This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing a claim seeking to recover damages against the school district for injuries inflict *742 ed upon a student by another student. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district because there was insufficient evidence to establish liability under Idaho Code § 6-904C(2). We affirm.
I.FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At about 12:30 p.m. on September 15, 2006, sixth-grader Tristen Mareei walked into the office of the Canfield Middle School where he contacted Janice McIntosh, the secretary. Tristen was accompanied by Quinton Kamara, a classmate. Tristen told Ms. McIntosh that he had bumped his head, and she sent Quinton for a bag of ice. She noticed that Tristen was neither bleeding nor vomiting. When Quinton returned with the ice, she gave it to Tristen to put on his head, and Quinton left for class. Once Quinton was gone, Tristen told Ms. McIntosh that when he and Quinton were outside on a grassy field, Quinton “ran and he came up at full speed and he pushed me backwards, and I hit the ground and hit my head on the — hit my head on the ground.” Ms. McIntosh left Tristen in the sick room with the ice on his head.
About twenty minutes later, Sarah McLain, a school counselor, walked into the sick room with another student in order to resolve some issue involving that student and Tristen. After she had talked with him a while about the issue involving the other student, Tristen told her that right now was not the best time to discuss it. He then told her that “Quinton had pushed me — had ran around, came up and pushed me backwards, I cracked my head on the ground, and that I was seeing blurry and everything was doubled and I felt sick to my stomach.” 1 Ms. McLain left with the other student, leaving Tristen in the sick room. Ms. McIntosh then sent Tristen back to class.
When school was out, Tristen and Quinton boarded the same bus to ride home. Quinton was sitting in front of Tristen. Before the bus began to move, Quinton knelt on his seat and turned rearward facing Tristen. Fearing that Quinton may try to hit him, Tristen took his keys and hit Quinton on the head. Quinton responded by swinging his backpack of books, hitting Tristen in the head. At that point, Tristen’s symptoms worsened and he began crying. Nothing further happened between the two boys. Since then, Tristen has suffered from daily headaches.
Canfield Middle School is one of the schools in Coeur d’Alene School District No. 271 (School District), and both Janice McIntosh and Sarah McLain were employees of the School District. On July 28, 2008, James and Lorie Mapeci, Tristen’s parents, filed this action to recover damages for both themselves and Tristen from the School District, from Quinton, and from his parents Scott and Stevie Kamara. The personal claims that James and Lorie Mareei may have had against the School District were dismissed because they had not given timely notice of their tort claim. On the School District’s motion for summary judgment, Tristen’s claims against it were also dismissed. The district court entered a final partial judgment in favor of the School District, and Plaintiffs appealed.
II.ISSUES
A. Did the district court err in holding that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by Idaho Code § 6-904A(2)?
B. Is the School District entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117(1)?
III.ANALYSIS
A. Did the District Court Err in Holding that Plaintiffs’ Claims Were Barred by Idaho Code § 6-904A(2)?
When reviewing on appeal the granting of a motion for summary judgment, we apply the same standard used by the trial court in ruling on the motion.
Infanger v. City of Salmon,
The School District is a governmental entity under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. I.C. § 6-902(2). As a general rule, a governmental entity is liable for the wrongful actions of its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment if a private person or entity would be liable under Idaho law. I.C. § 6-903(a). Both Janice McIntosh and Sarah McLain were employees of the School District and were acting within the course and scope of their employment. Because a private entity would be liable under Idaho law for the conduct of its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment,
Finholt v. Cresto,
A School District has a duty to act affirmatively to prevent foreseeable ham to its students while they are in the district’s custody.
Summers v. Cambridge Joint School Dist. No. 432,
The liability of a School District and its employees is limited when a claim arises out of an injury caused by a person under its supervision, custody, or care. I.C. § 6-904A(2);
Mickelsen v. School Dist. No. 25,
For the purposes of the Tort Claims Act, “ ‘[R]eekless, willful and wanton conduct’ is present only when a person intentionally and knowingly does or fails to do an act creating unreasonable risk of harm to another, and which involves a high degree of probability that such harm will result.” I.C. § 6-904C(2). Quinton accompanied Tristen to the school office. There is no evidence of any prior conflict between the two of them, nor is there any evidence that Quinton had previously bullied or intentionally harmed any other student. Tristen’s account of how *744 he was injured did not indicate that he and Quinton were fighting or even quarreling, nor did it indicate that Quinton intended to injure him. In fact, in his deposition Tristen testified that he did not think Quinton intended to injure him. Nothing Tristen said indicated any animosity between the boys, nor did he express any fear of Quinton or any desire to get even with him. In this case, the evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the conduct of either Ms. McIntosh or Ms. McLain was reckless, willful, and wanton.
Plaintiffs’ argument that the conduct of Mses. McIntosh and McLain was reckless, willful, and wanton is summed up by Plaintiffs’ assertion: “Certainly reasonable minds could find it highly probable that two eleven-year-old boys would fight following an injury-causing physical altercation between them earlier in the day. That’s what eleven-year-old boys do.” “[C]onelusory assertions unsupported by specific facts are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.”
Goodman v. Lothrop,
Plaintiffs contend that even if they cannot establish liability under Idaho Code § 6-904A(2), the School District could still be liable under Plaintiffs’ claims of ordinary negligence. They assert that the district negligently supervised Mses. McIntosh and McLain “based on a lack of appropriate policies, procedures and training” and that it is liable for their negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Relying upon
Hei v. Holzer,
In
Hei v. Holzer,
we held that a school district was not entitled to immunity under section 6-904A(2) on a claim that it negligently failed to supervise a teacher who had sexual intercourse with a student because “[t]he fact that the teacher worked for the School District did not place him under the District’s ‘supervision, custody or care’ within the meaning of the immunity provisions.”
The statute limits the liability of a governmental entity and its employees “for
any claim
which ... [a]rises out of injury to a person or property by a person under supervision, custody or care of a governmental entity.” I.C. § 6-904A(2) (emphasis added). It applies to
any claim
based upon the status of the
person who caused the injury
as being someone under the supervision, custody, or care of a governmental entity. In
Coonse ex rel. Coonse v. Boise School District,
Not only is the Plaintiffs’ argument contrary to the clear and unambiguous wording of the statute, but we have specifically held that it applies to claims based upon negligence. In
Coonse,
the parents of a child assaulted by other students at school argued that Idaho Code § 33-512(4) created an independent duty of care that was not affected by Idaho Code § 6-904A(2). We rejected that argument, holding that section 33-512(4) “merely supports the existence of a common law cause of action against a school district which might otherwise be limited by the application of statutes establishing exceptions to liability.”
B. Is the School District Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees Under Idaho Code § 12-117(1)?
The School District seeks an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117(1), which provides that “in any ... civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or political subdivision and a person, ... the court ... shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees ... if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.” This appeal was brought without a reasonable basis in fact or law. The School District is entitled to an award of attorney fees as a matter of right.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the district court. We award costs and attorney fees on appeal to respondents.
Notes
. In her affidavit, Ms. McLain stated that she did not recall Tristen mentioning Quinton during the conversation.