ORDER
THIS MATTER came before this Court for trial on March 23, 2011. In this adversary proceeding, David Robert Marcotte (“Marcotte”) is seeking discharge of a student loan pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 1 Texas Guaranteed Student Loan Corporation (“TGSLC”) contests the dischargeability of this debt.
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. This matter is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I). Venue of this proceeding is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409. Upon consideration of the pleadings and record, the evidence presented, and the arguments made by counsel at trial, and pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52, made applicable to this proceeding by Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7052, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 2
FINDINGS OF FACT
Marcotte was in an automobile accident in 1996. He broke several teeth and suffered severe and permanent injuries to his spinal cord. Despite his injuries, Marcotte was able to attend and graduate from college in 2002 with a bachelor’s degree in accounting. Marcotte obtained student loans from Brazos Higher Education Service Corporation to assist with his college tuition and expenses. 3 Marcotte consolidated his student loans 4 (“Loan”) to a single monthly payment under the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program on July 15, 2004. See Def.’s Ex. A, at 3. TGSLC did not assert that Marcotte has failed to take advantage of any other opportunities to consolidate his student loans or repay them on more manageable terms.
After graduating from college, Marcotte worked for six (6) years, earning an annual salary of approximately $48,000.00. Mar-cotte testified that during this time, the pain from injuries he sustained in the accident gradually worsened. He currently
Marcotte made payments on the Loan the entire six years he was employed, and continued to make Loan payments after he stopped working. The monthly Loan payments were approximately $100.00 and the parties stipulate that the remaining balance on the Loan is $8,755.58. 5 The 2004 Note attached to Defendant’s Answer indicates that the original interest rate on the Loan was 3.37%. (Def.’s Answer, Doc. No. 16 at 5). 6
Marcotte filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on February 4, 2010 (“Bankruptcy Case”). The Bankruptcy Case was assigned case number 10-00759-hb. Mar-cotte scheduled outstanding unsecured debts of $42,762. (Schedules, Doc. No. 1 at 1-18). Included in that amount is a debt to Brazos Higher Education Service Corporation for educational loans. The parties stipulate that TGSLC is the current owner and holder of the Loan.
Marcotte is single, has no dependents and there was no evidence presented regarding his age. Marcotte disclosed income for 2008 and 2009 at approximately $10,000.00 per year with the source listed as “Disability State of Michigan Civil Service commission.” (Statement of Financial Affairs, Doc. No. 1 at 24). Marcotte’s Amended Schedule I indicates he was receiving temporary Social Security benefits of $1,142.00 per month at the time the case was filed in February 2010. 7 (Amended Schedules, Doc. No. 10 at 1-2). After the period of temporary benefits but prior to trial of this matter, Marcotte qualified for Social Security Disability Income (“SSDI”). Marcotte’s counsel argued at trial that, since January 2011, Marcotte has received an increased amount of $1,049.00 SSDI per month. However, after a review of the transcript the Court believes that this statement was in error because this amount is less than Mar-cotte’s temporary disability. 8 Marcotte testified that he will continue to receive SSDI for three (3) years, upon approval from the Social Security Administration to continue his SSDI. This is Marcotte’s only source of income.
Marcotte’s Schedule J, filed in February 2010, indicated that he budgeted $1,060.00 per month for medical and dental expenses alone, $250.00 for food, $50.00 for transportation, $230.00 for auto insurance, $10.00 for clothing and $100.00 for the Loan, for total expenses of $1,700.00. (Schedules, Doc. No. 1 at 22). His budget did not include any expenses for housing, utilities, a telephone, etc. Assuming the highest income figure in the record— $1,142.00 per month — Marcotte would have a monthly budget deficit of $558.00 based on his February 2010 schedule of
Marcotte lives with his parents in their home in Roebuck, South Carolina. Mar-cotte’s parents do not charge him for rent or utilities at this time and assist him with his food expense. According to Marcotte’s testimony, his parents are retired and their sole source of income is Social Security. There is little indication in the record regarding how long Marcotte’s parents plan to or have the ability to continue to supplement his food expense and provide him with free housing.
After he filed for bankruptcy, Marcotte purchased a 1998 Jeep Wrangler for $6,800.00. Marcotte was able to purchase the car with $3,800.00 he personally accumulated and $3,000.00 he borrowed from his sister. As a result of this purchase, Marcotte pays approximately $108.00 per month for auto insurance. He, therefore, has reduced the $230.00 monthly expense listed on his Schedule J by $122.00. 9 This is Marcotte’s only car and his parents own one car as well.
Marcotte sees several doctors for injuries related to the car accident. One doctor is located in Columbia, South Carolina, approximately one and one-half hours away from his parents’ home. The other doctors and the pharmacy where Marcotte fills his prescriptions are located approximately twenty minutes from his residence. He also seeks regular treatment at a pain clinic. Marcotte testified that, according to his doctor, the only way to assuage his pain is to continue taking the medications currently prescribed.
Marcotte initially had implants to replace his broken teeth after the 1996 accident; however, he testified that the implants only have a lifespan of ten years. Therefore, he needs to replace them, which will also require two root canals. Mar-cotte testified that the root canals will cost approximately $1,000.00 each and he is not sure of the cost of the implants. It is not clear whether these costs were considered when Marcotte calculated the estimated $1,060.00 per month in anticipated medical and dental expenses on his Schedule J.
At the time of Marcotte’s car accident in 1996, he held a car insurance policy with Allstate. According to Marcotte’s testimony, pursuant a provision of his insurance policy, Allstate is supposed to reimburse him for some monthly medical and dental expenses resulting from the accident. Marcotte, however, stated that reimbursements from Allstate have been difficult to obtain because he must submit a reimbursement request each month, attaching all receipts and written proof from his doctor(s) that the expenses are related to injuries from the car accident. He testified that, in his experience, full reimbursement is not reliable or guaranteed. Marcotte has only been able to request reimbursements twice from Allstate. As a result of submitting one of these requests, last year he received $1,000.00 toward the medication costs for one month. Marcotte testified that he would be required to pay for the medical and dental procedures pri- or to requesting any reimbursement.
Marcotte testified that since January 2011 he has been enrolled in Medicare at a cost of approximately $107.00 each month. From Marcotte’s testimony, it was difficult
Marcotte has a 401K account with a balance of approximately $11,200.00. Id. at 18. A review of his schedules indicates no other significant assets. 10 Marcotte testified that he would like to use a portion of the 401K balance to repay the post-petition loan from his sister for the car and to pay for his dental procedures. No evidence was presented as to whether Mar-cotte would be penalized for withdrawing from his 401K account.
The Court observes that Marcotte was a credible witness and that he responded to questions sincerely, even if the response could be interpreted as contrary to his cause.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A discharge in chapter 7 relieves debtors from all pre-petition debts, with the exception of certain debts enumerated in § 523. Government-backed educational loans are among those debts excepted. 11
A discharge under Section 727 ... of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt—
(8) unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents, for—
(A)(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution; or (ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend ...
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (West 2010). Thus, an educational debt is generally not dis-chargeable in bankruptcy unless the debt- or establishes that he would suffer an undue hardship if required to repay it.
Spence v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Spence),
Marcotte asserts that he is entitled to discharge the Loan pursuant to § 523(a)(8). “Debtors seeking to discharge their student loans bear the burden of proving that they are ‘in the
limited class
of debtors for which § 523(a)(8) meant to allow discharge.’ ”
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mosko (In re Mosko),
In order to prove an undue hardship within the meaning of § 523(a)(8), the Brunner test requires the debtor to show:
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for [himself] and [his] dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans; and; (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans.
Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner),
The heightened “undue hardship” standard “protects the integrity of the student-loan program and saves it ‘from fiscal doom.’ It also ensures public support for the program by preventing debtors from easily discharging their debts at the expense of the taxpayers who made possible their educations.”
Frushour,
TGSLC only asserts that Marcotte did not make good faith efforts to repay the Loan.
12
However, the Court deems it appropriate to analyze each prong of the
Brunner
test as applied to Marcotte’s situation because the analysis of certain prongs overlaps with determinations made under other portions of the test.
See Richardson v. N.C. Educ. Assistance Auth. (In re Richardson),
Adv. No. S-07-00096-5-AP,
Analysis under the first
Brunner
prong requires the Court to examine Mar-cotte’s budget to determine whether he is able to maintain a minimum standard of living going forward.
See Mosko, 515
F.3d at 326 n. 7. This part of the test “requires a debtor to show more than an austere budget or tight finances.”
Straub,
Marcotte’s current and anticipated monthly income consists solely of SSDI, and his income is quite low. 13 By moving in with his parents, he has made commendable efforts to minimize his expenses. Marcotte’s Schedule J, filed in February 2010, lists frugal, nonmedical expenses of $540.00, excluding the Loan payment. According to his testimony, this amount must be adjusted up by the costs of Medicare ( + $107.00) and down as a result of a reduction in auto insurance ($230.00 - $108.00 = -$122.00), leaving expenses of $525.00. His fixed income is approximately $1,142.00 per month. Therefore, after payment of these minimal expenses, $617.00 of his income remains to apply towards medical and dental costs and any other unscheduled expenses that may arise. Marcotte estimated his medical and dental expenses at $1,060.00 in February of 2010, which would leave a budget deficit of $443.00 ($617.00-$1,060.00). However, his testimony further indicated that these amounts for medical and dental expenses may be reduced by Medicare and any Allstate reimbursements. Determining the exact amount of any reimbursements is difficult; however, it is clear that if Mar-cotte was required to pay $617.00 or more of these estimated costs per month without reimbursement, his income would be exhausted. 14
However, while addressing the third prong of the Brunner test, TGSLC argued that Marcotte could use some or all of his 401K account to repay the Loan without undue hardship. 16 This argument is relevant to the first prong because:
a debtor, even though having very little income, may still be found to have the ability to repay their student loan when it is shown that the debtor has, or will likely have, access to significant assets which could be utilized to repay the loan
To hold otherwise, and allow a debtor with significant assets to escape their student-loan obligations, would undercut the inherent nature of an “undue hardship” inquiry: Ensuring that debtors with the means to repay their student loans do so.
Cekic-Torres v. Access Group, Inc. (In re Cekic-Torres),
In
Craig v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Craig),
[i]n making this fact-intensive determination, courts should consider a number of factors, including but not limited to: the debtor’s age, income, overall budget, expected date of retirement, existing retirement savings, and amount of contributions; the likelihood that stopping contributions will jeopardize the debtor’s fresh start by forcing the debtor to make up lost contributions after emerging from bankruptcy; and the needs of the debtor’s dependents. Courts must allow debtors to seek bankruptcy protection while voluntarily saving for retirement if such savings appear reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support of the debtor or the debtor’s dependents.
Id.
at 1046^47 (emphasis added) (citing
Hebbring,
The Craig court’s decision is insightful because the Ninth Circuit recognized that even ongoing contributions to and accumulation of retirement savings may be justified under the right facts, and it is a fact-intensive inquiry to determine the role that retirement savings play in an undue hardship dispute. While Craig’s view of ongoing retirement contributions may not withstand challenge in this circuit, it does provide some guidance in reviewing this matter. In the instant case, Marcotte does not wish to continue a controversial funding of a retirement account from his income while attempting to discharge a student loan debt. Rather, the issue is whether the Court should require a debt- or, who has insufficient income to meet his basic needs, to liquidate a minimal amount in a retirement account and apply those funds to an educational loan. After a factual inquiry based on this debtor’s current budget and future prospects, the Court finds that the 401K balance is necessary to pay for current and future necessities. 17
Second Prong of Brunner
The second part of the
Brunner
test requires proof that additional circumstances exist indicating that the debtor’s state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant period of time.
Frushour,
In the Fourth Circuit, “[t]his factor is ‘the heart of the
Brunner
test.’ It most clearly reflects the congressional imperative that the debtor’s hardship must be more than the normal hardship that accompanies any bankruptcy.”
Frushour,
In
Frushour,
the Fourth Circuit strictly applied the
Brunner
test to reverse the lower courts, thereby denying a debtor’s request to discharge a student loan debt as an undue hardship. The Court instructed that the hardship should be “unwarranted” or “excessive” and “not the garden-variety hardship.”
Id.
at 399;
see also Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Nys (In re Nys),
The Frushour court held that the debtor failed to prove the second factor of the Bnmner test because she “provided no additional circumstances beyond the debt itself to show that her hardship [was] undue.” Id. at 401. There were no additional circumstances preventing Frushour from maintaining a minimal standard of living because she was educated, worked in several different areas of employment, and she and her son were not mentally or physically disabled. See id. Furthermore, despite the fact that Frushour’s financial condition was not desirable, there was no indication that she could not return to a job similar to one she previously held where she made almost double her current income. Id. Therefore, the court concluded that “[h]aving a low paying job ... does not in itself provide undue hardship, especially where the debtor is satisfied with the job, has not actively sought higher-paying employment, and has earned a larger income in previous jobs.” Id.
Unlike the debtor in Frushour, Marcotte has met his burden of proof under the second prong. It is uncontrovert-ed that the pain from Marcotte’s injuries forced him to leave his previous job and render him unable to work. 18 His income for the past three years has been solely from disability payments and his condition is likely to endure through no fault of his own. Marcotte’s injuries and disability result in increased medical expenses that are unlikely to end. Therefore, the Court finds that Marcotte has established “additional circumstances” that are likely to persistent for a significant period of time.
Before reaching this conclusion, the Court considered all resources available to assist Marcotte in meeting his expenses. Specifically, whether Marcotte would be able to alleviate his “additional circumstances” if he liquidated assets, chiefly his 401K account.
See Nys,
Clearly, a liquidation of assets would not alleviate Marcotte’s disability; however, additional available funds to repay the Loan or defray expenses could alleviate a portion of his unfortunate financial circumstances. TGSLC would certainly benefit if Marcotte withdrew funds from the account and paid the Loan in full or used the funds to continue payments on the Loan. However, Marcotte’s evidence demonstrates that his dire circumstances — a disability that prevents him from working, results in higher medical expenses and leaves him without sufficient means to meet his basic needs — will continue for a significant period of time and would not be alleviated by this action. Although TGSLC would be repaid, Marcotte’s circumstances would be far worse. Any value in requiring Marcotte to use the 401K to maintain payments on or pay off the Loan is outweighed by his evidence of additional circumstances. That is, he has shown that his hardship is unwarranted, excessive and exists through no fault of his own, and there is no evidence that his situation will improve in the future. Removing the 401K funds from his resources or requiring him to repay the Loan from any source available to him would cause further deterioration of his dismal financial situation.
Third Prong of Brunner
The third prong of
Brunner
requires a debtor to prove he has made good faith efforts to repay the student loans.
Brunner,
“[A] determination of good faith under part three necessarily includes a retrospective analysis because it focuses on the debtors’ prior actions. We analyze the payments that debtors have
made
on their loans. Similarly, we do not judge a debtors’ [sic] mere proposals, but their actual ‘efforts’ to minimize expenses.”
Mosko,
Marcotte previously consolidated his student loans and there is no assertion that he failed to take advantage of any consolidation or other plan of assistance available to him. He made payments on his Loan while he was employed and continued to make payments during a period of disability and until he filed for chapter 7 relief.
19
Marcotte maximized his income
However, it is noteworthy that after the Bankruptcy Case was filed but prior to trial, Marcotte purchased a 1998 Jeep Wrangler to meet his transportation needs. He was able to accumulate $3,800.00 to contribute to this purchase. Courts have held that debtors do not meet the third part of
Brunner
if they incur expenses that are not necessary to maintain a minimum standard of living, thus, indicating a lack of good faith efforts to minimize expenses.
See Mosko,
Marcotte testified that he needs the car for transportation to his various doctors’ appointments, to the pain clinic, and to the pharmacy to refill his prescriptions. While it is remarkable that he was able to save $3,800.00, frugally saving funds to make a necessary purchase should likely be commended instead of questioned. A reasonable expenditure to meet Marcotte’s long-term transportation needs is certainly a greater necessity than memberships to health clubs, internet access, satellite television and other recreational activities, and is not evidence of a lack of good faith on the facts of his case. 20
Finally, the 401K balance must also be addressed under the third prong.
Considering the facts, the following weigh heavily in Marcotte’s favor: (1) his efforts to obtain and maintain employment despite his physical difficulties; (2) his efforts to maximize his income for as long as possible; (3) the length of time he continued to make payments on the Loan; (4) his efforts to minimize his daily living expenses by moving in with his parents; (5) the fact that his situation results from his physical challenges and through no fault of his own; and (6) his consolidation of the Loan. This is significant proof of his good faith.
Cf. Sperrazza v. Univ. of Maryland,
C/A No. 07-CV-792,
The following considerations appear to the Court to be neutral, or at best detract slightly from Marcotte’s showing of good faith: (1) purchasing a vehicle to meet his transportation needs rather than applying those funds toward repayment of the Loan; and (2) failing to liquidate his 401K account to repay the Loan. The record does not contain any evidence that would lead the Court to believe that Marcotte has demonstrated a lack of good faith in making these two decisions. Instead, they indicate only that he has made decisions that do not directly benefit TGSLC. TGSLC has not provided any authorities to persuade the Court that a debtor must make every decision with only the creditor’s interest in mind before he can meet his burden of proof. In fact, bankruptcy law requires the opposite' — '“the Bankruptcy Code does not require that the debtor live in abject poverty before a student loan may be discharged.”
White,
After weighing the evidence and considering the credibility and demeanor of the witness on the good faith issue, the Court finds that Marcotte has satisfied the third prong of
Brunner
by providing significant
Conclusion
“Congress, in enacting § 523(a)(8), set a high bar for a debtor seeking to discharge government-guaranteed educational loans,”
Frushour,
Under the first prong, Marcotte has shown that, without considering the Loan payments, his monthly income is insufficient to meet his basic needs. Therefore, if required to make monthly payments on the Loan, his budget would result in a larger deficit and he would be unable to maintain a minimal standard of living.
With regard to the second prong, Mar-cotte has proven that additional circumstances exist indicating that his state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the loan’s repayment period. His injuries have rendered him unable to work and there is no indication that his condition will improve. He collects SSDI as his only income and his medical expenses will persist.
Cf. Spence,
To meet his burden of proof under the third prong, Marcotte has shown good faith efforts to repay his Loan by making payments for a significant period of time, continuing his payments until filing for chapter 7 relief and consolidating his Loan.
Cf. Spence,
Based on the evidence presented and the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED,
That the Loan owed to TGSLC is hereby discharged.
Notes
. Further reference to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., will be by section number only.
. To the extent that any of the following Findings of Fact constitute Conclusions of Law, they are adopted as such, and vice versa.
. Marcotte testified that he is unsure as to how many student loans he took out to pay for the three years he attended college.
.Although the number of loans taken out by Marcotte is unknown, it appears that at one point in time he had two (2) outstanding student loans from Brazos Higher Education Service Corporation. Marcotte consolidated these loans under a single note and, for all purposes herein, the loans are treated as a single loan and debt owed to TGSLC. See Def.'s Ex. A.
. In 2004, the balance of the note was $12,876.00. See Def.'s Answer, Doc. 16 at 2.
. A payment of $100.00 per month toward a debt of $8,756.00 at the interest rate of 3.37% requires a repayment period of more than eight (8) years.
.This Amendment was supported by a copy of the letter from the Social Security Administration verifying the amount.
. It appears that counsel may have meant $1,149.00 per month instead of $1,049.00. However, the Court is convinced that the increase was minimal and the uncertainty at this income level has no significant impact on the Court’s decision.
. Marcotte’s schedules and the case docket indicate that he surrendered a 2006 Hyundai Tucson Limited Crossover valued at $10,625.00 and encumbered by a lien, and that at filing he paid $230.00 per month for auto insurance instead of the $108.00 that he currently pays. See Schedules, C/A No. 10-00759-hb, Doc. No. 1 at 22, 31; see also Order Modifying the Automatic Stay, Doc. No. 12 at 2 (granting Hyundai Motor Finance Co. relief from the automatic stay on Mar-cotte’s Hyundai Tucson).
. The value of Marcotte's listed assets is $5,125.00, excluding the 401K balance and the Hyundai Tucson automobile he surrendered to the secured lender. See id. at 9-12.
. Neither party asserted that this loan was not a government-backed loan subject to § 523(a)(8).
. Counsel for TGSLC did not contend that Marcotte did not meet the first or second Brunner prongs: (1) that he cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a "minimal” standard of living for himself if forced to repay the loans; and (2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that his state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans.
. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., The HHS Poverty Guidelines for the Remainder of 2010 (August 2010), Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, http:// aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/10poverty.shtml (last revised Jan. 21, 2011) (stating that the poverty guidelines for one person within the 48 contiguous states is $10,830.00 per year).
. In a case involving a debtor with similar financial affairs, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina found the debtor to have satisfied the first Brunner prong because:
[He] is currently unemployed, and he has been only periodically employed in temporary jobs since he obtained his certificate from [which he took out student loans for] ... He receives $162 per month in food stamps, and he has no assets except a fully-encumbered vehicle. [Debtor] lived with his parents until recently, did not pay rent and did not contribute to the costs of utilities. He was unable to pay the filing fee in this case, and was unable to hire an attorney to represent him in the case and in this adversary proceeding.
[Debtorfs only scheduled monthly expenses include a car payment of $400,which has been reduced to $333 pursuant to a reaffirmation agreement; $200 for food; $50 for clothing; $275 for transportation, car taxes and car insurance; $20 for recreation; $50 for charitable contributions; and $50 for payments for his daughter ... Though his expenses are minimal, he has difficulty meeting those needs due to his lack of income, and he is, in fact, behind on his car payments. Because of [Debtorl's lack of income and assets, he has shown an inability to meet a minimal standard of living if he is forced to repay the loans. Richardson v. N.C. Educ. Assistance Auth. (In re Richardson), Adv. No. S-07-00096-5-AP, 2008 WL 3911075 , at *2 (Bankr.E.D.N.C. Aug. 14, 2008) (internal citations omitted).
. Marcotte budgeted $250.00 per month for food, approximately $8.30 per day.
. There was no evidence presented to indicate how much money Marcotte would net if he withdrew funds from the account at this time.
. There was no evidence regarding the net amount that he could withdraw or borrow. Assuming Marcotte could receive a net distribution of $11,200 without penalty or tax, this would add approximately $311.00 per month to his budget over thirty-six months; approximately $117.00 per month over the next eight years. This amount could supplement his food, medical, dental, housing and unexpected expenses but is insufficient to provide a minimal standard of living from his income and assets and pay the Loan.
. TGSLC does not contest that Marcotte is disabled. In addition the Court finds Mar-cotte's testimony persuasive to prove he suffers from a disability that prevents him from being gainfully employed. The Court's finding is supported by the fact that "[a] debtor is not required to present expert testimony to corroborate [his] own testimony about [his] health.”
White v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re White),
Adv. No. 07-4157,
.
Cf. Spence v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Spence),
.
See Wallace v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Wallace),
C/A No. 06-2735,
.
In re Brown,
Adv. No. 06-24,