602 N.E.2d 419 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1991
Patricia K. Barry, the Administrator of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas remanding an action initiated as an appeal from the Industrial Commission to the Industrial Commission for readjudication of the factual issues utilizing the legal standard as determined by the trial court. Appellant raises a single assignment of error, as follows:
"The trial court erred in remanding the issue of the merits of this workers' compensation claim back to the Industrial Commission for an administrative readjudication under the standard of law established in Schell v. Globe Trucking [,Inc.] (1990),
The basic issue before us is application of R.C.
Neither the trial court nor appellee makes any analysis of a basis for remand other than to cite the case of Borbely v.Prestole Everlock, Inc. (1991),
"The syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion states the controlling point or points of law decided in and necessarily arising from the facts of the specific case before the Court for adjudication."
Under the circumstances, the reference to the remand being to the Industrial Commission, without further elucidation, should be considered dicta rather than the promulgation of a rule of law with respect to the application of R.C.
The jurisdiction of, and procedure to be followed, by the court of common pleas in an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission or a staff hearing officer is set forth in R.C.
"(A) The claimant or the employer may appeal a decision of the industrial commission or its staff hearing officer * * * other than a decision as to the extent of disability, to the court of common pleas * * *. Notice of the appeal shall be filed by the appellant with a court of common pleas within sixty days after the date of the receipt of the decision appealed from * * *. The filings shall be the only act required to perfect the appeal. * * *
"* * *
"(C) Upon receipt of notice of appeal the clerk of courts shall cause notice to be given to all parties who are appellees and to the commission.
"The claimant shall, within thirty days after the filing of the notice of appeal, file a petition containing a statement of facts in ordinary and concise language showing a cause of action to participate or to continue to participate in the fund and setting forth the basis for the jurisdiction of the court over the action. Further pleadings shall be had in accordance with the Rules of Civil *539 Procedure * * *. The court, or the jury under the instructions of the court, if a jury is demanded, shall determine the right of the claimant to participate or to continue to participate in the fund upon the evidence adduced at the hearing of the action.
"(D) The court shall certify its decision to the commission and the certificate shall be entered in the records of the court and appeal from the judgment shall be governed by the law applicable to the appeal of civil actions.
"* * *
"(F) If the finding of the court or the verdict of the jury is in favor of the claimant's right to participate in the fund, the commission and the administrator shall thereafter proceed in the matter of the claim as if the judgment were the decision of the commission, subject to the power of modification provided by section
Although labeled an appeal and commenced initially by the filing of a notice of appeal, the action in the common pleas court under R.C.
As indicated above, R.C.
Having analogized the R.C.
"1. A trial de novo is an independent judicial examination and determination of conflicting issues of fact and law, notwithstanding the evidence before the appellate court consists of the record of the proceedings in the lower tribunal.
"2. Parties to an appeal on questions of law and fact are entitled to a trial de novo, and the appellate court must determine the facts and give judgment disposing of the issues of law and fact as if no trial had been had in the lower tribunal.
"3. In an appeal on questions of law and fact, a Court of Appeals is without power to remand the cause to the inferior court for further proceedings tantamount to a new trial, but is required to substitute its independent judgment for that of the inferior court and to grant final judgment in accordance with its findings on the evidence before it."
See, also, Beeler v. R.C.A. Rubber Co. (1989),
We see no reason to apply a different principle with respect to an R.C.
Under these circumstances, and applying the third paragraph of the syllabus of Lincoln Properties, and following Beeler, we find that a court of common pleas in an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission has no power to remand the cause to the Industrial Commission for further proceedings — the equivalent of a new trial before the Industrial Commission. Nor is such power somehow conferred because the Industrial Commission applied the wrong rule of law in determining the matter upon its facts. There *541 is a mandatory duty upon a court of common pleas to proceed to a final determination of the appealed issues, especially the right to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund upon the law and the evidence adduced before that court. Such duty cannot be avoided by remand to the Industrial Commission. Accordingly, the assignment of error is well taken.
For the foregoing reasons, the assignment of error is sustained, the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings in accordance with law consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversedand cause remanded.
BOWMAN, P.J., and McCORMAC, J., concur.