We affirm the judgment of the district court on the basis of that court’s reasoning on the issue of proximate cause. See
Jacob v. Curt,
*839
1. We reject appellant s contention that the district court improperly treated defendant’s motion for dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) as -a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. We read the court’s opinion to hold that, based on the allegations in the complaint, appellant failed as a matter of law to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. A plaintiff is not entitled to present affidavits and reach the summary judgment stage if her complaint, on its face, reveals an inadequate basis for her claim. Although the district court did refer to the “undisputed facts in the case,”
see
2. Although appellant struggles mightily to persuade us there is a triable issue concerning defendant Curt’s “control” over the Bahamian government, the complaint is devoid of allegations that Curt was connected in any way with the officials who decided the IAT clinic should be closed. Contrary to counsel’s suggestion at oral argument, there is no allegation that Curt ever directly communicated with the Bahamian government. Allegations that he wished the clinic closed or criticized the clinic are simply insufficient to satisfy the causation requirements of appellant’s
Bivens
claim.
See Arnold v. IBM,
In
Springer v. Seaman,
3. In light of our disposition, we need not and do not reach issues concerning the asserted constitutional right to medical treatment.
Affirmed.
