MARCEL DUBOIS et al. v. TOWN OF ARUNDEL et al.
Yor-18-147
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
February 12, 2019
2019 ME 21
JABAR, J.
Submitted On Briefs: November 28, 2018. Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. Reporter of Decisions.
[¶1] Marcel Dubois and Sol Fedder appeal from an order of the Superior Court (York County, O‘Neil, J.) granting the Town of Arundel‘s motion to dismiss their complaint and imposing sanctions on Dubois and Fedder. We affirm the order dismissing Dubois and Fedder‘s complaint, but vacate the order of sanctions and remand to the Superior Court.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] This appeal relates to the Town of Arundel Planning Board‘s denial of an application to renew a conditional use permit submitted by Dubois
[¶3] On September 18, 2017, Dubois and Fedder filed a complaint against the Town of Arundel, individual members of the Planning Board, and the Arundel Town Planner. Dubois and Fedder‘s complaint alleged that a memorandum drafted by the town planner and distributed to the members of the Planning Board led to an illegal executive session or sessions. Following the submission of briefs pursuant to a Rule 80B Notice and Briefing Schedule, the Town of Arundel moved to dismiss Dubois and Fedder‘s complaint as untimely filed, for lack of standing, and for failure to state a claim. On February 1, 2018, the Superior Court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding:
[T]he plaintiffs lack standing to bring the action, no subject matter jurisdiction exists for the court to properly review the matter, and
plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the [Freedom of Access Act]. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. Given the significant problems with the present litigation, the court also awards defendants reasonable attorney‘s fees and expenses pursuant to Rule 11 of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .
At the invitation of the Superior Court, the Town of Arundel subsequently submitted an affidavit of attorney fees and costs, seeking $5,862.50 in attorney fees and $231.75 in costs, which the court then determined was reasonable. Dubois and Fedder moved for reconsideration and relief from the Superior Court‘s judgment, but both motions were denied. This timely appeal followed. See
II. DISCUSSION
[¶4] It is unclear from the face of the complaint whether Dubois and Fedder rely on the Freedom of Access Act (FOAA),
[¶5] The court concluded that Dubois and Fedder did not have standing to bring this claim pursuant to Rule 80B and, alternatively, that any such claim was untimely. We have held that Rule 80C is inapplicable to FOAA claims. See Dubois v. Office of the Attorney General, 2018 ME 67, ¶ 7 n.3, 185 A.3d 734. Rule 80B is the municipal analogue to Rule 80C, which applies to appeals from state administrative action, and thus the same principle applies here, in the context of appeals from municipal action. Accordingly, to the extent that Dubois and Fedder seek to assert a FOAA claim through the process prescribed by Rule 80B, the court correctly dismissed the claim because Rule 80B is inapposite. See id.
[¶6] Even if the complaint can be construed as a Rule 80B appeal that seeks relief from municipal action other than a FOAA violation, the court correctly concluded that neither Dubois nor Fedder has standing. We review whether a party has standing de novo. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Greenleaf, 2015 ME 127, ¶ 6, 124 A.3d 1122. “Standing is a condition of justiciability that a plaintiff must satisfy in order to invoke the court‘s subject matter jurisdiction in the first place.” Id. ¶ 7. In order to have standing to file a Rule 80B complaint, the complainant must show “(1) that it was a party at the administrative
[¶7] Here, Dubois and Fedder were not involved in the administrative proceedings in any manner. In Dubois Livestock‘s application for renewal of the conditional use permit, “Dubois Livestock” is listed as the applicant, “Randrick Trust” is listed as the property owner, and “Ricky Dubois and Randy Dubois” are listed as the authorized agents for Dubois Livestock. Neither Dubois nor Fedder attended the administrative hearing on July 21, 2017, and neither has alleged a particularized injury as a result of the Planning Board‘s denial of Dubois Livestock‘s application for a renewal permit. As a result, the Superior Court did not err by dismissing Dubois and Fedder‘s Rule 80B complaint for lack of standing. See Friends of Lincoln Lakes v. Town of Lincoln, 2010 ME 78, ¶¶ 12-17, 2 A.3d 284.
B. Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to FOAA
[¶8] Dubois and Fedder argue that a complaint brought pursuant to FOAA is not subject to dismissal under
[¶9] Pursuant to section 403 of FOAA, “all public proceedings must be open to the public and any person must be permitted to attend a public proceeding” unless an exception applies. See
[¶10] Contrary to Dubois and Fedder‘s contentions, the Superior Court did not err in dismissing their complaint because they had failed to state a claim that would entitle them to relief pursuant to FOAA. Specifically, Dubois and Fedder failed to allege that any action was taken during the alleged executive session or sessions which would entitle them to the relief provided for by
[¶11] Because Dubois and Fedder failed to allege that any action was taken during the alleged executive session or sessions which would entitle them to any relief, the Superior Court did not err in dismissing their complaint.
C. Sanctions
[¶12] Finally, Dubois and Fedder argue that the Superior Court‘s imposition of sanctions pursuant to
[¶13] “Maine‘s trial courts may sanction parties for various types of pretrial misconduct,” see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Welch-Gallant, 2017 ME 105, ¶ 7, 162 A.3d 827 (quotation marks omitted), and among the sanctions that courts are authorized to impose are reasonable attorney fees and expenses pursuant to Rule 11. See
[¶14] Although in Welch-Gallant and Cope we considered the sanction of dismissal with prejudice in the context of a foreclosure case, due process requires that the same procedure be afforded here to Dubois and Fedder. See Bd. of Registration in Med. v. Fiorica, 488 A.2d 1371, 1375 (Me. 1985) (describing “the essence of due process as notice and an opportunity to be
III. CONCLUSION
[¶15] We affirm the court‘s order granting the Town of Arundel‘s motion to dismiss Dubois and Fedder‘s complaint, and we vacate the court‘s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against Dubois and Fedder and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The entry is:
Judgment as to sanctions vacated. Judgment affirmed in all other respects. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Sol Fedder, appellant pro se
Leah B. Rachin, Esq., and Benjamin T. McCall, Esq., Bergen & Parkinson, LLC, Kennebunk, for appellees Town of Arundel et al.
York County Superior Court docket number AP-2017-25
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY