{1} This is аn action to terminate an oil and gas lease in San Juan County, New Mexico. The lessee’s gas well stopped producing between December 1990 and March 1991. The lessors asserted the lease had terminated for lack of production because the lessees failed to tender shut-in royalty payments during that time and failed to resume operations within 60 days after the well stopped producing. The district court agreed and concluded that the lease terminated. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion. We also agree, though for different reasons, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the district court and the Court of Appeals.
BACKGROUND
Facts
{2} The lease in question, signed in 1959, covers two sections of land in San Juan County: Section 24 of Township 30 North, Range 12 West and Section 19 оf Township 30 North, Range 11 West. Petitioners, Norman and Loretta Gilbreath, are successors in interest to the original lessee. The lease contains a standard habendum clause, providing that “[tjhis lease remains in force for a term of five years and as long thereafter as oil, gas, casinghead gas, or other mineral or any of them is or can be produced.” During the five-year primary term, the original lessees successfully drilled one gas-producing well, Blancett Well # 1, in Section 24. Neither they nor the Gilbreaths drilled any other wells on the property. Blancett Well # 1 produced gas without interruption for several years until it stopped suddenly in December 1990. The Gilbreaths believed that production stopped because the pressure inside the well was insufficient to force the gas to flow into the рipeline operated by the gas purchaser, El Paso Natural Gas. In early January 1991, Norman Gilbreath closed off the valve to the pipeline in order to build up enough pressure in the well to overcome the pressure in the El Paso line. Because that step proved insufficient, on February 4,1991, the Gilbreaths treated the well with foam to remove excess liquids, another step that can
{3} Around this same time, the Gilbreaths were negotiating to enter a farmout agreement with Plaintiff Maralex Resources, an oil and gas development company that was seeking to acquire new leaseholds in the San Juan County area. The farmout agreement would have allowed Maralex, rather than the Gilbreaths, to operаte the well. While negotiating this agreement, Maralex hired a law firm to conduct a title search on the Gil-breaths’ mineral interest. The firm issued a title opinion concluding that the lease terminated under the terms of the habendum clause because the well stopped producing between December 1990 and March 1991. The author of the title opinion concluded that, if the Gilbreaths wanted to prevent the lease from terminating during that period, they were required to make payments to the Blancetts under the terms of the “shut-in royalty clause,” which in some situations allows the lessee to make predetermined payments instead of producing gas. Maralex provided this information to the Blancetts. In July 1991, the Gilbreaths mailed a royalty payment to the Blancetts. The royalty check represented payment for October 1989 to December 1990 the period prior to the time the well stopped producing. It is undisputed that the Blancetts were entitled to royalty payments for that time period. The Blancetts refused payment, asserting that the lease had already terminated because production ceased between December 1990 and March 1991.
{4} In October 1991, after asserting that the Gilbreaths’ interest under the 1959 lease had terminated, the Blancetts executed two leases for Maralex covering the Section 24 lands. The Gilbreaths, however, through their development company Caprock Energy, retained rights to Section 19 under a separate lease, signed in January 1991, that gave them the right to build a new well within three years. The Gilbreaths did not build a new well, so the Caprock lеase expired under its own terms in 1994. In May 1994, the Blancetts executed two additional leases for Maralex covering the Section 19 lands. Maralex then brought this suit seeking a declaratory judgment that (1) the 1959 lease expired under its own terms when the Gilbreaths failed to tender shut-in royalties in early 1991 and (2) the subsequent leases between Maralex and the Blancetts were therefore valid and in effect. The Gilbreaths brought numerous counterclaims alleging that Maralex interfered with their contractual relationship with the Blancetts.
Proceedings
{5} Maralex moved for partial summary judgment, asserting that the 1959 lease expired when production stopped during the early months of 1991. Maralex argued that, under the terms of the 1959 lease, if the Gilbreaths wanted to prevent the lease from terminating, they were required to pay shut-in royalties during the period of non-production. Because the Gilbreaths never tendered shut-in royalty payments, Maralex argued, the lease terminated under the terms of the habendum clause when the well stopped producing gas. The Gilbreaths raised several arguments in response. First, they argued that shut-in royalty payments were not required so long as they satisfied the “continuous operations clause” by taking steps to repair the well after it stopped producing. Second, while they argued that they could pay shut-in royalties to preserve the lease, they argued that the royalty payments were not yet due, so the lease had not yet terminated. 1 The district court rejected these arguments and granted Maralex’s motion for summary judgment.
{6} The Gilbreaths filed two separate motions for recоnsideration. In the second motion, they raised two new arguments, based on lease clauses that they claimed were previously illegible. First, they argued that the high pressure in the El Paso Natural Gas pipeline constituted an event beyond their control, and therefore they were protected by the force majeure clause, which prevents a lease from terminating when operations shut down due to a “cause beyond the control of the Lessee.” They also argued that, because
{7} Later, Maralex filed a full motion for summary judgment covering issues not raised in this appeal. Once that motion was granted, the Gilbreaths appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion. We granted certiorari.
DISCUSSION
{8} This Court reviews a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Mitchell-Carr v. McLendon,
{9} The typical oil and gas lease grants the lessee a fee simple determinable interest in the subsurface minerals within a designated area. See Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson,
{10} Most leases, however, contain savings clauses, which allow the lessee to avoid the consequences of automatic lease termination when production ceases. See id. at 247,
The Shut-in Royalty Clause
{11} Section 4 of the 1959 lease provides that:
[W]here gas from a well or wells capable of producing gas only is not sold or used, lessee may pay annually as royalty an amount equal to the delay rentals as providedin Section 5 hereof, which payment shall not be less than $100.00 per well per year, and if such payment is made it will be considered that gas is being produced from the above described land under all terms and clauses hereof.
This clause, known as the shut-in royalty clause, applies to the production of gas, rather than oil. See Greer,
{12} Maralex initially argued that thе lease terminated because the Gilbreaths failed to pay shut-in royalties during the period of non-production in order to prevent the lease from terminating. In arguments before the district court and the Court of Appeals, the parties assumed that, after the well stopped producing in December 1990, the Gilbreaths could have invoked the shut-in royalty clause contained in the 1959 lease. The dispute among the parties focused on whether the payments were due before or after the Blancetts asserted that the lease had terminated. The district court concluded that the lease terminated because the Gilbreaths failed to make a timely tender of shut-in royalty payments.
{13} After we granted certiorari, we asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing аddressing whether or not the Gil-breaths had the option of paying shut-in royalties in order to prevent the lease from terminating. In response, Maralex argued, for the first time, that the shut-in royalty clause does not apply when a well is incapable of producing gas in paying quantities, and therefore even if the Gilbreaths had tendered shut-in royalty payments, the lease would have terminated. Maralex relies on the particular language of the shut-in royalty clause within the 1959 lease, as well as cases from other jurisdictions that have so limited the application of the shut-in royalty clause. See, e.g., Hydrocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v. Tracker Exploration,
{14} Hydrocarbon also involved a well that suddenly stopped producing gas. See Hydrocarbon,
We believe that the phrase “capable of production in paying quantities” means a well that will produce in paying quantities if the well is turned “on,” and it begins flowing, without additional equipment or repair. Conversely, a well would not be capable of producing in paying quantities if the well switch were turned “on,” and the well did not flow, because of mechanicalproblems or because the well needs rods, or pumping equipment.
Id. at 433-34. Recently, in a case that did not involve a shut-in royalty clause, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed this definition of “capable of production.” See Anadarko Petroleum,
{15} The Hydrocarbon court then held that the well in that case was incapable of producing in paying quantities, because it did not flow when turned on. Hydrocarbon,
{16} The Gilbreaths acknowledge that the jurisdictions cited above have limited the application of the shut-in royalty clause. They argue, however, that New Mexico adopted a different approach in Greer,
{17} The Greer Court disagreed, holding that, despite the particular language within the lease, the lease would terminate under the habendum clause unless the lessees complied with the terms of a savings clause.
2
Id. at 248-49,
{19} In concluding this analysis, the Greer Court stated that “[t]he appellants could have saved themselves from automatic termination by complying with [the cessation of production clause]. Not having done this, they could have saved themselves from automatic termination by paying the shut-in royalty for the producible well, but this was not done.” Id. at 250,
{20} We do not believe that Greer stands for the proposition that a lessee can preserve a lease by paying shut-in royalties when a well is incapable of production. Instead, we believe the issue is undecided in New Mexico. We recognize that the well in Greer would not appear to meet the standard set out in Hydrocarbon and Anadarko Petroleum. It would appear that, because there was a leak in the line, the well would not have produced gas if the lessees had turned it on. Nonetheless, the parties stipulated that “the well was capable of producing in commercial quantities.” Greer,
{21} Moreover, in Greer, the lessees argued that they did not have to satisfy the terms of any savings clause, and it was clear in that case that the lessees had not satisfied the terms of any savings clause. The issue to be decided in Greer was the meaning of the habendum clause within that lease. The Court analyzed the shut-in royalty clause in order to determine the meaning of the habendum clause. The Court did not address the question of whether the shut-in royalty clause applied when a well is incapable of production because neither party raised that argument. Because cases are not authority for propositions not considered, see Fernandez v. Farmers Ins. Co.,
{22} In addition, while some general rules govern the interpretation of oil and gas leases, “a lessor and a lessee frequently vary from standardized oil and gas lease forms, which makes hazardous the application of standardized interpretations.” Greer,
{23} As noted above, the burden generally falls on the party seeking to terminate a mineral lease to prove that there was no production and that the lessees failed to satisfy the terms of any savings clause. Nonetheless, once a party has established that there was no production from a well, some jurisdictions shift the burden to the lessee to prove that a well is capable of producing in paying quantities. See Webb,
{24} Despite these concessions, the Gil-breaths argue that we must remand this cause so that the district court can determine whether the well was capable of production. They base their arguments on Clifton v, Koontz. In that case, the well in question operated at a loss for a period of two to three months. Clifton,
{25} Clifton has no application to this case. Indeed, the Clifton court specified that its holding did not extend to cases in which a well stopped producing altogether. Id. at 690. The Court explained that specific clauses, such as a cessation of production or continuous operations clause, apply when a well stops producing. Id. Those clauses often designate a specific time period, such as 60 or 90 days, during which the lessee must take steps toward resuming production. Thus, when production stops as a result of a mechanical problem with the well, the lessee must satisfy the terms of the cessation of production clause in order to prevent the lease from terminating. In this case, it is undisputed that Blancett Well # 1 stopped producing in Decembеr 1990 due to a problem with the well. Therefore, the Clifton analysis does not apply. In addition, the Gilbreaths never raised this argument below, although such an argument directly related to Maralex’s claim that the 1959 lease terminated due to lack of production.
{26} We see no reason to remand this issue to the district court, even though the district court did not consider arguments regarding the applicability of the shut-in royalty clause. We have held that the Gilbreaths could only rely on the shut-in royalty clause if the well in this case were capable of production. There is no evidence in the record to support a claim that the well was capable of production. For that reason, we do not believe it would be unfair to the Gilbreaths to affirm the district court, even though we do so on different grounds. In addition, we need not address the parties’ arguments
The Continuous Operations Clause
{27} The Gilbreaths assert that the 1959 lease did not terminate because they complied with the terms of the continuous operations clause, 3 which provides that
If, at the expiration of the primary term, Lessee is conducting operations for drilling a new well on said land or on acreage pooled therewith or reworking an old well thereon, or, if, after the expiration оf the primary term, production on this lease or on acreage pooled therewith shall cease, this lease nevertheless shall continue as long as said operations continue or additional operations are had on this lease or on acreage pooled therewith, which additional operations shall be deemed to be had where not more than sixty (60) days elapsed between abandonment or operation on one well and commencement of operations on another well,....
They argue that the district court erred by concluding that they were required to begin reworking operations within 60 days. The plain language of the clause, they argue, only requires that there be no more than 60 days between the abandonment of one well and еfforts to begin drilling a new well. They observe that the plain language imports no similar time limit for the commencement of reworking operations. As a result, they argue that the lease should not terminate so long as they exercised due diligence in working to regain production. In the alternative, they argue that they satisfied the 60-day time limit by closing the valve to the well in early January 1991. They argue that this action can be considered reworking operations because it was the first step in the efforts to resume well production.
{28} We see nothing in the record to indicate that the Gilbreaths preserved either of these arguments for appeal. “To preserve a question for review it must appear that a ruling or decision by the district court was fairly invoked.” Woolwine v. Furr’s, Inc.,
{29} The Gilbreaths make no effort to assert that they raised their other argument on apрeal-that there was no 60-day time limit for reworking operations-in arguments before the district court. Instead, they ask this court to “construe the rules of appellate procedure liberally so that causes on appeal can be determined on their merits.” We decline to do so. After the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Maralex, the Gilbreaths filed two separate motions to reconsider. In total, the Gil-breaths filed three separate briefs addressing the interpretation of the lease. Having failed to raise this issue in any of those briefs submitted to the district court, they cannot raise the issue on appeal.
Force Majeure
{31} The Gilbreaths argue that the lease did not terminate because the problem with line pressure was beyond their control and therefore triggered the force majeure clause, which applies when production ceases due to events beyond the сontrol of the well operators. See Sun Operating Ltd. P’ship v. Holt,
All express or implied covenants of this lease shall be subject to all Federal and State laws, Executive Orders, Rules or Regulations, and this lease shall not be terminated, in whole or in part, nor lessee held liable in damages, for failure to comply therewith, if compliance is prevented by, or if such failure is the result of any such Law, Order, Rule or Regulations or if prevented by an act of God, of the public enemy, labor disputes, inability to obtain material, failure of transportation, or other cause beyond the control of the Lessee.
The Gilbreaths argue that the line pressure problem either constituted a “failure of transportation” or fit into the catch-all phrase “other cause beyond the control of the Lessee.”
{32} In response, Maralex argues that the force majeure clause does not apply because it was within the Gilbreaths’ control to make shut-in royalty payments. This argument misconstrues the purpose of the force majeure clause. If the cessation of production is caused by a force majeure event, then no shut-in royalties are due. Sun Operating,
{33} The question to be decided, then, is whether the cessation of production was the result of a cause beyond the control of the Gilbreaths. “ ‘[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things of a particular and specific meaning, the general words are not construed in their widest extent but are instead construed as applying to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.’ ” State v. Foulenfont,
{34} The Gilbreaths contend that the cessation of production was beyond their control because it was caused by the pressure within the El Paso Natural Gas line.
Counterclaims
{35} In addition to granting summary judgment in favor of Maralex on the question of whether the 1959 lease was still valid, the district court also dismissed all the counterclaims brought by the Gilbreaths. These included claims for tortious interference with contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation, fraud, slander of title, and prima facie tort. The parties agree that if the 1959 lease is invalid, then the district court properly dismissed these counterclaims. We have held that neither the shut-in royalty clause nor the' force majeure clauses apply, and that the Gil-breaths failed to preserve the argument that they complied with the terms of the continuous operations clause. Therefore, the 1959 lease terminated during the spring of 1991, and the distriсt court properly dismissed the Gilbreaths’ counterclaims.
CONCLUSION
{36} The 1959 lease terminated when production ceased during the spring of 1991. Because neither the shut-in royalty clause nor the force majeure clauses apply, and because the Gilbreaths failed to preserve the argument that they complied with the terms of the continuous operations clause, the district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of Maralex. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
{37} IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The Gilbreaths raised additional arguments before the district court, but those arguments have either been abandoned on appeal or are no longer relevant to our analysis.
. Interestingly, the habendum clause in the 1959 lease is similar to the one in Greer, in that it provides that the lease remаins in effect so long as gas "is or can be produced.” Recently, the Texas Supreme Court disagreed with Greer, reading identical language to mean that actual production is not required to sustain the lease. See Anadarko Petroleum,
. Throughout the proceedings, the parties to this case have described this clause as the continuous operations clause. They did so, in part, to distinguish it from a different clause, which they labeled the cessation of production clause, that applied during the primary term of the lease. Nonetheless, that this clause is similar in effect to the "cessation of production clause” in Greer and other cases.