63 Ind. App. 101 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1916
The facts disclosed by the record herein, necessary to an understanding of the questions presented by this appeal are, in substance, as follows: Prior to and on October 29,1913, the “Indiana Trust and Savings Bank,” hereinafter referred to as the “insolvent.bank,” was a corporation engaged in the business of a loan and trust company in the city of Indiana Harbor. On said day the auditor of state caused an examination of said bank and found it to be in an insolvent and failing condition. Thereupon an agreement was made between such auditor, the ‘ ‘ Citizens Trust and Savings Bank,” the “Indiana Harbor National Bank,” the “First National Bank of East Chicago;” and the “First Calumet Trust and Savings-Bank,” whereby said banks were to advance money as needed to pay the debts and depositors of the insolvent bank, and to that end the Citizens Trust and Savings Bank was to .be appointed liquidating agent and by said agreement was authorized, as such agent, to borrow from either or any of the banks that entered into said agreement the money necessary for the payment of the creditors and depositors of such insolvent bank and to give to the bank so loaning money for such purposes a note or notes therefor, which notes were to be the obligation of the insolvent bank, and were to bear seven per cent, interest payable semi-annually, the assets of the insolvent bank to be held in trust by such liquidating agent for the payment of the notes. It seems that this arrangement had the sanction of a petition of the stockholders purporting to be signed by, persons representing more than eighty per cent, of the stock of such insblvent corporation. Said agent undertook and proceeded for a time with the discharge of its duties as liquidating agent, when the legality of many of its acts was questioned by some of the stockholders and creditors and such liquidating bank and the other banks above named petitioned for the appointment
After the filing of these claims, to wit, on July 2, 1914, the record shows the filing of other claims and proceeds as follows: “Comes also” (naming the various claimants, the banks above named, the former receiver and the present receiver), “and comes also Wolf Marcovich, another of said stockholders and comes also the Indiana Securities Company. ’ ’
“The receiver herein now files his verified petition for leave to compromise and adjust certain claims and for the disposition of other matters shown in said petition, which
Over the separate and several objections of the receiver and each of the said claimant banks, appellant, Marcovieli, was permitted by the court to file objections to the allowance and compromise of the claims of such banks. The record shows that such objections were overruled by the court, and exceptions saved by Mareovich, and an appeal from such ruling prayed and granted, bond fixed- and secur
A demurrer to this petition was filed and withdrawn, and a motion to strike out the petition was then filed by the receiver, which motion was sustained. To this ruling appellant excepted and prayed an appeal. This ruling is assigned as error in this court and relied on for reversal.
The ground upon which appellant predicates his right to be made a party to this suit is the showing made in his petition that he is a stockholder of the insolvent corporation, the property and business of which is being managed, directed and disposed of by said receiver under the orders of the court; that, as such stockholder,' he, in common with other stockholders, is directly affected by each and all the proceedings had or taken in said receivership proceedings, and hence entitled to be made a party thereto under §273 Burns 1914, §272 R. S. 1881. This statute provides as follows: “The court may determine any controversy between the parties before it, when it can be done without prejudice to the rights of others or by saving their rights; but when, a complete determination of the controversy can not be had, without the presence of other parties, the court nlust cause them to be joined as proper parties.- And when, in an action for the recovery of real or personal property, a person not a party to the action, but having an interest in the subject thereof, makes application to the court to be made a party, it may order him to be made a party by the proper amendment.”
While our Supreme Court recognizes that a general creditor, by reason of his lien upon the property so held in trust by such receiver, “has the right to intervene and contest the validity as well as the priority of other claims or asserted liens,” (Franklin, etc., Bank v. Whitehead,
In the case of Voorhees v. Indianapolis, etc., Co., supra, .where a creditor of the insolvent corporation attempted to intervene, the court used the following language, which we think is pertinent and applicable to the petition under consideration: “The petition and proposed complaint, * * * were nothing more nor less than a proposal on the part of the rolling mill (petitioner) to usurp the functions of the received, or practically to appoint another receiver. The petitioner had no right to do this. Beach Rec., section 167. If one creditor could do so, each one could, and the purposes and objects of a receivership would be broken down and destroyed. All that is said in said petition against the receiver’s conduct might be material to petition to remove him and appoint a successor, but those facts do not justify supplanting him by a person not a receiver. 20 Am. and Eng. Encyc. Law, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 3-4-5, and authorities there cited.”
We find no error in the record, and the judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.
Note.—Reported in 114 N. E. 100. See under (1) 10 Cyc 963; (2, 3) 10 Cyc 907; (4) 10 Cyc 970; (6) 34 Cyc 236. Corporations, appointment of receiver, when proper, 72 Am. St. 48.