277 F. 727 | 2d Cir. | 1921
Lead Opinion
(after staling the facts as above).
We are presented with a document marked “Bill of Exceptions.” It appears to have been signed and filed on December 20, 1920. As the judgments of the court were entered on July 2, 1920, the term of the District Court expired with September 30, 1920, under rule 5, automatically extending the term 90 days after the entry of final judgment. Defendants rely on an oral statement, which is before us only because incorporated in the so-called bill of exceptions, which was made by the District Judge from the bench on July 2, 1920, and which was as follows:
“I will extend it [the term] until November 1st; and I am quite sure ii it becomes necessary, I will have the power to grant an additional extension.”
“In the absence of a positive written law excluding Sundays from a period of days prescribed for any purpose, they are counted, even though the period ends on Sundays. Where a period less than a week is prescribed by statute, it has sometimes been held that an intervening Sunday should not be counted, nor if it be the last day of the period.” “This,” the writer says, “appears to be the settled rule in Massachusetts. It is not universally adhered to as to periods of more than one or two days, subject to this qualification: Where the last day is Sunday, any act required by statute to be done within the period must be done before that day. Por such acts the period practically ends on the preceding day.”
The subject in connection with a bill of exceptions was carefully considered in American Tobacco Co. v. Strickling, 88 Md. 500, 41 Atl. 1083, 69 L. R. A. 909, it being held that, if the last day for signing a bill of exceptions falls on Sunday, it cannot be signed on Monday, the period for settling the bill in that state being in excess of seven days. The court declared:
“We can see no valid reason for excluding the last Sunday and including the others. The general rule, subject to but few exceptions, is that statutory time of over seven days cannot be extended because the last day falls on Sunday.”
After stating the general rule to which attention has been already called the court added:
“There are but few exceptions to the general rule laid down above. There are cases which may seem to be [the contrary], but a careful examination of the most of them will show that,'when Sundays are excluded from the computation of time of more than a week, it is because of the language of the statute, or because the days referred to are such as the courts find exclude Sundays.”
See, also, Cartwright v. Liberty Telephone Co., 205 Mo. 126, 103 S. W. 982, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1125, 12 Ann. Cas. 249; Geneva Cooperage Co. v. Brown, 124 Ky. 16, 98 S. W. 279, 124 Am. St. Rep. 388; Kelly v. Independent Pub. Co., 45 Mont. 127, 122 Pac. 735, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1160, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1063; Hanover Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 89 Tex. 35, 32 S. W. 872, 33 S. W. 112, 30 L. R. A. 498, 59 Am. St. Rep. 25; Cunningham v. Mahan, 112 Mass. 58; State v. Harris, 121 Mo. 445, 26 S. W. 558; State v. Seaton, 106 Mo. 198, 17 S. W. 169.
We are not at liberty, therefore, there being no bill of exceptions here, to consider the various assignments of error relating to the admission and rejection of evidence, and to comments which are alleged to have been improperly made by the District Judge during the trial, as well as those relating to alleged erroneous instructions given to the jury in the charge and the refusal to give instructions requested. Neither are we at liberty to inquire concerning an alleged unlawful search and seizure of certain books and papers or the character of the distilled spirits involved about which we can know absolutely nothing.
The Lever Act of August 10, 1917 (40 U. S. St. at L. c. 53, p. 276), otherwise knowñ as the National Defense Act, became effective after September 8, 1917. Tt did not in express terms prohibit the sale of distilled spirits or the use of such spirits for beverage purposes. It was concerned with the production of such liquors from certain food materials. Section 15 of the act (section 3115%/) provided that after 30 days from the date of the approval of the act no foods, fruits, food materials, or feeds shall be used in the production of distilled spirits for beverage purposes. But it also provided that under such rules, regulations, and bonds as the President might prescribe such materials might be used in the production of distilled spirits exclusively for other than beverage purposes. And any person who willfully violated the provisions of the section or any rule or regulation made under it was subject to a fine not exceeding S5,000, or to imprisonment for not more than two years, or both. Thereafter, acting under section 15 of the act, the following regulations were promulgated:
“(B) The manufacture of distilled spirits from foods, fruits, food materials, or feeds for beverage purposes is prohibited ai'tpr September 8, 1917.
“All persons are forbidden to use any distilled spirits manufactured after September 8, 1917, from foods, fruits, food materials, or feeds in manufacturing or preparing beverages or to sell any such spirits for beverage purposes. * * *"
The War Prohibition Act of November 21, 1918 (40 St. at L. c. 212, p. 1046), provided that after June 30, 1919, until the conclusion of the war and thereafter until the termination of demobilization, the date of which was to be determined and proclaimed by the President, it should be unlawful to sell for beverage purposes any distilled spirits, and that during said time no distilled spirits held in bond should be removed therefrom for beverage purposes except for export. And it provided that after May 1, 1919, no specified food products should be used in the manufacture or production of beer, wine, or other intoxicating malt or vinous liquor for beverage purposes. It also prohibited .the importation into the United States of distilled, malt, vinous, or other intoxicating liquors during the continuance of the war and period of demobilization.
Laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation,- and it is a reasonable presumption that the lawmaking body does not intend to effect so important a measure as the repeal of a law without expressing an intention to do so. It is said in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (6th Ed. London) 296, that—
“Such an interpretation [repeal by implication] is not to be adopted unless It lie inevitable. Any reasonable construction which offers an escape from it is more likely to be in consonance with the real intention.”
The two acts must stand in so far as they involve no inconsistency. And repeals by implication are not favored either in England (West Ham v. Fourth City Building Society, [1892] 1 Q. B. 654) or in the United States (United States v. Greathouse, 166 U. S. 601, 17 Sup. Ct. 701, 44 L. Ed. 1130). But in both countries alike it is well-established law that one statute may repeal or suspend another statute on the same subject, although it contains no words of express repeal. A later statute repeals by implication an earlier enactment when the two are clearly inconsistent with each other. United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, 20 L. Ed. 153. And in Bishop on Statutory Crimes, § 160, it is correctly laid down that; where a newly enacted statute covers the whole ground occupied by a prior one. or by the common law, it repeals such law by implication, if the two are irreconcilably in conflict.
It appears that the elements of the offense punishable under section 15 of the Lever Act and regulation 3 (assuming for the purposes of the argument that regulation 3 was promulgated in accordance with law)’ are (1) A sale of distilled spirits (2) for beverage purposes, (3) the distilled spirits having been manufactured from food materials subsequent to September 9, 1917. On the other hand, the elements of the offense punishable under the War Prohibition Act are (1) a sale of distilled spirits (2) for beverage purposes, and (3) not for export. Both
The punishment for a violation of the Eever Act was a possible -£5,000 fine and imprisonment for two years; while under the War Prohibition Act it was a possible $1,000 fine and imprisonment for one year.
That the War Prohibition Act was constitutional when enacted was decided in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 40 Sup. Ct. 106, 64 L. Ed. 194. That it was not repealed by the National Prohibition Act we have already pointed out! And that it was not repealed by the Eighteenth Amendment was decided likewise in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., supra. By that amendment it was expressly provided that the prohibition thereby imposed.was to become effective after one year from its ratification, and ratification was proclaimed on January 29, 1919. 40 Stat. 1941. The contention was that in postponing the effective date of prohibition the amendment impliedly guaranteed to manufacturers and dealérs in intoxicating liquors a year of grace and impliedly removed the existing restriction imposed by the War-Time Prohibition Act. The Supreme Court, however, held the claim untenable.
The effect of these various acts in working an implied repeal of certain revenue legislation of the government will be considered in a subsequent portion of the opinion.
• We come now to a consideration of the indictment and to the action of the court in imposing sentence thereunder.
The sentences imposed under this count were imposed under the provisions of section 37 of the Criminal Code (Comp. St. § 10201), which authorizes each of the parties found guilty of conspiracy to be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. In this case the sentences must be held good, not being in excess of the statutory limit.
The second count was dismissed by the court before the case was submitted to the jury, and therefore is not now before us.
In Williams v. United States, 168 U. S. 382, 389, 18 Sup. Ct. 92, 94 (42 L. Ed. 509), the court declared that it was wholly immaterial what statute was in the mind of the district attorney when he drew the indictment, if the charges made were embraced by some statute in force; that the indorsement on the margin of the indictment constituted no part of the indictment and did not add to or weaken the legal force of its averments.
“We must.,” said the court, “look to the indictment itself, and, if it prop- . orlj charges an offense tinder the lairs of the United States, that is sufficient to sustain it, although the representative of the United States may have supposed that the offense charged was covered by a different statute.”
As was said in United States v. Nixon, 235 U. S. 231, 235, 35 Sup. Ct. 49, 50 (59 L. Ed. 207), the important, fact is that the indictment alleges that an act was done contrary to the form of the statute in sucii case made and provided, and “what was that statute and on what statute the indictment was founded was to be determined as a matter of law from the facts therein charged.” In the Nixon Case, as in the Williams Case, the court held the reference to the statute was no part of 1he indictment. See, to the same effect, Wechsler v. United States, 158 Fed. 579, 86 C. C. A. 37, decided by this court; United States v. Wood (D. C.) 168 Fed. 438; United States v. Freidericks (D. C.) 273 Fed. 188. In the Nixon Case the entries on the back and in the caption of the indictment described it as being for violation of a certain statute, which was inapplicable, and the court declared that this did not invalidate the indictment, but that it was for the court to say whether there was any statute in existence which made the facts charged a crime; “an indictment must set out facts and not the law,” and the indorsements constituted no part of the indictment. In the absence of an allegation in the count that the unlawful act charged constituted a violation of a specific statute, the mere indorsement in parentheses at the end of the count is in the opinion of the majority of the court of no greater significance than the same words would have if they had been indorsed on the margin of the indictment or on the back of the indictment or in the caption of the indictment. In all these cases the indorsement indicates the intention of the pleader to rest the indictment upon the statute named, but that intention cannot nullify the indictment or in any wise conclude the government if there is some other statute which can sustain it. For many years it has been the practice in the Southern district in drawing indictments to do what was done in drawing this count, but the practice is an unfortunate one, as it is quite unnecessary to allege the particular statute which has been violated.
“That after June 30, 1919, until the conclusion of the present war and thereafter until the termination of demobilization * * * it shall be unlawful to sell for beverage purposes any distilled spirits; * * * ”
One of the members of the court, however, holds that the third count is expressly under the Lever Act, so that thfe allegation that the distilled spirits were made from food products after September 9, 1917, is material and necessary, and that it was to this charge that the defendants pleaded nqt guilty, and he thinks the finding that the Lever Act is impliedly repealed by the War Prohibition Act is no ground for treating the count as filed under the latter act. Pie thinks that there was no mistake or misunderstanding upon the part of any one, and the defendants have prevailed upon the precise issue proposed by the government. Another member of the court, while thinking the count good, thinks the conviction under it bad. The writer, however, thinks both the count and the sentence under it good, but the majority think the sentence under the count bad.
Count 10 charges a similar unlawful sale, alleging, however, that it occurred on November 15, 1919, and that it was not for export, and that the quantity sold was 24,106.96 proof gallons. At the end of the count occur the words “(Act of November 21, 1918).” There can be no doubt as to the validity of count 10, and, as it charged an unlawful sale, and as the sentences imposed under both counts were single and did not exceed the punishment authorized under the War Prohibition Act, the sentence imposed under count 10 is affirmed, while that imposed under count 3 is reversed.
Counts 4 and 5 having been dismissed by the District Judge, are not before us.
“Whenever any person removes, or aids or abets in the removal of any distilled spirits on which the tax has not been paid, to a place other than the distillery warehouse provided hy law, or conceals or aids In the concealment of any spirits so removed, or removes, or aids or abets in the removal of any distilled spirits from any distillery warehouse or other warehouse for distilled spirits authorized by law, in any manner other than is provided by law, or conceals or aids in the concealment of any spirits so removed he shall be liable to a penalty of double the tax imposed on such distilled spirits so removed or concealed, and shall be fined not less than two hundred dollars nor more than five thousand dollars, and imprisoned not less than three months nor more than three years.”
That section, if in force on the dates specified in the counts, made it a criminal offense for any one to remove distilled spirits on which the tax had not been paid. Act Feb. 24, 1919, § 600 (40. St. at U c. 10, p. 1105 [Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 5986e|), imposed a tax of $2.20 on each proof gallon withdrawn unless withdrawn for beverage purposes, iu which case it wras liable to pay a tax o f $6.40 on each gallon. The only difference in counts 6 and 9 is that the former count charges the removal on November 15, 1919, of 960.47 proof gallons, while the latter charges the removal on November 12, 1919, of 971.08 proof gallons. To constitute the crime charged and to sustain the conviction under these counts it must appea r that on the dates named the law imposed a tax on the liquors withdrawn which had not been paid. On the dates named in the counts the act of February 24, 1919, was in force. Subdivision (a) of section 600 imposed a tax of $6.40 on each proof gallon of distilled spirits “if withdrawn for beverage purposes,” but subdivision (b) of the same section (section 5986Í) provided that the tax imposed by subdivision (a) on distilled spirits intended for beverage purposes should not be due or payable on such spirits while stored in any distillery, bonded warehouse, or special or general bonded warehouse, and which, pursuant to any act of Congress or proclamation of the President of the United States, “cannot be lawfully sold or removed from any such warehouse during the period of prohibition fixed by such act or proclamation.” As on November 12 and November 15, 1919, it was not lawful to sell for beverage purposes, such sales being absolutely prohibited by the War Prohibition Act, which also declared that no distilled spirits held in bond should be removed therefrom for beverage purposes, there was no tax then to he paid on liquors withdrawn “for beverage purposes” without payment of the tax. It does not therefore conclusively establish the invalidity of the counts if it should be conceded, and we do concede it, that no tax was at that time payable on liquors withdrawn “for beverage purposes.” And, as said, that was not the charge contained in the counts. The charge was that liquor had been withdrawn without payment of the tax, without specifying the purpose for which «the withdrawal was made. And, as the liquor was subject to a tax of $2.20 on each proof gallon withdrawn during the period specified (when not withdrawn for beverage purposes), the counts
“To our minds,” said the court, “the Volstead Act, in its entire scope and purpose, is plainly inconsistent with the scheme of revenue protection embodied in the Revised-Statutes and in the section under review.”
The court declared that offenses committed under the Volstead Act and since it went into effect are punishable only under that act. Volstead Act, tit. 2,.§ 3, declared that no person on or after the date when the Eighteenth Amendment goes into effect should manufacture, sell, etc., except as authorized by the act. And as the amendment referred to did not go into effect until January 29, 1920, one year after ratification was announced, the Volstead Act had not repealed section
“That Congress may under the broad authority of the taxing power tax intoxicating liquors notwithstanding their production is prohibited and punished we have no question.”
Then it said:
“We agree with the court below that, while Congress manifested an intention to tax liquors illegally as well as those legally produced, which was within its constitutional power, it did not intend to preserve the old penalties prescribed in section 3257 in addition to the specific provision * * * made in the Volstead Act.”
What the defendants in that case were charged with was that they unlawfully engaged in the business of distillers without paying the tax imposed for engaging in that business. And the Supreme Court said it did not think Congress intended to preserve the penalties provided in section 3257 in addition to those provided in the Volstead Act.
The question presented in the case now before us is a different one. The Volstead Act is not before us so far as counts 6 and 9 are concerned for the reason that the act complained of in those counts was committed in November, 1919. and prohibition under Volstead Act, tit. 2, § 3, did not become effective, as declared expressly therein, until one year after the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, or on January 29, 1920. Moreover, section 35 of title 2 of the Volstead Act declared:
“Nor shall this act relieve any person from any liability, civil or criminal, heretofore or hereafter incurred under existing law.”
And this section also did not become effective until January 29, 1920. As the Volstead Act was not in effect on the dates charged in the counts, it is not important as respects these counts that it was in effect and even had repealed section 3296 prior to the trial and sentences of the defendants; the right to impose sentence for offenses previously committed having been saved by the provision in section 35 of title 2 of the act above quoted.
Our attention has been called to a number of cases in which it has been decided that the Volstead Act has worked an implied repeal of certain revenue legislation. But the court is not aware of a single decision which has gone as far as we are asked to go in this case and hold that the War Prohibition Act repealed' section 3296.
This court holds that section 3296 was not repealed by the.War Prohibition Act, and that counts 6 and 9 are good and the sentences imposed thereunder are valid.
The eleventh count, like the sixth and ninth counts, previously considered, related to a violation of the Revenue Raws, but to a different section of those laws. It charged that on November 15, 1919, the defendants carried on the business of a wholesale liquor dealer without having paid the special tax as required by law. At the end of this count was indorsed “(section 3281, U. S. R. S.).” Section 3281 (Comp. St. § 6021) prohibited the carrying on of the business of a distiller without payment of the special tax required by law. The applicable statute would have been more correctly cited as section 16 of the act of February 8, 1875 (Comp. St. § 5966) which was supplementary to R. S. 3281. So long as the law was in force one could not engage in the business of a wholesale liquor dealer without taking out a license and paying a special tax of $100, and, if he engaged in the business without doing so, he committed an offense for which he could be fined not less than $100 nor more than $5,000, and be imprisoned not less than 30 days nor more than 2 years. .The mistaken reference to the section of the Revised Statutes indorsed at the end of the count cannot affect its validity for reasons heretofore stated in connection
“To absolutely prohibit the manufacture and sale of spirituous liquors, and then to send persons engaged in such business to the penitentiary because they had not paid a tax on the spirits distilled, involves such a contradiction of purpose that there would seem to be no escape from the conclusion that the law requiring the payment of a tax is inconsistent beyond all reasonable doubt with the -act.”
In the Ketchum Case the court was referring to the National Prohibition Act. And in United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U. S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 551, 65 L. Ed. -—, decided on June 1, 1921, the defendants were charged, among other things, with an attempt to defraud the United States of the tax on distilled spirits under section 3257, and with a violation of section 3281 of the Revised Statutes in carrying on the business of a distiller without giving the required bond. The Supreme Court held the provisions cited had been repealed by implication. But, granting that the National Prohibition Act worked a repeal of the provision in section 3281 which made it an offense to carry on the business of distilling without giving a bond, it does not follow that the War Prohibition Act repealed section 16 of the act of February 8, 1875, which required the payment of a tax for carrying on the business of a wholesale liquor dealer, upon which count 11 of the indictment is based.
The National Prohibition Act is entitled:
“An act to prohibit intoxicating beverages, and to regulate the manufacture, production, use, and sale of high-proof spirits for other than beverage*748 purposes, 'and to Insure an ample supply of alcohol and promote its use in scientific research and in the derelpment of fuel, dye, and other lawful industries.”
As its title indicates, it is a comprehensive statute relating to the entire subject of distilled spirits. It embraces three titles and as printed covers some 18 pages of the United States Statutes at Large. The War Prohibition Act, on the other’hand, is entitled:
“An act to enable the Secretary of Agriculture to carry out, during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1919, the purposes of the act entitled ‘An act to provide further for the national security and defense by stimulating agriculture and facilitating the distribution of agricultural products’ and for other purposes.”
The-.part relating to prohibition of the liquor traffic is merely a part of the first section of that act, and covers a single page of the Statutes at Large. As the title of the act indicates, and a comparison with the National Prohibition Act makes clear, it is not a comprehensive statute dealing with the entire subject of distilled spirits. The War Prohibition Act in itself simply prohibited the manufacture and sale of distilled spirits for beverage purposes. It provided, however, that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue might prescribe rules and regulations subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury in regard to the manufacture and sale of distilled spirits and their removal when held in bond after June 3, 1919, for other than beverage purposes ; also in regard to the manufacture, sale, and distribution of wine for sacramental, medicinal, or other than beverage uses. It seems to us that the act itself, prohibiting merely the sale for beverage purposes, cannot be regarded as working an implied repeal of prior legislation requiring a tax to be paid by the wholesalers; it still being lawful to sell for all purposes except for beverage purposes. If the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, prescribed under the act any valid rules and regulations which deprived the manufacturers or wholesalers of the'right to sell for other than beverage purposes, our attention has not been called to the fact.
Whether the National Prohibition Act is to be construed as an implied repeal of the revenue provision involved is not before us in this case. If that act works an-implied repeal, about which we express no opinion, it is because of certain sections of the act in title 2, which provisions did not become operative until after the date when the Eighteenth Amendment went into effect. But the act complained of in count'll, which is alleged to have been committed on November 15, 1919, which was prior to the date when that amendment took effect, is not affected by the National Prohibition Act; it being expressly provided therein, as before stated, that it should not “relieve any one from any liability, civil or- criminal, heretofore or hereafter incurred under existing law.”
Judgments of conviction and sentences under the first, sixth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh counts are affirmed.
Judgments and sentences under the third count are reversed.
“(1) And to effect the objects of the said conspiracy, Giovanni Rubino, between the date of July 1, 1919. and- November 15, 1919, at the Southern disti’ict of Now York and within the jurisdiction of this court, did sign applications for permission to withdraw 254 barrels containing 24,-10(5.96 proof gallons of distilled spirits, for sale and use for other than beverage purposes.
“(2) And further to effect the objects of the said conspiracy, the Gramatan Company, Inc., between the date of July 1, 1919, and November 15, 1919, at the Southern district of New York and within the jurisdiction of this court, did receive 254 barrels containing 24,106.96 proof gallons of distilled spirits.
“(3) And further to effect the objects of the said conspiracy, Giovanni Rubino, on November 14, 1919, at the Southern district of New York and within the jurisdiction of this court, did. sign an application for permission to withdraw from the American Distributing Company, Inc., wholesale dealers in nonbeverage alcohol, 10 barrels of distilled spirits.
“(4) And further to effect the objects of the said conspiracy, the Gramatan Company, Inc., and Louis Lipari, on November 14, 1919, at the Southern district of Now York and within the jurisdiction of this court, received 10 barrels of distilled spirits.
“(5) And further to effect the objects of the said conspiracy, Louis Lipari, on November 14, 1919, at the Southern district of New York, and within the jurisdiction of this court, did deliver 5 barrels of distilled spirits, to a person whose name is to the grand jurors unknown.
“(0) And further to effect the objects of the said conspiracy, Giovanni Rubino, on November 15, 1919, at the Southern district of New York and within the jurisdiction of this court, did sell for cash to a person whose name is to the grand jurors unknown 1,000 gallons of distilled spirits designated as Quo Vadis, .1,000 gallons of distilled spirits designated as essence of peppermint, 500 gallons of distilled spirits designated as essence of wintergreen, and 500 gallons of distilled spirits designated as essence of clove, and did then and there cause an entry to be made In the books of the Promotion Sales Company, Inc., indicating sales for cash of 1,000 gallons of Quo Vadis at $4,000. 1,000 gallons of essence of peppermint at $16,000, 500 gallons of essence of wintergreen at $8,000, and 500 gallons of essence of clove at $8,000-—
“Against tile i>oaee of the United. States and their dignity and contrary to the form of the statute of the United States in such case made and provided (section 37, U. S. O. O.) ”
The following are cases in which the Volstead Act has been held to repeal certain revenue legislation: United States v. Windham (D. C.) 264 Fed. 376; United States v. Puhac (D. C.) 268 Fed. 392; United States v. Stafoff (D. C.) 268 Fed. 417; The Goodhope (D. C.) 268 Fed. 694; United States v. Fortman (D. C.) 268 Fed. 873. And in the following cases it was held not to repeal it: United States v. Sohm (D. C.) 265 Fed. 910; United States v. One Essex Touring Automobile (D. C.) 266 Fed. 138; United States v. Turner (D. C.) 266 Fed. 249; United States v. Farhart (D. C.) 269 Fed. 33; Violette v. Walsh (D. C.) 272 Fed. 1014.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). The indictment here has eleven counts. Counts 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8 were dismissed by the court, and the defendants were each convicted upon the remaining counts, Nos. 1, 3, 6, 9, 10, and 11. Count 1 charges a conspiracy to sell distilled spirits for beverage purposes in violation of the War Prohibition and the Eever Acts. Count 3 is for a violation of section 15 of the act of Congress of August 10, 1917 (Lever Act), for the selling, for beverage purposes, of distilled spirits made from food products. The sixth count is for violation of section 3296 of the Revised Statutes (title 37), removal of distilled spirits on which the tax had not been paid from a place other than a distillery warehouse. The ninth count is for a similar offense, except as to another quantity of distilled spirits. The tenth count is a violation of the act of Congress of November 21, 1918 (War Prohibition Act, 40 Stat. 1045), for selling distilled spirits for beverage purposes, and not for export. And the eleventh count is for violation of section 16 of the act of February 8, 1875 (18 Slat. 307), for carrying on the business of a wholesale liquor dealer without having paid the special tax. The evidence discloses that the distilled spirits was alcohol of 190 proof. The individual plaintiffs in error were each sentenced to various terms under these convictions, and it was ordered that the sentences run concurrently. The plaintiff in error Maresca was the president and sole owner of the Herba Products Company, Rubino was the president of the Gramatan Company, Inc., and De Angelis was a stockholder of the Gramatan Company, Inc., and its treasurer. The Herba Products Company was a domestic corporation, as was the Gramatan Company, Inc., and the Promotion Sales Company. It was through the medium, of these corporations that the individual plaintiffs in error conducted a business for the manufacture and sale of flavoring extracts, hair tonic, and candy. Their factory was located at No. 138 Prince street, in the city of New York. The office of the Promotion Sales Company was at No. 1482 Broadway. On the door of the office there were names of each'of the corporate plaintiffs in error. Concededly they carried on a legitimate business of manufacturing hair tonic. It appears that alcohol was used in the manufacture of the Gramatan hair tonic; the formula calling for 5 per cent, alcohol. This was their sole requirement for alcohol. A permit was granted to the Gramatan Company, Inc., for the withdrawal of alcohol, pursuant to the acts of Congress on September 2, 1919, for use only in malting hair tonic and flavoring extracts. A bond was given in a sum inadequate in amount for the withdrawals of the barrels of alcohol which the record shows the corporate companies used during the period. On November 14, 1919, the plaintiffs in error were detected delivering two barrels of 190 proof alcohol at a saloon at No. 424 Mulberry street, Newark, N. J., with
After the conviction the plaintiffs in error sued out this writ of error. This bill of exceptions, which was signed and filed on December 20, 1920, is attacked by the defendant in error for the reason that it was not prepared and filed within the term. The judgment of the court was entered on July 2, 1920. The term of the District Court expired September 30, 1920, 90 days after the entry of final judgment. On July 2, 1920, after sentence was imposed, the court said:
“I will extend it (tlie term) until November 1st; that is four months, and I am quite sure, if it becomes • necessary, I will have the power to grant an additional extension.”
No minute or docket entry was made of the judge’s remarks, and no order was ever signed until November 3, 1920, when, over the government’s objection, an order was signed extending the term until December 8th. This order was procured on an affidavit which was filed November 3d, in which affidavit it was stated that the term had been extended until November 3d. The order was filed. November 4th. On November 29, 1920, a further order extending the term was granted. The contention is that .the term expired September 30th pursuant to rule 5, and that all subsequent orders are void and of no effect. The claim is that the order granting time to file a bill after the term must be made during the term, and that there must be a record entry showing that fact at the time the leave is granted, and that the mere recital in the bill of exceptions of an extension granted is not sufficient. The contention is that November 2d was election day, and that, if a four months’ extension was granted, the period ended on and with November 2, 1920, and that the subsequent order extending the term, granted On November 3d,, is void.
The first count of the indictment alleges a conspiracy to violate both the Lever Act (40 Stat. 276) and the War Prohibition Act (40 Stat. 1045). It is alleged that this violation of law occurred between the 1st of July and the 15th of November, 1919. The Lever Act became effective August 10, 1917. Titles 1 and 3, and sections 1, 27, 37, 38 of title 2 oi the National Prohibition Law (Volstead Act) became effective on October 28, 1919. The other sections of title 2 took effect and were enforced when the Eighteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States became effective. The first count of the indictment charges that the plaintiffs in error, both corporate and individual—
“dkl conspire and agree together and with said divers other persons to violate section 15 of the act of Congress approved August 10, 1017, and the act of November 21, 1918, and the rules and regulations made thereunder, in that at the time and place aforesaid they did conspire and agree together to use and to sell for beverage purposes a large quantity of distilled spirits manufactured from foods, fruits, food materials, and feeds after September 9, 1917, and to sell for beverage purposes, and not for export, large quantities of distilled spirits; and it was a part of the conspiracy that the individual defendants and corporate defendants should purchase such distilled spirits for the ostensible purpose of using it as an ingredient in the manufacture of hair tonic and flavoring extracts, but with ¡lie true object and purpose of using and selling such distilled spirits for beverage purposes.”
As a charge in furtherance of this conspiracy six overt acts are set forth. In substance it is charged that on November 14 and 15, 1919, the plaintiffs in error, individual and corporate, did various acts such as obtaining a permit, physically obtaining certain barrels of distilled spirits, and. delivering five barrels to persons unknown to the grand jury for other than nonbeverage purposes.
The Lever Act was intended to conserve the food supply of the country, while the War Prohibition Act was intended to conserve, in addition, the man power of the country. Under the Lever Act, provision was made for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to inaugurate and enforce regulations. It was provided by regulation of February 6, 1919, that the manufacture of distilled spirits from foods, fruits, food materials, or feeds for beverage purposes is prohibited after September 8, 1917. The charges of the third count of the indictment are that the plaintiffs in error withdrew alcohol on permits duly issued for alcohol already manufactured ostensibly for nonbeverage purposes, and used and sold such alcohol for beverage purposes. And count 1 charges that the plaintiffs in error conspired to "use and to sell for beverage purposes a large quantity of di.stilled spirits,” claiming a violation of the Lever Act. This is not a charge that the plaintiffs
“All persons are forbidden to use any distilled spirits manufactured after September 8, 1917, from foods, fruits, food materials or feeds, in manufacturing or preparing beverages or feed, and provided they were made from such materials after September 8, 1917. All persons are forbidden, to use any distilled spirits manufactured after September 8, 1917, from foods, fruits, food materials or feeds, in manufacturing or preparing beverages, or to sell any such spirits for beverage purposes.”
While the President was authorized to make regulations to enforce by the Rever Act, it was not permissible for the 'Department of the .Treasury, acting for the President, to make or proclaim regulations which were beyond the powers delegated by the Congress to the President in the Lever Act. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U. S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 5 L. Ed. 37; U. S. v. Bathgate, 246 U. S. 220, 38 Sup. Ct. 269, 62 L. Ed. 676. Regulation must not transgress the statute. Waite v. Macy, 246 U. S. 606, 38 Sup. Ct. 395, 62 L. Ed. 892; U. S. v. Antikamnia Chemical Co., 231 U. S. 654, 34 Sup. Ct. 222, 58 L. Ed. 419, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 49.
By comparing section 1 of the War-Time Prohibition Act (effective November 21, 1918) with section 15 of the Rever Act, it will be observed that in the former act the use of food products for the manufacture of beverages was forbidden, and the act went further and prohibited altogether the sale of any and all intoxicating liquors for beverages purposes. It is clear that this impliedly repealed the Lever Act. U. S. v. Yuginovich, 256 U. S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 551, 65 L. Ed. -, decided June 1, 1921. Therefore count 3 does not charge a crime. Nor does count 1 state a criminal offense in charging a conspiracy to violate the Rever Act.
Title 1 of the National Prohibition Act of October 28, 1919, was effective during the period the conspiracy is charged to have existed and during which the overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were committed. It provides for the enforcement of the war prohibition, aná. it will be noted that the period when it is alleged in the indictment this conspiracy existed in part was after the effective date of the National Prohibition Act (Volstead Act), to wit, from October 28 to November 15, 1919. The acts which are charged to be the overt acts in the furtherance of this conspiracy are alleged to have occurred on the 14th and 15th of November. The National Prohibition Act repealed by implication all preceding revenue provisions because it prohibited the manufacture or sale or removal from warehouses, except for export, of distilled spirits so that laws' providing taxes in connec
In the Yuginovich Case the charge was a violation of section 3257 of the Revised Statutes, unlawfully engaging in the business of distillers within the intent and meaning of the internal revenue laws of the United States, and in defrauding and attempting to defraud the United States of the tax on spirits. It was charged that the plaintiffs in error failed to provide with the requirements of section 3279 of the United States Revised Statutes (Comp. St. § 6019) in exhibiting a sign, as the statute requires, and with section 3281 of the United States Revised Statutes, in carrying on the business of distilling within the intent and meaning of the Revised Statutes of the United States without-giving the bond required by law; further, a violation of section 3282 of the Revised Statutes (section 6022) in unlawfully making a mash fit for distillation in a building not a distillery duly authorized by law. The Supreme Court sustained the ruling of the lower court which held that the National Prohibition Act repealed by implication the provisions of the internal revenue laws relating to operation of dislilleries. The court said:
“The question remains concerning the applicability of section 3257, involving the right to punish for attempting to defraud the United States of a tax. I>id Congress intend to punish such violation of law by imposing the old penalty denounced in section 3257 or as provided in the new and special provision enacted in the Volstead Act?
“It is the contention of the government that section 35 saves the light to prosecute as to taxes, as well as the acts charged as violative of the other sections of the Revised Statutes, because of the phrase with which the section concludes: * * * ‘Nor shall this act relieve any person from any liability, civil or criminal, heretofore or hereafter incurred under existing laws.’
“It is, of course, settled that repeals by implication are not favored. It is equally well settled that a later statute repeals former ones when clearly inconsistent with the earlier enactments. United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, 20 L. Ed. 153. In construing penal statutes, it is the rule that later enactments repeal former ones practically covering the same acts, but fixing a lesser penalty. The concluding phrase of section 35 by itself considered is strongly indicative of an intention to retain the old laws. But this section must be interpreted in view of the constitutional provision contained in tho Eighteenth Amendment and in view of the provisions of the Volstead Act intended to make that amendment effective.
“Having in mind those principles and considering now the first count of the indictment charging an attempt to defraud and actually defrauding tho government of the revenue tax, we do not believe that the general language used at the close of section 35 evidences the intention of Congress to Iifflict for such an offense the punishment provided in section 3257 with the resulting forfeiture, fine, and imprisonment, and at the same timo to authorize prosecution and punishment under section 35, enacting lesser and special penalties for failing to pay such taxes by imposing a tax in double tho amount provided by law, with an additional penalty of $500 on retailers and $1,000 on manufacturers. Moreover, the concluding u ords of the first paragraph of section 35, as to all the offenses charged, must bo read in the light of established legal principles governing tho interpretation of statutes, and In view of the provisions of tho Volstead Act Itself making it unlawful to possess intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, or property designed for the manufacture of such liquor, and providing for its destruction. Wo agree with tho court below that, while Congress manifested an intention to tax liquors illegally as well as those legally produced, which was within its con*754 stitutional power, it did not intend to preserve the old penalties prescribed in section 3257 in addition to the specific provision for punishment made in the Volstead Act.”
Where the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier act and embraces new provisions and indicates an attempt to substitute for an earlier act the later—as well as a lesser term of punishment—it prescribes the only rule in respect thereto. It operates as a repeal of all former statutes relating to the subject-matter even if the former acts are not in all respects repugnant to the new statute. U. S. v. Yuginovich, 256 U. S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 551, 65 L. Ed.-, decided June 1, 1921; U. S. v. Tynen, 78 U. S. 88, 20 L. Ed. 153; Tracy v. Tuffly, 134 U. S. 206, 10 Sup. Ct. 527, 33 L. Ed. 879; Reed v. Thurmond (C. C. A.) 269 Fed. 252.
A single act of a conspiracy may charge a violation of two or more laws of the United States, and not be duplicitous. Dealy v. U. S., 152 U. S. 539, 14 Sup. Ct. 680, 38 L. Ed. 545; U. S. v. McKinley (C. C.) 127 Fed. 170; U. S. v. Howard (D. C.) 132 Fed. 325. Still, to constitute a good indictment under section 37, it must be charged that the conspiracy was to do some acts made a crime by the laws of the United States, and it must state with reasonable certainty the acts intended to be effected or carried out by the agreement of the parties, so that it can be seen the object of the conspiracy was a crime against the United States. The conspiracy or agreement and the doing of some act in furtherance of it make- up the offense. The indictment must state with reasonable certainty the acts intended to be effected and carried out by the agreement of the parties, so that it can be seen that the object of the conspiracy was a crime, well defined, against the United States.
It is apparent to me that the pleader on the first count had in mind principally the violation of the Lever Act (and the regulations made thereunder), and not the War Prohibition Act. The gravamen of the offense is that the plaintiffs in error used and sold the alcohol manufactured after September 9, 1917, the date fixed by the regulations referred to. Count 1 does not describe the kind of liquor the plaintiffs in error conspired to use and sell. It is referred to, however, as' distilled spirits. What is prohibited by the War Prohibition Act is defined. By it Congress intended to prohibit the manufacture, sale, and transportation for beverage purposes of *any and every kind of intoxicating liquor within the United States. The liquor must be fit for use for beverage purposes. It cannot be that alcohol which is not converted into beverage form and then offered for sale or sold is forbidden by the War Prohibition Act. There is no charge in the indictment, nor does the evidence show, that any or either of the plaintiffs in error had converted the alcohol into form or shape fit for beverage purposes, and that they intended to offer or did offer the same for sale for beverage purposes, and thus come within the prohibition of section 1 of the War Prohibition Act. As was said in Commonwealth v. Morgan, 149 Mass. 314, 21 N. E. 369:
“It is a matter of common knowledge that alcohol is the intoxicating element in intoxicating liquor, that pure alcohol is not used as a beverage, and*755 that all intoxicating liquors that are so used contain alcohol mingled with other things, particularly with water. Whisky is alcohol mixed with water and other elements, of which the alcohol alone is intoxicating.”
And by the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Eighth Circuit in Allen v. Liquid Carbonic Co., 170 Fed. 315, 95 C. C. A. 11:
“The court below found that the extracts were never manufactured, used, or sold by the company as a beverage, and that they could not be drunk as a beverage in their original and full strength becuse of the strength of the flavoring principle, but were susceptible of use only in imparting flavor to drink or food intended for human consumption. We think the testimony supports this finding of the court and that these extracts are not spurious imitations or compound liquor, within the meaning of section 3244 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2096). * * *
“As already indicated, we think this finding is supported by the testimony, and that these extracts are not beverages or liquor, within the meaning of the section of the statute above referred to.”
See Commonwealth v. Mandeville, 142 Mass. 469, 8 N. E. 327; Arkansas v. Witt, 39 Ark. 216.
In the court's charge the jury was advised that the offense of count 1 was a conspiracy to violate the Lever Act as well as the Prohibition Act-
Alcohol is a principle in fermenting and distilling liquors. The Century Dictionary defines it as “the chief constituent o f fusel oil, a product of fermentation in distilleries, which is contained in crude spirit”; and it is further defined as “a liquid, ethyl hydroxid, C* Hr. OH, formed by the fermentation of aqueous sugar solutions, usually prepared from starch by the action of malt.” Webster defines it as “in the class of analogous hydroxides of organic radicals, including common or ethyl alcohol, methyl or wood alcohol.”
Congress in the National Prohibition Act (title 3), which was effective on October 28, 1919, specifically legislated as to the manufacture, warehousing, sale and use of alcohol. Therefore the sale of alcohol as charged in count 10, and in so far as it may be charged in count 1, did not violate the War Prohibition Act. It was not a beverage. Title 3, § 1, provides:
“When used in this title—the term ‘alcohol’ means that substance known as ethyl alcohol, hydrated oxido or ethyl, or spirit of wine, from whatever source or whatever processes produced.”
Section 19 provides that all prior statutes relating to alcohol as defined in this title, are hereby repealed in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this title.
Its use and sale is regulated by title 3. The conditions and scheme of its use and sale are comprehensive. I think this repealed the War Prohibition Act in so far as it affected the use and sale of alcohol, whether considered in the popular sense of distilled spirits or in the more accurate terms of the various known kinds of alcohol. U. S. v. Yuginovich, supra.
Counts 6, 9 and 11 are charges of violation of the revenue statutes. These alleged offenses were committed on November 14 and 15, 1919. They are bad because of the implied repeal of the revenue statutes by the National Prohibition Law.