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Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, as of the Estate of Charlotte C. Wallace v. United States
775 F.2d 459
2d Cir.
1985
Check Treatment

*3 light statistical norm. of all these cir- GRAAFEILAND, NEW- Before VAN cumstances, nothing there is unconstitu- PRATT, Judges. MAN and Circuit challenged practice. about the tional PRATT, Judge: C. Circuit GEORGE appeal by question presented Background

The judg summary from the the United States 5, 1923, On November Charlotte C. Wal- Hanover Trust ment Manufacturers provided in- lace established a trust (S.D. States, F.Supp. v. United Co. and, death, come to her for her life on her Stewart, N.Y.1983), Judge, Charles E. son, corpus her Howard. The income to the Internal Revenue Service’s use whether pass by the terms of How- the trust would mortality gender-based tables to value mother, by if he outlived his but ard’s will reversionary of a decedent’s es interests prede- if he terms of Charlotte’s will 2037 violates the tate under U.S.C. § February died on ceased her. Charlotte guaranteed by the due equal protection 88; by age she was survived at the of the fifth amendment. process clause Howard, years old. The was then 57 who IRS, following regulations effect if the value of provides tax law estate used mor from 1970 reversionary interest in a trust a decedent’s tality to calculate the estate tax percent immediately before death exceeds by plaintiff Manufacturers Hanover owed value, corpus trust’s then the trust Company, as executor of the estate Trust included in the estate. 26 must be The district court of Charlotte C. Wallace. (1982). 2037(a)(2) U.S.C. § practice unconstitu held that the IRS tional, plaintiff awarded and it therefore the value executor calculated Charlotte’s $455,581.71plus interest. tax refund of per- at 4.9867 her interest cent, 1 of the United using Unisex Table Although the chal We reverse. 1959-61, published by Tables: States distinguish did be lenged IRS Life States known as the United then what was females, clas males and tween Health, and Wel- Education Department of substantially related to sification was the value fell below fare. Because pro objective of important governmental cutoff, paid estate statutory percent in estate taxes moting equity and fairness corpus. reversionary inter- no tax on the trust accurately valuing Are situated regulations in A. men and Treasury effect at the differently women treated because death, however, re- time of Charlotte’s gender? quired the value of classification computed according in a trust to be government argues the IRS tables. See Treas. practice does men treat and women 20.2031-7(a), 20.2031-10(d), (e), (f), differently “[ujnder Reg. percent the 5 §§ rule of section 66-307, estates of 20.2037-l(c)(3); dece- Rev.Rul. 1966-2 includable, dents of both sexes Using gender-based tables, Cum.Bull. 429. trusts established for benefit of mem- value of the calculated the reversion- IRS bers of both key sexes are taxable. The percent ary interest at 6.654 assessed grantor’s grantee’s sex, not the aggregate deficiency, the estate grantor’s in- $458,662.98. additions, plus terest.” and, paid deficiency The estate after argument unconvincing. While it *4 claim for a an administrative refund was is true that of both estates male and fe- denied, suit. filed this refund The district male decédents are includable under the estate’s granted court the motion for sum rule, may and that trusts be taxed whether (S.D.N.Y. F.Supp. 837 mary judgment, 576 women, their men beneficiaries are or 1983), holding gender-based that use of nevertheless, government what the calls mortality equal protec the tables violated “key” the of section 2037—the value of the the fifth component tion amendment. grantor’s reversionary interest —is deter- appeal This followed. mined calculations treat

situated men and differently. women As a result the amount of the estate tax will Discussion depend upon sometimes whether the dece- “Statutory classifications distin- dent or male beneficiary is or female. This guish and between males females are ‘sub- following comes way. about ject scrutiny Equal under Protection purposes tax, For of the estate the value ” Boren, Craig Clause.’ grantor’s reversionary interest in a (1976) 50 S.Ct. requires calculating trust the probability Reed, Reed v. (quoting 71, 75, U.S. person age grantor, that a at 251, 253, (1971)). S.Ct. “To just prior death, would outlive the * * * challenge withstand constitutional figures beneficiary. trust’s on life ex- by gender impor- classifications must serve pectancies come standard mortality from governmental tant objectives and must be tables, gender-based and tables reflect the substantially related achievement of that, undisputed average, fact on the wom- objectives.” Craig Boren, these longer every age. en live than men at 456. In the statistical fact then affects calculation first, government argues, case the that the of a ways. interest two challenged statutory scheme does not treat First, gender-based when tables are second, men differently, and women used, the likelihood that a female trust statutory that even if the scheme does beneficiary great- settlor will outlive her treat differently, men and women the dif- er than the likelihood that a male trust justified ferences in are treatment and not in similar circumstances will outlive settlor arguments support- invidious. We find the (Similar circumstances, beneficiary. his ing point unpersuasive, first be present purposes, when occur the male point agree on the second we with the beneficiary age trust settlor’s is the same government nothing that there is invidious female trust as the settlor’s unjustified way particular this Therefore, beneficiary.) gender- when statutory scheme makes use of distinctions calculating tables are used tax, between men estate the fact the decedent and women. of the rever- male decedent and increase the value with female de- female will 6.654% cedent). over what that value would sionary interest The table also shows that if How- male, were male. if the decedent been female be ard had instead of trust would not have been included using gender-based A effect second taxable estate because the value of the played by role comes from the tables reversionary interest would have been beneficiary. When expectancy percent corpus. 3.520 of the trust used, are gender-based tables beneficiary will likelihood that a female therefore, apparent, It is that under the greater than the her trust settlor is outlive using IRS mortali- beneficiary in likelihood that a male similar tables, ty similarly situated men and wom- will outlive his trust settlor. circumstances differently way en are treated in a (Similar circumstances occur here when the may taxpayer’s affect the ultimate tax bur- beneficiary’s trust settlor is the same male den. This constitutes discrimination based beneficiary’s as the female gender. settlor). When conclusion, arguing against therefore, used, the fact that bene- government challenged reg- claims that the ficiary is female will decrease the value ulations do not discriminate because “the from it what estate, tax here is assessed male. if the were legal separate fiction that is and distinct possible that in certain It is therefore any gen- the decedent and that lacks the sex of the decedent or of circumstances * * der. It is a tax not on an individual *5 beneficiary will determine whether or the However, the mere fact that the taxed enti- not the value of the interest impossible ty is an estate does not make it percent corpus exceeds the 5 of the trust against for that tax to discriminate men or requires the trust to be included as represents legal women. The estate part estate. The ef- of the taxable interests of the decedent and the dece- using gender-based is illus- fect of beneficiaries, may dent’s who be individual table, following trated in the which shows pays men an estate a or women. When calculating percent to be used for tax, practical impact there is an obvious on of a interest in a trust tax, higher the beneficiaries: by person died at Charlotte’s created a who to the less the estate has to distribute beneficiary age. with Howard’s impact There is also an beneficiaries. Resulting Percent decedent, since the the estate Prom Gender-Based benefit, less the decedent can tax the Age Age Decedent 88 Beneficiary 57_Tables_ estate, through she wishes to thpse her Male 6.654 Female governing Estates and the laws benefit. Male 6.415 Male channeling a means of effects them are 3.520 Female Female individuals, on estates are upon and taxes Female 3.390 Male discrimina- just capable, principle, The table demonstrates that whatever against as a tax on ting men women beneficiary, sex of the the value of a rever- level, there- individuals. On a substantive sionary greater interest for a female fore, difficulty challenging there is no (6.654% beneficiary male decedent with ground it discrimi- tax on the estate beneficiary) than for a with female 3.520% As for nates men or women. (6.415% decedent similarly situated male challenge cannot be standing, perhaps the beneficiary male for female 3.390% es- brought except by an executor of the beneficiary). Similarly, the sex whatever suing after death has occurred and tate decedent, the value of a allegedly controversy concerning the dis- beneficiary a female is less with ripened, there can criminatory tax has (3.390% decedent and with male 3.520% type conten- that this is the decedent) no doubt than with with by an executor. (6.415% may be advanced tion that male situated Alabama, 449, 78 would not NAACP be burdened if the ig- IRS had Cf. (1958); 1163, gender. nored Barrows Jackson, 346 U.S. short, it does not matter that (1953); Society L.Ed. 1586 Pierce v. challenged practice calculates the rever- Sisters, L.Ed. sionary greater percent interest at than 5 (1925). of the trust whether Charlotte was male or female, because the still treats government argues also men and differently, women basic challenged regulations present case the decision system gender to use a that takes cannot be found to discriminate on the ba- account, into rather than one which does gender corpus sis Char- not, demonstrably burdens this estate. have been lotte’s includable the estate even if she had been male. As B. gender Is the invid- classification shows, given the table if Charlotte above ious? had male the value of her been reversion- Classifications distinguishing be ary percent, interest would have been 6.415 tween males and justified females are un percent and since that value is above the 5 der the if they constitution are substantial cut-off, statutory the trust would still have ly related important governmental objec part included as been taxable estate. Boren, tives. Craig v. 429 U.S. at shows, claims, government that in S.Ct. at 456. This imposes test a lower this case there is no dissimilar treatment standard than scrutiny” the “strict test that could count as discrimination. race, used for classifications such as which reasoning here is flawed two requires that a classification be “neces First, ways. argument ignores sary” “compelling” to further a govern beneficiary. classifications interest, ment imposes higher but it stan that affect the estate tax involve Howard dard than the rationality minimal test tradi as well as If Charlotte. Howard had been tionally required legislative classifica male, female instead of the value of the involving tions not either or an “in reversionary interest would have been less herently suspect” categorization. Mi See *6 percent taxable, than 5 and therefore not chael M. Superior v. Court Sonoma regardless of the sex of the decedent. The 464, 468-69, County, 450 U.S. 101 S.Ct. injury estate can thus claim because of the 1200, 1204, (1981); 67 L.Ed.2d 437 Freed dissimilar treatment of male and female man, Equality, Differences, Sex Sex beneficiaries. . Court, 913, 92 Yale L.J. 926 (1983). n. 57 government’s

The second flaw in the ar- gument ignores consequence is that it Contrary government’s position, using this case of the IRS apply we do not rationality minimal gender-based mortality tables instead of just standard because the case involves gender-neutral gender-neutral tables. If a support federal estate taxation. To its table were used to calculate the value of claim that the standard should be one of Charlotte’s reversionary interest her estate rationality, government minimal cites pay not have to the contested tax. primarily equal protection challenges to tax For a age decedent 88 and a regulations that did not involve dis- 57, the value of a decedent’s reversion- Regan crimination. E.g., v. Taxation with ary interest, by gender-neutral calculated 540, Representation, 461 103 U.S. S.Ct. tables, percent would be 4.9867 of the trust 1997, (1983); Madden v. corpus no matter what the sex of the dece- 83, 406, Kentucky, 309 U.S. 60 S.Ct. 84 Thus, dent or beneficiary. (1940); basic IRS L.Ed. 590 Burke Mountain Acade- (2d decision to treat men and States, women different- my, Inc. v. United 715 F.2d 779 ly by using gender-based mortality Cir.1983). authority unper- tables We find this directly in way burdens the estate it suasive.

465 by Kahn v. enjoyment at or after transfer- sion persuaded we [the Neither are 1734, Shevin, 351, 40 94 S.Ct. in the transfer- 416 U.S. death” was includable or’s] (1974), accept govern- 189 gross L.Ed.2d or’s estate. Internal Revenue Code correct standard position on the 202(b), 463, ment’s 1916, ch. 39 Stat. 778 § equal protection Kahn involved review. (1916). This rule was taken to its extreme giving property a state law challenge to Commissioner, 335 Spiegel in Estate v. not to widow- exemption to widows but tax (1949), U.S. 69 S.Ct. 93 L.Ed. 330 say that ers, opinion does the Court’s Supreme Court included a when the arbitrary although is not state tax law “[a] $1,140,000 gross in the settlor’s es- in favor of a certain it ‘discriminate[s] though even the value the settlor’s tate * * * upon is founded if the discrimination approximately interest was distinction, or difference a reasonable Congress response, enacted what $70. the Feder- policy,’ not in conflict with state 2037(a), codified as 26 U.S.C. has been § 355, 94 Id. S.Ct. al Constitution.” policy judgment which embodies Bowers, 358 (quoting Allied Stores v. 1737 the value of when 437, 441, 522, 528, 3 L.Ed.2d trust, percent 5 of a it is not falls below (1959)). But Kahn also held that 480 sufficiently significant require it had challenged justified law in the estate for tax trust be included to the ob- relation “a fair and substantial purposes. See 1949 U.S.Code Cong.Serv., legislation”, Kahn 416 U.S. at ject of the Sess., 2171, Cong., 1st 81st Reed, Reed v. (quoting 94 S.Ct. at The use of tables to calcu- 251, 254, 71, 76, 404 U.S. reversionary interests was late the value of (1971) (quoting Royster Gua- L.Ed.2d 225 412, 415, greater “in interest of adopted in 1970 Virginia, no Co. (1920))), 560, 561, and the accuracy.” L.Ed. 989 Memorandum accom- actuarial S.Ct. impor- great change care to show the proposed took to male- panying Court notice remedying objective of tables, 11, 1970, tance of the law’s from Ran- June suggests past gender discrimination. Thrower, Commissioner, to Ed- dolph IRS Kahn is no applied the standard Cohen, of the Treas. Asst. Sec. win S. general standard the than the different library (available in file of Fedtax Memos cases, subsequent applied has Court 1719”). term “LR Lexis under the search Boren, Craig such as The rationale was (1976), re- which accurate measure of aver- provide a more by gender be the classification quires that expectancies, and that the more age life gov- important substantially related to an averages, of those the measure accurate objective. ernmental impo- equitable the tax fairer and more government case the In the sitions. *7 using gender- objective in

claims that its find no fault with ob Since we accuracy in valu- interests, challenged practice, its consti and that jective ing practice equity and accuracy promotes tutionality turns on whether increased objective. tax burdens. We imposing to that “substantially fairness related” important governmen- this is an agree that test for deter is no mechanical While there us record before objective, and the tal satisfies or not a mining whether the chal- to doubt presents test, no reason law relationship case the substantial actually adopted was lenged practice partic least four clear that at make it does objective, promoting that intention of explored and matters must be ular to discriminate and without intent class; (2) (1) impact on aggregate weighed: either men or women. (3) stereotyped demeaning generalizations; (4) of statis use and flawed assumptions; tax was first federal estate When the four factors of these Consideration tics. subject to a property enacted in all there is us that case convinces posses- to take effect transfer “intended nothing invidious about the IRS’s use of greater interest will be gender-based mortality purposes tables for when the decedent is female than when the 2037(a). male, decedent is both in the case where § beneficiary is male and in the case Aggregate impact on class. beneficiary where the is female. This shows that at least one directly subclass of deciding In whether the substantial affected women—female may satisfied, relationship test is it is relevant decedents— special way by burdened a the IRS disadvantages whether the classification all practice. But it does not show that sex, particular members of a or whether it class of women as a any whole is burdened and distributes benefits burdens to both differently men, from the class of equally. Aiello, Geduldig sexes female only decedents are not the women 2485, L.Ed.2d 256 directly by affected practice. the IRS Fe- (1974), Supreme rejected Court a claim male beneficiaries are directly also affect- gender discrimination because the class ed, practice actually and the IRS benefits benefitting challenged of those from the them, in comparison similarly situated men, statute included women both so men. The value of the inter- fiscal and actuarial benefits “[t]he est when the is female is al- [challenged] program thus accrue to ways lower than the value when the benefi- members both sexes”. Id. at 496-97 n. male, ciary is as the table set out earlier 20, 94 S.Ct. at 2492 n. 20. The statute illustrates. practice places Thus the IRS challenged in Geduldig arguably involved positions beneficiaries in better gender classification because it excluded than male beneficiaries. pregnancy compensable from a list of disa patchwork kind of distribution of upheld statute, bilities. The Court advantages relative disadvantages however, aggregate because “the pro risk pattern not the common found in provided tection” statutory disabili suits, itself it does ty program disadvantage did not the class not show unconstitutional discrimination. of all women as compared to the class of all case, Court did find in one 496-97, men. Id. at 94 S.Ct. at 2491-92. Wengler Druggists Mutual Insurance When discrimination on the basis of Co., has constitution, been found to violate the (1980), challenged that a prac- always it has been the case that the direct unconstitutionally tice discriminated ly (or men) affected women as a class were against both men and women. The law disadvantaged. held Wengler provided unconstitutional in present case, In the there has been no that compensation workers’ death benefits showing challenged practice that the disad- paid regardless would be to a widow vantages the directly class of all affected prove whether dependence she could actual compared women as to the class of all on her earnings, husband’s that a wid- directly affected men. In some situations ower would receive death benefits if practice places the IRS directly affected proved dependence he actual on his wife’s position woman in a worse similarly than a earnings incapacitated wage man, prac- situated but at other times the earning. directly The law affected both places tice directly affected woman in a widowers, widows and and widowers were position similarly better than a situated directly in way burdened Moreover, nothing *8 man. indicates that the Any situated widows not. discrimina- were comparative overall distribution of advan- was, tory burden suffered there- women tages disadvantages favors one sex fore, only consequence of the direct over the other. placed in burden the first instance on their challenged practice places husbands; moreover, burden, female de- that direct positions husbands, cedents in worse placed on all and there was any situated male decedents of because no subclass men who received direct

467 challenged practice. The advantage from the classifications themselves often dis- courage experimentation rejected Wengler, very of with so- the law The effects therefore, prove tax cial roles are the effects of the that would the traditional unlike assumptions wrong. us. As de- issue in the case now before with at law meaning generalizations, however, this direct benefits A law which distributes classic kind of discrimination is not at issue might men and women and burdens both present in the case. troubling if that were still be distribution unduly- equal, so one sex would be not 4. Flawed use statistics. expense at the of the other. In the favored case, however, present simply there no Satisfying the relation substantial inequality, there is of such since ship prove evidence test will difficult the extent challenged nothing to show either that the classification on is based practice places greater aggregate a generalizations IRS statistical that are unrelia ble, tax the class all women only correlations, estate burden on that show weak or men, it of all or that ways. than on class are in other Craig flawed In v. greater 190, places aggregate Boren, 451, burden on 429 97 U.S. S.Ct. for ex on the all ample, shortcomings of all men than class of required statistics women. the invalidation of an Oklahoma law which prohibited percent men from drinking 3.2 Demeaning generalizations.

2. 21, age until the beer which allowed percent age women to drink 3.2 18. beer at or benefits which Distribution burdens in support The statistics offered might objec- appear equal still be otherwise difference treatment of men and women they are based on classifi- tionable because percent showed that .18 of females social ability which demean or cations years 18 old who were to 20 were arrested legislature men or A status of of women. driving offenses, for alcohol-related where generaliza- free to overbroad “is not make * * * percent 2 males to 20 were 18 which demean tions based sex 201, at 97 arrested those offenses. Id. or affected ability social status survey at 458-9. A roadside random S.Ct. 347, Hughes, class.” Parham v. also found a alcohol concentration blood 1747, 354, 1742, 60 269 99 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d greater percent percent than .01 14.6 (1979). However, not this is a concern of females. Id. at percent males and 11.5 case. 16, at 460 n. 16. 203 n. 97 S.Ct. defense, Stereotyped assumptions. Supreme rejected Court state’s percent of 2 be- holding that correlation Under the Court decisions driving con- drinking and “must be tween early 1970’s which first established 202, ”, at unduly tenuous ‘fit’ id. sidered part gender discrimination as a constitu 459, sur- and that roadside 97 S.Ct. law, Reed, 71, see 404 92 tional Reed v. U.S. vey disparities sexes were between 251, (1971); 30 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 225 Frontiero 16, 203 n. 97 S.Ct. substantial. Id. at Richardson, 677, 1764, U.S. n. 16. (1973); Weinberger v. Weis gender- significance of contesting enfeld, statistics, in the appellee (1975); Stanton Stan that, to the ton, points case fact 43 L.Ed.2d at ran- (1975), group of males and females chosen significant it if the dom, all the stereotyped or more than based on classification deaths of matched about roles. deaths could be assumptions social traditional Bergman & age. See “naturally” males of same or men Arguments that women Benefits, Gray, Equality in Retirement towards, “naturally” suited incline It was Rights Fall at 25. for, roles, Dig., are flawed Civ. “traditional” social fact, Judge apparently, that led Stew- self-fulfilling character. their *9 of say “only utory language forbidding art in this case all to that sex discrimina- men”, do actually same, women outlive 576 tion and race discrimination is the 842, conclude, therefore, and F.Supp. except at for a few in differences defenses gender-based mortality that tables could separate pregnancy. section on not be used because their use results constitution, however, imposes only in- an against discrimination those who do not fit scrutiny termediate level of for sex discrim- reasoning norm. ination, statistical His requiring while that race discrimi- equal protection component that the of subject scrutiny. nation be to strict Mi- fifth amendment is concerned with individ- Superior M. chael v. Court Sonoma of rights, ual who do fit a that those not 464, 468-69, County, statistical norm on not 1200, should 1204, (1981). Proving 67 L.Ed.2d 437 their have individual situations measured prohibition a violation of Title VIPs dis- averages by gender-based group com- or require proving crimination does not that posites. intentional; proving the discrimination was prohibition a violation of constitutional reasoning plausibility has initial an against require discrimination proving does similarity, apparent because of its or sim- that discrimination was intentional. ilarity, reasoning by used the Su- Village Arlington Heights Metropoli- of preme City Angeles, Dep’t Court in Los of Development Housing Corp., tan Manhart, 702, Water (1977). (1978). In S.Ct. Man- reasons, For these it cannot be assumed a city department required hart had its every that form of classification employees monthly pay- to make by by forbidden Title VII also is forbidden pension ments to its fund which were the constitution. monthly than the payments 14.84% required employees. city de- male Second, every directly Manhart affect- partment justified practice by claiming this by challenged ed woman was burdened gender-based mortality tables showed case, practice. present explained In the as longer men, women lived than above, by some women are benefitted receive, that women would therefore on the challenged practice, compared as to similar- average, more in retirement benefits men, ly situated and there has no been men would. The Court held showing as a women rights Title VII of the 1964 prohib- civil act any is subject whole a burden different ited use be- statistics placed from the burden on the class of men it cause results aas whole. individual women who do not fit the statis- Third, the be- relationship Manhart generalization tical norm. “Even a true predic- statistics and tween about the an class is insufficient reason for expectancy tions individual life disqualifying an individual whom the relationship present as that same generalization apply.” does not Id. at In justification case. Manhart re- risks, at S.Ct. 1375. “Individual like quiring higher payments any individu- performance, may predict- individual not be individual, she, al woman was that as an proscribed by ed resort to classifications expectation living longer than a had at

Title VII.” Id. age, there- man the same and that she reasoning Manhart, expectation larg- receiving how fore had an ever, aggregate dispositive is not of the issue in the er benefits over the course of First, pension years. case for three Title case the reasons. her using gender-based VII’s standard not the is not statistics to same the stan IRS equal protection dard settlor has an component set establish that individual outliving gives expectation of the fifth Title VII his her amendment. actual tax beneficiary. sex discrimination the same level of scruti When the estate becomes ny discrimination; already In a gives it to race the stat- an issue dead. the settlor *10 moreover, cases, accuracy gender-based the actu- increased great number tables just constitutionally justifies trust expectancy of the settlor their use. al life The Indeed, challenged practice comparative to zero. prior to death will be close distributes women, men concerned benefits to both and and if tax code were with dis- comparative individual reversion- tributes burdens to both market value of men actual showing and There has as measured individu- women. been no ary interests situation, any disparate impact on rather a theo- the class of women al’s actual whole, by some as a or on the of men as value as measured statisti- retical whole. The do not average, then the classifications demean cal they gender, in a either are not rarely be included decedent’s based on stereotyped assumptions gross estate. about social might roles men or women choose. Final- concerned, fact, tax with The estate is ly, valuing reversionary the method of in- something goal The of the es- different. focuses, purposes terests tax con- with a fair accu- tax in this matter is tate legitimacy, averages, stitutional on kind special determination of a of aver- rate gender-based mortality provide tables do interests. Con- age value averages. more nothing accurate We find through regula- and the gress, its statutes challenged practice. in the unconstitutional them, has implementing determined tions way valuing reversionary We therefore reverse. a fair death use after decedent’s is to interests NEWMAN, average expectancies life of settlors Judge, JON O. Circuit dis- reject to indi- It chose senting:

and beneficiaries. determinations, and in- aimed vidualized appeal presents apparently novel making fair across the tax burden stead equal protection gender issue in the area We groups of settlors and beneficiaries. is discrimination. issue whether say that to look aver- this choice cannot mortality use of tables val- rather than to individual situations ages, ue estate interests for tax actual market for individual rever- to some equal female purposes denies decedents interests, sionary illegitimate. protection laws. The Government statistical “fit” that matters in this gender-distinct uphold seeks to use case, then, averages. accuracy In this grounds: The tables do not tables on two and, has special situation there been a where on the basis of discriminate do, choice value in terms legitimate they to define is not even if discrimination average majori- expectancies, agree rather than I unconstitutional. reasons, approxima- ty, terms of the best individualized that the though for different respect- particular person’s unavailing, actual life ex- I argument tion of first I pectancy, great fully there is a deal said that the dissent because conclude using gender-based be- also Both conten- argument tables second fails. do, fact, they give more cause accurate merit extended discussion. tions averages gen- of life than do expectancies tables. Our conclusion is that der-neutral I. the same kind of

this case does Is There Gender Discrimination? unjustified discrimination danger found in there has as was Man- contends that against individuals Government against use of more The estate tax’s hart. been no aspects averages There are two accurate decedent. First, individuals. the Government not discriminate this contention. does if the had been a points decedent out male, been liable Conclusion would still have her estate Second, corpus. upon for tax special of circumstances set Given a trust is argues that whether ease, think the Government in this we depends indudable in a decedent’s estate A. The on the decedent. The effect a variety of factors —the present value of the decedent’s reversion- *11 death, of decedent at the the benefi- ary prior interest in the just trust her death, ciary gender at the of death, the decedent’s gender-dis- calculated on the of basis decedent, gender the of the and benefi- tables, tinct mortality was of the 6.654% ciary. Recognizing that there is “some corpus. trust If the decedent had been a data,” on reliance male-female male, present value of the the Government maintains that there is “no interest, calculated in the way, same groups of on disparate treatment the basis have been of the corpus. 6.415% trust The of that data” “no classification cre- and argues Government per- that since both groups solely identifiable ation sex.” centages greater are than the threshold 5% for Appellant Brief at 15. figure at a corpus which trust is includable estate, gross in the decedent’s considering specific argu- Before there has these ments, gender no acknowledge agreement I been my with a Wallace; premise basic that underlies of Charlotte her trust each was not in- government practice them—a does con- cluded in her not estate because of her gender stitute bur- gender. discrimination unless it a solely dens class identified on the basis argument That premise carries the gender. premise That the core beyond Geduldig legitimate far scope. its in Geduldig decision Court’s thing It is one to say, as the Court did in Aiello, 484, 2485, 41 v. 417 U.S. 94 S.Ct. Geduldig, practice a gen- that constitutes a (1974), rejecting gender-dis- L.Ed.2d a 256 der-based discrimination when it disad- challenge crimination to a state’s exclusion vantages a solely class identified on the pregnancy coverage under a dis- gender. basis of It quite thing another ability program: insurance say, urges here, the Government The identity lack of ex- between the challenged practice a does not disadvan- disability cluded as such un- tage a solely class identified on the basis of program der this insurance becomes gender class, some members of the upon cursory analysis. clear the most including decedent, not sufficiently program potential recipients divides disadvantaged to suffer adverse conse- into two groups pregnant women and — precise quences at the level at which the nonpregnant persons. While the first Government has elected attach con- such female, group is exclusively the second sequences. cases, some absence includes members of both sexes. The consequences adverse may standing defeat pro- fiscal and actuarial benefits of the a particular plaintiff, but it does gram thus accrue to members of both show absence of a dis- (cid:127) sexes. example, government crimination. if a For 20,

Id. at 496-97 n. 94 S.Ct. 2492 n. employer points awarded five extra to all Feeney, See Personnel Administrator males who took civil service examination 256, 271-74, 2282, 99 2291- S.Ct. persons passed, hired all who (1979); 60 L.Ed.2d Parham v. would be a discrimi- 347, 352-57, Hughes, 441 U.S. against females, regardless nation of what (1979). Successful the employer passing score selected as a protection equal challenges grade. practices discrimination have involved challenged practice in this case—use burdened a solely by gen class identified gender-distinct mortality pro- E.g., der. Mississippi University tables— disadvantage duces to a identified Hogan, Women (1982); solely gender: on the The rever- L.Ed.2d 1090 basis Craig v. Boren, 1742, 1746-48, sionary every female decedent (1976). higher valued inter- reflecting tality tables this statistical fact male.1 Since every similarly situated est of conflicting upon the rever- has effects calculation of the in- interest, value of likely more sionary following circum- terest because in the decedent’s be included will trust taxed, ages consequent life ex- the exist- stances. and therefore gross estate pectancies of the decedent and the not defeat both dividing line does ence of beneficiary affect that value. Whatever gender-based discrimination. claim of predicted expectancy case increases standing defeated Nor is use, the trust settlor increases the likelihood that, gender-distinct tables fact beneficiary; in- that the settlor will outlive would have been *12 the decedent’s hand, whatever increases the if she had on the other gross estate even cluded her beneficiary predicted expectancy life of the presenting male. Her executor been the likelihoodthat the settlor will has violated decreases that the Government the claim beneficiary. ta- using outlive the Gender-based requirements by equal protection yield higher expectancies for fe- of a bles mortality tables instead gender-distinct every age. for males at There- trust males than the decedent’s table. Since unisex used, fore, are gross when such tables the female included in her not have been used, gender of the decedent increases the had if unisex table been estate interest, reversionary of the present make this value standing to plainly has executor the beneficiary but the female claim. present decreases the value of that inter- the class B. The on female effect est. the use Determining whether decedents. gen- complicated The situation is further is a gender-distinct compares one the outcome under against the class when discrimination der-based gender-based tables with the outcome un- complicated female decedents der a unisex Female decedents with calculating present value table. for formula have The male beneficiaries of their trusts will interest. of a decedent’s higher interests valued proba- their for calculation of the formula calls gender-based tables than under a age of the dece- under bility person that a at the likely more dent, death, table and thus will be will outlive the unisex just prior to included in their es- The have the trusts beneficiary decedent’s trust. However, female decedents with reversionary interest tates. present fe- of their trusts will nor- expectancies male beneficiaries a function of the life is thus reversionary interests val- mally have their the decedent and the both gender-based tables than ued lower under trust, of their estimated on basis and thus will be less a unisex table death. under ages just prior to the decedent’s included their likely to have the trusts as a Though undisputed it is that women contends gross estates.2 Government longer than men average live on the undercuts assortment of results3 class, mor- that this gender-distinct as a the use of case, variety possible results illustrated 3. The purposes a male and a female 1. For of this table, following percent shows the they which are the situated if decedent calculating present value of a trusts be used for age of their same and the beneficiaries by a a trust created gender. interest of age and are of the same age person at Charlotte’s bene- who died infrequent where the bene- In those instances age: ficiary at Howard’s (and ficiary both are is older than the decedent Resulting From female), reversionary interest of the dece- Percent Tables Gender-Distinct a unisex table dent will be valued lower under Decedent_Beneficiary gender-based tables. For an older under aged aged 57 6.654% 88 Male Female beneficiary, table the switch to a unisex female aged aged 6.415% 88 Male Male expectancy yields in the life a lesser reduction decedent, thereby younger aged decreas- aged of a 3.520% 88 Female Female person the dece- ing aged that a aged the likelihood 3.390% Female Male beneficiary. survived the dent's would have regulations the claim that the IRS discrimi- ated non-members of the class. Decisions gender. nate on the basis of Court implicitly have adopted view, though even precise It is clear that female decedents are not choice we face was not explicitly posed. In uniformly worse off when ta- Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance bles are used than when a unisex table is Co., calculating used for value of a (1980), instance, the Court However, reversionary interest. it is also invalidated equal protection on grounds a true that the value of the rever- Missouri law that denied a widower sionary decedent, work- every interest of calculat- compensation ers’ death gender-distinct tables, ed benefits on his under is always death, work-related when the decedent is a unless he female than either wife’s was mentally physically when the or incapacitated decedent is a male. These two require issue, proved dependence facts consideration of earnings, his wife’s rarely presented cases, granted a widow death benefits with- pertinent comparison whether the equal having out her prove dependence on her protection purposes is between the treat- husband’s earnings. The recognized Court challenged ment of a class under the prac- that “the statute discriminates both tice and the treatment that class under a men and women.” Id. 100 S.Ct. at *13 practice, neutral or between the treatment It against discriminated widowers challenged of a class under similarly vis-a-vis situated widows and dis- the treatment of all similarly others situ- criminated wage female earners challenged ated under practice. similarly vis-a-vis situated wage male earn- normally issue does not arise discrimina- ers. The Court reject did not equal tion cases gender-based practice because a protection claim simply because under the disadvantages compared women to law, discriminatory (widows) some women usually men disadvantage will also women fared earners) better while others (wage compared they to how would fare under a fared worse than they would have fared neutral rule.4 gender-neutral under a law. The relevant inquiry was how women compared Once fared analytical clearly issue is focus, similarly situated men. its resolution is clear. See also purposes For Califano equal protection Goldfarb, 199, 208, analysis, 430 U.S. pertinent inquiry in determining (1977); 51 whether discrimi- L.Ed.2d 270 Wein- nation exists is pro- berger Wiesenfeld, whether members of 651-53, tected class are disadvantaged by 1225, 1234-35, the chal- 95 S.Ct.

lenged practice compared similarly (1975). situ- Male Female Male Female for a female decedent cedent 3.390%). percentage the text. Under value (3.520% Decedent female than when the aged aged aged aged present percentage table (6.654% [88] versus [88] than for a Under such illustrates the Female Female Male Male always decedent with a male Beneficiara 6.654%; versus aged aged is percentage aged aged always higher lower when the [57] tables, 6.415%; 3.390% versus Percent comparisons beneficiary tables, situated male de- Unisex Table 3.520% versus always higher 4.9867% 4.9867% Resulting 4.9867% 4.9867% present for a female beneficiary 6.415%). noted in is male present value From 4. This based effects are pending beneficiaries are of cy tend two death, the effects of the the life enter the calculation of the gender-based tables than under a unisex table ue dent with a (3.520% table under percentage different, persons (6.654% case is gender-based cancel each other expectancy versus on the combination of beneficiary, again younger the effects are versus distinctive, involved. When decedents and is 4.9867%). always augmented gender-based mortality the same estimating of the tables than under a unisex 4.9867%). and because twice —once female lower for a female dece- out; if not decedent, present amplified. gender, beneficiary when the the life unique, diminished de- genders those value of the present just the effects estimating expectan- genders gender- before under tables val- gender-distinct Since the use of tables The Government contends that the “im- present portant governmental causes the value of the reversion- objective” it seeks to promote ary by gender-distinct interests of all female decedents to be the use of mor- tality tables accuracy than the is actuarial value of the rever- in valuing reversionary interests of sionary interests of all decedents’ similarly situated trusts. It is the achievement of objective male decedents and therefore increases the gender-distinct which the use of likelihood that the trusts created must “substantially be related.” Since decedents will be included in their class, longer women men,” live “[a]s taxed, consequently estates and the use of Angeles Department Los Water & Pow- these tables is a discrimination Manhart, 702, 704, er v. gender. Whether that discrimination is un- 1370, 1373, (1978), 55 there is a constitutional Equal under the Protection plausibility surface to the Government’s issue, Clause is a different to which I now contention that gender-distinct use of ta- turn. bles is sufficiently related to objective promoting actuarial accuracy to justify II. discrimination inherent in Analysis such use. of the Government’s Is the Discrimination Unconstitutional? contention, however, demonstrates that the To challenge withstand constitutional un- requisite justification using gender-dis- equal protection der the component of ei- tinct tables is not in the limited Amendments, ther the Fifth or Fourteenth context illustrated litigation —the regulations that discriminate on the basis valuation of the reversionary interest of a must “substantially related” decedent’s trust. *14 promotion “important to the governmen- place, In the first it should be noted that objectives.” Boren, tal Craig v. supra, the gender-distinct valuation for which ta- 197, 429 U.S. at 97 S.Ct. at 456.5 In this bles are in implementing used cut- case the Government has the burden of off of section 2037 significantly differs demonstrating that regulations requir- purposes from most other for which such ing use of imple- tables in Typically tables are used. gender-distinct menting standard, section 2037 meet this are used to determine the amount of for, stated, as the Court has dollars that women as a class and men as a party seeking uphold to a statute “[T]he (or pay paid should have for them that classifies individuals on the basis of employer) their in order to fund some bene- gender carry their must the burden of pension. context, fit such as a In that showing an ‘exceedingly persuasive justifi- average expectancies of those in each cation’ for the Mississippi classification.” class determine the amount of dollars that University Hogan, supra, Women v. need to be collected to fund the benefit. for 724, (quoting U.S. 102 S.Ct. at 3336 separate Whether or not calculations of life Feeney, Personnel Administrator expectancies su- for a class of male benefi- pra, 273, 2293). 442 U.S. at ciaries and a class of 99 S.Ct. female beneficiaries that, argues despite authority 5. The Government unpersuasive. the fact is Even Kahn v. regulations requiring gender-distinct Shevin, 351, 1734, ta- 416 U.S. 40 L.Ed.2d women, they bles discriminate should (1974), gender which involved discrimina- subjected only scrutiny” to "minimal because tion, Kahn, dispositive. is not Unlike federal- they regulations. support are tax In of this require poli- ism does not deference to state tax contention, primarily the Government cites case, and, cy in the instant unlike the statute in equal protection challenges regulations to tax Kahn, Treasury regulations at issue here do gender that did not involve discrimination. employ gender in order to E.g., Regan Representation, v. Taxation With past correct the effects of discrimina- 540, (1983); exempt regula- tion. There is no reason to tax Kentucky, Madden v. scrutiny applicable tions from standard (1940); Academy, 84 L.Ed. 590 Burke Mountain in all other discrimination cases. States, (2d Cir.1983). Inc. v. United 715 F.2d 779 accuracy, promote beyond sionary what interest. recog- sufficient The Government table, nizes this circumstance: a unisex be achieved discrimination, all justify In cases where IRC 2037 a comes § play, grantor prede- into has in fact calculations in that context at least deter- beneficiary. reality, ceased there- something mine the real—the valuation fore, the decedent’s interest money amount needed to fund the bene- in a Section 2037 situation has no real providing fit. The cost of future benefits value, longer since reversion can no oc- higher for a class of females is provide cur. What IRC 2037 does is § promoting periodic cost of the same level of for the valuation of the in- of similarly benefits for a class situated hypothetically regard terest —without males the class of females will the fact of the death. decedent’s longer period receive the benefits for a Appellant’s Brief What being at 34. is argument time. That is the that economi- is the measured this case theoretical higher cally justifies payment dollar a interest that Government males, Kimball, females than for see Re- in reality. concedes has no value It Manhart, verse Sex Discrimination: governmen- to see important difficult what 83, 106, J. whether Am.B.Found.Research objective being tal substantially ad- or not the decision price threshold by using gender-based vanced a discrimina- cost of coverage males and females place tion to value on a theoretical rever- separately is sound social is con- policy or sionary interest whose actual value is al- legal requirements, sistent with see Los always most zero. Angeles Department Water Power v. & recognize, course, I Congress had Manhart, (pricing supra employment bene- legitimate wanting reason for the I.R.S. fits for females than for males vio- determine theoretical value of a re- lates Title Rights VII of Civil Act of versionary prior just to a dece- 1964). dent’s death. The equity. reason tax Prior to enactment section contrast, By gen- the valuation for which included in estate no der-distinct tables used under section how matter remote the likelihood that the anything reality, 2037 does not concern corpus would ever have reverted to the but instead concerns a theoretical con- during decedent his lifetime. See Estate of struct. When section 2037 focuses atten- Commissioner, Spiegel *15 tion present on the value of a decedent’s 707, 301, 303-04, 93 L.Ed. 330 in interest a trust moment the (1949). Congress adopted the cutoff 5% death, before the statute is not concerned rule of section prevent 2037 to taxation of with the fair of actual market value decedent, trusts in which the interest (all interest. In most cases in which the just prior death, to valued on the basis of illness) decedent succumbs to a last average expectancy persons life for of actual market value of such an will interest age, slight the decedent’s too to war- virtually Allen, be zero. See Estate corpus. of rant taxation of the entire trust 14, 21, 558 F.2d (1977) 214 Ct.Cl. 630 Cong.Serv., Cong., 1949 U.S.Code 81st See (Nichols, J., concurring). a dece- Unless Sess., 2172, 2185; Allen, 1st Estate su- dent dies from totally sudden and unantic- 8. pra, 558 F.2d 17-18 & n. causes, ipated expectancy his realistic life inquiry whether Thus becomes tax death, just prior distinguished to substantially equity by will be advanced average expectancy persons life of all interests, valuing reversionary pur- for age, any of his give is too brief to real rule, poses applying cutoff 5% value to his More- interest. gender-distinct tables. One im- means over, just prior to death equity portant indication that tax will not persons calculated for those who by gender-dis- significantly promoted die, a circumstance that eliminates even a tinct is the recent decision of the tables Treasury theoretical to use of such ta- value for their rever- abandon the Sullivan, 1, 1983, cock Discrimination in & Sex December Effective bles. A Employer-Sponsored mor- Insurance Plans: of a unisex the use Treasury resumed Demographic Analysis, 47 Legal table, returning to tality (1980) (“Demograph- U.Chi.L.Rev. prior to 1970. See followed had been observation, however, 20.2031-7(a). sug- Analysis”). ic That I do not Treas.Reg. § degree accuracy tells us little about requiring the is a field that taxation gest com- by gender-distinct achieved tables restrictive use the least to Government helpful pared to a unisex table. More objec- accomplishing legitimate its means that, group people chosen the fact elects the Government tives. And what random, of all female at more than of what 80% not the determinant is of course do deaths of can be matched with the requires it to do. deaths minimally the Constitution age.6 Demographic of the same males Nevertheless, inquiry as to whether supra, at 531. It was this fact “substantially” pro- Analysis, gender-distinct Judge to conclude in this objec- that led Stewart governmental “important” mote actually “only of all women has case tive, the Government 20% the fact F.Supp. at 842. meet do outlive men.”7 576 adequately it realize that can come to the chal- the use of objectives without its uniformly estimate Gender-distinct tables is at least relevant. lenged discrimination longer expectancy life for all women com- all men in fact that estimate pared when degree which Finally, I examine no than turns out to be true for more tables achieves gender-distinct the use Whether or not the enhanced the accu- of women.8 promoting interest in the asserted degree accuracy predicting the life being theoretical valuation racy of even the expectancy of women as class would sat- of what requires consideration made. isfy equal protection standards in a case as a say that women mean when we we involving purchase of retirement bene- surely do than men. We longer class live fits, priced prospectively, longer than which must be live that all women not mean provide not a suffi- most tables do even mean that do not all men. We accuracy justify cient increment of longer most men. One than women live inherent gender-based discrimination expressed mean has been thing we do to the theoretical applied use when field in the their knowledgeable those in a of a A at valuation terms: woman following statistical death, a just prior to a decedent’s mortality mean of the distribution retrospec- always made a man valuation that longer than all women will live Boren, supra, 429 U.S. tively. Craig v. of the distribution at the mean Cf. 199-204, (invalidat- Hekeler, 97 S.Ct. at 457-60 Lay- Brilmayer, for all men. See age. Though un- group most of the analysis the same of a is based on an 6. The statistic un- than most of the aged Bergmann women die later & matched females of males and (a in the Benefits, men fact reflected Civ. matched Gray, Equality in Retirement class), expectancies as a accuracy, average for women Rights Dig., at 25. The Fall undoubtedly some of the unmatched there are though significance, the statistic has longer some of the un- Demographic who live widely accepted. Compare men been *16 percentage of wom- women. The true (arguing reliance on matched Analysis, supra, in at 531 slightly Kimball, probably less is statistic), en who outlive men Sex Discrim- Reverse the Manhart, (accepting supra, than 20%. at 121-22 ination: characterizing argument statistic but “fallacy” applied predictive benefits accura- slight to in it as a when increase from 8. Even this group tendency priced prospectively). question by For a cy brought that must be into is population, female life randomly from the entire male and selected between the differential age, Demographic regard change rapidly. to which male expectancies to the extent without 558; probably Laycock Brilmayer, & matched is Analysis, supra, deaths can be and female reported Sullivan, Averages figure Group lower than the Use somewhat The Efficient Rejoinder group aged 65. A Nondiscrimination: Benston, Professor (“Such (1983) 50 U.Chi.L.Rev. not that sex is means unstable appears [differential] maximum figure to be the 7. The 20% longevity of predictor of the a reasonable that even possible consequence of the fact groups.”). with female deaths can be matched male deaths discriminatory drinking ing age statute there is no subclass of female beneficiaries grounds always statistical correla- that of insufficient comes out better. alcohol-related of- tion between traffic Moreover, even if female beneficiaries gender). fenses and gender-dis- sometimes fare better under opinion, contending (as in majority tinct The those instances when case they happen among the discrimination involved is to be included the lega- unlawful, heavily not rests on the assertion tees who benefit from reduced estate tax- directly es), consequence that “the of all affected wom- does not eliminate complaint en” shown to be has not been disadvan- the valid of all female settlors taged directly gender to the “compared always class of all that their results in a reversionary men.” F.2d at of the affected 466. valuation interest The noting majority this assertion after would if makes occur these had settlors been things fact that indisputable inquiry all other males. The focus of an into wheth- tables, being equal, gender-distinct er gender adversely under af- the value of the interest when fects all class members must be confined to beneficiary always is a female is lower gen- situated of that members beneficiary than the when the is a scoring system der. A civil service majority male. From this fact the draws the test reduces scores of all female candi- totally I is unsupportable points what believe five by dates not be would saved practice places “the proviso conclusion that IRS daughter any that the appli- positions female beneficiaries better five-point cant would be entitled to a bonus. than male beneficiaries.” Id. at 466. To significance dispute The in this appreciate argu- flaw in the majority’s been substantially case has reduced ment, recognize “benefi- one must that the voluntary Government’s abandonment of ciary” value of gender whose affects the gender-distinct tables to value necessarily interest is gender-dis- interests. The consideration person the same who benefits from the tax tables, however, tinct will be with us for saving in the the trust event is not included many case, years to come. In this for all “beneficiary” in the estate. taxable forth, respectfully the reasons set I dis- whose the value the re- affects sent. versionary the second life tenant identity trust. of the “benefi- ciaries” of a de- reduction estate taxes

pends on how the estate tax attributable among corpus allocated all

persons property who would benefit from estate, male, may the taxable who CHEMICAL ALLIED INTERNATIONAL female, or neuter the case of charities. CORP., Plaintiff-Appellee, The second life tenant benefits from the corpus non-inclusion dece- in the dent’s taxable estate in those circum- DE COMPANHIA NAVEGACAO corpus stances where the trust have BRASILEIRO, LLOYD portion borne all or a of the estate taxes Defendant-Appellant. thereby be said saved. most that can No. Docket 85-7103. changing succes- Appeals, States United Court of sor life tenant from male Second Circuit. possibility tends to reduce the of an corpus, estate tax on the value of the trust Argued 8,May consequence that will all bene- benefit *17 Decided Oct. ficiaries of the estate whose interests have borne taxes that are saved and, circumstances, in some will benefit

successor life tenant of But the trust.

Case Details

Case Name: Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, as of the Estate of Charlotte C. Wallace v. United States
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date Published: Sep 16, 1985
Citation: 775 F.2d 459
Docket Number: 1334, Docket 84-6051
Court Abbreviation: 2d Cir.
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