Mаrgaret Kalush, an Illinois resident, appeals from summary judgment in favor of Deluxe Corporation (“Deluxe”), a Minnesota corporation, on her diversity suit for breach of employment contract and promissory estoppel. We now affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Margaret Kalush began working for Deluxe Corporation in its Bensenville, Illinois plant on January 22, 1973 as an order entry clerk. After numerous promotions, Kalush became a manager in 1980. In June 1994, Deluxe began a plant consolidation at the Bensenville facility. As a result of this consolidation, Deluxe notified certain “affected” employees that they might lose their jobs and explained severanсe packages that might be available to them. In January 1995, Deluxe began a company-wide restructuring and notified employees of their potential displacement and their severance options. Deluxe only planned to offer these severance benefits to employees who were not terminated for poor performance.
In June 1995, Bernard Sponsel, Kalush’s supervisor, met with Kalush to discuss the сompany’s restructuring and its effect on her. Kalush was informed that, as an “affected” employee, she had two options: she could quit and take what was called the “Business System’s” severance packagе worth one year’s salary (approximately $50,000) or she could remain employed at the company in the Customer Interface Project (“CIP”) in a position that would eventually be phased out as well at which time she would be eligible for a severance package worth approximately $25,000. Sponsel encouraged Kalush to take the $50,000 Business System’s package. Ka-lush, however, chose to remain with the сompany in the CIP. Kalush was given a copy of the company’s Employee Handbook which explained that employment at Deluxe was on an at-will basis, and she later admitted that Deluxe never promised nоt to terminate her prior to completion of the CIP.
In August 1995, Deluxe’s human resource managers audited the Bensenville plant and concluded, among other things, that Kalush’s performance as a manager was dеficient because of her weak counseling and coaching skills. 1 As a result of the audit, Deluxe put Kalush on probation. At that time, Sponsel began a review of Ka-lush’s performance and, after five months, found other deficiencies — none of which are disputed by Kalush — and fired her effective January 31, 1996. Kalush was not offered a severance package because she was terminated for poor performance.
Kalush filed a complaint against Deluxe for breach of an oral employment contract and promissory estoppel. 2 Deluxe removed the suit to federal court and moved for summary judgmеnt. The district court granted Deluxe’s motion and Kalush now appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review.
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
See Bragg v. Navistar Internat’l Transp. Corp.,
B. Existence of an Employment Contract.
The district court granted summary judgment for Deluxe on Kalush’s breach of contract claim because it found thаt no employment contract existed. Kalush argues that this was error and that she should be able to proceed to trial on her breach of contract theory. In Illinois, employment contracts are рresumed to be at-will and terminable by either the employee or the employer.
McInerney v. Charter Golf, Inc.,
The district court also correctly determined that Kalush failed to establish adequate consideration to support the existence of an oral contract. Under Illinois law, an oral emplоyment contract must be supported by consideration adequate to suggest that the alleged agreement involved a bargained-for exchange of mutual obligations. Id. at 1350. We agree with the district court’s finding that thеre was no consideration to support this alleged contract.
First, there was no bargained-for exchange between the parties. Kalush claims that she gave up the first severance packagе worth $50,000 in consideration for employment until the CIP position was phased out. However, the record shows that Deluxe, through Sponsel, encouraged Kalush to take the first severance package rather than remain employed with the CIP. Thus, Ka-lush has not shown that she gave up anything of value in consideration of Deluxe’s offer of continued employment. Second, as Kalush testified that she was free to quit her employmеnt at any time, there was no mutuality of obligation. Finally, the evidence shows that Kalush received a copy of Deluxe’s Employee Handbook which expressly provides that employment at Deluxe is at will. Thus, the distriсt court was correct in concluding that there was no oral employment contract between the parties.
C. Collateral Estoppel.
Next, Kalush challenges the district court’s conclusion that even if a contract existed, thеre were adequate grounds to terminate her for poor performance. Deluxe responds that Kalush is estopped from arguing that she was not terminated for poor performance based on the findings made in an age discrimination proceeding filed by Kalush in the Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”). Deluxe defended Kalush’s age discrimination claim by arguing that Kalush was terminated for poor performance. The IDHR found in fаvor of Deluxe and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court denied Kalush’s petition for review. Deluxe relies on
DiAngelo v. Illinois Department of Public Aid,
Under Illinois law, collateral estop-pel requires that: (1) the issues decided in the priоr adjudication are identical to issues presented for adjudication in the current proceeding; (2) there be a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party оr in privity with a party in the prior action. Herzog v. Lexington Township,
D. Termination for Poor Performance.
On the merits, however, thе district court's decision is amply supported by the record. The evidence shows that Kalush received sub-par evaluations by the human resource department auditors and that Sponsel's five-month long review оf her work uncovered numerous problems in her performance as a manager. Although she admits that her performance was poor in 1995, Kalush argues that the allegations of poor performance are highly suspect because (1) top management clearly wanted to end her employment with Deluxe and (2) it is unlikely that a twenty-two year veteran employee who had been receiving favorable reviews would suddenly receive poor evaluations. However, Kalush has not presented any evidence supporting these charges. Moreover, Kalush admits that she failed to perform some of her requirеd duties in 1995. Additionally, Deluxe presented evidence that as part of the consolidation process it began to seek a higher standard of performance, a standard that Kalush could not reach. Even if we assume that an oral contract existed, Kalush has not persuaded us that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Deluxe did not terminate her for poor performance.
E. Promissory Estoppel.
Kalush alsо argues that even if the court finds that she did not have an employment contract, she is entitled to relief under a theory of promissory estoppel. In an employment situation, promissory es-toppel requires proof of the following: (1) an unambiguous promise of employment communicated from the employer to the employee; (2) reasonable reliance on the promise of employment by the employee; (3) the reliance was expected and foreseeable by the employer; and (4) the reliance was to the employee's detriment. Quake Construction, Inc. v. American Airlines,
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, thе district court correctly disposed of Kalush's claims on summary judgment. Therefore, that judgment is AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Kalush’s 1993 and 1994 performance evaluations were favorable.
. Kalush also filed an action at the Illinois Department оf Huinan Rights, alleging that Deluxe terminated her because of her age. The IDHR dismissed her complaint and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that Kalush failed to present sufficient evidence of age discrimination.