Marcel Watch Company appeals from the judgment of the United States Court of International Trade granting in part and denying in part cross-motions for summary judgment on Marcel’s challenge of the United States Customs Service’s classification determination and duty assessment of merchandise imported by Marcel in 1982.
Marcel Watch Co. v. United States,
BACKGROUND
The merchandise at issue, described as “quartz wall clocks” having a quartz analog movement measuring over 0.50 inches in thickness and less than 1.77 inches in width, entered the United States on September 24, 1982. Customs classified the merchandise as “Clocks: With watch movements; or with clock movements measuring less than 1.77 inches in width” under Item 715.15, dutiable at “[t]he column 1 ratе applicable to the cases, plus.the column 1 rate applicable to the movements.” Thus, the movements and cases of the imported clocks were constructively- separated and the duties for those components were separately determined. Customs assessed a rate of 34 cents each for the clock movemеnts under Item 720.02 and a rate of 11% ad valorem for the clock cases under Item 720.34. The entry was liquidated by Customs on November 5, 1982.
Marcel subsequently filed a protest with Customs challenging the classification of the imported merchandise. The protest was denied and Marcel paid the liquidated duties assessed. On November 1, 1983, Marcel commenced an action in the United States Court of International Trade contesting the denial of its protest. 1 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1988). Marcel claimed that the imported clocks were properly classifiable as “Electrical articles and electrical parts of articles, not specifically provided for: ... Other” under Item 688.43, TSUS (as added by Exec. Order No. 12371, 3 C.F.R. 196 (1982)), dutiable at a rate of 4.9% ad valo-rem, or in the alternative, as “Machines not specially provided for, and parts thereof’ under Item 678.50, TSUS, dutiable at a rate of 5% ad valorem.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court affirmed the classification of the merchandise under Item 715.15, rejecting Marcel’s argument that the imported clocks were not classifiable under the provisions of Schedule 7. In reviewing the applicable duties assеssed pursuant to that provision, the trial court affirmed Customs’ determination that the rate of duty on the clock cases derived from Item 720.34. However, it disagreed with Customs’ determination that the duty rate on the clock movements derived from Item 720.02. Instead, the court concluded that the clock movements should have been liquidated under Item 720.14, the provision covering “Other clock movements: ... Valued over $2.25 but not over $5 each.”
*1056 Marcel now appeals from the judgment of the trial court affirming Customs’ decision to classify the imported clocks under Item 715.15 and assessing duties thereunder at the rates set forth in Items 720.14 and 720.34. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1988).
DISCUSSION
Our standards of appellate review regarding classification determinations are wеll settled. We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for correctness as a matter of law.
See Lynteg, Inc. v. United States,
976
F.2d
693, 696 (Fed.Cir.1992). The ultimate issue as to whether particular imported merchandise has been classified under an appropriate tariff provision is a question of law subject to
de novo
review.
W.R. Filbin & Co., Inc. v. United States,
The clock movement provisions of TSUS, Schedule 7, Part 2, Subpart E (1982) (“Watches, Clocks, and Timing Apparatus”), read as follows:
. Clock movements, assembled, without dials or hands, or with dials or hands whethеr or not assembled thereon:
Measuring less than 1.77 inches in width:
Not constructed or designed to operate for over 47 hours without rewinding:
720.02 Having no jewels or only 1 jewel
720.04 Having over 1 jewel Constructed or designed to operate for over 47 hours without rewinding:
720.06 Having no jewels or only 1 jewel
720.08 Having over 1 jewel
720.09 If certified for use in civil aircraft
Other clock movements:
720.10 Valued over $1.10 each
720.12 Valued over $1.10 but not over $2.25 each
720.14 Valued over $2.25 but not over $5 each
720.16 Valued over $5 but not over $10 each
720.18 Valued over $10 each
Marcel maintains that the clocks do not fall within Schedule 7 as a matter of law because their movements are not classifiable under either Item 720.02, as found by Customs, or Item 720.14, as found by the trial court. Specifically, Marcel claims that the clock movements are not classifiable under Item 720.02 because that provision requires movements less than 1.77 inches in width to be capable of being wound and rewound. It is undisputed that the clock movements of the merchandise at issue here do not involve winding and rewinding. Marcel argues that neithеr are the clock movements classifiable under Item 720.14 because that provision only covers clock movements greater than or equal to 1.77 inches in width. It is undisputed that the clock movements are less than. 1.77 inches in width.
In support of its contention that the clock movements at issue are not classifiable under Schedule 7, Marcel relies on the deсision of the Court of International Trade in
Belfont Sales Corp. v. United States,
The imported merchandise at issue in Bel-font was collectively referred to as “quartz analog watch[es].” Customs classified the merchandise under Item 715.05, TSUS (1980) (“Watches”), which provides that duties are to be assessed on cases and movements separately. Accordingly, duties were assessed on the watch movements under Items 716.27 or 716.29, TSUS, depending on their width, and on the watch cases under Items 720.24 or 720.28, TSUS, depending on thеir composition. The importer in Belfont challenged Customs’ classification determination, arguing that the watches were classifiable as “electrical articles” under Item 688.45, TSUS.
The court in
Belfont
first addressed the threshold issue whether the imported quartz analog watches contained “watch movements” according to Schedule 7. Upon concluding that they did, the court then addressed whether the watches were properly classified under Item 715.05 as determined by Customs. That issue turned on whether the movements of the watches could be classified under Schedule 7, because if they could not, then the watches themselves could not.
See
The watch movement provisions of Schedule 7 (1980) consisted of Items 716.04r-716.06, 716.10-716.44, and 719. The heading that governed Items 716.10-716.44 required that thе movements be: Item 719 contained a similar limitation that the movements be “constructed ...' in excess of 47 hours without rewinding.”
Not adjusted, not self-winding (or if a self-winding device cannot be incorporated therein), and not constructed or designed to operate for a period in excess of 47 hours without rewinding. [Emphasis added.]
In view of the “rewinding” restriction governing all of the pertinent watch movement provisions of Schedule 7,
2
the trial court concluded that those provisions were necessarily limited to movements that were capable of being wound and rewound. The court found that the movements of the imported watches did not meet that limitation because they were battery operated and thus did not require, winding and rewinding. Because the mоvements could not be classified under Schedule 7, the court concluded that the watches themselves could not be classified therein. Instead, the court held that the watches were properly classified under Item 688.45 of Schedule 6, TSUS. The court’s decision in
Belfont
was affirmed on appeal “for the reasons stated in that court’s published,opinion.”
Belfont Sales Corp. v. United States,
Despite the undisputed fact that the imported clocks at issue in the instant case are similar in construction and operate on the same principle as the movements of the watches at issue in
Belfont,
the trial court below concluded that
Belfont
was not disposi-tive of the classification issue. The court determined that the clock movement provisions of Schedule 7 were broader in scope than thе watch movement provisions and that the imported clocks were properly classifiable in Schedule 7. Accordingly, the court held that although certain of the clock movement provisions of Schedule 7 contain the identical “rewinding” restriction at issue in
Belfont,
those provisions in Schedule 7 nevertheless contemplate battery-operated, nоn-winding movements. ' The court based that determination on its finding that in contrast to wrist watches, “winding and rewinding have not necessarily been integral to clocks, which date almost to the moment of recorded history itself.”
We agree with the trial court that
Belfont
does not in and of itself preclude classification of the imported clocks within Schedule 7. However, we arrive at that conclusion by a route different from that taken by the trial court in reaching its decision. Resort to extrinsic aids in interpreting the provisions at issue is unnecessary where, as here, the statutory language clearly and unambiguously manifests congressional intent.
See Brookside Veneers, Ltd. v. United States,
In resolving issues of statutory construction, we begin with the language of the statute.
See Lynteg, Inc. v. United States,
However, unlike the watch movement provisions at issue in Belfont, not all of the clock movement provisions at issue here are subject to a “rewinding” restriction. Certain clock movement provisions of Schedule 7 fall under the heading “Other clock movements.” The provisions subsumed under that heading, Items 720.10 through 720.18, are not governed by any limitation that the movements be capable of being wound and rewound. Accordingly, the court properly held that the movements were covered by one of the provisions falling under that heading.
In order for a clock movement to be properly classified under Item 720.14, it must come within the statutory description “Clock movemеnts, assembled ...: Other clock movements: ... Valued over $2.25 but not over $5 each” (emphasis added). Marcel claims that the clock movements are not classifiable undér that provision because the heading “Other clock movements” limits the applicability of Item 720.14 to movements greater than or equal to 1.77 inches in width. The government, on the other hand, argues that the heading “Other clock movements” is not limited to clock movements greater than or equal to 1.77 inches in width, but that it includes all clock movements coming within the description of the superior heading which are not covered by any of the provisions of the preceding inferior heading, Items 720.02 through 720.09.
Both parties find support for their interpretations in General Interpretative Rule 10(e) оf the TSUS. Rule 10(c) sets out the so-called “rule of relative specificity5’ which provides that “an imported article which is described in two or more provisions of the schedules is classifiable in the provision which most specifically describes it.” The rule is a “judicial aid to the construction of a statute in order to conform with the intent of Congress.”
F.L. Smidth & Co. v. United States,
Marcel claims that in determining the scope of the inferior heading “Other clock movements,” Rule 10(c)(ii) requires that the heading be compared only with its coordinate inferior heading “Measuring less than 1.77 inches in width.” Thus, Marcel contends that the heading “Other clock movements” meаns clock movements other than those measuring less than 1.77 inches in width, ie., movements measuring 1.77 inches or more in width. Under the interpretation proposed by Marcel, therefore, clock movements measuring less than 1.77 inch in width but which do not require winding or rewinding, e.g., the movements at issue, are not covered by any of the clock movement provisions of Schedule 7.
Marcel’s intеrpretation must be rejected because it fails to reconcile and give effect to all of the provisions of the rule of relative specificity. Marcel may not choose those rules that afford a favorable interpretation and ignore those that do not. See General Interpretative Rule 10(a), TSUS (1982) (interpretation of TSUS provisions “subjeсt to the rules of interpretation set forth herein”).
The interpretative approach proposed by Marcel disregards the clear language of Rule 10(c)(i), which explicitly recognizes that a superior heading can be limited by its inferi- or headings.
See Nissho-Iwai Am. Corp. v. United States,
This interpretation аccommodates both aspects of General Rule 10(e), that which suggests limitation of a superior heading by its inferior headings, and that which requires comparison between provisions of coordinate status. The meaning of the first heading “Measuring less than 1.77 inches in width” is determined in part by its inferior headings, and the meaning of its coordinate heading “Other clock movements” is determined by comparing it with the meaning of the first heading. The choice of classifying the clock movements under Item 720.14, among the items enumerated under the heading “Other clock movements,” Item 720.10-720.18, follows from the fact that the movements are “[vjalued over $2.25 but not over $5 each.”
Alternatively, Marcel argues that the legislative history of the TSUS clock movement provisions contained in the
Tariff Classification Study
supports its restrictive reading of the heading “Other clock movements.” We, however, do not consider such putative evidence of legislative intent to be persuasive in light of the clear language of the governing interpretative rules and the operative tariff provisions. An arguable indication of congressional intent in the
Tariff Classification Study
alone cannot overcome the clear meaning of the words of the statute.
See American Customs Brokg. Co. v. United States,
Accordingly, we hold that the clock movements of the imported quartz analog clocks, *1060 measuring less than 1.77 inches in width and not requiring winding and rewinding, are properly classified under Item 720.14. Consequently, we hold that the imported clocks are properly classified under Item 715.15.
CONCLUSION
Marcel has identified no reversible error committed by the trial court in holding that the imported clocks are classifiable under Item 715.15 and that the clock movements are dutiable under the rate set forth in Item 720.14. We therefore affirm the trial court’s grant in part of summary judgment in favor of the government.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. The action was designated a test case by the trial court. See U.S.Ct.Int'1 Trade R. 84(b). The complaint also challenged in a separate count the classification of merchandise described as "quartz alarm clocks” imported to the United .States on May 18, 1982. That merchandise is not at issue here.
. Items 716.04-716.06, governed by the subheading “Having over 17 jewels,” were the only watch movement provisions not subject to a “rewinding” requirement. Apparently those items were not considered because the watches at issue in Belfont either had no jewels or did not have over 17 jewels.