*1 rеversed, Order retail theft charge reinstated case is remanded trial. Jurisdiction is relinquished. Manzitti,
Thomas A. Appellants, MANZITTI and Patricia AMSLER, Williamsport Dr. R. Fred Jr. and Orthopedic Hospital, Appellees.
Superior Pennsylvania. Court of
Argued Feb. 1988.
Filed Oct. 1988.
Reargument Denied Nov. supra. Secondly, review of support our the record does not evidence insane, appellee for the conclusion that the was other than the bald evidence, psychiatrist, by any assertion that such unsubstantiated medical finding properly presented drawn from facts at hearing held below. *2 Jr., Youngman, Williamsport, appellants. for John C. Drust, Wilkes-Barre, appellees. for Joann POPOVICH, CAVANAUGH, OLSZEWSKI and Before JJ.
OLSZEWSKI, Judge: Manzitti, appeal from Thomas A. and Patricia Apрellants, to enforce petition granting appellees’ the trial court’s order and loss of injuries for agreement personal settlement our review: issues for Appellants present consortium. two claim for spouse’s of an (1) injured whether settlement loss of non-injured spouse’s disposes personal injuries agreement (2) whether a settlement a case settles attorney wrongfully where an is enforceable client. For of his/her obtaining first the consent without below, affirm the trial court’s order stated we the reasons agreement. enforcing the settlement malpractice Thomas Manzitti filed this medical Appellant arising of an opera- out appelleеs injuries Amsler, M.D., Fred on Dr. performed by appellee, tion included, inter injuries Mr. Manzitti’s August alia, spinal nerves, permanent severed loss of bowel and control, bladder and sexual impotency. Patricia Appellant Manzitti, Thomas', filed jointly wife a claim for loss of her consortium. husband’s appellants represented Kocsis, were
Originally, by John Esquire. early February appellees’ insurance carrier, through general agent, its negotiated settlement $150,000.00 directly Attorney with Kocsis and offered settle the claims of both appellants.1 Attorney Kocsis indi- agent cated to the insurance that he had settle and, on case February accepted settlement offer on of both аppellants. Appellees behalf tendered the occasions, draft appellants settlement on several appellants, expressing abrogate their intention to the oral agreement, to accept refused the settlement and sign the releases. *3 April counsel,
On appellants, through new filed continuance, counsel, a motion for withdrawal of and re- motion, moval of the case from the list. In trial signed by appellants, and verified the following statements were made:
10. Patricia never by Manzitti was consulted Attorney respect Kocsis with to giving authority to settle her case and never authorized settlement her case at time any or for any price.
11. The offеr of the defense for Fifty One Hundred ($150,000.00) Thousand 00/100 was Dollars not an alone, offer to settle the case of Thomas but Manzitti was an offer to settle the case of both Thomas Manzitti and Patricia Manzitti for a One payment total Hundred ($150,000.00) Dollars, Fifty Thousand and 00/100 and no division the two cases was in said between made offer.
12. Thomas Manzitti authorized the settlement of his ($150,- case Fifty for One Hundred Thousand 00/100 000.00) Dollars represented on the belief as by Attorney $100,000.00 Appellees pay 1. would while the Medical Professional $50,000.00. Catastrophe Loss Fund would contribute the additional could verdict was jury the most he obtain Kocsis that ($200,000.00) Thousand and 00/100 Dollars. Two Hundred motion and re- subsequently granted trial The court from the trial list. moved the case to responded petition with enforce Appellees thereafter trial on argued was court settlement which before At the trial court ruled that hearing, March 18, 1986 motion appellants’ April 11 and 12 of paragraphs appellants of Thomas Manzitti’s by admissions judicial were personal injury to settle his claim. express authorization however, on court, to hear wheth- The trial refused evidence acquired express authority Kocsis actually er Attorney prior accepting appel- to settle the case Patricia Manzitti of Mr. The trial court found that settlement lees’ offer. of Mrs. Manzitti to extinguished Manzitti’s claim her further with cause action bеcause proceed any was derivative of her husband’s loss of consortium claim addition, relying claim. on Rothman personal injury Fillette, trial court enforceable agreement concluded that the settlement appellants’ Kocsis had ex- regardless Attorney of whether Thus, trial their claims. court settle press agreement with the settlement appellants comply ordered this followed. timely appeal is erred Appellants’ first contention trial court spouse’s loss of consortium claim finding non-injured that a of his/her spouse’s injured barred this discussing claim. For the personal injury purpose *4 issue, determined that properly we find that the trial court personal injury authorized settlement his Mr. Manzitti addition, court refused to hear claim. since trial authorization of her alleged evidence on Mrs. Manzitti’s assume, she not purposes, we for did will review claim. of her loss of consortium authorize settlement Pennsylvania note it is we well-settled Initially, is for of consortium derivative of the that an action See, Winner v. Oakland injured spouse’s e.g., claim. 405, (1893); A. v. Linebaugh Pa. 27 1110 Township, 158 458
Lehr,
135,
Pa.Super.
(1986);
351
The consortium claim and personal claim injury are interconnected; total, closely together, represent they compensable damages and indirect —suffered aas —direct principal plaintiffs result Viewed in this injury. it light, makes little sense to hold that an injured party’s
negligence would or limit direct bar his for recovery but would not injury, spouse’s affect recovery indirect injury.
The plaintiff has ... suffered no direct inju- ry____ derived, to recover is both in a [His/Her] sense, legal literal and from injury suffered by spouse. [his/her]
Scattaregia,
Pa.Super.
455-456,
at
The question of whether
the non-injured spouse’s
claim
for loss
consortium is
by
barred
the injured
spouse’s settlement and
personal
release
his/her
injury
claim
yet
has
to be directly
addressed
a Pennsylvania
appellate
however,
court.
Pennsylvania decisions,
Several
support our holding
that a loss
today
of consortium claim is
a separate and distinct cause of
from
the injured
spouse’s
derived;
claim from
it
and,
which was
consequent
ly, that a claim for loss of consortium not
barred
settlement and
injured spouse’s
release
personal
claim. See Nunamaker v. New Alexandria Bus
(1952);
371 Pa.
Walker v. Philadelphia,
459
denied,
639, 523
346
(1986),
A.2d
635
A.2d
allocatur
116,
Blanco,
Pa.Super.
224
Super. attempted a husband and wife with situation where for and loss of proceeds personal injury collect insurance damages through Pennsylvania Insurance consortium 1701.101, Act, seq. 40 Pa.S.A. et Guaranty Association § an The which was issued insolvent policy, insurance insurer, for provided compensation expressly damages personal injury was included agreed This Court with Insurance recovery. claimant’s Guaranty only obligated pay Association that it was analysis, As a of the this part individual claim of husband. Court stated: attempt opposing interpreta- reconcile
[W]e tions of the nature of a loss of consortium one is proper purpose, namely which one the other which recovery spouse “separate,” of a as unites the two proper liability when limitation separate “persons language under the injured” claims [of as in this case. policy], insurance Vickodil, 638. While our at 514 A.2d at Vickodil, was to enforce contractual purpose supra, in accordance with the provisions policy of the insurance provisions statutory Pennsylvania Insuranсe Guaran- ty Act, Association' this acknowledged Court its willingness *6 to a “separate” allow and distinct loss of consortium claim. Court, in Buttermore v. Aliquippa Hospi-
Recently, this
tal,
49,
Pa.Super.
(1987),
368
Buttermore,
60,
Further,
Court,
Supreme
our
in Nunamaker v. New
Alexandria
Bus
(1952),
371
Pa.
2. The Act been has Pa.R.Civ.P. Rules 2228 and interpreting prior Cases the Act versions of Rules 2228 and 2232, however, validity retain their because the new versions those merely provisions Rules recognizing restate the of the Act while pursue woman’s a loss of consortium cause of action. Pres- ently, Pennsylvania joinder Civil Rules of Procedure mandate plaintiffs. related added). Similar (emphasis at 699 at 88 A.2d Pa. Id. 371 Blanco, Pa.Super. Hopkins ly, (1974), this Court 90, aff'd, injury infliction of a non-fatal “The stated: unequivocally rights and distinct separate now confers spouse one upon at Id. upon spouses.” both of actions added). Thus, Nunamaker (emphasis A.2d at 858 a loss position our current expressly support Hopkins distinсt cause separate claim is a consortium it was claim from which injury personal action from derived. that loss of has also indicated addition, legislature our injured independently compensable claim. personal and release
spouse’s *7 8528(c),3 are recoverable damages 42 Pa.C.S.A. Under § for, alia, earnings, loss of inter against the Commonwealth loss of consor and suffering, expenses medical pain 100 Pa.Cmwlth. Com., Dept. of Transp., In Kowal v. tium. inter (1986), Court 593, 116 the Commonwealth 515 A.2d from separate recoveries 8528(c)to authorize Section preted of con and loss injured spouse the Commonwealth to the are similar facts of Kowal claimant. The sortium law, promotе Pennsylvania in order undisputable that is It verdicts, requires that economy inconsistent judicial and avoid be of consortium claim must personal injury claim and the loss disposition of the emphasize that our brought single We in a action. joinder As rules. judice the aforementioned sub does not alter case 116, Blanco, Hopkins v. 224 stated in this Court spouse’s join other (1973): spouse to "The failure of one Donoghue non-joining spouse. v. the claim of the will forever bar 181, (1902); Todd Company, Pa. 201 Traction Consolidated Thus, (1952).... rights Bercini, A.2d 538 92 v. 371 121, Pa.Super. at one suit.” Id. 224 spouses be redressed in both at A.2d 302 8528, part, Damages, pertinent Limitations § 3. 42 Pa.C.S.A. reads: Damages shall be recoverable (c) damages Types of recoverable. — only for: earning capacity. earnings (1) future loss of Past or (2) suffering. Pain including---- expenses (3) dental Medical and (4) of consortium. Loss (5) Property losses.... 462
case at the injured bar husband his personal settled claim the Commonwealth but his wife did not settle loss of expressly consortium claim. The Com- monwealth Court stated: concede,
The Kowal’s they must, as loss of claim since derivative it arises from the impact spouse’s one physical injuries upon the other spouse’s marital privileges and not, amenities. This does however, alter the uninjured spouse’s plaintiff status as a in her damages, own since her derivative, although are personal her.
Id. at
597,
Furthermore,
persuaded
we are
by the
opinions
our
sister states which
support
position that a claim for loss
of consortium
accrues
spouse alone
non-injured
and is
not
barred
the settlement
and release of the injured
See,
e.g.,
West,
Crouch v.
spouse’s
personal
injury claim.
Parks,
72,
Deese v.
Colo.App.
29
(1970);
Two of the
opinions
above-cited
are very similar
to the
Copco
Rosander v.
Steel and Engineering
case at
bar.
Company,
Id.
opinion).
court
The
of the
(quoting
analysis
at 991
trial
Rosander
by
is
used
court
almost
identical
trial
court in the case sub
judice.
The
Indiana Court
the trial
trial court
held:
reversed the
Appeals
loss of
cannot
denied that a claim for
consortium
It
be
to one
the
spouse,
is derivative in that without an
such,
no
As
spouse
subject
other
would have
action.
it
it
some of
defenses as the action from which
the same
v. Arthur
Arthur
(1973), 156 Ind.App.
is derived.
Nevertheless,
actions in
placing
Id. Indiana adopt by at 991. We used analysis Rosander, that, hold autho- Appeals Court absent spouse rization to sеttle by non-injured claim does not bar injured spouse’s claim subsequent prosecution of the loss of consortium non-injured spouse. us, the facts similar to the case before strikingly Under a loss of consor Jersey Court New ruled that Superior injured claim is the settlement tium not barred Kossove, Neely N.J.Super. spouse’s claim. Neely court addressed the “deriva
A.2d 788 The issue as tive” follows: claim is plaintiff’s contend that
Defendants further her husband’s entirely dependent upon derivative may prose- it her claim not be cause of action. Without *9 cuted. To conclude that because it is derivative it may not be instituted unless her husband’s claim is still action- able would ignore the fact that her claim is a sеparate and distinct cause of action. Derivative means “come from owing its existence to something fore- another — going.” Black’s (rev. Law Dictionary 530 4th 1957); ed. thus it is the husband’s not his cause of action that accounts for the creation of the right wife’s litigate. To succeed in her action she would still have to establish through credible evidence the liability tortfeasor as well as her damage loss. Her to do so cannot be affected injured spouse’s release of his claim since her right to a recovery separate and dis- tinct.
Id.
a derivative independent but claim for loss of consortium to continue after settlement of the injured spouse’s action will create problems of double recovery and inconsistent verdicts. concerns, These however, are unfounded. The prospect that a knowledgeable insurer, securing a bargain release, for permit would double recovery through payment of a settlement greater than the value of the claims actually released is untenable. Additionally, to prevent double re- covery, the loss of consortium claimant is not entitled to recover loss of support. Maker, See Troue v. 253 Ind. 252 N.E.2d 800 Inconsistent verdicts are not *10 disposi- is not in instant situation as a release the problem the under Consequently, of an action. of the merits tive facts, and inconsist- recovery about double concerns instant After carеful not of consideration. are worth ent verdicts loss of non-injured spouse’s the we find that analysis, derivative, distinct separate is and though Therefore, claim. personal injury injured spouse’s from the give does not of the consortium claim posture the derivative rights the the to waive vested party power the injured of claim Settlement the consortium non-injured spouse. the the of consortium authorized loss expressly must be claimant. damages for based on a
Having ruled that lawsuit of despite claim continue the settlement may of consortium claim, we now will address underlying personal injury the the trial court erred second contention that appellants’ attorney where the enforcing agreement a settlement obtaining the settled the case without first wrongfully the court of client. We find that trial consent his/her in Roth- Supreme on our Court’s decision correctly relied Fillette, which man v. controlling a situation. such Rothman, the question Court was confronted with two innocent of loss between who bear burden acted parties for one of the has
parties attorney where the misappropri- and has beyond scope his/her as proceeds. The facts Rothman are ated the settlement Rothman was involved an automobile Philip follows: and, result, Roth- personal injuries. sustained accident as Madniek, to institute suit Irving Esquire, man retained filed A damages. cоmplaint subsequently was recover insurer, The Fillettes* and Ronald Fillette. Gloria agreed to Company, Insurance settle Liberty Mutual $7,000.00. offer Attorney accepted case for Madniek authorization, Lib- returned a release to without Rothman’s Rothman, and absconded erty signed by Mutual purportedly Madniek, case Attorney with the On order money. settled, discontinued, ended. marked Unaware was believing these events case go would eventually trial, Rothman maintained contact with his attorney. later, years Five Rothman discovered that his had attorney “settled” the and misappropriated case the the settlement Rothman hired proceeds. new counsel and petitioned settled, trial court to remove marking the order the case discontinued, and ended. The trial granted court peti- tion reinstated Rothman’s action against the Fillettes. ruling That affirmed appeal by on this Court. See Fillette, Rothman v. A.2d Court, (now On to our appeal Supreme Justice Nix Chief Justice), writing the majority, reversed this Court and explained:
The
jurisdiction
law this
is quite
attorney
clear that an
must have express
authority to settle a cause
action of
the
Masters,
client. International Organization
Mates
America,
and Pilots
Local No.
v.2
International
Masters,
Organization
America,
Mates and Pilots of
Inc.,
436,
(1974);
456 Pa.
v.
Archbishop
Karlak,
(1973);
450 Pa.
294
A.2d
McLaughlin v.
(1927);
A.
Monaghan, 290
Lipschutz v.
Lipschutz,
(1936).
124 Pa.Super.
The thаt is here relates to where the allocation loss should fall as a agent’s result of the performance. unfaithful It must emphasized be our judgment both of the parties of this action were any innocent and free of fault. Mr. Rothman in selecting counsel, his a that time person at certified to law practice by this Court had no suspect reason to misconduct. Like- wise, the Fillettes their bargained and insurer in good faith appellee with and Mr. Madnick under circumstances reasonably give would not rise to any inference that counsel was a breaching trust the client. The Fillettes insurer every their had reason to believe under facts presented that the purported settlemеnt had been expressly approved Mr. Rothman. circumstances,
Under these
we believe
applicable
long
recognized principle that where
one
two
persons
innocent
must suffer because of the fraud of a
third, the one who has accredited him
must bear
loss.
Co.,
Keller v. N.J.
and Plate Glass Insurance
Fidelity
Wickersham,
v.
Mundorff
(1960): suffer, one of persons
Where two innocent must should himby put wrongdoer be borne who position trust and confidence and thus him enabled perpetrate the wrong. case law has expressed acting Our that a principal through agent in dealing party with an innocent third of the consequences agent’s bear fraud. Keller Co., N.J. Fidеlity supra.; v. Glass Incurance [sic] Cook, Wickersham, v. supra; Williams Mundorff Homes, Inc., supra; Rykaczewski Kerry supra. such instances the lack of agent has been rejected shifting as a basis for onto principal’s losses the innocent third party. Fidelity See Keller v. N.J. Cook, supra.; supra; Glass Insurance Williams v. Wickersham, supra; Rykaczewski v. Kerry Mundorff Homes, Inc., Herr, supra; Himes v.
(1896). The fact that the has agent wronged principal through agent’s unlawful act does provide not *12 predicate insulating the harm principal caused by agent expenses at the of the innocent third party who had no for the conduct of the responsibility agent. See Keller Fidelity v. N.J. and Glass Insurance Co., Cook, supra.; Williаms v. Wickersham, supra; Rykaczewski Mundorff Homes, Inc.,
Kerry supra. We believe that this view is consistent with fundamentally principals agency sound and equity that there were no other additional factors here present justify ignoring its applicability.
jfc ¡fc ift sit sit sf! The next step question must address the analysis as to agent whether the unauthorized actions of the bars
Rothman’s further pursuit of the claim.4 Logical consist would not ency be offended a finding that although the Fillettes were entitled to a credit for the payment made, the unauthorized settlement should be set aside provided Rothman opportunity establish that the damages exceeded the However, amount received. such a view must be rejеcted as being inescapably disrup tive of established policies. strong
There
judicial
policy
parties
favor of
voluntarily settling lawsuits.
Corporation
Pennwalt
Inc.,
(3d
Plough,
Cir.1982);
F.2d 77
Castillo v. Roger
(3d
Construction
560 F.2d
Cir.1977);
Autera v.
Robinson,
136 U.S.App.D.C.
# sjc [*] # sic # design We cannot our rules on the assumption that the members our Bar will participate in criminal behavior. We must rely upon the fidelity of our Bar main, experience has demonstrated the justification for that reliance. Where the unusual and unfortunate case occurs, of breach of trust here, such as we rely upon the procedures other established in our law to provide punishment and to serve as a deterrent against repetition of suсh conduct. 4 The harshness of this result is to some extent ameliorated this Court’s security establishment of a client fund which was de signed defalcating to assist attorneys. Pennsylvania clients of Client Fund, Enforcement,
Security Disciplinary Rules of seq. Rule 502 et 264-265, Id. 503 Pa. at (footnote A.2d at 545-547 omitted).
Instantly, appellants concede that Mr. Manzitti ex pressly authorized Attorney Kocsis to settle personal claim.4 Appellants argue, however, that Mrs. Man zitti did not expressly authorize Attorney Kocsis to settle continuance, counsel, In their motion for withdrawal of and remov- list, however, appellants Kocsis, al from the trial alleged Attorney through misrepresentation claims, fraudulent of the value of their сonvinced Mr. Manzitti unwisely. Appellants to settle his case main- Attorney intentionally tained that misrepresented Kocsis the value of $200,000.00 the claims to be recovery a maximum of at trial. This contention, however, currently is not before us for review. *13 her and distinct separate consortium claim. Even assuming that Mrs. Manzitti did not authorize expressly claim, Attorney Kocsis to settle her agree- settlement ment nonetheless was still enforceable. Rothman,
As in
to this
parties
action were innocent
free of
Appellees
fault.
and their insurer had a reason
able belief
the oral settlement agreement had been
authorized
expressly
by both Mr. and Mrs. Manzitti. By
failing to obtain Mrs. Manzitti’s express сonsent to settle
Kocsis
Attorney
acted
beyond
scope of his
wrongfully settled her claim.
Supreme
Our
“
explained
Court
in Rothman that
one of two
‘[w]here
persons
suffer,
innocent
the loss should be borne by
him
put
who
wrongdoer
position
of trust and
”
confidence and thus enabled him perpetrate
the wrong.’
Id.,
not err by enforcing the
agreement.
We must
be mindful that in the rare and unfortunate case where
occurs,
such a breach
as in
case,
the instant
the client
“must rely upon the other procedures established in our law
provide
punishment and to serve as a
deterrent
repetition of such
cоnduct.” Id.
Accordingly, the order of the trial court is affirmed. POPOVICH, J., concurring files dissenting Opinion.
POPOVICH, Judge, concurring and dissenting: While I agree wholeheartedly with the majority’s learned holding that a lawsuit for damages based on a loss of consortium claim may continue despite the settlement of the underlying personal claim, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s application of Fillette, Rothman v. (1983) 469 A.2d 543 to enforce the settlement agreement. *14 Rothman, supra, Supreme
In our Court unequivocally stated: outset,
At the
it must be understood that under the
question
facts of this case there is no
of an
or an
implied
The
apparent agency.
jurisdiction
quite
law
this
attorney
express
an
must have
clear that
client,
a cause
the
settle
added)
(emphasis
Masters,
Organizаtion
International
Mates and Pilots
America, Local No. 2 v.
Organization
International
Masters,
America, Inc.,
Mates and Pilots
436,
456 Pa.
Karlak,
Archbishop
v.
(1974);
535,
318 A.2d
450 Pa.
(1973);
McLaughlin v.
Monaghan,
290 Pa.
v.
74,
Lipschutz
Lipschutz,
(1927);
However, continued, stating: the Court circumstances, these applicable
Under
we believe
here
long recognized
the
that where one of
principle
two
innocent
must suffer
persons
because of the fraud of a
third, the one who has accredited him must
the loss.
bear
Co.,
Keller v.
Fidelity
N.J.
and Plate Glass Insurance
Wickersham,
(1932);
v.
306 Pa.
(1960): suffer, one persons
Where
of two innocent
must
the
loss should
him who
the
put
wrongdoer
be borne
position
of trust and confidеnce and thus
him
enabled
the
perpetrate
wrong.
expressed
principal acting
Our case law has
that a
through
agent
dealing
with an innocent third party
Keller
of the
fraud.
consequences
agent’s
bear
Co.,
Fidelity
supra;
v. N.J.
and Glass Insurance
Cook,
Williams v.
Mun-
Wickersham, supra; Rykaczewski
v.
v. Kerry
dorff
Homes, Inc.,
supra.
such
instances
lack of au-
of the
has
as a
for
thority
agent
rejected
been
basis
losses onto the innocent
third
shifting
principal’s
See
v.
Fidelity
Co.,
Keller N.J.
Glass Insurance
party.
Cook,
supra; Williams
supra;
v. Wickers
Mundorff
ham, supra;
Homes, Inc.,
Rykaczewski Kerry
supra;
Herr,
Himes v.
3 Pa.Super.
The fact
agent has wronged
principal
through
the agent’s
act
provide
predicate
unlawful
does not
for insulating
principal
harm caused
agent at
expense
innocent third
had
party who
no responsi
Keller v. N.J. Fideli
agent.
the conduct of the
bility
Glass
ty
supra;
Cook,
Insurance
Williams v.
Wickersham,
supra;
supra, Rykaczewski v.
Mundorff
*15
Homes, Inc.,
Kerry
supra. We believe that this
view
consistent with
sound
fundamentally
principals of agency
and
and that there
equity
were no other additional factors
here present
justify ignoring
to
its applicability. Roth
man,
Applying the Supreme Court our reversed affirmance of the lower court’s decision.1 Clearly, the two from passages Supreme the quoted Court’s decision above and, inconsistent, are consequently, legal the еffect the Rothman opinion is vitiated that by inconsistency.
I am bemused the by Supreme application Court’s by in agency estoppel the context of an attorney-client relationship. Normally, “[ajuthority by estoppel occurs when a principal his by culpable negligence, permits an agent him, to exercise powers granted not though to even the principal did not know or have notice of agent’s the Apex Decker, Financial v. conduct.” Corp. Pa.Super. v. Reifsnyder Dougherty, Obviously, logical the conse- quence of that applying principal “agency law” to Rothman facts is prior to overrule Pennsylvania case law establish, law, and to Pennsylvania as the rule that settle- Fillette, 1. In Rothman we that, client, express authority attorney held absent from an cannot compromise his client’s release his cause of action or settle Thus, litigation. holding we affirmed the lower court’s that agreement by attorney settlement entered Mr. into Rothman’s without express authority his was unenforceable. by attorney ment of a client’s cause of action is enforce- the client had either attorney able where ex- I, however, or to settle. press, apparent implied authority result, Supreme do not our Court intended such a believe prior Pennsylvania regarding since case law the need for create an sеttlement express authority to enforceable overruled, and, fact, precisely not that case law expressly support was cited court’s decision. I to the conundrum
Though explain am unable Rothman, creates, I Supreme assume that our supra, to from depart long Court did not intend established tradition which mandates invalidation of the Pennsylvania attorney express- settlement or release of a claim an not indeed, authorized his client so do. And ly Court, citing Karlak, Supreme Archbishop supra, alia, reinforced Monaghan, supra, inter McLaughlin however, very principle. Inexplicably, Supreme its proceeded depart Court from own statement of the law, sound applying “fundamentally principles agency to enforce a settlement there equity,” where was admit- tedly express authority Clearly, Pennsylvania no settle. “principle agency equity” case law commands that apply adjudicating attorney’s do not when unauthorized Therefore, of a I client’s claim. would follow *16 as in prior the mandate of case law stated v. McLaughlin Monaghan, supra:
An
as such cannot release a client’s cause of
attorney
...,
or
rights
or surrender his substantial
whole
...,
in part
compromise
litigation,
or
or settle his client’s
special
without
so to do.
138 A.
authority
McLaughlin,
at 80.
(1973);
See also
Interna-
Masters,
tional
Amer-
Organization
Mates and Pilots of
ica,
Masters,
International Organization
Local No. 2 v.
Inc.,
America,
456 Pa.
318
supra,
Mates and Pilots of
(1974);
Tucker,
A.2d 918
v.
370 Pa.
Moreover,
Circuit,
Third
Appeals
the Court of
Co.,
client’s case
virtue of his
to
solely
Parker,
(7 Cranch)
handle
case. Holker v.
U.S.
(1813). Instead,
See also Smith v. Delaware
Auto
Valley
Spring
(E.D.Pa.1986) (cited Rothman,
F.Supp.
supra,
proposition
tends that she did not authorize her to settle attorney of consortium claim. I Consequently, would remand case for an evidentiary hearing question on gave Attorney express whether Patricia Manzitti Kocsis her settle her claim. authority to A.2d Pennsylvania, Appellant, COMMONWEALTH Burton KAUFMAN.
Superior Pennsylvania. Court of
Argued Aug. 1988.
Filed Oct. 1988.
Reargument Denied Nov.