141 Ga. 619 | Ga. | 1914
On August 18, 1911, the Brown Wagon Company and the Manufacturers Finance Company, both corporations, entered into a written contract for the former to sell “its accounts receivable, notes, contracts, and choses in action,” all designated as “accounts,” evidencing sales and deliveries of personal property in which it dealt, to the latter in consideration of the payment by it of 100 per cent, of the face value of “such accounts,” less certain stated discounts according to the maturity of such accounts, the amounts and times of payment being fixed under the contract. The contract provided that the “first party [Brown Wagon Co.] and R. L. Brown, of Macon, Ga., are hereby given the right and privilege to make collections, at the expense of and at the office of first party, of all accounts purchased herein by second party [Manufacturers Finance Co.], and to that extent only shall said named parties act as agents of second party. . . During the continuance of such agency, said agents agree to transmit and deliver to second party at its office at Baltimore, Maryland, on the day of receipt thereof, all original checks, drafts, and notes and other evidences of payment received in payment of, or on account of, any accounts purchased herein by second party.” And further, “It is expressly understood that neither of the parties hereto shall be bound by anything not expressed in writing by and between the parties hereto.” Subsequently to the execution of such contract the W. L. Jones Co. purchased goods of the Brown Wagon Co., and in settlement of the accounts sent its promissory note to the Brown Wagon Co. for $1,301.31 principal, dated January 2, 1912, and due May 2d thereafter. The Brown Wagon Company wrote to the W. L. Jones Co., requesting it to give, in lieu of the one note, three notes aggregating the amount of the first note, which it promised to return upon receipt of the three notes. Thereupon the W. L. Jones Co. sent to the Brown Wagon Co. three notes, all dated December 31, 1911, one for $400 principal, maturing April 1, 1912, another for the like amount,
(a) An equitable proceeding for interpleader proper lies when a person is possessed of funds, or owes a debt or duty, to which more than one person lays claim, and the claims are of such a character as to render it doubtful or dangerous for the holder, or person owing the debt or duty, to act. Civil Code, § 5471. If the question is, not to which one of two or more claimants a single duty or debt should be rendered or paid or the same property should be delivered, but whether the person filing the proceeding is liable to each of two holders of different negotiable promissory notes transferred to them respectively before due, on which separate suits have been brought, whether they are not bona fide holders for value and without notice, and whether the debtor has a defense as against each or either of them, arising out of transactions with the original payee, this presents no case of a double claim to one debt or liability, but a ease of whether there is a double liability, and does not authorize a proceeding for interpleader proper. Crawford v. Fisher, 1 Hare, 436; Greene v. Mumford, 4 R. I. 313; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 23 R. I. 1 (49 Atl. 26, 91 Am. St. R. 590); and note; Hoyt v. Gouge, 125 Iowa, 603 (101 N. W. 464); Standley v. Roberts, 59 Fed. 836; Bassett v. Leslie, 123 N. Y. 396 (25 N. E. 386); National Life Insurance Co. v. Pingry, 141 Mass. 411 (6 N. E. 93); Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kidder, 162 Ind. 382 (70 N. E. 489, 66 L. R. A. 89); 23 Cyc. 5 (3); 11 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 459(g).
(b) “To entitle a person to a bill of interpleader, he must be in a position in which he is liable to one of two or more persons, who claim from him the same debt or duty; and he claims no right in opposition to the claimants or either of them; and he does not know to whom he ought, of right, to render the debt or duty.” In other words, he must occupy the position of a disinterested stakeholder. Adams v. Dixon, 19 Ga. 513, 515 (65 Am. D. 608) ; Davis v. Davis, 96 Ga. 136 (21 S. E. 1002); Little v. Davis, 140 Ga. 212 (78 S. E. 842) ; 23 Cyc. 5 (3), 21(b) ; 11 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 461(j).
[(c) Where two different persons lay claim to a debt, and the debtor in a petition against them for strict interpleader denies that he is indebted to one of them, an order for such interpleader will not be granted. Shaw v. Coster, 8 Paige (N. Y.), 339 (35 Am. D. 690 and note); 11 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 461, 468; 23 Cyc. 23, 25.
[(d) Applying the rulings above announced to the pleadings and the evidence in this ease, which is a strict interpleading suit, the court erred in granting an order for interpleader and a temporary inunction.
Judgment reversed.