Manuel v. StateManuel v. State
KIMBALL, Justice.*
THE ISSUE
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 15, 1995, plaintiffs Jody W. Manuel and Stacey P. Foret, citizens of Louisiana under twenty-one years of age, and Burke G. Pierrotti and Wendell J. Manuel, retailers of alcoholic beverages, filed suit in Evangeline Parish requesting that enforcement of
On August 24, 1995, trial of the request for preliminary injunction was held and, following the presentation of testimony and exhibits, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction “declaring the age legislation unconstitutional, and prohibiting its enforcement throughout the State.” Pursuant to
On September 21, 1995, the parties entered into a stipulation, filed into the record, that the district court‘s judgment of August 24, 1995, be considered as that court‘s judgment on the permanent injunction, subject to the appeal already pending in this court. On October 20, 1995, the parties jointly moved in this court to add plaintiffs Christopher T. Nobles and Jessica A. Slutsky, both between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, as the original plaintiffs Jody Manuel and Stacey Foret each achieved the age of twenty-one during the pendency of these proceedings.
The constitutionality of the challenged statutes, which make it illegal for persons eighteen to twenty years old to purchase or be sold alcoholic beverages is now squarely and properly before this court. After a thorough review of the law and the record herein, we affirm the trial court‘s declaration of unconstitutionality of the challenged statutes insofar as those statutes make it illegal for eighteen to twenty year olds to purchase or be sold alcoholic beverages.
HISTORY OF ACT 639 OF 1995
In 1986 the Louisiana Legislature passed Act 33 of 1986, which amended and reenacted
While Act 33 of 1986 raised the minimum drinking age in Louisiana to twenty-one by prohibiting the purchase or public possession of alcoholic beverages by persons under twenty-one, it contained no sanctions applicable to retailers or sellers of alcoholic beverages to such persons. Though this statutory scheme apparently satisfied the requirements of
In 1995, Act 639 of 1995 amended and reenacted
Therefore, the changes made in Act 639 of 1995 effectively closed the “loophole” in Louisiana‘s drinking age law which had rendered it practically unenforceable.
LAW
Section 3. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited, except in the latter case as punishment for crime.
In Sibley, this court recognized and discussed the unique language of
... commands the courts to decline enforcement of a legislative classification of individuals in three different situations: (1) When the law classifies individuals by race or religious beliefs, it shall be repudiated completely; (2) When the statute classifies persons on the basis of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations, its enforcement shall be refused unless the state or other advocate of the classification shows that the classification has a reasonable basis; (3) When the law classifies individuals on any other basis, it shall be rejected whenever a member of a disadvantaged class shows that it does not suitably further any appropriate state interest.
Sibley, 477 So.2d at 1107-08 (emphasis added, notes omitted). This court went on to explain that when a statute classifies persons on the basis of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations, “the state is assigned the burden of justifying such a classification by showing that it substantially furthers an appropriate state purpose.” Id. at 1108 (emphasis added).
More recently, in Pace v. State, Through Louisiana Employees Retirement System, 94-1027 (La. 1/17/95), 648 So.2d 1302, this court explained:
...
Article I, § 3 designates certain types of legislative classifications that cannot be used to arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person. When a statute classifies persons on the basis of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations, it is presumed to deny the equal protection of the laws and to be unconstitutionalunless the state or other advocate of the classification shows that the classification substantially furthers an important governmental objective. This intermediate type of analysis was not fully articulated in this court‘s interpretation of Article I, § 3 until its decision in Sibley, supra. Nevertheless, all of this court‘s decisions that have carefully examined such legislative classifications of persons are consistent with this form of intermediate review.* * * * * *
The United States Supreme Court uses a similar intermediate standard of review in analyzing legislative classifications challenged as denying the equal protection of the laws.
Pace, 94-1027 at 3-5, 648 So.2d at 1305-06 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
In determining whether the State has met its burden of showing a classification based on any of the attributes listed in the third sentence of
The requirement that a proponent of a law which classifies persons on the basis of age must prove the challenged classification is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable by showing the classification substantially furthers an important State objective is compelled by the straightforward language and structure of
DISCUSSION
Since the adoption of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, this court has not had occasion to address the constitutionality of a law which discriminates on the basis of age. We hold today, as explained infra, that in the context of a law which singles out a particular age group of adults for treatment different under the law from other adults, the classification can only be found constitutional if it is the classification which most directly implicates or furthers the asserted governmental interest. In other words, if the evidence shows there are other age groups which would better further the State‘s asserted interest, then the classification chosen is inherently arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable where there are no other asserted State interests which would justify choosing the challenged classification over the group which better furthers the asserted State interest. We further hold the State‘s eligibility to obtain or to continue to receive federal funding is not, by itself, a legitimate state interest sufficient to abridge the constitutionally protected rights of classes of persons specifically protected in
Burden of Proof
The challenged statutes classify persons on the basis of age by prohibiting the sale or purchase of alcoholic beverages to or by persons eighteen to twenty years old. Due to
Highway Safety
As its “important governmental objective” justifying the challenged statutes’ classification of persons on the basis of age, the State argues prohibiting the purchase and sale of alcoholic beverages to those between eighteen and twenty-one years old will improve highway safety, reduce the incidence of driving while intoxicated (“DWI“) among persons in that age group, and reduce the number of injury and fatality automobile accidents in that age group.
Before discussing the evidence introduced by the State in support of its highway safety justification, however, it is first necessary to explain why the only potentially legitimate justification offered by the State is the improvement of highway safety in general. As previously noted, the State argues that prohibiting the purchase by and sale to eighteen to twenty year olds of alcoholic beverages will improve highway safety, reduce the incidence of driving while intoxicated among persons in that age group, and reduce the number of injury and fatality automobile accidents in that age group. Arguing that reducing the incidence of driving while intoxicated of eighteen to twenty year olds and reducing the number of injury and fatality accidents involving eighteen to twenty year olds are important governmental objectives which are substantially furthered by prohibiting the purchase or sale of alcohol by or to that very group, however, is both circular and illegitimate. First, targeting a specific group of adults for reduction of DWI‘s and alcohol related accidents in that group begs the question of whether there is a legitimate reason which is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable for so classifying or targeting that group in the first place. Second, as the statistics submitted by both sides show, every age group of licensed drivers has some incidence of driving while intoxicated and some number of alcohol related fatality and injury accidents. Obviously, prohibiting the purchase or sale of alcohol by or to any specific age group will lead to a reduction of the incidence of driving while intoxicated and the number of alcohol related accidents in that age group. This, however, does not in any way explain or justify the initial selection of that group for discriminatory classification and treatment. Finally, the reasoning in support of these particular objectives is circular. In the challenged statutes, the State classifies the target group solely on the basis of age, then attempts to justify the classification by showing the benefits which will accrue to that age group by so classifying them and by claiming that that classification substantially furthers an important governmental objective, which is to reduce the incidence of DWI‘s and alcohol related accidents among that age group. The legitimacy of this classification, however, is exactly what is at issue. Under this line of reasoning, there would be no reason why the State could not choose any age group and justify prohibiting the purchase or sale of alcoholic beverages to that age group by simply asserting that the law will reduce DWI‘s and alcohol related accidents for that group. Because these purported governmental objectives are invalid, there is only one remaining legitimate important governmental objective which the State can argue is substantially furthered by the age classification contained in the challenged statutes: highway safety in general.
As previously stated, in determining whether the State has carried its burden of proving the presumptively unconstitutional age classification contained in the challenged statutes is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable because it substantially furthers the important governmental objective of highway
The State introduced affidavits from James Hedlund, Acting Associate Administrator for Traffic Safety Programs, and Director of the Office of Alcohol and State Programs, NHTSA, and Bette Theis, Executive Director for the Louisiana Highway Safety Commission, each of which contained exhibits in the form of statistical studies of alcohol involved accidents, as well as testimony from Capt. Ronald B. Jones, Commander of Troop A of the Louisiana State Police, who was qualified as an expert in traffic enforcement and policy development, and Dr. Richard Scribner, an expert in public health, who also relied on a 1987 Governmental Accounting Office study evaluating other statistical studies of alcohol involved accidents. A review of this evidence shows the following.
Mr. Hedlund‘s affidavit, relying on statistical data obtained by NHTSA through their Fatal Accident Reporting System (“FARS“) and from reports studying age twenty-one drinking law effectiveness, asserts that age-21 drinking laws have been proven to save lives and that FARS data and the studies show an over-involvement of eighteen to twenty year olds in alcohol related crashes. He states FARS data and the studies show that: (1) in 1994, 44% of eighteen to twenty year old traffic fatalities were alcohol related, as compared to 40.8% for all traffic fatalities; (2) alcohol related traffic fatality rates, on a per capita basis, are over twice as great for eighteen to twenty year olds as for the population over twenty one; (3) in 1994, more eighteen to twenty year olds died in low blood alcohol level (.01 to .09) traffic accidents than any other three year age group; and (4) in 1994, Louisiana had the fourth highest percentage of alcohol related traffic fatalities of fifteen to twenty year olds of all States. Mr. Hedlund‘s affidavit also refers to: (1) a Governmental Accounting Office (“GAO“) report to Congress, “Drinking Age Laws—An Evaluation Synthesis of Their Impact On Highway Safety, March 1987,” which concludes on the basis of the report‘s review of fourteen leading traffic accident studies that raising the drinking age has a direct effect on reducing alcohol related traffic accidents among youth affected by such laws; (2) a 1989 NHTSA study, “The Impact of Minimum Drinking Age Laws On Fatal Crash Involvements: An Update of NHTSA Analyses,” which estimates minimum drinking age laws have been responsible for a 12% reduction in fatal crash involvements of drivers affected by such laws; and (3) NHTSA‘s 1994 estimates that minimum drinking age laws have reduced traffic fatalities involving eighteen to twenty year olds by 13% and saved an estimated 14,816 lives nationwide since 1975.
Capt. Jones, Commander of Troop A of the Louisiana State Police, testified that based on his personal experience, the challenged statutes could be “the most critical and fundamental improvement in traffic safety when it comes to alcohol in this state.” He further testified that in his opinion, access to and use of alcohol by eighteen to twenty year olds had a detrimental effect on highway safety because that age group “is not only inexperienced at driving but is also inexperienced at drinking.”
Finally, Dr. Scribner, qualified by the State as an expert in public health, testified that in his opinion, alcohol is the leading cause of death among eighteen to twenty year olds. He testified that by this he meant that although the three leading causes of death among eighteen to twenty year olds are accidents, homicide, and suicide, alcohol plays a part in a significant number of deaths attributed to these causes. On the basis of a 1987 GAO Report, see supra at 10, Dr. Scribner further testified that raising the drinking age decreases alcohol related fatal and injury accidents, and that the younger the driver, the greater the over-representation in alcohol involved auto accidents. On the basis of the GAO Report, he estimated that enforcement of the challenged Act would result in a 5%-28% decrease in alcohol involved fatal injury crashes in Louisiana.
The trial court found, as a matter of fact, that the state‘s interest in highway safety is not substantially furthered by the challenged classification because, at least in Louisiana, eighteen to twenty year olds are neither arrested in greater numbers than other age groups for driving while intoxicated nor, according to the State‘s own data compilations,4 involved in or responsible for a greater number of alcohol related injury and fatality producing accidents. After thoroughly reviewing all of the record evidence, we find the trial court‘s conclusion was not clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Instead, our review of the evidence reveals the State‘s own statistics clearly show that, in Louisiana, persons between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-three are involved in significantly higher numbers of alcohol related injury and fatality accidents than eighteen to twenty year olds. Indeed, certain statistical evidence showed eighteen to twenty year olds are not even the group second most responsible for alcohol related accidents. Nor are eighteen to twenty year olds the group with the highest incidence of DWI arrests or convictions. As such, prohibiting the purchase by or sale to eighteen to twenty year olds of alcoholic beverages does not prohibit the age group most responsible for alcohol related accidents on the State‘s highways from the purchase or public possession of alcoholic beverages.
The Louisiana Traffic Data Report for 1986 shows the eighteen to twenty year old age group had a total of 854 accidents involving alcohol, injury and/or death in 1986. By comparison, the report shows that the twenty-one to twenty-three year old age group had a total of 924 such accidents, the twenty-two to twenty-four year old age group had 916 such accidents, the twenty-three to twenty-five year old age group had 877 such accidents, and the twenty-four to twenty-six year old age group had 837 such accidents. In sum, the report shows that in Louisiana in 1986, every three year age group, up to and including the twenty-three to twenty-five year old group, was involved in more alcohol related accidents than the eighteen to twenty year old age group.
The Louisiana Traffic Data Report for 1992 shows there were 337 alcohol related fatal and injury accidents in 1992 involving
An affidavit by Mary Jane Marcantel, a paralegal employed by plaintiffs to perform statistical research, states that she personally searched the records of the Clerk of Court‘s Office for the Parish of Evangeline in Ville Platte, Louisiana, and the booking records of the Sheriff‘s Office for Evangeline Parish, for the calendar year 1986 and the period of January 1, 1994 through July 28, 1995, to ascertain the number of persons charged with DWI during the time periods listed and the age of those persons at the time of their arrests. Ms. Marcantel‘s affidavit states her research showed of the 92 DWI arrests in Evangeline Parish in 1986, nine were of persons eighteen to twenty years old. By comparison, her research showed there were thirteen persons twenty-one to twenty-three years old and twelve persons twenty-four to twenty-six years old arrested for DWI in Evangeline Parish during the same time period. Ms. Marcantel‘s affidavit further states that of the 179 DWI arrests in Evangeline Parish during the January 1, 1994 to July 28, 1995, time frame, ten were of persons eighteen to twenty years old. By comparison, her affidavit states her research showed there were sixteen persons twenty-one to twenty-three years old and twenty-five persons twenty-four to twenty-six years old arrested for DWI in Evangeline Parish during the same time period. In sum, Ms. Marcantel‘s research shows that fewer eighteen to twenty year olds were arrested for DWI in Evangeline Parish in either time period examined than either twenty-one to twenty-three or twenty-four to twenty-six year olds.6
The affidavit of Joseph W. Demourelle, Chief of Detectives of the Evangeline Parish Sheriff‘s Office, was also introduced by plaintiffs. Detective Demourelle states he researched and reviewed the criminal arrest and probation records of Evangeline Parish for the period of January 1, 1995 to July 31, 1995, to ascertain the number of DWI convictions in Evangeline Parish during that time period and the age of the persons convicted. Detective Demourelle states that his research shows that of the 79 DWI convictions in Evangeline Parish during that time period, only one was of a person under twenty-one years old.
The affidavit of Dr. Robert Gramling, a Professor of Sociology at the University of Southwestern Louisiana, was also introduced by plaintiffs. Dr. Gramling‘s affidavit states that his research, consisting of studies done in 1986 and 1992 comparing drinking habits of young adults in Louisiana and North Carolina, reveals there is a lack of empirical evidence to support the assumption that raising the drinking age to twenty-one years old will result in less alcohol consumption by
Furthermore, on cross-examination by plaintiffs, Dr. Scribner admitted his research has also shown that peak alcohol consumption among young people occurs in their twenties, and not in their late teens. Dr. Scribner testified that peak alcohol consumption occurs at ages twenty to twenty-four, and that drivers through age thirty are over-represented in alcohol related injury and fatality accidents. Dr. Scribner also agreed that the risk to others on the highways, i.e., the public at large as opposed to alcohol impaired drivers, of alcohol related accidents is greater with drivers in the twenty-one to twenty four year old age group, because not only are they over-represented in alcohol related accidents, there are numerically more licensed drivers in that age group. Finally, Dr. Scribner agreed on cross-examination that the rate of alcohol related deaths, regardless of the attributed cause of death, i.e., accidents, homicide, suicide, was consistent among all age groups up to and including persons fifty-four years old, in that alcohol related violent deaths consistently accounted for 47-48% of all violent deaths among every age group up to fifty-four years old.
On the other hand, the statistical evidence presented by the State, as reviewed earlier, primarily consists of national statistical data on alcohol related fatal and injury accidents. This data, sufficient to provide Congress with justification for enacting the National Minimum Drinking Age Act under its Commerce Clause powers, see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987), is not sufficient to carry the State‘s burden in the instant case in light of the Louisiana statistical evidence introduced by plaintiffs showing that eighteen to twenty year olds are not the group responsible for the greatest number of alcohol related accidents in Louisiana. The relevant inquiry in this case is whether eighteen to twenty year olds are the age group responsible for the greatest number of alcohol related accidents in Louisiana. The statistical evidence presented by plaintiffs, primarily consisting of the State‘s own data compilations, clearly shows that twenty-one to twenty-four year olds are responsible for far more alcohol related accidents in Louisiana than eighteen to twenty year olds.
Furthermore, the national data introduced by the State merely shows that eighteen to twenty year olds are “over-represented” to a greater degree than other age groups in alcohol related accidents,7 not that eighteen to twenty year olds are the group involved in the highest number of alcohol related accidents. Such a showing is not relevant in the instant case, however, as prohibiting an age group because they are over-represented in alcohol related accidents to a greater degree than other age groups will not decrease the number of actual traffic accidents and concomitantly increase highway safety nearly as much as would prohibiting the age group responsible for the greater number of accidents from purchasing or publicly consuming alcohol. While the State also introduced evidence to show that, given the relative number of licensed drivers in each age group, eighteen to twenty year olds are over-represented to a greater degree than twenty-one to twenty-four year olds in such accidents in Louisiana as well, this, as Dr. Scribner admitted and as we have previously explained, is not the proper measure of whether the Act substantially furthers the State‘s objective of increased highway safety.
The trial court also found that there are several non-discriminatory alternatives available to address the state‘s highway safety concerns. Our review of the record evidence reveals no error in the trial court‘s finding. In this regard, though Capt. Jones, a state witness, testified he believed a minimum drinking age law set at twenty-one years of age could “be the most critical and fundamental improvement in traffic safety when it comes to alcohol in this state,” he later acknowledged on cross-examination by plaintiffs that a law prohibiting persons twenty-one to twenty-three years old would also save lives, and that the twenty-one to twenty-three year old age group also has a very high rate of alcohol related accidents. Capt. Jones further admitted activities such as school educational programs, public advertising, education and training of retailers of alcohol, improved highway designs, and tougher DWI laws are all important and effective methods of combatting drinking and driving and improving highway safety. Of course, absolute prohibition of all alcohol sales in the State of Louisiana would also achieve the State‘s objective of increased highway safety without discriminating against persons eighteen to twenty years old. The record evidence in this case as to this factor therefore also points toward the unconstitutional nature of the challenged age discrimination, as reasonable non-discriminatory alternatives to the classifications contained in the challenged statutes by which the State could achieve its objective of increased highway safety exist.
Finally, we agree with the trial court‘s finding that the classification contained in the challenged statutes undercuts countervailing interests of the State. Our Civil Code accords majority status to persons upon reaching the age of eighteen.
Upon attaining the age of eighteen, persons are treated as adults under the law, and are accordingly assigned the responsibilities and obligations of an adult under the law.10
The challenged
Such discrimination against these otherwise similarly situated adults clearly undercuts the State‘s consistently expressed countervailing interest in according eighteen to twenty year olds “adult” or “major” status. Furthermore, the State‘s proclamation that eighteen to twenty year olds need special regulation of their alcohol consumption, despite the factual evidence to the contrary showing that eighteen to twenty year olds are involved in less alcohol related accidents than certain other age groups, undercuts the State‘s countervailing interest in addressing the broader problem of alcohol impaired driving on the highways of Louisiana. By targeting only eighteen to twenty year olds, the State is failing to address this problem. Therefore, once again, the record evidence in this case points toward the unconstitutional nature of the challenged age discrimination, as the classification contained in the challenged statutes undercuts countervailing state interests.
Our review of the record in this case shows the factual findings of the trial court in this case are well supported by record evidence and are not clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. The trial court‘s declaration of unconstitutionality of the challenged statutes on the basis of those factual findings is also correct. When properly evaluated in light of the unique protection against age discrimination afforded persons under
The evidence before us fails to show that eighteen to twenty year olds are the group most responsible for alcohol related accidents in Louisiana. As such, the State‘s objective of improved highway safety is not directly implicated by the discriminatory classification contained in the
Furthermore, the evidence shows there are reasonable, non-discriminatory alternatives available to the State which would substantially further the governmental objective of increased highway safety, and there are significant, countervailing State interests which are undercut by this discriminatory classification. As the United States Supreme Court stated when presented with a somewhat similar case involving a law requiring gender discrimination in the purchase of alcoholic beverages, “[i]n sum, the principles embodied in the Equal Protection Clause are not to be rendered inapplicable by statistically measured but loose-fitting generalities concerning the drinking tendencies of aggregate groups.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 208-09, 97 S.Ct. 451, 463, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976).
Loss of Highway Funds
As an alternative justification for the challenged statutes’ classification of persons on the basis of age, the State asserts that a declaration of unconstitutionality of the challenged statutes in this case will result in Louisiana having no law fixing the minimum drinking age at twenty-and will cause the State to fall out of compliance with
Though the trial court failed to specifically address in his reasons for judgment the State‘s asserted interest in the receipt of federal highway funds, our review of the record shows the trial court was presented with argument and evidence on the issue by both the State and plaintiffs, and that he subsequently considered and rejected the State‘s argument. After careful consideration, we must agree with the trial judge.
Although the State‘s objective of continued receipt of its full share of federal highway funds is an understandable and desirable goal, it is, nevertheless, not legitimate in the context of the instant case. Simply stated, where there is no other governmental interest which justifies the discrimination, the State‘s inability to obtain certain discretionary federal funds cannot suffice as a legitimate reason for the presumptively unconstitutional discrimination.
One of, if not the most important governmental objectives of the State is the securing and protection of the rights of its citizens which are enumerated in the constitution of the State of Louisiana. See
As the United States Supreme Court has stated, “it is obvious that vindication of conceded constitutional rights cannot be made dependent upon any theory that it is less expensive to deny than to afford them.” Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537, 83 S.Ct. 1314, 1321, 10 L.Ed.2d 529 (1963).
Furthermore, even if this court were willing to entertain the proposition that a straightforward “sale” of its citizens’ constitutional rights could possibly be upheld under some particular set of circumstances, examination of other relevant factors in this case, i.e., whether reasonable non-discriminatory alternatives by which the State‘s objective could be satisfied exist and whether the discriminatory classifications contained in the challenged statutes undercut any countervailing State interests, also point toward the unconstitutional nature of the challenged age classification. First, in the instant case non-discriminatory alternatives are available to the State to maintain its eligibility to continue to receive full federal highway funding. For instance, the State has the power to impose an absolute prohibition on the purchase, sale or possession of alcoholic beverages by persons of all ages. This, of course, would maintain the State‘s ability to receive full federal funding without discriminating against any particular protected class of persons. Further, raising the age of majority in the State of Louisiana to twenty-one would also accomplish the State‘s objective without discrimination, as persons under twenty-one would then be minors, not adults, as a matter of law. While neither of these examples may be politically desirable or palatable to the State, they are nevertheless reasonable in light of our constitutional prohibition against arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable discrimination on the basis of age.
Second, as we previously explained, our Civil Code accords majority status to persons upon reaching the age of eighteen. Upon attaining the age of eighteen in Louisiana, persons are treated as adults under the law for all purposes, and are accordingly assigned the responsibilities and obligations of an adult under the law. The discriminatory classification contained in these statutes to acquire federal funds clearly undercuts the State‘s consistently expressed countervailing interest in according eighteen to twenty year olds “adult” or “major” status.
We therefore hold the trial court was correct in rejecting the State‘s continued receipt of its full share of federal highway funds as sufficient reason to discriminate against otherwise similarly situated adults solely on the basis of their age. When measured against the constitutional presumption against discrimination on the basis of age, the availability of non-discriminatory alternatives, and the State‘s countervailing interest in having its young adults act responsibly in accordance with their legal status as majors for all purposes under Louisiana law, discrimination by the State solely on the basis of age for the purpose of continued receipt of its full share of federal highway funds is not only discrimination in furtherance of an illegitimate governmental purpose, but is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable discrimination under
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly held the State failed to overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality accorded the age classification
AFFIRMED.
LEMMON, JOHNSON, and VICTORY, JJ., dissent and assign reasons.
LEMMON, Justice, Dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons assigned by Justice Victory and for the following additional reasons.
The standard for determining the constitutionality of a statute that sets up a classification on any basis not enumerated in Section 3 is whether the classification under the presumptively constitutional statute furthers any legitimate governmental interest, and the opponent has the burden of proof. On the other hand, the standard for determining the constitutionality of a classification based on age is stated expressly in
The principal difference in the standards is in the placement of the burden of proof, although a classification on a basis enumerated in Section 3 requires that the legitimate governmental interest be a substantial reason for the classification rather than merely an incidental consideration.
The statute at issue in this case is a minimum drinking age statute. The issue is whether establishing the minimum drinking age at an age higher than the age of majority substantially furthers the legitimate governmental interest of promoting highway safety. The pertinent inquiry is made by comparing the category composed of persons from eighteen to twenty years of age with the category composed of persons twenty-one years of age and older. The majority errs in comparing the eighteen-to-twenty age group with numerous other three-year age groups for the purpose of determining the legislative arbitrariness in fixing the minimum drinking age at twenty-one. The focus should be on the reasonableness of the Legislature‘s drawing the line at the specific age higher than eighteen, and the State has the burden of proof.
The State introduced national statistics showing an overrepresentation of the age group classified under the Louisiana statutes in alcohol-related highway injuries and state statistics showing that the group represents five percent of all licensed drivers, but are involved in ten percent of all alcohol-related accidents. A National Highway Transportation Safety Administration study estimated that highway fatalities have been reduced by twelve percent because of the minimum drinking age laws. Louisiana can certainly use these and the other national and state statistics and reports, which were undertaken for the specific purpose of evaluating this minimum drinking age, as a non-arbitrary basis for establishing a reasonable minimum drinking age in this state, rather than reverting back to the lowest minimum drinking age in the nation.
I have difficulty in finding arbitrary a classification establishing a minimum drinking age that every other state has established in order to substantially further the legitimate governmental objective of promoting highway safety. Moreover, there is undeniable logic in the theory that prohibiting drinking by younger drivers who are inexperienced both at driving and at drinking would surely promote highway safety.
While I conclude that the State proved furtherance of a legitimate government interest in establishing the minimum drinking age at twenty-one, I have a great deal of problems
VICTORY, Justice, dissenting.
The majority in the instant case, citing Pace, has again expanded the test, stating that Louisiana courts examine several factors, including whether: (1) each interest asserted by the state is actually implicated by the classifications employed in the statutory scheme; (2) there are no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives to the challenged statutory scheme by which the state‘s asserted interests and objectives might be satisfied; and (3) the discriminatory classifications contained in the challenged statutory scheme do not undercut any other countervailing state interest.
Further, the majority has now decided:
We hold today, as explained infra, that in the context of a law which singles out a particular age group of adults for treatment different under the law from other adults, the classification can only be found constitutional if it is the classification which most directly implicates or furthers the asserted governmental interest. In other words, if the evidence shows there are other age groups which would better further the State‘s asserted interest, then the classification chosen is inherently arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable where there are no other asserted State interests which would justify choosing the challenged classification over the group which better furthers the asserted State interest.
In my view, this Court in its prior cases, and the majority in this case, have distorted what
The undisputed evidence produced by the state shows beyond question that the Legislature was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in passing this Act, because it reasonably furthers the state interest of highway safety. The majority acknowledges that the state‘s evidence shows that nationwide, drinking laws, such as at issue here, have been proven to save lives. FRAS data
Yet the State presented compelling evidence about Louisiana accidents. 1986 Louisiana traffic records data reports compiled by the Louisiana Highway Safety Commission clearly show that eighteen- to twenty-year-old drivers had fatal and injury-producing accidents at the rate of 1 for every 191 drivers in that age group, whereas all other age groups had a substantially higher per capita rate of fatal and injury-producing accidents. The next closest group, the twenty-one- to twenty-four-year-olds, had a per capita rate of 1 out of every 217 drivers. This statistic showed that drivers in the eighteen-to twenty-year-old age group have fatal and injury-producing accidents at a 12% higher rate than the next highest group, the twenty-one- to twenty-four-year-old age group. Further, Ms. Theis‘s affidavit that eighteen-to twenty-year-old drivers were only 5% of the licensed drivers in Louisiana in 1993 but were involved in 10% of the alcohol-related and fatal injury accidents, also clearly shows a much higher per capita rate for eighteen- to twenty-year-olds for alcohol-involved and fatal and injury car crashes. Again, the majority erroneously dismisses this evidence simply because the twenty-one-to twenty-four-year-old group has a higher number of drivers, thus resulting in a total number of fatal and injury accidents greater for that age group than the eighteen- to twenty-year-old group.
In spite of this overwhelming and compelling statistical evidence which clearly shows the Act does not arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate based on age, the majority holds that the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in concluding as a factual matter that the state‘s interest in highway safety is not substantially furthered by the Act. The majority points to statistical evidence, such as eighteen- to twenty-year-olds are neither arrested in greater numbers in Evangeline Parish than other age groups for DWI, and eighteen- to twenty-year-olds are not the age group with the highest incident of DWI convictions in Evangeline Parish. This evidence is easily explained by the fact that eighteen- to twenty-year-olds only make up 5% of the drivers. For instance, Ms. Marcantel‘s statistics for 1986 show 9 of 92 DWI arrests in Evangeline Parish were eighteen- to twenty-year-olds, over 10% of the total arrests. Her statistics for 1994-95 reveal 10 of 179 arrests for eighteen- to twenty-year-olds, which is 5.6% of the total arrests, larger than the percent of 5% for eighteen- to twenty-year-old drivers in Louisiana. Even if Marcantel‘s statistics had shown fewer arrests per capita for eighteen-to twenty-year-olds, there are many explanations as to why eighteen- to twenty-year-olds may not be arrested or convicted as frequently as other age groups including: (1) there are fewer eighteen- to twenty-year-old drivers; (2) police officers may be less inclined to arrest young adults for DWI, preferring to take them home instead; and (3) the fewer the arrests, the fewer the convictions. In my view, the evidence presented
Having concluded that the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in finding that the state failed to carry its burden of proof that highway safety is not substantially furthered by the Act, the majority turns it attention to whether or not there are reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives to the challenged statutory scheme by which the state‘s asserted interests and objectives might be satisfied. The majority suggests to avoid losing federal funding that the state could: (1) impose an absolute prohibition on the purchase, sale or possession of alcohol beverages of all persons of all ages in the state; or (2) raise the age of majority in the state to twenty-one so that eighteen- to twenty-year-olds would then be minors and would be subject to treatment as such. The majority‘s first suggestion, prohibition, conjures up the days of speak-easys, tommy-guns, and illegal importation of alcohol. Surely, it is an alternative that was tried and discarded decades ago. The majority‘s second suggestion that eighteen- to twenty-year-olds be reclassified by the Legislature to be minors, not adults, would not only deprive them of all of the other advantages that they gained by being classified as adults at age eighteen, but would also raise serious equal protection problems under the majority‘s own test herein. Would not a law to reclassify eighteen-to twenty-year-olds as minors simply to deny them the right to drink alcohol be arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable under the majority‘s determination that state highway safety is not substantially furthered by denying them the right to drink?
In summary, every state (but Louisiana) and the federal government have drinking laws similar to the one in question. Common sense dictates that the legislatures of all other states and the Congress would never have passed such laws without a reasonable basis. The reasons are obvious—traffic safety. The undisputed evidence introduced by the state shows that Louisiana drivers in the age group of eighteen- to twenty-year-olds have a much greater frequency of fatal and injury-producing accidents than any other three-year age group. The trial court was not free to disregard or minimize this evidence nor is this Court. In my view, the evidence presented shows a reasonable basis for the law, and the legislature did not arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably discriminate against the eighteen- to twenty-year-olds. I would reverse the trial court‘s ruling of unconstitutionality and dismiss plaintiffs’ claims.
Justice Johnson filed Opinion Dissenting from Original Opinion March 14, 1996
JOHNSON, Justice, Dissenting
I respectfully dissent.
The evidence presented by the State clearly shows that the challenged classification is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable by showing that the classification substantially furthers the important State objective of highway safety. The State introduced into evidence national statistics which established a direct relationship between alcohol related accidents and the age group classified by the Louisiana statute. According to those statistics, Louisiana had the fourth highest percentage of alcohol related traffic fatalities of fifteen to twenty year olds of all States in the nation. In 1994, more persons in the age group classified under the Louisiana minimum drinking age statute died in low blood alcohol level traffic crashes than any other three year age group.
Moreover, in 1994, 44% of the traffic fatalities involving persons ages eighteen to twenty were alcohol related as compared to 40.8% for all traffic fatalities. Alcohol related traffic fatalities were over twice as great on a per capita basis for persons age eighteen to twenty as for the population over twenty. This evidence is undoubtedly relevant to evaluating the reasonableness of the classification. Based on the evidence presented, I believe that the State met its burden of proving that there was a reasonable basis for enacting the law at issue.
Moreover, I disagree with the majority‘s holding that “in the context of a law which singles out a particular age group for treatment different under the law from other age groups, the classification can only be found constitutional if it is the classification which
Since the state proved that the law has a reasonable basis and the legislature did not arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably discriminate against eighteen to twenty year olds, I would reverse the trial court‘s ruling declaring unconstitutional
95-2189 (La. 7/2/96)
ON REHEARING
LEMMON, Justice.*
This rehearing was granted to reconsider the earlier decision which held unconstitutional the statutory provisions that raised the minimum drinking age in this state to twenty-one. On original hearing, a majority of this court ruled that these statutes violated the equal protection afforded by
I
In 1986, the Legislature raised the minimum drinking age in the state from eighteen to twenty-one. See La.Acts 1986, No. 33, amending and reenacting
In 1995, the Legislature amended and reenacted
Challenging the constitutionality of Act 639 of 1995 and seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief, plaintiffs commenced this action in the form of a class action with two plaintiff subclasses—purchasers and retailers. The trial judge granted a temporary restraining order, prohibiting defendants from enforcing any prohibition against the purchase, possession, service or sale of alcoholic beverages to persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one pending the injunction hearing.
After the hearing on the preliminary injunction at which both sides presented evidence, the trial judge granted plaintiffs declaratory relief, ruling that Act 639 of 1995 constituted arbitrary age discrimination in violation of
On original hearing, a majority of this court affirmed the trial court‘s decision declaring the minimum drinking age provisions unconstitutional under
II
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall discriminate
against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited, except in the latter case as punishment for crime. (emphasis added).
In asserting the constitutional challenge to the minimum drinking age statutes, plaintiffs rely on the special protection against arbitrary discrimination based on age set forth in the third sentence of
In Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ. and Agric. and Mechanical College, 477 So.2d 1094 (La.1985),2 we construed this third sentence of Section 3 to mean that when a statute classifies persons on a basis therein enumerated, the statute is unconstitutional unless the proponents of the statute prove this legislative classification “substantially furthers an appropriate state purpose.” Id. at 1108. In so holding, we expressly repudiated the notion that the federal system of equal protection review should be used as a model for interpreting or applying this third sentence of Section 3, concluding that “the state constitution calls for more than minimal scrutiny of certain types of classifications, and assigns the state the burden of showing that such legislation is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.” Id. at 1107.
As we recently explained in Moore v. RLCC Technologies, Inc., 95-2621 (La. 2/28/96), 668 So.2d 1135,
At the other end of the spectrum are laws that classify persons on any basis other than those bases expressly enumerated in Section 3. These laws are reviewed under the standard set forth in the first sentence, which has been construed to mean that every statutory classification must pass the minimum standard of being rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.3 Whenever a person disadvantaged by such a classification seeks to have the law declared unconstitutional, that person has the stringent burden of demonstrating that the law does not suitably further any appropriate state interest.
In the middle of the spectrum are laws that classify persons on the basis of the six grounds enumerated in the third sentence of Section 3: (1) birth, (2) age, (3) sex, (4) culture, (5) physical condition or (6) political ideas or affiliations. A law containing a statutory classification based on any of the six enumerated grounds does not enjoy the usual presumption of constitutionality. Moreover, with that reversal of the ordinary presumption of constitutionality comes a reversal of the rule that ordinarily places the burden of proof on the party seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality. When the court reviews such a law, the burden is on the proponent of the classification and the standard of review is heightened, requiring the proponent to establish that the classification is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable because it substantially furthers an appropriate governmental objective.4Moore v. RLCC Technologies, Inc., 95-2621, pp. 9-10 (La. 2/28/96), 668 So.2d 1135, 1140-41.
In summary as to the two lower levels of scrutiny, the standard under the Louisiana Constitution for determining the constitutionality of a statute that sets up a classification on any basis not enumerated in Section 3 is whether the classification under the presumptively constitutional statute furthers any legitimate governmental interest, and the opponent has the burden of proof. On the other hand, the standard for determining the constitutionality of a classification based on age is stated expressly in
The principal differences in the standards for the two lower levels of scrutiny are the placement of the burden of proof and the requirement for the middle level that the appropriate governmental purpose be a substantial reason for the classification rather than merely an incidental consideration.5
III
As noted above, the standard of scrutiny appropriate for review of a statute that classifies persons on the basis of age is whether the classification substantially furthers an appropriate governmental purpose. There is general agreement that improving highway safety is an appropriate governmental purpose, and an important one. The narrow issue is thus whether the age classification in these statutes substantially furthers that purpose.
On original hearing, the majority applied the above-stated standard to the evidence and framed the relevant inquiry as “whether eighteen to twenty year olds are the age group responsible for the greatest number of alcohol related accidents in Louisiana.” 95-2189 (La. 3/8/96), p. 14 (emphasis added). In concluding that the evidence failed to establish that this age group was responsible for the greatest number of alcohol-related accidents in this state, the majority compared age groups in three-year segments. The majority rejected evidence that the eighteen-to-twenty-year-old age group was “over-represented”6 to a greater degree than other three-year age groups in alcohol-related accidents, because other three-year age groups with a larger number of licensed drivers were involved in a larger number of alcohol-related accidents. The majority also rejected the national statistics presented by the State, reasoning that while the national data provided sufficient justification for Congress under the Commerce Clause to enact the National Minimum Drinking Age Act, see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987), that national data did not provide sufficient justification for an increase in the minimum drinking age in Louisiana. Using this focus on absolute numbers and Louisiana statistics, the majority concluded that “eighteen to twenty year
On rehearing, we frame the relevant inquiry differently and employ a different focus.
The statute under review involves a change in the minimum drinking age. The precise question is whether the raising of the minimum drinking age from eighteen to twenty-one, which discriminates against adults in the lowest range of adulthood by postponing their legal access to alcoholic beverages, substantially furthers the governmental objective of improving highway safety. The inquiry should focus on the reasons for and effect of removing eighteen-to-twenty-year-old persons from the group of licensed drivers who are allowed to drink alcohol legally. The analysis should examine the relation of the two classes to each other by comparing licensed drivers in the eighteen-to-twenty-year-old group in alcohol-related accidents with licensed drivers in the age group of twenty-one and above. The inquiry should also include consideration of the reasons, presented by the evidence, for raising the minimum drinking age in order to affect highway safety.
IV
A detailed summary of the evidence introduced at trial is attached to this opinion as an appendix.
The governmental objective at issue is improving highway safety. The means chosen by the Legislature to improve highway safety in these particular statutes are aimed generally at the problem of drinking and driving, a problem that pervades all age groups, but specifically at the problem of youthful drinking and driving. The eighteen-to-twenty-year-old age group, who are barely experienced at driving legally, are totally inexperienced at drinking legally. In the words of the Commander of the Louisiana State Police, allowing this group to use alcohol has a detrimental effect on highway safety because the group “is not only inexperienced at driving but is also inexperienced at drinking.” The Commander, based on his experience, expressed his expert opinion that the statutes under review are a “most critical and fundamental improvement” in attacking the problem of intoxicated drivers.
Increasing the minimum drinking age clearly is a rational and non-arbitrary approach to solving the particular problem of youthful drinking and driving, as well as the overall problem of intoxicated driving.7 Forty-nine other states and the federal system have adopted this approach as a non-arbitrary method of attaining improvement in the problem. Admittedly, those legislative decisions are not subject to the same equal protection scrutiny as the Louisiana statutes. Nevertheless, unanimous utilization of this approach to the problem is a significant indication that this approach “substantially furthers [the] appropriate state purpose” contemplated in Sibley. Id. at 1108.
Logic and experience were the principal bases for the governmental conclusion that an increase in the minimum drinking age will substantially further the objective of improving highway safety. Statistics were primarily used at trial to provide corroborative support for that conclusion.
The trial court, affirmed by the majority on original hearing, concluded that the statistics did not support that governmental decision. On reconsideration of the evidence and arguments of counsel, we conclude that the trial court erred manifestly on the mixed question of law and fact by using an incorrect method of analysis, and the majority on original hearing fell into the same error.
The majority on original hearing took a mistaken view of the State‘s argument, noting that the State attempted to justify the classification on the basis that the statutes
The State‘s principal argument, which we deem valid, is that prohibiting use of alcohol by eighteen-to-twenty-year-old licensed drivers will improve highway safety for all motorists by removing from the general group of alcohol-using licensed drivers the specific group of alcohol-using licensed drivers who are, by percentage, the drivers most frequently involved in alcohol-related accidents. The overall statistical evidence supports this argument.
Of the statistical evidence, the most significant by far was the data obtained by the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) from studies that were undertaken for the specific purpose of evaluating the effectiveness on highway safety of laws that raised the minimum drinking age to twenty-one. These statistics compared the specific group disadvantaged by the discrimination with the general group of licensed drivers and established, among other things, that the disadvantaged group was involved in twice as many accidents per capita as the general group and that Louisiana ranked above forty-six other states in the percentage of alcohol-related fatalities involving drivers under twenty-one. Other studies combined to conclude that minimum drinking age laws were responsible for significant reductions in traffic fatalities among motorists generally.
The executive director of the Louisiana Highway Safety Commission concluded from Louisiana and national data that alcohol-related fatalities involving young drivers increased significantly at age seventeen and peaked at age twenty. Particularly important was her testimony that persons in the disadvantaged group represented only five percent of the licensed drivers, but were involved in ten percent of the alcohol-related accidents involving injuries or fatalities. The latter statistics are particularly significant because if an increase in the drinking age to twenty-one eliminates drinking by the group of licensed drivers that are involved in twice the number of alcohol-related accidents proportionate to the percentage of drivers in that group, then clearly the increase substantially furthers the goal of improving highway safety. Prohibition of drinking by persons who are proportionately the most dangerous group of drinking drivers has to increase highway safety substantially, as opposed to incidentally.
Other reports outlined in the evidence established that the increase in the drinking age substantially reduces alcohol-related traffic accidents. Although any prohibition in the use of alcohol would have some beneficial effect on alcohol-related accidents, the specific evidence referred to in the previous paragraph establishes that the increase in the drinking age to twenty-one would have a significantly greater effect in reducing alcohol-related accidents.
The trial court‘s finding that the challenged classification does not substantially further the State‘s interest in improving highway safety because members of the disadvantaged group in Louisiana are neither arrested in greater numbers for intoxicated driving nor involved in greater numbers of alcohol-related accidents was erroneous as a matter of fact and law. First, there was no reason to reject from consideration the statistical data, studies, reports and expert opinions from outside Louisiana, and especially those studies that were specifically performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the increase in the minimum drinking age to twenty-one.8 Second, the court erred in considering a reduction in the gross number of
V
The trial court further erred in accepting plaintiffs’ argument that the decision in Pace v. State, Through La. State Employees Retirement Sys., 94-1027 (La. 1/17/95), 648 So.2d 1302 imposed three additional requirements to the burden of proof established by Sibley.
In their trial brief, plaintiffs set forth their interpretation of Pace as adding three additional requirements to the Sibley standard for determining whether legislation falling within the intermediate level of scrutiny under
Accordingly, the Age Legislation must survive the three Pace tests:
First, each interest must actually be implicated by the statutory scheme, Pace, 648 So.2d at 1309;
Second, there must be no non-discriminatory “alternatives which deal directly” with the asserted interest, Id.; and
Third, the age discrimination must not “undercut” a “countervailing state interest.” Id. at 1310.
Plaintiffs’ argument in the present case that Pace imposed additional requirements for intermediate review is erroneous. In Pace, this court merely reaffirmed that the proper standard for intermediate review of the statutory classifications expressly enumerated in the third sentence of Section 3 is the standard articulated in Sibley. We now clarify that Pace was simply a specific application of the Sibley standard to a concrete factual record and that Pace neither altered nor expanded the Sibley standard.
The Pace decision involved a challenge to a retirement statute that classified persons on the basis of birth or legitimacy. This court, using the Sibley standard for the enumerated categories in
The Pace decision further mentioned that there was a more effective non-discriminatory means of preventing fraudulent claims by the use of extremely reliable evidence, available through advances in modern scientific technology, to prove filiation, and that the strength of the asserted state interest in preventing fraudulent claims was undercut
While these three factors perhaps were relevant for rejecting the classification in the factual context of Pace, these factors were neither part of the holding in Pace nor were these adopted as mandatory requirements for the intermediate level of scrutiny. Nevertheless, because the trial judge in the present case found a deficiency in the State‘s case based on failure to prove these factors, we discuss each separately.
A
The trial court ruled that the State failed to prove that the asserted governmental interest in improving highway safety was actually implicated by the classifications in the statutory scheme, as required by Pace.9
The innocuous language in the Pace decision that the State‘s interest in the orderly disposition of property at death was not actually implicated by the statutory scheme that provided for fixed benefits hardly suggests that Pace added a significant burden to Sibley‘s intermediate scrutiny standard. Rather, the language in Pace indicates that there simply was not a substantial relationship in that case between the classification and the asserted governmental interest, which is essentially an application of the Sibley standard.
Since few classifications provide for a perfect fit10 between the classification and the asserted governmental purpose or for a completely irrational mismatch of classifications with purposes, “[t]he key factor in reviewing classifications is the degree of correlation between the means and the ends that is required by the judiciary and the extent to which the judiciary will analyze the permissible purpose of the legislation.” Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, 3 Treatise on Constitutional Law § 18.2 (2d ed. 1992). This factor is dependent upon the standard of scrutiny applicable to the legislation in question.
In applying the federal intermediate standard of scrutiny in a case involving gender classification, the Supreme Court in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 456-57, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976), framed the inquiry as whether the classification serves “important governmental objectives and [is] substantially related to achievement of those objectives,”11 and focused on the classificatory fit. Considering a challenge to a statute
In the present case, there is a common sense and experience-based relationship between the classification resulting from the increase in the minimum drinking age and the statutory objective of reducing youthful drinking and driving to improve highway safety. That relationship is supported by statistical data, when viewed in the proper focus. Although there is the difficulty noted in Craig of proving broad sociological propositions by statistics, the statistics in the present case were only necessary to provide corroborative support for the proposition, widely accepted by experts, that raising the minimum drinking age is substantially related to the improvement of overall highway safety by reducing alcohol-related accidents.13
We conclude that there is a substantial relationship in the present case, that was absent in the Pace case, between the classification and the asserted governmental interest, which is all that Sibley requires.
B
The trial judge also imposed a burden on the State to prove that there were no non-discriminatory alternative methods for reducing accidents caused by intoxicated driving. The judge listed alternatives, among others, such as public education, lowering the legal blood-alcohol level for drivers, and mandating lengthy driver‘s license suspensions.
This burden imposed on the State by the trial judge, at plaintiffs’ suggestion that Pace required this burden, is seldom appropriate in intermediate scrutiny cases. In the federal system, cases requiring strict scrutiny because suspect classes or fundamental rights are involved sometimes mandate that the classification be narrowly tailored to achieve the specific governmental objective.14 Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, 3 Treatise on Constitutional Law § 18.3 (2d ed. 1992). The intermediate scrutiny standard adopted by Sibley for review of age classification statutes falls far below the strict scrutiny standard in the federal system. Indeed, the Sibley standard—the classification must substantially further an appropriate governmental interest—is virtually the same as the intermediate scrutiny standard enunciated in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976)—the classification must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. Neither the Sibley intermediate standard nor the Craig intermediate standard requires that the proponent of the statute prove there are no non-discriminatory methods of achieving the objective sought by the statute, as the trial judge required in the present case.
The trial judge indicated that the State had the burden to prove that the age classification does not undercut any countervailing governmental interest. However, the judge did not discuss this “requirement” any further in reasons for judgment. Suffice it to say, the Sibley intermediate standard contains no “requirement” that the proponent of the statute prove the classification does not undercut any countervailing governmental interest, and the trial judge erred in imposing this requirement.15
VI
Plaintiffs’ final argument is that even if implementation of the prohibitions in the challenged statutes would substantially further the governmental objective of improving highway safety, the statutes contain so many exceptions that the asserted objective “is not even implicated, much less substantially furthered.”
(i) For an established religious purpose.
(ii) At a function sponsored by a bona fide nonprofit organization under
26 U.S.C. 501(c) where an individual had received or purchased a ticket for admittance.(iii) When a person under twenty-one years of age is accompanied by a parent or legal custodian twenty-one years of age or older.
(iv) For medical purposes when prescribed or administered by a licensed physician, dentist, nurse, hospital, or medical institution.
(v) In private residences.
The State argues that almost all of the other forty-nine state statutes have similar exceptions permitting under-aged persons to drink in certain situations. Plaintiffs counter that while the minimum drinking age laws of other states contain similar exceptions, no minimum drinking age law of any state contains as many exceptions as the Louisiana statute. Plaintiffs contend that the inconsistencies presented by the exceptions undermine any furtherance of the governmental purpose. Noting that under-aged persons can nevertheless drink alcohol legally in their residences, at religious events, with parents and at bona fide nonprofit functions, plaintiffs submit that the statutes, when considered with the numerous exceptions, authorize public possession and consumption of alcohol by this age group in so many settings that the statutes cannot substantially further the governmental interest of improving highway safety.
The issue is determined by examining the State‘s purpose—improving highway safety—and
No one disputes the exceptions for medical and religious purposes. See Felix v. Milliken, 463 F.Supp. 1360 (E.D.Mich.1978) (noting accepted notion that religious and medical purposes are exceptions from such statutory and constitutional drinking age provisions). Rather, the dispute is over the other three exceptions.
The exceptions for consumption in a private residence or consumption with a parent or legal custodian share the common notion of family occasions, and we therefore address them together.
The trial judge concluded that since these exceptions allowed under-aged persons to consume alcoholic beverages “as much as they want” in certain settings uncontrolled by governmental supervision over alcoholic beverages, the exceptions effectively undermined the stated objectives of improving protection of the motoring public from youthful driving and drinking, as well as undermining the governmental policy favoring temperance.
Contrary to the trial judge‘s suggestion, this is not a temperance statute. Rather, the purpose of this statute is to curtail the ready availability of alcohol to inexperienced drivers and drinkers in this age group. The real danger at which the minimum drinking age law is aimed is the situation of under-aged persons’ buying drinks at bar rooms and convenience stores before driving around in their vehicles. This is the setting in which the greatest danger of accidents is presented. On the other hand, when under-aged persons drink alcohol at home or with parents or guardians, theoretically their parents or guardians are not likely to allow them to drive on the highways after such drinking, and thus theoretically far less danger is presented.
This theoretical division between public settings and family settings is based on family controls versus societal controls on drinking and driving. Tracking that division, the exceptions restrict alcohol consumption by this age group to family-controlled settings, leaving the prohibition applicable primarily to non-family settings in public places. The statutory objective of reducing the ready availability of alcohol to under-aged persons likely to drive after drinking thus is not undercut by the two exceptions which permit consumption in family-controlled settings.
The exceptions also recognize the reality that the Legislature can control alcohol acquisition, possession and consumption in certain settings, but cannot exercise control, short of enacting a temperance statute, in certain other settings. When these exceptions are viewed in accordance with the division of control between the State and parents, the statutory exceptions do not undermine the statute‘s furtherance of the governmental purpose.
As to the final exception for consuming alcohol at ticketed functions sponsored by bona fide nonprofit organizations, we take judicial notice of the fact the Legislature recently amended
Allowing persons between eighteen and twenty-one to drink alcohol at a ticketed event sponsored by a bona fide nonprofit organization is a very narrow exception to the prohibitory law against “public” possession and consumption of alcohol by this age group. The exception distinguishes between (1) a public place or a club which is de facto open to the public and (2) a single ticketed event held by a good faith nonprofit organization. While there is some “public” nature to this type of function, the effect of this infrequently anticipated occasion for drinking alcohol under this now repealed exception cannot truly be said to undermine the effect of the overall prohibition on the improvement of highway safety.
JOHNSON, J., concurs in result.
BLEICH, J., concurs and files additional reasons and subscribes to the majority opinion.
KIMBALL and MARCUS, JJ., dissent and assign reasons.
APPENDIX:1
At the injunction hearing in the trial court, both sides submitted extensive affidavit testimony and documentary materials, and two live state expert witnesses testified.
Both sides introduced portions of the Louisiana Highway Safety Commission‘s raw data compilations. Particularly, plaintiffs introduced relevant portions of the 1986, 1991 and 1992 Louisiana Traffic Records Data Reports (“Louisiana Reports“).2
The 1986 Louisiana Report showed that the 18-20 year olds had 854 total alcohol-related fatal and injury accidents. By comparison, the 21-23 year olds had 924 such accidents; and the 24-26 year olds, 837. Adjusted to reflect the number of licensed drivers, however, the 1986 data report reflected that 18-20 year olds had fatal and injury-producing accidents at a per capita rate of 1 for every 191 drivers in that age group; whereas, all other older age groups had substantially higher per capita rates of alcohol-related fatal and injury-producing accidents, with the nearest group being the 21-23 year olds, having a per capita rate of 1 for every 217 drivers, followed by the 24-26 year olds, having a per capita rate of 1 for every 263 drivers.
The 1991 Louisiana Report employed a different methodology, using 4-year age grouping, and splitting the relevant 18-20 year old category into 2 categories: 15-19 and 20-24. Nonetheless, the 1991 report reflected that only 9.61% of all accidents for the 15-19 years olds were alcohol-involved; whereas, the corresponding statistic for the 20-24 year olds was 13.70%; the 25-29 year olds, 14.06%; the 30-34 year olds, 13.84%; the 35-39 year olds, 11.47%, and the 40-44, 11.89%.
The 1992 Louisiana Report employed yet another methodology, reflecting that the 15-20 year olds had 337 total alcohol-related fatal and injury accidents; whereas, the 21-24 year olds had 402 total such accidents; the 25-29 year olds, 479; the 30-34 year olds, 426; and the 35-39 year olds, 330.
The 1993 Louisiana Report, discussed in more detail below in connection with Bette Theis’ affidavit, was introduced in full by the State and, as plaintiffs point out, reflected that of the 509 total accidents involving 18-20 year olds, 352 (69.12%) involved alcohol impairment. In comparison, the report reflected that of the 517 total accidents involving 22-24 year olds, 377 (72.92%) involved alcohol impairment.
Plaintiffs also submitted 3 affidavits and documentary materials to establish that 18-20 year olds are arrested and convicted less often on DWI charges than other older 3-year age groups. Particularly, plaintiffs introduced affidavits from Charles Lombardino, Mary Jane Marcantel and Joseph W. Demourelle.
Lombardino, a Shreveport citizen, attested to DWI statistics he acquired from Caddo, Bossier City and Shreveport police departments. Lombardino attested that he requested and received statistical evidence from those departments listing the number of DWI citations issued, by age, for the year 1994. The Shreveport data was of no use in this case given that it was divided into age groups which split the 18-20 year olds into different categories. The Bossier City data showed that there were 22 DWI citations issued to drivers 20 and under and 119 DWI citations issued to drivers 21-30 years old. Assuming that the 21-30 years old group had an even distribution of citations, every 3-year age group in that range had an average of 36 DWI citations during this same time period.
Marcantel, an experienced paralegal, was employed by plaintiffs to conduct statistical research, analyzing certain official DWI statistical records in Evangeline Parish for
Demourelle, an Evangeline Parish detective, also attested regarding DWI statistics in Evangeline Parish and regarding his experience with alcohol issues with young drivers. He stated that he researched and reviewed the criminal arrest and probation records of Evangeline Parish for the period January 1, 1995 to July 31, 1995, to determine the number of DWI convictions in that parish during that time frame and the age of the persons convicted. He stated that his research revealed of the 79 DWI convictions in Evangeline Parish during that time, only 1 was of a person under 21 years old.3
Plaintiffs also introduced the affidavit of Robert Gramling, a professor of sociology at the University of Southwestern Louisiana, who has studied the relationship between drinking age legislation and alcohol consumption. His research, consisting of studies done in 1986 and 1992 comparing drinking habits of young adult college students in Louisiana and North Carolina, revealed a lack of empirical evidence to support the assumption that raising the drinking age to 21 resulted in a decrease in alcohol consumption by 18-20 year olds. Indeed, his research strongly suggested that increased quantities of alcohol may be consumed by 18-20 year olds where the drinking age is raised to 21.
Focusing on the Louisiana statutes at issue, Professor Gramling concluded that raising the legal drinking age in 1986 did not significantly change the alcohol consumption of 18-20 year olds in Louisiana. Commenting on the statutory exceptions, he stated that the exceptions “make it extremely likely that consumption of alcoholic beverages by persons between eighteen and twenty-one years of age will change locations from supervised public places to unsupervised places, further resulting in a potential increase in amounts consumed by this age group.”
Discussing the latter shift in location of consumption, Dr. Gramling made a division between alcohol consumption in controlled and in uncontrolled setting. “Controlled” settings included those at which an under-aged youth may be required to provide proof of age as well as places at which societal controls are in place (public places and on the highway). “Uncontrolled” settings included those in which the sole controls are from family and guardians.4 Dr. Gramling concluded that raising the drinking age merely shifts the location of consumption from “controlled” settings—bars, cars and highway— to “uncontrolled” settings—private residences, fraternity houses, and friends houses—and found that it had no, or perhaps even an inverse effect, on consumption.
Dr. Gramling referred to this location shift as “front loading,” which he defined as “consuming
Turning to the State‘s evidence on the highway safety issue, the State introduced affidavits from James Hedlund and Bette Theis.
James Hedlund was the Acting Associate Administrator for Traffic Safety Programs, and Director of the Office of Alcohol and State Programs, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), U.S. Department of Transportation. Hedlund attested that “NHTSA has monitored the involvement of teenage drivers in fatal traffic crashes and the effectiveness of state laws establishing 21 as the legal age for purchase and public possession of alcoholic beverages. The Office of Alcohol and State Programs is responsible for NHTSA‘s impaired driving (resulting from alcohol or other drugs) and traffic records program.” Hedlund further attested that
Relying on statistical data obtained by NHTSA through its Fatal Accident Reporting System (“FARS“) and from reports studying age 21 drinking law effectiveness, Hedlund provided the following data.
First, he noted that over-involvement of 18-, 19- and 20-year-olds in alcohol-related crashes has been established by the following four findings:
(1) In 1994, 44% of 18-, 19-, and 20-year-old traffic fatalities were alcohol-related; this compares to 40.8% for all traffic fatalities.
(2) Alcohol-related traffic fatality rates (fatalities per capita) are over twice as great for 18-, 19-, and 20-year olds as for the population over 21.
(3) More 18-, 19-, and 20-year olds died in low (.01 to .09) blood alcohol level traffic crashes than 21-, 22-, and 23-year olds, or any other 3-year group, in 1994.
(4) In 1994, Louisiana had the 4th highest percentage (57.2%) of alcohol-related traffic fatalities of 15-20 year olds of all States (behind Alaska, Delaware, and New Mexico).
Second, Hedlund noted that the effectiveness of age 21 drinking laws has been established by the following three reports:
(1) A Government Accounting Office (GAO) report to Congress, Drinking-Age Laws—An Evaluation Synthesis of Their Impact on Highway Safety, March 1987, examined 14 high quality traffic accident studies. The report concluded that “[r]aising the drinking age has a direct effect on reducing alcohol-related traffic accidents among youths affected by the laws, on average, across the states.” The report further stated that “[a]lmost all studies have found statistically significant reductions in traffic-accident outcomes, even though the studies often varied in scope, design, analysis methods and outcome measured.”
(2) A January 1989 NHTSA study, The Impact of Minimum Drinking Age Laws on Fatal Crash Involvements: An Update of NHTSA Analyses, estimated that minimum drinking age laws were responsible for a 12% reduction in fatal crash involvements of affected drivers.
(3) In 1994, NHTSA estimated that state 21-year-old minimum drinking age laws have reduced traffic fatalities involving drivers 18-20 years old by 13% and have saved an estimated 14,816 lives since 1975.
The State also introduced the affidavit of Bette Theis, the Executive Director of the Louisiana Highway Safety Commission. She attested, based on the Louisiana Highway Safety Commission, 1993 Traffic Records Data Report, discussed above, and the NHTSA FARS 1994 Data Summary Report, that Louisiana data for 1993 reflected alcohol-involved
Consistent with the “over-representation”5 evidence established by the 1986 Louisiana Report and federal data discussed above, Ms. Theis attested that the 1993 Louisiana Report reflect that 18-20 year olds represented only 5% of the licensed drivers in Louisiana in 1993, yet were involved in 10% of the alcohol-involved fatal and injury accidents. In the 46 alcohol-involved fatal crashes during 1993, she attested that 72% of the 18-20 year old age group had been drinking. In the 17-20 year old age group, 26 drivers were killed in alcohol-involved crashes, representing 47% of all traffic fatalities in this age group. Moreover, she commented that “this number (Driver Fatalities) represents the proverbial ‘tip on the iceberg’ and does not include other fatalities in crashes (e.g. passenger and pedestrian) or driver, passenger, and other injuries among young people in this age group.”
The State also introduced an affidavit from a doctor and a nurse regarding the effect of alcohol on accidents in general involving 18-20 year olds.
Dr. Melvin Kohn attested that “injuries— particularly due to motor vehicle crashes, homicide and suicide—are the leading cause of death among persons aged 18-20 years. According to the best data available, alcohol use contributes to the occurrence of 30-50% of injuries.” Continuing, he attested that alcohol use can result in “impaired judgment, delayed reaction time, and impulsive behavior” and that “[a]lcohol can exaggerate [the increased] willingness [of adolescents] to take risks, and transform what normally might be a harmless prank or activity into a serious injury either to the risk-taker or to an innocent bystander.”
Similarly, David Lawrence, a registered nurse, attested that “[a]lcohol-related injuries are an important cause of death and disability in Louisiana but especially among the young.” He further attested that “[t]he use of alcohol has been shown to increase the risk of virtually all types of injuries” and noted that studies of adolescents and young adults in other states reflected that “there is a great amount of evidence that a reduction in alcohol consumption also reduces the number and severity of injuries in this age group.”
The State also introduced a copy of the report rendered to Congress by the Government Accounting Office (GAO), entitled Drinking-Age Laws—An Evaluation Synthesis of Their Impact on Highway Safety (March 1987), which is mentioned in Mr. Hedlund‘s affidavit, discussed above, and in Dr. Scribner‘s testimony, discussed below. The report cautioned that “[i]t is generally acknowledged that drinking-age laws do not affect traffic accidents directly but are mediated by a variety of intervening variables.” Id. at 20. Nonetheless, the report noted that the studies that have analyzed the effect of changes in the drinking age on total crash fatalities for age groups affected by the law have found “statistically significant” effects; particularly, one study found that raising the drinking age resulted in a 7% average reduction in fatalities in the states with the higher drinking age. Id. at 39. The report further noted that “[s]tates with an older minimum [drinking] age seem to have better control over drinking and driving among youths.” Id. at 63.6
As noted, the State also called two live expert witnesses to testify.
The State‘s first witness was Captain Ronald Jones, Commander of Troop A of the Louisiana State Police, who was qualified as an expert in traffic enforcement and policy development. Captain Jones testified that, based on his personal experience, the challenged minimum drinking age statutes could be “the most critical and fundamental improvements
On cross-examination, Captain Jones agreed that 21-23 year olds likewise have a high rate of injuries related to drunk driving, stating that “I think that persons in their 20‘s also have been identified with having problems with drinking and driving in accidents.” He further testified on cross-examination that various alternative measures exist that the State could employ to reduce highway accidents, including school educational programs, public advertising about the risk of drinking and driving, using designated drivers, improving automobile and highway design, and tougher DWI laws such as mandatory jail time.
The State‘s second witness was Dr. Richard Scribner, who was qualified as an expert in public health and preventive medicine. Dr. Scribner testified that, in his opinion, alcohol is the leading cause of death among 18-20 year olds. He testified that this means that although the 3 leading causes of death among 18-20 year olds are accidents, homicide, and suicide, alcohol plays a part in a significant number of deaths attributed to these causes.
Relying on the 1987 Governmental Accounting Office (GAO) Report evaluating other statistical studies of alcohol involved accidents, Dr. Scribner further testified that raising the drinking age decreases alcohol related fatal and injury accidents and that the younger the driver the greater the overrepresentation in alcohol involved auto accidents. Based on that GAO Report, he estimated that enforcement of the challenged minimum drinking age law will result in a 5-28% decrease in alcohol involved fatal injury accidents in Louisiana.
Dr. Scribner testified on cross-examination that his own research has been in the area of alcohol availability and has revealed that peak alcohol consumption occurs between ages 20-24. He further testified on cross-examination that the rate of violent deaths associated with alcohol was consistent across all age groups. In response to questioning regarding the impact of alcohol involvement on violent deaths, he expressed his view that given the “social cues, the social milieu ... the younger you are the less experienced you are in many of the social situations in which alcohol is involved which leads to the types of situations which may result in either a violent altercation or a traffic crash.”
BLEICH, Justice, concurring in the majority opinion.
A basic cornerstone of creditable government service is public safety. At times the measures chosen are evident and readily acceptable; at other times the protective provisions are somewhat less popular. It is within the province of the people though, through their elected legislative officials, to make those choices, subject to their own constitution.
Occasionally, the laws chosen to effect the goals of public safety are passed without sufficient public scrutiny. Such is not the case here. The subject legislation has been the source of great public debate.1 There are those who seek to invalidate these statutes because of the effect on profits stemming from the sale of alcoholic beverages.2
The people of Louisiana have seen fit to prohibit, based in part on statistical information,5 the sale and possession of alcoholic beverages to some of their fellow citizens, those above the age of eighteen and less than twenty-one. The people of Louisiana have arguably created these prohibitions for safety and financial6 reasons. They have concluded that there is too great a risk imposed, not only on those in the subject age category but also on other travelers on our highways, to allow the possession and purchase of alcoholic beverages by persons in this age category.7 The people of Louisiana have said that they want to remove the “blood borders” that have heretofore existed.8 The citizenry have taken the position that despite the fact that they discriminate against their fellow citizens of the subject age category
The test adopted by the majority clearly meets the test of constitutionality. The subject statutes will certainly substantially promote the legitimate state interest of safety. To save any lives must be considered of “substantial” import.
The test adopted in the original opinion of the court and by the dissenters today defies the very intent of our constitution. If one were to take the rationale of the dissenters to its conclusion, one would find it impossible to ever draw a distinction based on age. As the dissenters today protest that our constitution is being misinterpreted, they must be reminded that the redactors of the constitution and the people said that sometimes a reasonable distinction must be drawn.
Obviously the subject legislation will not eliminate the carnage, death and destruction on our highways. As total prohibition earlier in this century did not eliminate all social ills, these statutes10 will not eliminate all highway safety problems. The subject statutes will, however, based on the record and evidence, save a significant number of lives.
The people of Louisiana have expressed their will through their legislators and have made it clear that they desire to impose these protective measures. This court would have acted inappropriately if it declared the judgment of the people unconstitutional and substituted its judgment for that of the people, especially when the people seek their own safety and protection.
I conclude that the legislature did not act arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably in enacting the subject statutes. Therefore, with this concurring opinion, I also respectfully adopt the well-reasoned opinion of Justice LEMMON.
KIMBALL, Justice, dissenting.
This case is not about whether 18-20 year olds should be allowed to purchase and consume alcoholic beverages in Louisiana. This case, instead, is about the proper interpretation of the Constitution of the State of Louisiana, as it exists in its present form. If the people of the State of Louisiana desire to prohibit 18-20 year olds from purchasing or consuming alcoholic beverages, the proper method for accomplishing such a result is to amend the Constitution of State of Louisiana. This, of course, is already in the process of being done, as the legislature has placed just such an amendment on the ballot for congressional
Under the majority‘s reasoning, the legislature could constitutionally decide, on the basis of “logic and experience,” that since men are overrepresented in alcohol related accidents, men may not purchase or consume alcohol. This, of course, is what the Oklahoma legislature decided in a statute which was struck down as unconstitutional under federal intermediate scrutiny by the United States Supreme Court in Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976), a standard the majority herein acknowledges “is virtually the same as the standard forOf course, by ignoring the prohibitions of
Finally, it has been said that “hard cases make bad law.” Such is clearly the case in the instant matter. In Pace v. State, Through La. State Employees Retirement System, 94-1027 (La. 1/17/95), 648 So.2d 1302, this Court unanimously decided that a statute which classified persons on the basis of birth or legitimacy was unconstitutional. In deciding that case, this Court employed several factors, including whether each governmental interest was actually implicated by the statutory scheme, whether any non-discriminatory alternatives which dealt directly with the asserted governmental interest existed, and whether the discriminatory classification undercut any countervailing State interests, to determine whether the discriminatory classification at issue could withstand constitutional challenge. Now, only 18 months later, the majority effectively completely disavows this Court‘s decision in Pace, ostensibly because the factors described were “simply a specific application of the Sibley standard to a concrete factual record.” Ante at 343. In my view, Pace and the analysis employed therein would not be so lightly discarded today but for the purpose of reaching a desired result in the matter at issue herein.
I respectfully dissent.
MARCUS, Justice (dissenting).
In my opinion, there is not a sufficient correlation between restricting the sale of alcoholic beverages to persons under twenty-one and the enhancement of traffic safety to support the conclusion that the classification is substantially related to the statutory objective. The majority permits this based upon tenuous statistical data.1 To further support its position, the majority relies upon “logic and experience“; however, this depends upon whose logic and experience are being employed. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Chief Justice Calogero filed Opinion Concurring with Rehearing Opinion July 12, 1996
CALOGERO, Chief Justice, assigns additional concurring reasons.
I fully agree with the outcome and the reasoning of the Court‘s opinion in this case. In my view, the majority on original hearing erred in holding that the State is constitutionally
On original hearing, the majority was led astray, in my view, by two factors. First, we misinterpreted and misapplied our decision in Pace v. State, Through Louisiana State Employees Retirement System, 94-1027 (La. 1/17/95), 648 So.2d 1302. In Pace, as the current opinion notes, this Court used three factors (whether a law implicates a state interest, whether there are non-discriminatory alternatives, and whether the challenged law undercuts countervailing state interests) to determine whether a provision of the State retirement system was valid.
These three factors were taken from Pace and used, for the first time, to stand for the proposition that they are the factors that “Louisiana courts examine” in order to determine whether a law “substantially furthers an important governmental objective.” Manuel v. State, 95-2189, p. 5-6 (La. 3/8/96) (quoting Pace, 648 So.2d at 1305) (on original hearing). This declaration by the original majority was an entirely new statement of the law. Prior to our original opinion, Pace had not been interpreted as establishing three additional factors by which challenges to statutes under the Individual Dignity Clause would be evaluated. By applying the Pace factors to this case, the majority on original hearing, added a significant and unsupported burden to Sibley‘s intermediate scrutiny standard. However, as the current opinion notes, all that is needed in order to support the statute is evidence that it substantially furthers an appropriate governmental interest, not compliance with the factors found applicable and essential in Pace.
The original opinion‘s addition of the Pace factors to the Sibley standard was a critical error. However, an equally critical error, and the principal one which led us astray, in my opinion, was this Court‘s interpretation of the statistical evidence in the case. Key to the original opinion was the conclusion that there was no difference in the level of risk— incident to alcohol related accidents—posed by drivers in the eighteen to twenty year old group versus the twenty-one to twenty-three year old group and the twenty-four to twenty-six year old group of drivers.
The original opinion framed the issue as “whether eighteen to twenty year olds are the age group responsible for the greatest number of alcohol related accidents in Louisiana,” Ante, at p. 340, and concluded that because they were not responsible for the greatest number of accidents, the statute‘s singling them out, among all post-eighteen year old age groups could not stand. The Court simply counted the number of alcohol related fatal and injury accidents within the eighteen to twenty year old and twenty-one to twenty-three year old groups, found more accidents in the latter group, then concluded that the eighteen to twenty year olds were less dangerous, not more dangerous, than the others. The fallacy in this argument is the fact that there were fewer eighteen to twenty year old licensed drivers than twenty-one to twenty-three year old licensed drivers. In fact, in terms of the number of licensed drivers, there was a greater percentage of eighteen to twenty year old alcohol related accidents than twenty-one to twenty-three year old alcohol related accidents. The eighteen to twenty year old group was thus over-represented in the percentage of alcohol related accidents. This group represented only five percent of licensed drivers, but was involved in ten percent of all alcohol related accidents involving injuries or fatalities, whereas the twenty-one to twenty-three year olds had a lesser percentage of alcohol related accidents notwithstanding that numerically they were involved in more accidents. The statistics, therefore, support the State‘s position that eighteen to twenty year olds are more dangerous where drinking and driving are concerned.
The prohibition on drinking for a group of drivers (by age) who are proportionately the most dangerous increases highway safety not insubstantially and without illegally discriminating against eighteen to twenty year olds. The legitimate state interest in promoting highway safety is substantially furthered by the statute.
Notes
Since the constitution of this state provides that no law shall be declared unconstitutional by any court of this state other than the supreme court, except by a single judge of a district court with the concurrence of two judges of a court of appeal, it is declared that no district court of this state shall have jurisdiction or power to issue any form of injunctive relief, or to declare any statute of this state unconstitutional, in any suit or proceeding where the purpose or effect is to prevent or restrain the execution or enforcement of any statute of this state, or any order, rule, or regulation of any administrative board, commission, or agency, or any officer of this state, or to restrain or prevent any action, duty, or function under such statute, order, rule, or regulation of the state, or any of its boards, commissions, or agencies, or any of its officers, except as provided in this Section. * * * * * * In the event that the trial court shall render a judgment granting an injunction, whether temporary or permanent, or declaring a statute unconstitutional, an appeal from such judgment by the state or its board, commission, or agency, or any of its officers shall be suspensive and the trial court shall have no discretion to deny such appeal.The majority claims, footnote 12, that I am using the rational basis test. This is simply not so. As stated in Sibley, the “advocate of the classification [must show] that the classification has a reasonable basis.” 477 So.2d at 1107. The traditional rational basis test requires only that the law further “any appropriate state interest,” and “the law shall be rejected whenever a member of a disadvantaged class shows that it does not suitably further any appropriate state interest.” Id. at 1107-1108. The standard stated in Sibley shifts the burden to the state to show the classification has a “reasonable basis.” The injunction was stayed pending appeal. This appendix is adapted from the summary of evidence in the original hearing majority opinion. The subject legislation has literally been the source of extensive debate in various legislative sessions since 1986, and for that matter prior thereto. The 1995 Regular Session was merely the latest forum. The legislature, by 1996 La.Acts No. 27, proposed an amendment to Article XII of the Louisiana Constitution by adding a Section 15 to read:
Section 15. The legislature may enact laws defining and regulating the circumstances under which any person under the age of twenty-one years may purchase or consume alcoholic beverages and the circumstances under which anyone may sell, purchase, or consume alcoholic beverages on behalf of, or to, any such person.
This proposed amendment will be voted on statewide on November 5, 1996.
Applying the same standard of scrutiny, the United States Supreme Court in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) held, in a case similar to the present case, that the relationship between the gender classification and the goal of traffic safety was far too tenuous to support a conclusion that the classification was substantially related to achievement of the statutory objective. The Court commented that “prior cases have consistently held that the principles embodied in the Equal Protection Clause are not to be rendered inapplicable by statistically measured but loose-fitting generalities concerning the drinking tendencies of aggregate groups.” Id. at 208-09, 97 S.Ct. at 463. I agree.See infra note 4.“... you are literally pulling the plug on forty-two million dollars worth of industry that‘s going on in the state.” Rep. Montgomery, Transcript of House Debate, May 22, 1995, regarding House Bill 1301 (now 1995 La.Acts No. 639).
“There is a lot of economic impact to my district.” Rep. Schneider, Transcript of House Debate, May 22, 1995, regarding House Bill 1301 (now 1995 La.Acts No. 639).
“The only people who are hurt, except of course the young people, the only other people that are hurt are the beverage industries, the alcohol distributors, bar rooms and package liquor stores.” Rep. Windhorst, Transcript of House Debate, May 22, 1995, regarding House Bill 1301 (now 1995 La.Acts No. 639).
I agree completely with the majority that improving highway safety is an important, legitimate, and appropriate governmental purpose. However, in our intermediate scrutiny analysis of this legislation, our focus must be on the classification the state has made, not the asserted purpose of the legislation. In other words, in determining whether the statute is constitutional, the proper inquiry is not whether highway safety is an important state interest, but whether the classification chosen by the state substantially furthers the state‘s interest.“... to say this one small portion of our young adult age group, eighteen, nineteen and twenty-year olds are solely responsible for the drunk driving on the highways in the State of Louisiana, that they‘re the only drunk drivers out there, is pure fiction, absolute pure fiction, because this age group isn‘t even the greatest percentage of drunk drivers.” (Remarks of Rep. Donelon).
“Let‘s talk about fairness. Let‘s talk about discrimination. When an individual reaches the age of majority in the State of Louisiana, that person is empowered with all the rights and all the responsibilities of every adult in this room. Now, let‘s look at it. You can vote. You can get married. You can execute a contract. You can be drafted. You can be put to death in this state for a crime you committed after your eighteenth birthday.” (Remarks of Rep. Copelin).
“... eighteen to twenty-year olds represent ten percent of the licensed drivers in Louisiana, yet they represent eighteen percent of the alcohol related injury and fatal accidents.” Rep. Windhorst, Transcript of House Debate, May 22, 1995, regarding House Bill 1301 (now 1995 La.Acts No. 639).
“... young drivers are killing themselves and others, not only in Louisiana, but in the United States at two and a half times their representation in the population.” Dr. Richard Scribner, Transcript of House Judiciary Committee Hearing, May 11, 1995, regarding House Bill 1301 (now 1995 La.Acts No. 639).
“It‘s true that not every young driver drinks and drives. But as a group they represent a far greater danger to themselves and to other people in alcohol-related crashes than any other age group.” Rep. Windhorst, Transcript of House Debate, May 22, 1995, regarding House Bill 1301 (now 1995 La.Acts No. 639).
“Louisiana is an island. Louisiana is an oasis. We are the only state in the country with an effective, usable drinking age under the age of twenty-one. Texas, Arkansas, and Mississippi all around us are at twenty-one. People who want to drink and can‘t do so legally in their home state drive across our borders, they come into our state, they drink and they get out on our highways and some of them have accidents in Louisiana and some of them have accidents trying to drive home.”
Section 10. Every citizen of the state, upon reaching eighteen years of age, shall have the right to register and vote, except that this right may be suspended while a person is interdicted and judicially declared mentally incompetent or is under an order of imprisonment for conviction of a felony.The original majority held that an age classification can only be constitutional if it is the classification that “most directly implicates or furthers the asserted governmental interest.” The following comments exemplify this attitude:
“I know this is not a panacea for all the problems of youth on highways, but to the extent that it will save lives, I don‘t see any other decision we can make.” Sen. Brinkhaus, Transcript of Senate Debate, June 6, 1995, regarding House Bill 1301 (now 1995 La.Acts No. 639).
“I also agree that all nineteen-year olds are not bad and twenty-two-year olds are not saints either. But by doing this, we‘re not only giving safety to that nineteen-year old, we are also giving safety to a lot of innocent drivers out on the highway.” Sen. Jordan, Transcript of Senate Debate, June 6, 1995, regarding House Bill 1301 (now 1995 La.Acts No. 639).
When a statute classifies persons on the basis of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations, the state is assigned the burden of justifying such a classification by showing that it substantially furthers an appropriate state purpose.Sibley, 477 So.2d at 1108 (emphasis added). This intermediate standard of review, reaffirmed in Pace, is compelled by the plain language of the constitution itself, and has consistently been applied to classifications under the third sentence of