Plaintiffs appeal from decree.dismissing their bill of complaint which prayed that defendants be enjoined from erecting a gasoline station on 3 adjoining lots in violation of building restrictions of record covеring the lots and subdivision in question.
i Defendant Wilson Oil Corporation, hereinafter called defendant, owns the 3 lоts; they front' pn James Couzens Highway. Intersecting that highway and running along one side of defendant’s lots is Robson avеnue. On it are a number of other lots, referred to in the'restrictions by lot number and so restricted t.o residential use. The restrictions permitted the erection of stores on all lots fronting on Couzens highway, but required that they should be not less than 2-story brick buildings with basements. Defendant’s projected building would not meet these requirements. Thе trial court found as a fact, however, and the proofs establish.that they never have been cоmplied with from the very beginning insofar as building along Couzens highway in said subdivision is concerned. Testimony indicates that this wаs due in part to. the fact that shortly after platting the Couzens highway, was widened, leaving lots fronting thereon оnly 51 feet deep, materially changing the practical uses to which they could be put. The court found that'plaintiffs never had objected to the construction on Couzens highway of buildings in violation of restrictions, and that they are estopped to do so now, citing
Cherry
v.
Board of Home Missions of Reformed Church in United States,
Plaintiffs say that defendant’s plans provide for a side-street entrance into the gasoline station from Robson avenue, as well as a Couzens highway exit. They contend that this violates the restrictions which make Robson avenue residential in character. Cited is
Tear
v.
Mosconi,
Plaintiffs point to the fact that, in addition tо the restrictions applicable to other lots fronting on Couzens highway, further provisions are made concerning 3 corner lots, including the lot of defendant at the corner of Couzens and Robson. These provisions are as follows:
“When any buildings are placed upon lots 1028, 1074, 1107 the rear of said lots abutting on Mortоn Court (now Robson avenue) or Avon or Beverly Crescent shall be built up with the same material and in such a manner as to make аs presentable and pleasing an appearance as the front of said buildings on Northwestern highway (now James Couzens highway). If no buildings are erected on the rear of said lots, then a continuous wall, with gate or door if desired, shall be placed thereon, and shall be constructed of the same material as the front of said buildings or of such other material as shall first have been approved by said sellers.”
The back of defendant’s proposed building will extend to the rear of its lots but will not run all the way to Robson avenue. Plaintiffs construe the language of the restriction to mean that under such circumstances the wall mentioned therein must be constructed along Robson avenue for the entire length of defendant’s corner lot. The lot fronts on Couzens. Robson is the intersecting street which runs alongside that lot. Opposite the lot’s front line on Couzens is a linе at the back dividing the lot from a rear alley. Webster defines “rear” to be the opposite of “frоnt”. The rear line of the lot is the one opposite the front line on Couzens and not the line interseсting the front line of the lot and running as its side line along Robson. Webster also defines the word “abut” as meaning, amоng other things, to touch with a projecting point or to terminate at a *605 point of contact. In that sеnse the line which is clearly the lot’s rear line, running along the alley, abuts Robson avenue which it intersects. To give the word “abutting” the meaning that it refers to the lot’s side line dividing it from Robson avenue, as plaintiffs urge, would rendеr the word “rear” utterly meaningless and require reading into the language of the restrictions something which is not there.
Affirmed, with costs to defendants.