*1 669 months, of 21 guidelines Brazell sentence but the September, of culating that as arrears), guideline range relevant without $63,576.45 in and be- would be § 4A1.1 enhancement have been 12- would object any of Brazell failed to cause 5A, § Sentencing PSR, 18 months. See U.S.S.G. in the district contained facts Accordingly, Table. we REVERSE facts and correctly relied on those resentencing.3 REMAND for applied the enhancement. not address We need disagree.
We that the date of indict- argument
Brazell’s which a continu- the latest date on
ment is to have taken may deemed
ing offense (i.e., contention that the date
place his activity”
“voluntary illegal termination only precedes that date where indictment): Instead, we believe date ADVERTISING, MARCO OUTDOOR by ruling court erred that the district INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, during probation his vio- Brazell’s conduct v. § lated AUTHORITY, REGIONAL TRANSIT criminalizes That section wilful Defendant-Appellee, support obligations; child pay failure to presumption ability confers rebuttable Outdoor, Inc., Clear Channel only during period alleged the time pay Intervenor Defendant- 228(b). § Bra- the indictment. See Appellee. failed to make zell’s admission that he No. 05-30875. support payments during period child no probation he was on creates which Appeals, United States Court of wilful, that his failure was presumption Fifth Circuit. (i.e., any wilfulness proof and without 15, 2007. June pro- of his ability pay) during the time bation, evidence to sus- there is insufficient that he
tain the district court’s conclusion
continued to violate the statute.2 Conse- by applying that court erred
quently, 4Al.l(d),
§ there was insufficient because that Brazell had vio-
evidence to conclude a criminal sen-
lated 228 while under
tence.
III. summary,
In the district court’s miscal- guidelines resulted
culation of the Mussari, pertained only to dates before statute's enact- F.3d 2. See United States v. (9th Cir.1998) ment). (holding that conviction pay support during wilful failure to child period covering and after time dates before Villegas, v. 404 F.3d 3. See United States violated Ex Post Facto enactment of statute Cir.2005). (5th Clause, ability pay because evidence of *2 JOLLY, Judge:
E. GRADY Circuit This cause arises under 42 U.S.C. Inc., Advertising, § 1983. Marco Outdoor (“Marco”) Regional contends *3 (“RTA”) Authority deprived Transit it of when, property without due of law in violation of the Louisiana Public Bid (“Public Law, 38:2211, seq. et La. R.S. Law”), arbitrarily Bid RTA awarded an (“Contract”) advertising contract to an in bidder, Outdoor, ferior Clear Channel Inc. (“Clear Channel”). The district court held that Bid Law because Public Contract, apply does not to this the state property right no had created favor Marco,1 prospective such as and bidders Marco, consequently, having protected no interest, property had failed to a Kinney, (argued), III Tara Henry W. constitutional due claim. The dis Clement, Kinney Ellinghau- & Elizabeth trict therefore the case dismissed Orleans, LA, sen, Plaintiff-Appel- for New jurisdiction. question for lack of federal lant. presented argued by The issue Randy George Haley,
N. Sundiata appeal, at trial and on parties, both McKee, Carter, Haley & (argued), McKee applies whether the Public Bid Law to this LA, Orleans, Regional Transit New for in- (thereby creating property Contract a Authority. terest), under a difficult and unclear claim Louisiana law. Marco contends Sarver, Robert Richard E. Edward contend applies; RTA Clear Channel Barrasso, Usdin, Kup- (argued), Wicker unnecessary find it that it does not. We Sarver, Orleans, Freeman & New perman, that, hold question decide this because we Outdoor, LA, for Inc. Clear Channel assuming the Public Bid Law even in this property a and creates Contract, provide Louisiana state courts remedy for the adequate procedural AF- alleged deprivation.2 We therefore complaint FIRM the dismissal of Marco’s WIENER, JOLLY, DAVIS, and Before for failure to state a federal claim. Judges. Circuit Admin., 1979) (La. jurisprudence, the Public 367 So.2d 1. Under Louisiana right (creating property a in the lowest re high a Bid Law creates sponsible a works bidder to receive responsible a est bidder to receive contract contract). entity. generate that will revenue for a state Co., Transp. v. New Orleans Aviation HTW Inc. Bd., 1988); request, parties (La.App. submitted So.2d 4 Cir. 2. At Court’s supplemental briefs on this issue. Haughton Elevator Div. v. State ex rel. Div. cf. jurisdiction. Although injunction I. tion no issued, bidding process apparently was RTA initiated Re- August On came to halt. No.2004-015, under Proposals for quest sealed bids from advertis- sought which it 23, 2005, August following two-day On that would proposals ing contractors trial, bench the district court dismissed RTA ad- placing revenue for generate complaint jurisdiction. Marco’s for lack of vehicles, RTA’s transit vertisements on The district court concluded that the Pub- shelters, and transit benches. re- Contract, apply lic Bid Law did not contractors, including ceived bids from six accordingly, that RTA was not re- parties and Clear Channel. The Marco quired to award the Contract to the most financially dispute superior, whose bid is Therefore, *4 favorable bidder. even if Mar- is, generate that which will more advertis- bid, co right submitted the best it had no 24, 2005, in ing May revenue for RTA. On under state law to receive the Contract RTA in- response inquiries, to Marco’s property right receiving and thus no planned that RTA to award formed Marco Consequently, Contract. Marco could days Channel two Contract Clear deprivation constitutionally- claim a of a May later on protected property right by the RTA. Be- action, however, May and on Marco took question cause the federal basis of its law 25, Marco filed this 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit eliminated, suit was the district court dis- against RTA in federal district court. jurisdiction. missed for lack of Marco now sought injunction preventing an Marco appeals. awarding the Contract to Clear ordering of mandamus Channel and writ II. In
RTA to award the Contract to Marco.
suggested,
As we have earlier
we
court and on appeal,
the district
Marco
purposes
appeal
will assume for the
of this
argues
financially superior
that its bid is
that
a property right
Marco has
in its bid.
bid,
Clear Channel’s
under
This is not
Law,
enough, however. The Four
Public Bid
RTA must award the
teenth
Marco,
requires
Amendment also
that the
allegedly
Contract to
which
submit-
plaintiff,
order to establish a
constitu
ted the best bid. Marco maintains
violation,
Law,
tional
prove
deprivation
it
that the
proper-
under the Public Bid
has a
ty
property right
of the
right protected by the Due Process
occurred without due
McCollan,
process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
of law. See Baker v.
137, 145,
2689,
This
443
U.S. Constitution.
constitutional
U.S.
99 S.Ct.
61
(1979).3
question
ques-
Thus,
is the
for federal
sole basis
L.Ed.2d 433
if
even
314,
(5th Cir.2002).
3. There is no merit to Marco’s claim of sub-
F.3d
325
As this Court
McClendon,
process.
pro-
due
Substantive
Supreme
stantive
due
observed
"[t]he
arbitrary, wrongful gov-
"bars certain
cess
Court’s discussions of abusive executive ac
'regardless
repeatedly emphasized
ernment actions
of the fairness of
tion have
‘only
”
procedures
implement
egregious
used to
them.’
the most
official conduct can be
Burch,
113, 125,
arbitrary
Zinermon v.
494 U.S.
110
said to be
in the constitutional
”
975,
(1990) (quoting
L.Ed.2d
(quoting County
S.Ct.
108
100
sense.’
Id. at 325-26
Williams,
327, 331,
Lewis,
833, 846,
Daniels v.
474 U.S.
106
Sacramento v.
523 U.S.
118
662,
(1986)).
1708,
(1998) (quoting
S.Ct.
673
Fla.,
18, 37,
Regulation
496 U.S.
disputed
to the
Bus.
Law
Public Bid
(1990)
Contract,
thus created a
110 S.Ct.
mary proceeding, WIENER, Judge, dissenting: Circuit award, contract satis- nouncement of the process prong of the due fies the elements respectfully dissent. I am convinced that are at issue of the Due Process Clause majority opinion misapprehends in this case. of, over, glosses nature Marco’s substantive claim, due-process grounded
III.
knowing
as it is in the RTA’s
and deliber-
assume for the
thus conclude: We
We
disregard
ate
law
Louisiana’s
bid
deciding
appeal
this
purposes
(and
procedure),
its own announced
de-
to Marco’s bid and
Public Bid Law
having
such law
spite
expressly
been
incor-
properly alleged
proper-
has
that Marco
porated
reference
the RTA’s en-
ty
to receive the Con-
act.
abling
nevertheless,
tract;
we
that Mar-
conclude
fails.
procedural
co’s
claim
I. ANALYSIS
authorizes
explicitly
The Public Bid Law
long
recog-
The
law
injunctive
relief
State’s bid
has
been
Marco to seek state
constitutionally
enjoin
awarding
creating
protect-
the contract
nized as
Nor,
satisfy
projects,
dy
require-
for RTA
must an
is sufficient
itself to
in bids
aggrieved
process,
Harper,
at
bidder exhaust RTA administrative
of due
see
509 U.S.
ments
bringing
prior
Systems’
suit. The RTA
remedies
S.Ct.
discussion of
procedures
"[a]ny person
protest
state that
injunctive
dicta.
relief is
aggrieved
who
in connection with the solic-
*7
injunctive
provides
Because the
relief
Mar
may protest
award of a contract
itation or
adequate pre-deprivation hearing,
co with an
In
the Director of Procurement/TMSEL.”
,
clearly distinguishable from Par-
this case is
State,
Enterprises, Inc. v.
ed and or, case, high- as in this the the Marco has established that it is the best lowest— (hereafter, bidder “best responsible bidder and thus entitled to process due est— bidder”) the con- to be awarded advertised protection.3 Having thus set up proce- the purpose of the bid tract.1 obvious law One dural due strawman through such by fisc public ensuring the protect is to assumptions, though, the panel majority price the people pay the lowest avail- that down, proceeds disregard to knock (or, here, qualified work as receive able for process claim, Marco’s substantive due by privilege grant- for the the most revenue conclusionally declaring, without any dis- ed)2; protect is to another law, analysis cussion of the facts or of the the best bidder to be awarded the right of that the “RTA’s decision to award the Thus, for a advertised contract. bidder Contract to Clear Channel instead Mar- § successfully due-process to assert a arbitrary co is not so as to ‘shock the claim, ” he establish the contract must According conscience.’ to the ma- panel subject public at issue is State’s bid then, jority, solely because Marco had the bidder, law, that he is the best and he (don’t option of resorting to state court we by agency’s wronged has been award- all?), its entitlement to seek relief there party. contract to another Mar- ing being arbitrarily capriciously de- after establishing co’s of these elements would nied its best-bidder’s to be awarded pursue entitle it to Fourteenth Amend- the contract pre- somehow satisfies the § under due-process ment claims deprivation procedure administrative both Even procedural. substantive and expressly requires. For the when, today’s purposes, accept with- majority, then, the RTA’s refusal to follow majority out granting panel has presumably applicable state bid law— gotten facet of procedural procedures its own announced —which right, that procedural place- Marco’s claim alia, designed is to protect, inter a best bo, viz., pre- post-deprivation Marco’s bidder’s property right, constitutional courts, access to the State’s falls far short somehow not unconstitutionally egre- so being panacea for Marco’s substantive gious to, as to warrant access and the ills, due-process much avail- less of, attention the federal In courts. other able cure. words, so, just say because we the RTA’s forthrightly deciding Instead of the sole patent disregard of the substantive due legal parties issue addressed process rights guaranteed to Marco under court, i.e., the district whether Louisiana’s the United States Constitution cannot be applies law even bid RTA’s rectified in federal court in a 1983 ac- (I of the instant contract letting believe tion. that the bid law and would so hold *8 appeal), majority ques- on the leaves that As I find panel majority’s the reasoning merely flawed, (as tion and unanswered assumes ar- to be fatally I too proceed shall 627, Haughton Dept. 1. Elevator Div. v. Highways, Louisiana Ex Rel. 203 La. 14 So.2d Admin., (La. (1943)). Div. So.2d 1979). The State's bid laws can create a objective allegations, proved, 3.Marco’s if high interest in either the lowest or bidder, easily leave no doubt that its bid was the best responsible depending est on the na of the six received the RTA'—-atleast before ture of the contract at issue. massaged the RTA Clear Channel's bid to Vinton, 2. Smith v. Town 216 La. elevate it above Marco’s and one other that (1949) (quoting So.2d topped original 21-22 Boxwell v. also had Clear Channel’s bid. (cid:127) Request RTA’s For majority) assumption Proposals on the The panel does (“RFP”) subject procedural to both for the contract was not that Marco is entitled despite previous before it furnished to Marco its process and substantive due property right, requests for notice of the initiation of of its conceded deprived be any advertising. Marco’s constitu- solicitation for transit and shall illustrate how (cid:127) right is violated. tional Similarly, Marco was not informed of pre-bid RTA’s conference on the process due Adverting to substantive contract. solely opinion, panel in footnote 3 of its (cid:127) proposals Of six received conclusionally that “Mar- majority declares RTA, patently Marco’s was the best co does not have a viable substantive due standpoints (guaranteed pay- from all Yet, majority claim.” never ments, revenues, percentage contrac- why simply us not. It stands mute as tells media, print tor bartered and broadcast concluding the reasons for that Marco media, marketing analysis), and and due-process claim. To has no substantive proposal Clear Channel’s was distant me, justify a I that alone would dissent. third. more, however, by why explaining shall do (cid:127)
I am convinced that Marco does indeed RTA Post-bidding, subjectively eval- due-process have a viable substantive proposals uated a previously- with claim, pursue which it is entitled to undisclosed, arbitrarily weighted formu- federal court la, baldly adding million to Clear $1.5 non-monetary proposal Channel’s majority explains, agree, As the and (which years benefits over ten one of the “[sjubstantive ‘bars certain ar- agreed had other contractors also to do bitrary, wrongful government actions for) an- yet got adding no “bonus” and Here, Marco’s substantive million) ($1.7 for non-mone- other bonus by plethora supported claim is tary proposed by benefits Clear Chan- of how the RTA arbi- allegations discrete nel, which no other bidder was advised trarily capriciously disregarded could submit. Even with this “artificial- accurately, affirmatively how it law—more ly figure,” enhanced Clear Channel’s rejected totally inap- state bid law as maximum score remained short of the 60 thumbing plicable by knowingly its nose — points only Marco’s bid had and, in requirements at Louisiana’s bid an achieved. fiat, blatantly handing agency exercise of (cid:127) post-bid, assigned Also to Clear bidder after the contract inferior 10-point compliance Channel a bonus for with that bidder to make its bid colluding Enterpris- Business Disadvantaged with the best. It is to me that these obvious (“DBE”) despite having stated that es shenanigans unquestionably resulted goals no had been established for such constitutionally-rec- deprivation of Marco’s subject despite obvious project ognized constitutionally-protected non-compliance by Clear Channel. quali- property right, putative as the best (cid:127) bidder, foregoing post-bid When all of the fied to have the contract awarded machinations failed to move Clear Chan- any to it. Lest there be doubt about the Marco, the RTA allowed euchring of Marco out of nel ahead of RTA’s audacious Channel) (and contract, subject I reiterate here the Clear Channel Clear *9 (1) by increasing its bid its alleged RTA’s machinations as Marco to revise (which $10,186,000 to stage guaranteed payment at this of must be credited (2) $13,386,000, increasing its estimated proceedings): Marco, through its conceded disre- original pro- its sion of by 40% above
revenues (3) artificially inflating its bid gard of the bid law and the refusal to posal, original and the of Marco above those law and its own announced follow bidders. second-place by self-servingly labeling them procedures (cid:127) foregoing Indeed, accomplishing day, that inapplicable. After as to this RTA declared Clear legerdemain, on, totality what the RTA relies is the of though— even the best bidder Channel viz., (erroneously) asserted to its unilateral post-bidding despite those revenue contract without award the instant proposal Channel’s changes law, complying public with the bid which is —Clear $10,186,000, still more guaranteed RTA expressly applicable made guar- less than Marco’s than million $3 statute, enabling incorpo- its and which antee. ration reference contains no limitations must, of purposes we Assuming, as applicability public pur- of works and pre- a TRO or four-part granting test for supplies. chases of materials or could liminary injunction, Marco advocate, remand, If, as I we were to they quintes- are prove allegations, these and the fact finder were to determine that capricious, and sentially arbitrary and responsi- not the Marco somehow was best satisfy the element more than sufficient bidder, pro- ble then Marco will have no success, entitling Marco to likelihood tected to enforce in a such a restraint. panel majority 1983 action. But the has of substantive due- Typically, the focus decision, purposes today’s conceded for claims in the area bid responsible that Marco the best bidder. awarding authority laws has is whether such, having we treat Marco As must as designated an arbitrarily capriciously or protected property interest responsible best inferior contender as the (or worse) abrogated by be the whim case, every such bidder. In almost violating the RTA—at least not without (or authority acknowledges is at awarding due-process rights. Marco’s substantive It aware) subject it is to the bid least say smacks of Lewis that the Carroll law, allegedly failed to but—at least —has arbitrarily RTA did not act and capricious- statutory regulatory bid follow (1) ly despite self-servingly declaring itself contrast, Here, rules. the RTA has (2) laws, that, free of the restrictions of the bid in awarding denied from the outset contract, conducting knowing its bid dis- revenue-producing this is sub- such, and, ject regard law at all as procedures, to the state bid of its own announced (3) has insisted that its bidders have no consti- colluding with the third best of six rights. The tutionally-protected property proposal bidders to enhance that bidder’s that, for its own rea- insists further i.e., post-submission, “going after sons—or was also free to for no reason —it bid, (4) ultimately school” on Marco’s disregard guidelines proposal its own bid awarding the contract to its favored bid- impunity, with of the reve- simply because der, regardless pre-award guide- of its own awarding. nue nature of contract it was lines. cannot see how this willful—and arbitrary capricious thus noted, As to decide we are asked wheth- —behavior majority’s does not shock the conscience: arbitrarily er Marco denied its status was bidder, jaded Even as as I have become from allegedly as responsible the best living seeing in New Orleans and almost accomplished by capricious the RTA’s fa- voring daily of an to the exclu- reports inferior bidder media of this kind of behavior *10 managed to the RTA has agencies, local America, UNITED STATES in this instance. my conscience shock Plaintiff-Appellee, II. CONCLUSION v. it, majority skirts the panel I see
As III, Defendant- Earnest JONES this case that controlled sole issue Appellant. parties that have court and district No. 06-30855. viz., whether argued appeal, on
briefed RTA, in enabling incorporat- act of the Appeals, States United Court law, public bid makes ing the Louisiana Fifth Circuit. to the award of this applicable
that law June question that RTA contract —a particular “a and unclear majority labels difficult respect, claim under Louisiana law.” With difficult, I
I not find it that because do the RTA’s plain wording
stop with trying act and refrain from
enabling legislative intent unspoken
divine statutory unambiguous
face of clear and “lawyering” should not be
language. We of the
the case as an advocate one acknowledge generally I
parties. reaching a difficult is-
preferable to avoid a case on a clear by resolving
sue of law well be what easy one—and But, do here. I majority means to path have avail-
cannot see that we such today. only options Our are to
able to us law does or does
hold that Louisiana’s bid then, here; on depending
not apply (1) answer, remand either reverse and
our (2) tiptoe around affirm. We should on the by, sponte, going sua off issue clearly
nature of Marco’s established latching claim and
process, property-right standing statutory procedural,
onto disposing of this
provision as a means of It is for these reasons
appeal. panel majority opin-
cannot concur
ion, dissent. respectfully and instead must
