Case Information
*1 BEFORE: BOGGS and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; and BARZILAY, Judge. [*]
GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant Maranda Tibbs filed this action against her former employer, defendant- appellee Calvary United Methodist Church (“Calvary”), alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). Tibbs appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Calvary. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
Maranda Tibbs is an African-American woman who wоrked as an assistant teacher at Calvary’s Young Children’s School (“YCS”) from March of 1989 until her discharge on July 29, 2008. In November 2007, Calvary hired Sharon Golden, a Caucasian, as the director of the YCS and instructed her to make changes in the program for the 2008-2009 school year, including rearranging teacher assignments to conform with the applicable state and federal accreditation and licensing standards. Although the YCS had been using a system of team teaching for some time, the 2008- 2009 standards required that each classroom have one lead teacher who had a Child Development Associate certification, an associate’s degree, or a college degree, and one assistant teacher (who was not required to hold a degree).
When Golden began her tenure, there were two classrooms that did not meet the 2008-2009 standards—one was Tibbs’s classrоom in the nursery. During the 2007-2008 school year, Tibbs, who was not qualified to be a lead teacher for lack of the requisite degree, taught with Linda Short, who also was not qualified as a lead teacher. Because neither Tibbs nor Short were lead teachers (nor eligible to be one), Golden decided to reassign them to different classrooms.
In March 2008, Golden discussed her proposed changes in classroom assignments for the 2008-2009 schoоl year with the staff. Tibbs expressed her preference to continue working with Short in the nursery, but because this was not an option, Golden arranged for Tibbs to work with Kimberly Hommel, a lead teacher, in the four-year-old’s classroom. Tibbs states that Golden justified the rearrangement by telling her that working with older students would be “easier on your back.” Tibbs further testified that Golden said that “because of my age and I was older, it would be less bending and lifting” and that “the yоunger teachers probably ha[ve] got more energy and [are] more . . . flexible working with younger children.” Golden denies making those statements, and Tibbs does not dispute that she took time off of work in early 2008 due to a non-work-related back injury.
In July 2008, due to a drop in enrollment numbers, Golden determined that there were not enough four-year-olds to comprise a class for the 2008-2009 school year. She ultimately decided to reassign Tibbs and Hommеl to a newly-created class for two-year-olds. On July 29, she and assistant director Jennifer Johnson met with Tibbs and Hommel, who were not pleased with the reassignment, to discuss the switch. The parties dispute what happened at the meeting. Golden testified that Tibbs became upset at the reassignment, yelled at her, and left the meeting before it concluded. Johnson and Hommel said Tibbs spoke loudly during the meeting and expressed anger and hurt. Goldеn viewed Tibbs’s behavior as insubordinate and inappropriate. Tibbs alleges to the contrary, testifying that Golden, in a raised and angry voice, said disparaging things about Tibbs’s education and nature. Tibbs testified that she was not disrespectful, but admitted that she became upset, started crying, and left the meeting before its conclusion.
Another teacher, Hedy Morrison, who was in an adjoining room and overheard part of the meeting, testified that she heard Golden yell at Tibbs and pound on her desk. While noting that both Golden and Tibbs have “loud voices” and that the discussion was “heated,” Morrison testified that she did not hear Tibbs say anything insubordinate or disrespectful, but she heard Tibbs crying. Tibbs admits that Morrison did not hear Golden make any comments about Tibbs’s age or race during the meeting and that there is nothing in Morrison’s statement to indicate that Tibbs’s age or race played a part in her subsequent termination.
After Golden concluded the meeting in Tibbs’s absence, she immediately conferred with assistant director Johnson, YCS attorney Chris Anderson, senior pastor Peter Van Eys and YCS personnel chair Leslie Calvert, about Tibbs’s behavior. Golden sought and ultimately obtained permission to fire Tibbs for insubordination. Later that day, Golden, Calvert, and Johnson told Tibbs she was terminated because of her behavior during the meeting. At the time of her discharge, Tibbs was 51 years old and was one of four African-American employees at Calvary. Calvary replaced her with a younger, Caucasian woman.
Tibbs filed the present action against Calvary, alleging age discrimination in violation of the ADEA, and race discrimination contrary to Title VII. Calvary moved for summary judgment. The district court, finding no direct evidence of discrimination under either claim, applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to both claims and, assuming that Tibbs еstablished prima facie cases, held that Calvary satisfied its burden of articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Tibbs’s termination—perceived insubordination towards Golden, her supervisor. The district court further determined that Tibbs failed to come forward with sufficient age or race-based evidence from which a reasonable jury might reject Calvary’s stated reason as pretextual. Tibbs now appeals the district court’s order of summary judgment in favor of Calvary. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filed an amicus brief in support of Tibbs’s Title VII claim.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Longaberger Co. v. Kolt
,
III.
A. Tibbs argues that the district court erred in concluding that she did not offer any direct evidence of age discrimination. We disagree.
The ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating “against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.”
29 U.S.C. § 623(a). An aggrieved employee may obtain relief under the ADEA if the employee can
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that age was the “but-for” cause of the challenged
employment action.
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.
,
“Direct evidence of discrimination is that evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion
that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.”
Provenzano
v. LCI Holdings, Inc.
,
Tibbs relies on Golden’s March 2008 statements as the purported direct evidence in this case. She states that Golden expressed concern that “because of [Tibbs’s] age and [she] was older, it would be less bending and lifting” to work with older children and that “the younger teachers probably ha[ve] got more energy and [are] more . . . flexible working with younger children.” Those ambiguous statements, which allegedly occurred four months before her termination, are not direct evidence of age discrimination. Assuming Golden made the statements as Tibbs claims, she was speaking in connection only with classroom assignments; they are not temporally connected with Tibbs’s dismissal or the reasons for that dismissal. The statements are also ambiguous in that they address Tibbs’s age and abilities in the context оf her recent back issues and do not explicitly demonstrate discriminatory prejudice based upon her age. Golden’s acknowledgment of Tibbs’s individualized circumstances are legitimate workplace concerns, not “blatant remarks” whose intent means nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of age. Since Golden’s statements were unrelated to the challenged employment action, and an inference is rеquired to link the ambiguous statements to Tibbs’s dismissal, they do not constitute direct evidence of age discrimination.
B.
Tibbs next argues that she has presented enough circumstantial evidence of age discrimination to survive summary judgment. In particular, Tibbs maintains that there is sufficient evidence to establish that she did not act insubordinately during the July 29, 2008, meeting, and, therefore, a reasonable jury could reject Calvary’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her as a pretext for age discrimination. Calvary, conceding that Tibbs has established a prima facie case of age discrimination, maintains that Tibbs has not presented sufficient age-based evidence to reject its nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. We agree with Calvary.
Under the framework established in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
,
Although Calvary concedes that Tibbs has established a prima facie case, it has articulated
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Tibbs’s termination: insubordination and inappropriate
behavior. We have previously confirmed that “insubordination can constitute legitimate reasons for
termination.”
Arnold v. Marous Bros. Constr., Inc.
,
Tibbs may establish pretext by showing that Calvary’s stated rеason (1) has no basis in fact;
(2) did not actually motivate the termination; or (3) was insufficient to warrant her dismissal.
Seeger
v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., LLC
, 681 F.3d 274, 285 (6th Cir. 2012). Here, Tibbs seeks to
demonstrate pretext by means of the first method—no basis in fact—which is essentially an attack
on the credibility of Calvary’s reason and “consists of showing that the employer did not actually
have cause to take adverse action against the employee based on its proffered reason, and thus, that
the proffered reason is pretextual.”
Id
. at 285 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In this
regard, although Tibbs denies being insubordinate and offers corroborating testimony of a third party
(Morrison), who admittedly heard only part of the meeting, she does not dispute that she left the
“heated” meeting early without her supervisor’s permission. This type of behavior, whether truly
insubordinate or just inappropriate, is enough to justify Calvary’s termination of Tibbs’s at-will
employment. Tibbs’s subjective belief that she was not insubordinate is insufficient to rebut
Calvary’s nondiscriminatory reason.
See Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp
.,
We further find that the “honest belief rule” protects Calvary’s termination decision. Under
this rule, if an employer demonstrates an honest belief in its proffered reason for the adverse
employment action, the inference of pretext is not warranted.
Seeger
,
an employer’s proffered reason is considered honestly held where the employer can establish it reasonably reli[ed] on particularized facts that were before it at the time the decision was made. Thereafter, the burden is on the plаintiff to demonstrate that the employer’s belief was not honestly held. An employee’s bare assertion that the employer’s proffered reason has no basis in fact is insufficient to call an employer’s honest belief into question, and fails to create a genuine issue of material fact.
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, so long as the employer has established its honest belief, “the emplоyee cannot establish pretext even if the employer’s reason is ultimately found to be mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless.” Id . at 286 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Calvary made its termination decision based on particularized facts. Golden personally
observed behavior she believed was insubordinate and inappropriate. Consequently, she consulted
Johnson, Anderson, Van Eys, and Calvert in obtaining permission to terminate Tibbs. Although
Tibbs continues to assert she was not, as a factual matter, insubordinate, “arguing about the accuracy
of the employer’s assessment is a distraction because the question is not whether the employer’s
reasons for a decision are
right
but whether the employer’s description of its reasons is
honest
.”
Smith v. Chrysler Corp.
,
C.
Next, Tibbs and the EEOC argue that she has presented enough circumstantial evidencе of race discrimination to present her Title VII claim to the factfinder. We disagree. [1]
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of race.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). This court applies the same
McDonnell Douglas
framework when
analyzing Title VII racial discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence as it does for the
ADEA.
See Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc.
,
Calvary concedes that Tibbs has established all but the fourth element of the prima facie case. It attacks the final element by arguing Tibbs was not treated differently than any employees outside the protected class and no different than other employees. We agree with Tibbs that the fourth element is stated in the disjunctive, so that a plaintiff may establish that element either by proof that she was replaced by someone outside the protected class, or was treated differently. Here, Calvary does not dispute it replaced Tibbs with a Caucasian female. Tibbs has therefore established the prima facie case, and the burden now shifts to Calvary to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. Consistent with their respective positions on the ADEA claim, Calvary asserts it terminated Tibbs because of insubordination, and Tibbs maintains this reason is a pretext for race discrimination.
As with her age discrimination claim, we find that Tibbs has failed to produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could reject Calvary’s nondiscriminatory reason as pretextual. Tibbs has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on the pretext issue because she does not deny that she left the “heated” meeting early, and her belief that she was not insubordinate is irrelevant in the analysis. In addition, she has failed to genuinely dispute Calvary’s honest belief in terminating her for insubordination.
Moreover, Tibbs’s exhaustive comparisons of her alleged behavior during the meeting, for
which she was fired, to Caucasian co-workers’ alleged misconduct, for which they were not fired or
disciplined, do not create a genuine issue of material fact on pretext. In reviewing such an argument,
we focus on whether the employees outside the protected class were similarly situated in all relevant
aspects, and whether the proffers of similar misconduct are analogous in terms of sеverity and
commonality.
Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc.
,
The proffered comparisons here are unpersuasive as the circumstances and seriousness of these other incidents varied considerably, and the Caucasian co-workers were not similarly situated to Tibbs. She offers no evidence that Calvary did not discipline Caucasian employees who engaged in severe misconduct analogous to arguing with a supervisor in a loud, “heated” meeting and walking out of that meeting before the supervisor called it to a close. She also offers no proof that Calvary employees commonly treated supervisors in such a manner or that supervisors routinely tolerated such behavior. Further, we reject Tibbs’s proffer of three memoranda written by Golden which purportedly show that Calvary did not terminate Caucasian employees for engaging in similar insubordinate cоnduct. Golden penned those memos seven months to two years after Tibbs’s termination; they are not temporally connected to events in this case and are irrelevant as to Golden’s motive for discharging Tibbs. Accordingly, Calvary was entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
D.
Tibbs’s final argument is that the district court erred in not considering her “mixed-motive” claim of racial discrimination when granting summary judgment to Calvary. Although the district court did not specifically address hеr mixed-motive claim in its written memorandum, it necessarily disposed of this claim by holding that Tibbs “produced no evidence that Defendant’s decision to terminate her was in any way based on her race . . . .” (Emphasis added.) We find no error in the district court’s conclusion.
Title VII prohibits adverse employment actions if the employee’s race was a motivating
factor, even if other legitimate factors also motivated the employer’s decision. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(m). To avoid summary judgment on a mixed-motive race discrimination claim, a plaintiff
must produce sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (2)
race was a motivating factor for the defendant’s adverse employment action.
White v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp.
,
Tibbs’s proofs do not allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Calvary considered her race a motivating factor in its decision to discharge her for insubordination. The record contains no direct evidence of racial discrimination. From the scintilla of circumstantial evidence offered—isolated comparisons of how Calvary allegedly treated Tibbs differently from Caucasian co-workers—a reasonable jury could not draw the inference that Calvary considered her race a motivating factor in its termination decision. Differences in requirements related to doctors’ notes or disciplinary decisions for minor workplace offenses underscore the discretionary nature of administrative decision making. A factfinder could not reasonably construe those differences as proof that it was more likely than not that Tibbs’s race partly motivated Calvary to fire a twenty-year veteran of its institution. Relatedly, as with the single-motive claim, we do not consider the memoranda that Golden wrote seven months to two years after Tibbs was terminated because the comparators were not similarly situated in that there is no temporal nexus to the events here and the misconduct differed from Tibbs’s actions in this case. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in Calvary’s favor.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Notes
[*] The Honorable Judith M. Barzilay, Senior Judge, United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
[1] Tibbs presents no direct evidence of racial discrimination.