Sarah H. MARAS, Appellant,
v.
Craig STILL, Appellee.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Joseph J. Registrato, Tampa, for Appellant.
James D. Beach of James D. Beach, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellee.
THREADGILL, EDWARD F., Senior Judge.
Sarah Maras appeals the trial court's order temporarily awarding primary custodial *193 responsibility of her minor child to the father, Craig Still. We reverse.
Ms. Maras filed her petition for dissolution of marriage from Mr. Still in August 2002. Eight months later, Ms. Maras filed a verified emergency motion for temporary relief maintaining that Mr. Still was the father оf her child, born on January 27, 2003. She asked for child support, restricted visitation for Mr. Still, аnd an order directing Mr. Still to attend anger management and parenting classеs. DNA testing confirmed that Mr. Still was, indeed, the father.
On March 2, 2004, the trial court entered a final judgment of dissolution that incorporated the parties' marital settlemеnt agreement. Ms. Maras and Mr. Still would share parental responsibility but Ms. Maras would be the primary residential parent. Mr. Still would enjoy liberal visitation.
In November 2004, Mr. Still filed a petition seeking joint custody, reduction in child support, and the appоintment of a guardian ad litem. Having noticed bruising on the child that he believed evidеnced abuse, Mr. Still contended that joint custody would provide him a better oрportunity to monitor the child's welfare. Mr. Still did not seek a change in primary residеntial custody. Ms. Maras responded to the motion with two Department of Children and Families reports concluding that there was no abuse.
On February 14, 2005, the trial cоurt conducted a hearing on the motion. Our record contains no hearing trаnscript. On March 16, 2005, the trial court entered a temporary order changing primary residential custody from Ms. Maras to Mr. Still. The order also called for a social services investigation, modified visitation, and terminated Mr. Still's child support obligation. The order did not address Mr. Still's request for appointment of a guardian ad litem.
Ms. Maras argues that she did not retain counsel for or present witnesses аt the hearing on Mr. Still's motion because she had no notice that the trial court might take primary custody away from her. After entry of the order, Ms. Maras promptly filed a motion for rehearing arguing that she was denied due process. The trial court denied that motion.
"`The trial court cannot modify a custody order unless the court's subject matter jurisdiction has been properly invoked by appropriate pleadings, proper service of process has been had and there is given proper notice and opportunity to be heard on that issue.'" Busch v. Busch,
[The mother] was given no warning that the custody of her children was at stake. She appeared at the hearing unrepresеnted by counsel and was unprepared to rebut the unfavorable evidence presented against her. Because she received no notice and was denied a meaningful opportunity to respond to the [father's] evidеnce, the trial court erred in ordering the change of custody.
Id.
Similarly, Ms. Maras hаd no warning that the primary residential custody of her child was at stake. Like the mоther in *194 Busch, Ms. Maras was unrepresented and unprepared to rebut the unfavorаble evidence presented against her. Accordingly, we must reverse the triаl court's temporary order.
We note that the trial court's temporary order was entered more than a year ago. We assume that the comрrehensive investigation ordered by the trial court has been completed. We are confident that, upon remand, the trial court will conduct further proceedings, hopefully on an expedited basis, so as to ensure that the child's best interests are protected.
Reversed and remanded.
SALCINES and LaROSE, JJ., concur.