evidence is reconsid- Thus the court concluded 1602.14did er. rulings in ered accord with the made on preservation apply not to the of the clock appeal. this reports. at daily charts and Id. 304-05. remaining We have considered the evi- disagree. We dentiary errors asserted Hicks but find finding that The district court’s the clock them to be without merit. reports solely daily charts and were used security guards gauge performance respect requirements with to the clearly insurance carrier was erroneous. Accordingly, judgment is reversed manager security for Ely,

Jack Lee pro- and the case is remanded for further opera- Company’s Gates Rubber Denver ceedings opinion. in this The accord with tions, testified that the clock charts and present reconsider the district court should routinely daily reports were used for deter- hearings further record conduct disciplinary mining whether action should making of re- necessary deemed for the against guard, IV R. be taken disposition findings, conclusions and vised 278, 280, and that the clock charts and on reconsideration of all of the of the cause daily reports in fact relied on in disci- were claims. plining ultimately firing Hicks. R. IV IT IS SO ORDERED. 299-300, 306, 307, 328, 329, 333. The doc- having uments “records to do with were SETH, Judge, dissenting: Circuit demotion, termination,” or 29 C.F. ... ... from the ma- respectfully I must dissent 1602.14(a), personnel R. and are thus or accept the jority opinion I cannot because employment records which should have (slip opin- majority opinion quotation in the argument been retained Gates. Gates’ Dole, ion, 1415) reports page McKinney v. daily that the clock charts and were employer selectively cer- support retained the record does not where an has 5. We observe that self-serving and discarded in documents the assertion that Gates acted in bad faith tain period. particular destroying in a time the documents. This is not the case remainder (D.C.Cir.), McKinney 765 F.2d 1129 as a definition or statement in v. Dole which the majority adopt rule that should in this would we follow circuit. instead. point On another majority agrees Dole, view, McKinney my goes in far Vinson, trial court’s that the work Bank, beyond Saving Meritor FSB v. environment was openly not hostile to 57, 106 77 U.S. 91 L.Ed.2d 4 employees. black However it directs the VII, as to the breadth of Title and in trial court on aggregate remand to “racial pervasive “unequal defining how treat- hostility” hostility” and “sexual in deter- appeals ment” must be. The court of in mining pervasiveness of “the harass- referring McKinney “unequal v. Dole opinion ment.” The Griggs cites v. Duke treatment” stated that it must be “suffi- Co., Power 401 U.S. 91 S.Ct. ciently patterned pervasive.” “Suffi- majority L.Ed.2d 158. The also refers to ciently” referring generalized to some Cty. v. Harris Community Ac- pro- undefined condition does not seem to Jefferies Ass’n, (5th Cir.). tion 615 F.2d 1025 There vide a useful standard and would seem to are, course, many cases wherein discrim- disparate do violence to treatment doc- alleged ination is based on both sex and trines. many race and where both have been found We are not here gen- concerned with the However, to exist. it is difficult to see how marketplace eral conditions in- we could on aggregate remand “racial hos- stead with whether sexual harassment tility” where none was found to exist with change caused a in the anything again else. majority Here plaintiffs conditions of would have the trial court evaluate the whether sexual harassment created an abu- impact of the working overall conditions sive environment. arising from whatever cause rather than Supreme Court Meritor states try the case as a sexual harassment case *14 (quoting Dundee, Henson v. under Meritor. (11th Cir.)), by referring directly to The case as it now stands is not a combi- plaintiff: harassment of the nation of statutorily protected characteris- actionable, “For sexual harassment to be tics advanced as a subclass as in Jefferies it sufficiently perva- must be severe or “plus” nor as a case. sive ‘to alter the conditions of vic- [the I would affirm the trial court in all re- employment and create an abusive tim’s] spects. working Respondent’s environment.’ al- legations in this case—which include not

only pervasive harassment but also crimi-

nal conduct of the most serious nature— plainly

are sufficient to state claima

‘hostile environment’ sexual harass- ment.” SHELEY, Robert P. Supreme Court does not center on “un- Petitioner-Appellant, equal treatment” but on sexual harass- ment conse- DUGGER, Richard L. quences on Robert A. Butter employment. conditions of worth, Respondents-Appellees. It very specific. is all the case before us the trial court No. 85-3636. found that there had been two incidents Appeals, United States Court involving the same employee male Eleventh Circuit. plaintiff which implications. had sexual Nov. This was a of fact as to the work- ing environment and approach does not Meritor,

statement of the doctrine in perhaps

would generalized conform to the

Case Details

Case Name: Marguerite Hicks v. The Gates Rubber Company
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date Published: Nov 25, 1987
Citation: 833 F.2d 1406
Docket Number: 84-1232
Court Abbreviation: 10th Cir.
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