Mаrgaret White appeals the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims that affirmed the 1998 decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) that denied her claim for dependency and indemnity compensation
*1379
(“DIC”).
White v. West,
No. 98-1870,
BACKGROUND
Mr. White served on active duty in the United States Army from May 12, 1942, to August 4, 1944, and again from July 7, 1952, to July 6, 1954. Mr. White died on January 3, 1990. At the time of his death, he had a service-connected disability diagnosed as degenerative arthritis of multiple joints, with a 40% disability rating. Mr. White’s death certificate lists bacterial pneumonia as the immediatе cause of death and arthritis, tendonitis, coronary artery disease, and congestive heart failure as underlying causes of death.
The surviving spouse of a veteran who died from a service-connected disability may obtain DIC benefits. 38 U.S.C. § 1310 (1994). A veteran’s death will be considered service-connected if the service-connected disability was “either the principal or a contributory cause of death.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.312 (2000). Ms. White applied for DIC benefits in February of 1990, asserting that her husband’s service-connected arthritis was a contributing cause of his death. The regional office of the Department of Veterans Affairs (“RO”) denied the claim, determining that there was no evidence substantiating that Mr. White’s arthritis contributed to his death. Ms. White appealed the denial to the Board.
The evidence before the Board included letters from four physicians: (1) Dr. Alston, an internist and Mr. White’s personal treating physician; (2) Dr. Oppenheim, M.D., J.D., L.L.M. (medical specialty unknown), who issued his opinion at Ms. White’s request after reviewing Mr. White’s medical records and the transcripts of hearings that had been held before the RO; (3) Dr. Miller, a Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) physician and specialist in pulmonary disease, who issued his opinion at the request of the VA after reviewing Mr. White’s VA records; and (4) Dr. Schnader, a VA physician and specialist in pulmonary disease and critical care medicine, who issued his opinion at the VA’s request after reviewing Mr. White’s VA records. The letters from Dr. Alston and Dr. Oppenheim supported Ms. White’s DIC claim. The letters from the VA doctors indicated that it was unlikely that Mr. White’s arthritis contributed to his death.
The Board acknowledged that the evidence as to whether Mr. White’s arthritis contributed to his death was conflicting. It is not clear that Ms. White asked the Board to apply the “treating physician” rule to resolve the conflict. The rule would have required the Board to give more evidentiary weight tо the opinion of the physician who actually had examined Mr. White, Dr. Alston, and would have required the Board to accept his opinion unless it was contradicted by substantial evidence. The Board did not apply such a rule. Insteаd, the Board determined that, because Mr. White died of pneumonia, the physicians who specialized in pulmonary medicine were better qualified to give opinions as to whether Mr. White’s arthritis contributed to his death. The Board found that the conclusions of these physicians, that Mr. White’s death was not related to his service-connected arthritis, constituted persuasive evidence against Ms. White’s DIC claim. The Board also determined that there was no contеmporaneous clinical support for Dr. Alston’s and Dr. Oppenheim’s opinions that Mr. White’s service-connected arthritis led to diminished pulmonary or cardiovascular’ function and thereby contributed to his death. The Board therefore denied Ms. White’s claim for DIC benefits.
Ms. White appealed the Board decision to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board.
White,
slip op. at 8,
DISCUSSION
I.
Our jurisdiction with respect to a decision of the Court оf Appeals for Veterans Claims is limited by statute. We can review the validity of any statute or regulation, or any interpretation thereof, upon which the court relied in making its decision. 38 U.S .C. § 7292(a) (Supp. IV 1998). However, we do not have jurisdictiоn to review a factual determination or an application of a law or regulation to the facts of a case unless a constitutional issue is presented. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2) (1994). The standard of review that we apply to the court’s decisions also is defined by statute. We must set aside any interpretation of a law or regulation that we find to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1) (Supp. IV1998).
Ms. White raises оnly one issue on appeal: whether the “treating physician” rule should apply to claims for veterans’ benefits. As a preliminary matter, the government argues that we lack jurisdiction over Ms. White’s appeal. It contends that the appeal relates solely to factual issues or to the application of law to the facts of the case, and does not challenge the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation or raisе any constitutional issues. The government also cites
Belcher v. West,
It is evident from the decision on appeal that Ms. White asked the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims to adopt the “treating physician” rule and that the court addressed this request when reaching its decision.
White,
slip op. at 8,
II.
The “treating physician” rule is applied in Social Security cases. As explained by the United Statеs Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the rule holds that
[The] treating source’s opinion on the subject of medical disability, i.e., diagnosis and nature and degree of impairment, is (i) binding on the factfinder unless contradicted by substantial еvidence; and (ii) entitled to some extra weight, although resolution of genuine conflicts between the opinion of the physician, with its extra weight, and any substantial evidence to the contrary remains the responsibility of the fact-findеr.
Schisler v. Heckler,
Ms. White argues that the court’s refusal to apply the “treating physician” rule in veterans’ benefits cases violates the benefit of the doubt requirement set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). That statutе provides that, “[w]hen there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.” Veterans Claims Assistance Act, Pub.L. No. 106-475, § 4, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000) (revising the language of 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b)). We must reject Ms. White’s argument.
In the first place, the approach Ms. White urges might well conflict with the statutory benefit of the doubt requirement. Her аrgument assumes that the treating physician’s opinion will favor the veteran. However, that may not be the case. As explained in
Guerrie'ii,
the VA, unlike the Social Security Administration, operates its own system of medical facilities for the cаre and treatment of veterans.
Guerrieri,
In addition, we agree with the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims that adopting the “treating physician” rule would conflict with 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). That regulation рrovides that “determinations as to service connection will be based on review of the entire evidence of record, with due consideration to the policy of [the VA] to administer the law under a broad and liberal interpretation consistent with the facts in each individual case.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2000). The regulation is based on 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a), which requires that “[decisions of the Board shall be based on the entire record in the proceeding and upon consideration оf all evidence and material of record and applicable provisions of law and regulation.” 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(a) (West Supp.2000). This statute does not suggest that the VA should give more weight to a piece of evidence based solely on its source.
Thus, unlike the Social Security benefits statutes, the VA benefits statutes and regulations do not provide any basis for the “treating physician” rule and, in fact, appear to conflict with such a rule. Moreover, given the comрrehensive statutory and regulatory scheme for the award of veterans’ benefits, it would not be appropriate for this court to impose the “treating physician” rule on the VA. Congress delegated to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs the authority to proscribe “regulations with respect to the nature and extent of proof and evidence ... in order to establish the right to benefits....” 38 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994). Thus, Congress left it to the VA, and not this court, to determine how best to weigh evidence in veterans’ benefits cases. Our limited role in this area is further reinforced by our general inability to review Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims’ decisions on factual issues. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).
*1382 CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is
AFFIRMED.
COSTS
Each party shall bear its own costs.